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ABSTRACT
During the Vietnam War, in Son Thang hamlet, a five-man 
American patrol murdered sixteen Vietnamese noncombatant 
women and children. The crime was discovered and the five 
apprehended.
International treaties define much of the law of war. 
That law requires apprehension and trial of those committing 
"grave breaches." The manner of their prosecution is 
undefined. The research question, resolved through 
examination of the Son Thang incident and its subsequent 
prosecutions, is whether the United States, through its 
military justice system, meets its obligations under 
customary law of war. The study is unique in illustrating 
the law of war from treaty, to application, through appeal.
Also examined are jurisdictional bases, the vitality of 
the defense of obedience to orders, and whether a good faith 
effort was made to prosecute the suspects — and whether good 
faith translated into effective prosecutions. The case 
offers a unique opportunity to observe U.S. military criminal 
process.
A grave breach was committed at Son Thang, although the 
victims' status, citizens of a co-belligerent, placed even 
that in issue. But prosecution clearly was required. Before 
those prosecutions are detailed, the sources and history of 
law of war are noted, their translation into military law 
traced. Application of the law of war at Nuremberg is 
related, as it is in Vietnam. Employing interviews and trial 
records, the Son Thang events are described and juxtaposed 
with aspects of today's law of war and U.S. military law 
embodied in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In 
assessing that Code's effectiveness, its procedural aspects 
are briefly compared with civilian models.
Appellate resolutions of the Son Thang cases are 
discussed, their results compared to similar prosecutions and 
sentences. Finally, recommendations are offered to improve 
prosecution of war crime cases in future wars and to enhance 
compliance with the laws of war.
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INTRODUCTION
On 19 February 197 0, the Vietnam War was at its combat 
peak. On that date First Lieutenant Lewis Ambort commanded 
Company B of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, part of the 
American 1st Marine Division. That evening, on Hill 50 in 
northern Quang Nam province, Lieutenant Ambort briefed Lance 
Corporal Randy Herrod, who was about to lead a five-man 
patrol into the village of Son Thang, in enemy territory. 
Lieutenant Ambort told Herrod:
I emphasized the fact to him not to take any chances, to 
shoot first and ask questions later....I said, "Don't let 
them get us any more. I want you to pay these little 
bastards backl"
The next morning, another Marine patrol entering Son Thang 
discovered what was eventually revealed as a crime of 
horrific proportion, committed by the previous night's 
patrol.
After a short-lived cover-up attempt the truth was 
revealed. Four months later, the first of the patrol members 
stood before a general court-martial, charged with sixteen 
counts of premeditated murder.
The examination that here follows is prompted by both the 
Son Thang and My Lai incidents, the cases bearing a 
melancholy similarity. Although Son Thang remains the most 
serious war crime prosecution in American Marine Corps 
history, it goes virtually unmentioned in legal literature. 
The two cases' ambivalent outcomes, in terms of trial 
verdicts and sentences, inevitably raise questions in the 
minds of laymen, lawyers, and academics. Both critics and 
supporters of the law may be dissatisfied with the results 
produced by the military justice system.
The scope of research for this case study embraces recent 
scholarly writing on the law of war. Interviews of surviving 
participants in the Son Thang trials are employed, as are 
transcripts of the legal proceedings, and contemporary Marine
Corps tactical records. Additional interviews of today's 
senior military lawyers indicate the current role of criminal 
law and the law of war in meeting America's responsibilities 
under the law of nations.
In examining the effectiveness of the U.S. court-martial 
system in meeting law of war obligations, the first chapter 
reviews the topic of international law, fixing its 
relationship to the law of war. The development of the law 
of war in large part reflects the maturation and 
sophistication that international law has undergone in the 
twentieth century, particularly since World War II. At the 
end of the chapter the link between international law and 
U.S. courts-martial is drawn and, finally, a thesis is 
offered. Testing of the thesis is accomplished in the 
classical tradition; not through empirical examination, which 
is in any event impossible, but by presenting various aspects 
of the law of war, addressing them to the Son Thang incident, 
and arguing their applicability and effectiveness in that 
case.
In the second chapter a further background is sketched 
for the events at Son Thang, to include the impact of the 
Nuremberg principles on the law of war. What part did 
Vietnamese municipal law play in the prosecution of war zone 
crimes? How did the American view of the Vietnamese people 
impact on U.S. combat forces' treatment of the Vietnamese? 
The negative results of U.S. governmental policies on its 
military forces are noted, as well.
The dissertation narrows its focus when the murders at 
Son Thang are described in chapter three. Drawing on 
interviews and letters from some of the officers involved, 
the role of the small-unit commanders is examined. The 
troubling criminal backgrounds of the Son Thang patrol 
members, revealed in Marine Corps records, demonstrates the 
quality of personnel the U.S. necessarily employed in the 
later stages of the Vietnam War.
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Essentially, the law of war relies on municipal criminal 
law for its enforcement. The Son Thang murders raised 
numerous criminal law issues, some common, some unique. 
Chapter four examines contemporary law of war issues, as 
implemented in American municipal law — in this instance 
through the military legal process. The unsettled extent of 
war crimes in Vietnam is described. The age-old defense to 
wartime depredations, obedience to superior orders, is 
particularly noted in chapter four. The chapter suggests 
that the defense sometimes merits greater consideration than 
it commonly receives.
Through verbatim records of trial, the courts-martial of 
the Son Thang accused are examined in chapter five. 
Preliminarily, the place of military law in the legal system 
is reviewed, to include jurisdictional issues, individual 
rights, and the fairness of military juries. The application 
of basic constitutional rights to military personnel is 
reviewed in detail.
The troubling court-martial results, in which those 
apparently most blame-worthy escaped punishment and those 
apparently less culpable received heavy sentences, are noted 
as well.
Chapter six examines American military law's appellate 
process in general and the Son Thang appeals in particular. 
The significant impact of appellate review in the resolution 
of Vietnam war crime cases is discussed, and civilian- 
military sentence comparisons are offered. This comparison 
raises basic questions regarding the role of sentencing in 
achieving "justice." Additionally, an historical overview of 
efforts to create an international criminal tribunal 
discloses the difficulty in such a system being implemented. 
In closing, the chapter offers a resolution to the question 
of the adequacy of America's response to its obligation under 
international law to discover and try law of war violations.
A review of law of war literature is conducted in chapter 
seven. Besides legal sources, historical and unique military
3
sources are noted. As far as the general public is 
concerned, law of war is noted only in celebrated instances 
such as Nuremberg and My Lai. But in recent years there has 
been a continuing flow of scholarly books and articles on the 
subject. Excellent examples of law of war literature are 
noted.
Finally, chapter eight presents a summary of the 
preceding material, points out continuing problems in U.S. 
application of the law of war, and offers recommendations to 
improve its application on the modem battlefield.
The dissertation is a case study of the Son Thang 
incident. By placing the topic in a context of international 
law, the law of war, U.S. military law, and numerous sub- 
topics are also discussed, particularly America's municipal 
criminal law vis-a-vis it's law of war obligations.
It has long been asserted that applying the law of war 
through courts-martial comports with customary international 
law. By examining the historical process of the Son Thang 
cases the correctness of that assertion is demonstrated. In 
examining these issues the current vitality of the law of war 
in America may be revealed.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO EVENTS CULMINATING 
IN THE INCIDENT AT SON THANG
If international law is, in som e ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, 
perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.
Lauterpacht, T he Problem of the Revision of the Law of War”
Sixteen Vietnamese women and children had been shot to 
death by American Marines. The participants in the resulting 
197 0 courts-martial gave little thought to international law 
and the law of war. The patrol members were simply charged 
with the premeditated murder of sixteen noncombatants — 
violations of Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice; premeditated murder, a simple malum in se violation 
of American military criminal law.
The rough, plywood-lined courtroom in a corrugated tin 
building in the U.S. Marine cantonment near Da Nang would not 
be mistaken for an international law forum. The Marine Corps 
lawyers in their camouflage field uniforms were a far cry 
from the usual image of international lawyers. The military- 
oriented procedural motions before the general court-martial 
did not seem the stuff of Geneva Conventions and customary 
international law.
But they were all that. They were the modern link in the 
chain that binds states recognizing the law of nations. The 
young judge advocates were the law of war incarnate, 
demonstrating through municipal criminal law both the 
viability and the frailty of the Geneva Conventions. The 
courts-martial are a window through which American resolve to 
abide by international law may be viewed. Though they did 
not often consider the law of war, those military lawyers 
were the test of their country's commitment to it.
The Son Thang trials were not ground breakers. Students 
of the law, or of war for that matter, know that the trial of 
war crimes is no modern innovation. The Nuremberg tribunals 
that followed World War II, often viewed as novel, were in
5
fact only refined extensions and variations on a theme 
hundreds of years old. But the Son Thang courts-martial 
present an unusually clear example of a Western nation's 
municipal law applied in conjunction with international law. 
Seldom have the legal issues in such a confluence been so 
well-defined, with the opportunity to so closely observe the 
workings of a legal system and determine its adherence to, or 
divergence from, international legal norms.
In this introductory chapter a broad-stroke review is 
presented of international law and its relation to municipal 
law, criminal codes, and military justice. The origins of 
international law are briefly noted, examining its 
enforceability and its application to individuals. "War" is 
defined and related to the rise of laws controlling its 
conduct. Battlefield crimes, war crimes, and grave breaches 
are described and differentiated. Having located law of war 
in its international law framework, its integration with the 
Geneva Conventions, the aspirations of the League of Nations, 
and the United Nations are summarized and applied to 
municipal law and military law systems.
In the chapter's closing section, a thesis is offered.
1.1. International Law and the Law of War
Acts carried out by a nation's armed forces in combat may be 
reviewed and dealt with in light of international as well as 
national concepts. A web of customary law, international 
conventions, declarations, and protocols bearing on the 
conduct of hostilities requires such an approach. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to review not only a particular 
nation's rules for the conduct of its troops in combat, but 
the international rules applicable to all troops in such 
circumstances. This, in turn, raises basic questions 
regarding international law, municipal law, the law of war, 
and their relationship to each other.
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What is international law? The term does not lend 
itself to a universally agreed upon response. Definition of 
the law of war, a branch of public international law, is 
subject to similar disaccord. But the foundations, 
applications and obligations of the latter go far in 
revealing those of the former, and their descriptions merit 
consideration.
1.1.a. Defining internationai Law a world ruled by law is 
an old idea, but only in the latter portion of the nineteenth 
century did it come to be seen as a practical choice that 
governments, particularly those of Western Europe, might make 
in determining their conduct. By then, many statesmen 
anticipated a world ruled by law in the near future.
It was part of the prevailing optimism of that time, and 
closely associated with the confident expectation that 
liberal democracy — with its great emphasis on law as the 
arbiter of relations among citizens with equal rights —
would now become a near universal form of government.*
Given that emphasis and those expectations for 
international law, from where did it arise? Custom is the 
original source of law, including the law of nations. The 
British jurist, Lassa Oppenheim, incorporated custom when he 
described international law's sources as two: express
consent, arising when states agree by treaty to certain rules 
for their future international conduct, and tacit consent; 
consent which is implied, or consent by conduct, given by 
having adopted the custom of submitting to certain rules of 
international conduct.2 In deciding disputes the 
International Court of Justice considers the sources of 
international law to be:
(a) International conventions...establishing rules 
expressly recognized by...contesting states;
Daniel P. Moynihan, On the Law of Nations (Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
1.
2Lassa F.L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. I, Peace. 8th ed., H. 
Lauterpacht, ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1955), 25.
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(b) International custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law;
(c) The general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; and
(d) ...judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified...as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.3
The Supreme Court of the United States generally agrees with
these descriptions,4 while the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, employing the Statute of the International Court
of Justice,5 adds the decisions of international and national
tribunals dealing with international questions and, uniquely,
diplomatic papers.6 Most descriptions agree that custom is a
primary, if not the primary source of international law.7
Indeed, international law is "just a system of customary law,
upon which has been erected, almost entirely within the last
two generations, a superstructure of 'conventional* or
treaty-made law. "8
State practice, in order to create a customary rule, must 
be accompanied by (or consist of) statements that certain 
conduct is permitted, required or forbidden by 
international law (a claim that conduct is permitted can 
be inferred from the mere existence of such conduct, but 
claims that conduct is required or forbidden need to be 
stated expressly)....what is necessary is that the
statements are not challenged by other states.9 
In recent years and to an ever greater extent, international 
agreements have assumed an important part in the formulation
3Article 38.1, Statute of the International Court of Justice.
4U.S. v Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820), cited in Filartiga v Pena- 
Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5Art 38.
6U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV 
(London: HMSO, 1949), 5.
7e.g., Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963), 157; Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law: As Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, vol. II, The Law of Armed Conflict (London: Stevens, 
1968), 45; and Frederick Pollock, "The Sources of International Law," 2 Columbia L. 
Rev. 511-12 (1902).
8David J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law. 3d ed. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1983), 2.
9Michael Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International Law," XLVII BYIL 1, 53 
( 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 ) .
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and growth of international law. But custom remains the 
vital source of international jurisprudence.
International law differs from national, or municipal, 
legal systems in that it has no central law-making authority 
and no enforcement machinery. But nations adhering to 
international law do have such law-making and enforcement 
mechanisms. Those states raise custom to the level of law 
and make the law of nations a concrete force. "International 
law was the product, however imperfect, of that sense of 
right and wrong, of the instincts of justice and humanity 
which are the heritage of all civilized nations."10
World legal opinion recognizes that international law is 
true law. " [I]t would be difficult to hold otherwise since 
the world as a whole calls it law, regards it as law, accepts 
it as law, and expects it to be obeyed as law..."11 If a 
definition of international law is needed, that of Professor 
L.C. Green is as good as any:
That system of laws and regulations which those who 
operate on the international scene — be they states or 
international organizations... recognize as being 
necessary for their orderly conduct, and which they 
recognize as being binding upon themselves in order to 
achieve that orderly conduct.12
1.1.b. Enforcing International Law international law is 
not without imperfection. Based largely on evolving custom, 
it knows no true stare decisis. Cases and scholarly 
literature are slow to follow general trends. Institutions 
that exist for making and applying its law are rudimentary.
As critics repeatedly point out, international law lacks 
an enforcement mechanism. Some hold that "there are no 
international laws unless there is an international police
10Lord Wright, "War Crimes Under International Law," 62 LOR 40, 1946.
^Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1959), 13.
12Leslie C. Green, "Is There An International Criminal Law?," 21 Alberta L. Rev.. 251 
(1983) .
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force with courts and punishments to deal with violations.1,13 
In accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 1910, Theodore 
Roosevelt referred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and noted, "The supreme difficulty... arises from the 
lack of any executive power, of any police power to enforce 
the decrees of the court. "14
But the same objection once could have been raised as to 
domestic law and the same answer given: the political system 
enforces it. That routinely occurs within settled polities 
such as the United Kingdom and United States. Though it is 
not routine at the international level, neither is it 
unattainable. Onlookers seldom note the steady observance of 
such treaties as that under which letters are carried over 
the world at fixed rates, or that in 200 years there has 
hardly been an instance in which an ambassador has been sued 
in the country of his stationing, or the hundreds of 
international court decisions that are routinely honored. But 
these, too, are international law. "The great majority of 
the rules of international law are generally observed by all 
nations without actual compulsion, for it is generally in the 
interest of all nations concerned to honor their obligations 
under international law."15 It may reasonably be said that the 
law of nations is as well observed as is municipal law.16 
Moreover, a great deal of international law has been 
incorporated in municipal law, securing an enforcing agency 
through the ordinary governmental machinery of those states. 
"[0]n careful analysis the enforcement procedures turn out to 
be less defective than is normally claimed... .The weight of 
world public opinion, the need not to wreck good relations in
13Sidney Axinn, A Moral Military (Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1989), 
166.
14Theodore Roosevelt, "International Peace," Address before Nobel Prize Committee, 
Christania, Norway, 5 May 1910, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Wash., 
D.C
15Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 5th ed. (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 
290.
16Philip C. Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations (NY: Macmillan, 1948), 6-7.
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the economic, commercial, and political fields..."17 all 
foster the enforcement of international norms.
1.1 .c. The U.S.. the U.K.. and International Law it need 
hardly be noted that the United States recognizes and abides 
by international law. While aspects of its recent record are 
imperfect,* America was founded with a basic respect for the 
law of nations. During the Revolutionary War the American 
Congress showed "great solicitude to maintain inviolate the 
obligations of the law of nations, and to have infractions 
punished in the only way that was then lawful, by exercise of 
the authority of the several states."18 The Congressional 
ordinance under which British Major John Andr£ was executed, 
following his court-martial, referred to "the law and usage 
of nations."19 A 17 84 Pennsylvania decision involving an 
assault on the consul general of France held: "The first
crime in the indictment is an infraction of the law of 
nations. This law, in its full extent, is part of the law of 
this State..."20 In 1900 the United States Supreme Court 
specifically held that, "International law is part of our 
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts 
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
17Antonio Cassese, International Law in A Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), 408.
* Senator Daniel Moynihan points out that in the 1980s American adherence to 
international law faded, associated with weakness in foreign policy. "Real men did not 
cite Grotius." (p. 7) He notes that in 1985 the U.S., having been sued by Nicaragua in 
the International Court of Justice, withdrew recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction just 
before being found, for the first time, in violation of international law in a matter 
involving force against another nation. On the Law of Nations , 6-8. It remains to be 
seen whether the resurgence of interest in international law raised by the 1991 Gulf 
War will last.
18James Kent, Kent’s Commentary on International Law, ed. J. T. Abdy (Cambridge: 
Deighton-Bell, 1866), 427.
19Ordinance of Dec. 4, 1781, 7 Journals of Congress 185.
20Republica v DeLongchamps, 1 Dali. I l l  (1784).
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of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination."21
The United Kingdom's approach to international law, set 
before America was a nation, is similar. It has been 
asserted that "there is no doubt that it was England that 
gave impetus to the idea of the municipal application of 
international law..."22 In a 17 37 opinion Lord Chancellor 
Talbot declared that the law of nations, to its full extent, 
was part of the law of England and was "to be collected" from 
the practice of nations and the authority of writers.23 In a 
more contemporary case, Lord Denning wrote, "...the rules of 
international law, as existing from time to time, do form 
part of our English law."24 Customary international law 
traditionally and automatically becomes part of English law 
through incorporation.25 "There has been occasional hesitation 
on the part of English courts to acknowledge the full 
operation of the doctrine of incorporation," Lauterpacht 
wrote in 1947, "but there ought to be no doubt as to its 
validity..."26 (The English courts, however, determine what 
"customary international law" is, primarily by examining 
prior English judgements, a technique that could be 
occasionally unreliable.)27 Additionally, treaties with other
2lThe Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), which still controls. See First National 
City Bank v Banco Para el Comercio, 462 U.S. 614, 623 (1983).
22Fritz A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 142.
23Barbuit's Case, cited in, Lord McNair, Selected Papers and Bibliography (Leiden: A.W. 
Sijthoff, 1974), 150.
24Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank o f Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529, 554. See 
also: The Cristina v The King [1938] A.C. 485.
25A 1939 Privy Council decision reads: "They [the courts] will treat it [international 
law] as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules 
enacted by statutes..." Chung Chi v The King [1939] A.C. 160, 167. This monoist 
approach to the incorporation of customary international law has been inconsistent, 
however, Chung Chi having reversed R v Ryan [1876] 2 Ex. D 63, which in turn 
reversed Triquet v Bath (1764) 3 Burr. 1478.
26Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the Law of Nations," pt. 1, 63 LOR 438, 443
(1947) .
27 McNair, Selected Papers and Bibliography. 147-57; and Michael Akehurst, A Modem 
Introduction to International Law , 6th ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 43-48.
12
states do not automatically become part of English law — with 
the exception of those regulating the conduct of warfare.28 In 
English practice a treaty becomes effective when ratified by 
the Queen, but usually has no effect in municipal law until 
ratified by act of Parliament, as well.29 The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, for example, have been incorporated into English 
domestic law through the Geneva Conventions Act of 1957.30
The American and English approaches are illustrative of 
the general practice of national courts. Where the common 
law prevails, courts usually apply customary international 
law as the law of the land. In states where the civil law or 
another legal system holds sway, and there is no 
constitutional provision directing the application of 
customary international law, the courts usually follow the 
same practice as common law courts to discover an applicable, 
similar rule of domestic law.31
International law of the past was formal in character, 
concerned in large part with the delimitation of jurisdiction 
and immunities of states and their representatives. 
Traditionally, the individual played an inconspicuous part. 
The crime of piracy was long an exception — historically an 
international crime for which an accused was individually 
liable to any capturing nation's courts. Through 
international conventions similar exceptions applied to 
individuals charged with breach of blockade, carriage of 
contraband, slave trade, and, oddly, injury of submarine
28Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties: British Practice and Opinions. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961), 89-91.
29The Parlement Beige (1879) 4 PD 129; and R v Chief Immigration Officer ex parte 
Bibi [1976] WLR 979. Treaties become part of English municipal law only when an 
enabling act has been passed by Parliament.
305 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52 (1957).
3Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Philippines, and the U.S. have 
such constitutional provisions. Joseph M. Sweeney, Covey T. Oliver, and Noyes E. Leech, 
Cases and Materials on the International Legal System. 3d ed. (NY: Foundation Press, 
1988), 9-18.
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cables.32 With the approach of the twentieth century the 
general exclusion of the individual from the processes of 
international law, whether or not charged with a crime, 
changed. The individual routinely became the subject of, and 
subject to, the law of nations. In 1928, the Permanent Court 
of International Justice specifically held that international 
law could apply to an individual.33 Lauterpacht wrote in 
1948:
[T]he evolution of an international law in which the 
individual is the subject of duties imposed by- 
international law is a corollary of the attribution to 
him of rights grounded in international law. It is 
difficult to urge and justify the existence of the former 
without admitting the operation of the latter."34
In America those rights and duties were underscored by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1942 Saboteurs' Case when the court
held, in effect, that individual offenders against the laws
and customs of warfare could be punished under the law of
nations without prior specific domestic legislation.35
By the mid-twentieth century the few remaining dissenters 
who had argued that international law was applicable only to 
sovereign states, and that it provided no sanctions for 
violations by individuals,36 were won over.
32Hans Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with 
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals," 31 California L. Rev. 530, 
535 (1943); and U.N. International Law Commission, Historical Survey of the Question 
of International Criminal Jurisdiction (NY: U.N., 1949), 1.
33Jurisdiction o f the Courts o f Danzig Case, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 15. Generally, 
treaties do not create direct rights and obligations in individuals but, this case held, if 
that was the intent of the parties, effect can be given that intent. Thus, in accordance 
with an agreement between Danzig and Poland regulating employment conditions in the 
railway service, Danzig railway officials had a right of action against the Polish railway.
34Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the Law of Nations," pt. 2, 64 LOR 97, 111
(1948). For a contra view see, George Manner, "The Legal Nature and Punishment of 
Criminal Acts of Violence Contrary to the Laws of War," 37 AJIL 407 (1943).
35Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
36e.g., Manner, "The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence," 407- 
10. Some, however, continue to demur: H.W.A. Thirlway, International Customary Law 
and Codification (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972), 76. "...it has always been - and 
probably still is - one of the most fundamental tenets...that individuals and private 
corporations are not subjects of International Law."
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1 -1 .d. International Law and the Individual Individual
responsibility, in many instances, extended to international 
criminal liability, as well. That is, through custom and 
state practice, nations gained the authority to try 
individual violators of international law even though, under 
normal rules of criminal jurisdiction, this would not have 
been the case. The duty of a state to punish violations of 
aspects of international law, such as the customary law of 
war, is now itself a matter of the law of nations. But 
whether a particular state requires specific implementation 
of international law into municipal law, in such instances, 
or opts to punish the violation directly, without domestic 
legislation, is a matter for each state's decision.37 The fact 
that trial and punishment are left to municipal law does not 
deprive the crime and its sanction of its international 
character. The state is simply executing an aspect of 
international law, functioning as an organ of the 
international community.38
In the United States, the Constitution specifically 
grants Congress the right to define and punish "offenses 
against the Law of Nations."39 This authority extends to 
breaches of law of war. In America in 1818, while battles 
with the American Indian continued, two Englishmen, Arbuthnot 
and Armbrister, were court-martialed and executed as 
"accomplices of the savages," contrary to the laws and usages 
of war.40 Lest there be doubt, in 1865 the United States 
Attorney General wrote to the President that the laws of war 
"exist and are of binding force upon the departments and 
citizens of the Government, though not defined by any law of
37Sheldon Glueck, "The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War," 59 Harvard L.Rev. 396, 
431 (1946).
38Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 
1944), 76.
39Art I, Section 8, clause 10.
40Francis Wharton, A Digest of the International Law of the United States , vol. Ill 
(Wash.: GPO, 1886), 326-29.
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Congress."41 Finally, "from the very beginning of its history 
this [United States Supreme] Court has recognized and applied 
the law of war...."42 As in the application of customary 
international law, the English view is similar:
The operation of rules of warfare is...a clear example of 
the direct effect of rules of international law upon 
individuals. A soldier who...is guilty of murder or 
plunder in occupied territory...is guilty of a war crime 
jure gentium
"The military court, by punishing the acts, executes 
international law," Hans Kelsen points out, "even if it 
applies at the same time norms of its own military law. The 
legal basis of the trial is international law."44 Those 
inclined to grant the state a greater degree of sovereignty 
might disagree with Kelsen, and argue that the state actually 
acts to enforce its own law, or to discharge its treaty 
commitments, and merely looks to international law to define 
or take the measure of the wrong involved. The pragmatist 
responds that by either route the same Kelsonian destination 
is reached.
One realizes then, that, considered or not, those 
participating in the 197 0 Son Thang courts-martial were 
following a path blazed many years before.
1.2. War, the Law of War, and War Crimes
Understanding the law of war necessitates a rudimentary 
understanding of war itself, the phenomenon those laws 
attempt to control.
1.2.a. Defining War The Peace of Westphalia, ending the 
Thirty Years War in 1648, gave rise to the modern state 
system. Under this system war has become a contest between
4111 Ops. Attv. Gen. 297, 299 (1865).
42Ex Parte Quirin, 27.
43Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the Law of Nations," p t 2, 105-06.
44Kelsen, Peace Through Law. 77. Kelsen makes the same point in, "Collective and 
Individual Responsibility in International Law," 553-56.
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states. The current U.S. Army manual on international law 
describes war as a hostile contention by means of armed 
forces carried on between states.45 "Hostile contention," the 
atmosphere in which war is waged, is simply what Clausewitz 
termed "conflict."46 "Armed forces" refer to the formal 
organized forces of the state, as distinguished from the 
civilian population. (The modern problem of differentiation 
between armed forces, guerrillas, and civilians, particularly 
in Vietnam, is addressed in Chapter 4.) "Carried on between 
states": since historically there was no higher organization 
capable of protecting the legitimate interests of each state, 
nations tended to look out for themselves and, since 1648, 
war has been an integral aspect of international politics, 
war most often undertaken for political ends. Accordingly, 
the means adopted for attainment of those ends should 
further, and not contradict, those ends. By implication, 
then, rules and laws are necessary. The U.S. Army's Law of 
Land Warfare manual states that "war may be defined as a 
legal condition of armed hostilities between states..."47 Its 
inclusion of the term "legal" emphasizes that war is governed 
by specified constraints: the laws of war.
Initially, wars of limited objective were fought by small 
armies of professional soldiers, the civilian population of 
the belligerent states being little affected. With the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars citizen armies 
began to supplant the small professional forces. Ideology 
rather than territory became a driving force. Distinctions 
between combatants and civilians began to blur. In the 1800s 
the industrial revolution helped to increase the means of
45Dept. of the Army, Pamphlet 27-161-2, International Law, vol. II (Wash.: GPO, 
1965), 2. Internationally inspired civil wars, particularly since World War II, have 
altered that aspect of die definition concerning "states," but that alteration is not 
pertinent here.
46Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 79.
47Dept of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Wash.: GPO, 
1956), par. 8.a.
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destruction possessed by armies. The nature of the state 
itself began to change, becoming more closely tied to the 
welfare and conduct of its citizens. Limits on war faded. 
"Unconditional surrender" was first imposed during the 
American Civil War, about the same time the first Geneva 
Convention convened. "Total war" was ushered in with World 
War I.
War's progression has been uninterrupted. Its legal 
definition, however, has become murkier. Grotius, Vattel, or 
Wheaton would have had no difficulty discerning when a state 
of war existed as a matter of fact, if not as a matter of 
law. Today, however, the line dividing peace and war is 
often indistinct. But between the two there is nothing, 
legally speaking — it is either one or the other. Such is 
the position of English and international law.48 The position 
of the United States On the war-peace dichotomy, whatever its 
practice, is not clearly delineated, but states do commonly 
disregard such objective events as organized, large-scale, 
armed hostilities between nations, and deny a state of war.49 
Instead they nominate the events "armed conflict," "de jure 
war," or "police action." Professor Ian Brownlie writes:
This practice.. .might be considered so absurd as not to 
merit discussion if it were not for the circumstances 
that governments have frequently used the doctrine....War 
became such a subjective concept in state practice that 
to attempt a definition was to play with words.5®
Geoffrey Best adds: "Armed conflicts — i.e., what the world
used frankly to call 'wars' but now might fear to do so lest
they affront U.N. proprieties — abounded."51 Still, armed
conflicts are easier to recognize than are wars, and modern
major powers remain pragmatically hesitant to employ their
48See Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines, (1902) AC 484, 497; and Lord McNair 
and A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War. 4th ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), 
45.
49Philip C. Jessup, "Should International Law Recognize An Intermediate Status 
Between Peace and War?", 48 AJIL 98 (1954), 99.
50Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 26.
51 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), 317.
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full arsenals if some reasonable way remains by which 
conflicts may be minimized.
There was no declaration of war, by any definition, in 
Vietnam. What happened there is usually referred to as a 
"conflict." Even the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, 
America*s highest military court, which should know better, 
wrote in a 1970 opinion: "We conclude that the words 'in time 
of war* mean...a war formally declared by Congress."52 That 
conclusion remains uncorrected. "But in cases turning on 
military discipline," another author points out, "the 
attitude of courts has been entirely different. Here, courts 
have normally construed 'war* to cover precisely what a 
soldier might have understood himself to be involved in...."53 
State practice commonly accepts that armed hostilities are 
war, a formal declaration of war's absence notwithstanding. 
There can be war crimes though war goes undeclared. Events 
in Vietnam shall herein be referred to as a war.
1.2.b. Law in War: A Paradox? During a 1981 Marine Corps 
field exercise, several law of war issues were injected into 
the tactical scenario. After the exercise the staff judge 
advocate reviewed the after-action reports, including 
critiques completed by the participants. In answer to the 
written question, "Of what value were the law of war 
problems?" one junior Marine responded: "About as valuable as 
a screen door on a submarine." He did not realize the extent 
to which he was himself protected, and obligated, by the law 
of war.
Can war be a rule-governed activity at all? Can jus in 
hello, the rights and duties of belligerent states in the 
course of war (as opposed to jus ad helium, the lawfulness of 
resort to war) be circumscribed? Or is it rules that
52U.S. v Averette, 41 CMR 363 (USCMA, 1970). For a lower military court's contrary 
view see: U.S. v Samas, 37 CMR 708 (ABR, 1967).
53Ingrid D. DeLupis, The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
14.
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differentiate war from riot, piracy, or generalized 
insurrection? The idea of war as indiscriminate violence 
suggests an image of violence as an end in itself — 
antithetical to the concept that war is a goal-related 
activity directed to attaining some objective. Even the view 
that all necessary means to achieving victory are permissible 
is itself implicitly restrictive in that it limits 
hostilities to means considered "necessary," in turn implying 
that violence superfluous to attaining the military objective 
is unnecessary and may be proscribed.54 It is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that wars necessarily entail, to some 
degree, rules and laws.
As it pertains to individuals, the law of war, perhaps 
more than any other branch of law, is liable to failure. In 
a sense, its goal is impossible: to introduce moderation and 
restraint into an activity uniquely insusceptible to those 
qualities. At the best of times its law is "never more than 
imperfectly observed, and at the worst of times is very 
poorly observed indeed."55
It may seem paradoxical that war, the ultimate breakdown 
of law, should be fought in accordance with rules of law. 
Why would a state fighting for survival allow itself to be 
hobbled by legal restrictions? in fact, nations of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the law of war was 
in its formative stages, did not regard themselves as 
fighting for survival. Territory, not ideology, was the 
usual basis for wars. Defeat meant realignment of national 
boundaries, not subjugation or dissolution as an independent 
state. Rules of warfare were intended to prevent unnecessary 
suffering that brought little or no military advantage.
In modem times, despite Clausewitz1 assertion that the 
laws of war were "almost imperceptible and hardly worth
54Ian Clark, Waging War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 24.
55Best, Humanity in Warfare. 11.
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mentioning,1,56 they remain the best answer to the opposing 
tensions of the necessities of war and the requirements of 
civilization. "It is the function of the rules of warfare to 
impose some limits, however ineffective, to a complete 
reversion to anarchy by the establishment of minimum 
standards on the conduct of war."57 The advantages of 
breaching the rules of war, if any, are far outweighed by the 
disadvantages. "Unnecessary killing and devastation should 
be prohibited if only on military grounds. It merely 
increases hostility and hampers the willingness to 
surrender.1,58
violations.. .can also result in a breakdown of troop 
discipline, command control and force security; subject 
troops to reciprocal violations on the battlefield or 
P.w. camps; and cause the defeat of an entire army in a 
guerrilla or other war through alignment of neutrals on
the side of the enemy and hostile public opinion.59 
"The ordinary desire of a commander to retain command of his 
soldiers will lead him to repress indiscipline...and to hold 
his soldiers to a high and consistent standard of conduct," 
Professor Michael Walzer points out. "[T]he best soldiers, 
the best fighting men, do not loot and rape...do not wantonly 
kill civilians."60 Illustrating the quid pro quo involved, a 
U.S. newspaper article during the Gulf War read: "Orders have 
come down to treat prisoners with dignity in the hope that 
U.S. prisoners in Iraqi hands will receive good treatment."61
Strategically, violations inevitably lessen the prospect 
of an eventual cease-fire. Ironically then, war must be 
conducted in the best interests of peace.
56Cited in Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law. 6th ed., 270-71.
57Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. II, 10.
58Bert V.A. Roling, "Are Grotius' Ideas Obsolete in an Expanded World?" in Hedley Bull, 
Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds., Hugo Grotius and International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 287.
59Jordan J. Paust, letter, 25 Naval War College Review (Jan-Feb 1973): 105.
60Michael Walzer, "Two Kinds of Military Responsibility," in Lloyd J. Matthews and 
Dale E. Brown, eds., The Parameters of Military Ethics (Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's, 
1989), 69.
61Edward Cody, Washington Post. 25 January 1991, A-25.
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1.2.C. Law in War: A History The chronicle of efforts to 
bring about a credible law of war is an ancient and absorbing 
story. As readers of the Old Testament, Thucydides, or 
Caesar knows, history relates appalling tales of rapine, 
pillage and massacre, often not merely permitted but admired. 
Still, efforts to control the baser aspects of man's wartime 
depredations are based in antiquity. In the fourth century 
B.C., Sun Tzu described the prevailing custom of sparing the 
wounded and the elderly. The Hindu Book of Manu, from the 
same period, speaks of rules for war. The Egyptians were
party to treaties on the subject. The Greeks and Romans had
rules on sanctuary and the treatment of wounded and 
prisoners, as did the Muslims. Use of the crossbow was 
forbidden as "deadly and odious to God" in the Catholic's 
Second Lateran Council of 1139. In medieval Europe the codes 
of chivalry restricted violence to the class of knights.
The European law of war had its origins in a religious-
based philosophy which exalted peace as the highest and
most 'natural' condition of humankind and reluctantly 
accepted war as no more than an occasional, unwelcome and 
discreditable incident of mortal frailty and
wickedness.62
One of the earliest written regulations on the conduct of 
hostilities was the Ordinance for the Government of the Army, 
published in 1386 by Richard II. On pain of death it 
prohibited acts of violence against women and priests, the 
burning of houses and the desecration of churches. "From 
then onwards, princes inside and outside the Holy Roman 
Empire vied with one another in publishing articles of 
war...until, by the eighteenth century, every self-respecting 
army in Europe had equipped itself in this fashion."63
Ayala, Suarez, Gentili, and the Dutch lawyer Grotius, 
were sixteenth and early seventeenth century scholars who set 
the doctrinal basis for the regulation of war by interpreting 
and generalizing the practices of centuries. In some cases
62Best, Humanity in Warfare. 129.
63Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. II, 16.
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these rules became part of treaties while other rules became 
accepted as customary obligations. So, even if a rule was 
not embodied in a treaty it still could be binding upon 
states as customary international law.64
In time, the British Articles of War became the model for 
America's colonial Articles, which included provision for 
punishment of officers who failed to keep "good order" among 
their troops. In the last half of the nineteenth century the 
hitherto common practices — the customary law of war — began 
to form into generalized rules to an even greater degree, 
becoming codified and extended by treaties. Modern manuals 
on the subject, like the 1884 British Manual of Military Law, 
were published.
In the same era, weapons and implements of war changed in 
ways that called for more precise formulations in restraining 
and limiting warfare: metal-hulled, screw-propelled ships,
the machine gun, smokeless powder, submarines, aerial bombs, 
and gas — all entered the armed forces' arsenal about this 
period.
During the American Civil War (1861-65), Francis Lieber, 
a German-born Columbia Law School professor who had fought in 
the Prussian Army against Napoleon, and who had three sons in 
the Civil War,65 wrote what came to be known as the Lieber 
Code.66 Promulgated in 1863 as Army General Order 100, it 
contained detailed discussion of the treatment of prisoners 
and noncombatants, as well as direction on the pursuit of 
warfare's objectives. Often regarded as the first general
64Peter D. Trooboff, ed., Law and Responsibility in Warfare (North Carolina: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1975), 24.
65James R. Miles, "Francis Lieber and the Law of War," XXIX Revue de Droit Militaire 
et de Droit de la Guerre 253 (1990). Two sons, one of whom later became Judge 
Advocate General of the Army, fought for the Union; another son for the Confederacy.
66"Instruction for the Government of the United States in the Field by Order of the 
Secretary of War," approved 24 April 1863.
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codification of the laws of war, the Lieber Code "served as 
the quarry from which all the subsequent codes were cut. "67
The law of war is remarkably consolidated. Whether 
devolved from long-standing customary practice or, as a few 
contend, universally evident rules that are binding by common 
recognition,68 the codified law of war is easily accessible. 
Today it consists of interlinked sets of rules pertaining to 
weapons, tactics, strategies, targets, and humanitarian 
factors. Conventions, usually declaratory of long- 
established custom, are the primary source of modern law of 
war. As earlier noted, conventions have particular 
significance in the United States and the United Kingdom 
because, as treaties they are national law, once ratified by 
Congress (in America) or incorporated in statutes (in the 
United Kingdom) .69
The 1856 Declaration of Paris on Maritime Commercial 
Warfare was perhaps the first such convention. It was 
followed by further attempts at codification by the first 
Geneva Convention in 1864, pertaining to the wounded and 
sick. Four years later the Declaration of St. Petersburg 
addressed prohibited weapons, after which the Brussels 
Conference on the Rules of Military Warfare convened in 1874. 
The first Hague Conference was in 1899. Through the years 
similar efforts, reflecting the view of statesmen that it was 
finally necessary to develop machinery for the regulation of 
disputes, produced a growing body of written rules and laws.70
Throughout the law of war's evolution it has encountered 
a measure of political and military resistance.
67Best, Humanity in Warfare. 170; and Trooboff, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. 
7 -10 .
68e.g., Ingrid DeLupis, The Concept of International Law (Stockholm: Norstedts Fdrlag, 
1987), 104, 122.
69William V. O'Brien, "The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam," 60 
Georgetown L. J. 605, 609 (1972); and A.K.R. Kiralfy, The English Legal System. 8th 
ed. (London: Street & Maxwell, 1990), 101.
70Thomas E. Holland, Studies in International Law (London: Clarendon Press, 1898), 
79.
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The philosophical campaign...had to fight...on two 
fronts, being pressed on one side by the demands of 
principle and logical consistency while being harassed on 
the exposed flank by the requirements of operability and 
the need to make philosophical theory meaningful in 
practice.71
In the abstract principle and operability may not be 
inconsistent but in reality reconciliation came hard.
Treaties and conventions on the law of war cover a wide 
variety of matters pertaining to the prosecution of war, of 
course. Nowhere in treaty or convention, however, is the 
term "war crime" defined, per se. That is to be expected, 
given the wide variety of possible offenses. Instead, the 
Geneva Conventions define "grave breaches."72
1.2.d. War Crimes Are Crimes On the battlefield there are 
crimes, war crimes, and "grave breaches." Simple crimes, 
obviously, are no more than the statutory or common law acts 
considered public wrongs punishable by municipal criminal 
proceedings. One soldier assaulting a fellow soldier, the 
theft of personal property, et cetera — crimes whether 
committed in a combat zone or elsewhere.
War crimes, on the other hand, are acts deemed 
violations of the customary law of war or the law of war 
embodied in multinational treaties. War crimes, whether 
committed by individuals or national agencies, create 
international responsibility in the offending state.73 
Conventional individual war crimes, or what will be referred 
to here as "battlefield war crimes," raise individual legal 
responsibility, as well.
In its restricted or conventional meaning, the term 'war 
crimes' denote[s] violations of the laws or customs of 
warfare whether committed by members of the enemy armed 
forces or by civilians. That is...acts committed in the 
conduct of a war already in being...and...acts
constituting violations of a particular body of rules.74
71Clark, Waging War. 137.
72Arts. 50, 51, 130, and 147 of 1949 Conventions I,II,III, and IV, respectively.
73Art. 3, 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
74Greenspan, The Modem Law of Land Warfare. 419.
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Of course, war crimes are not committed only by the enemy.
"[T]he substantial development of detailed rules in the 
field of individual responsibility probably came with the 
Nuremberg trials and the Far East trials."75 But like all 
systems of law, the law defining war crimes is not static. 
To determine what acts constitute war crimes at any given 
time requires ascertainment of the actual content of the law 
of war at that time.
At their basic level, battlefield war crimes include 
illegitimate violence and the mistreatment of prisoners. The 
laws of war defining war crimes are a blend of permission and 
restriction between permissible and impermissible acts. 
Generally, a battlefield war crime may be described as "an 
act that remains criminal even though committed in the course 
of war, because it lies outside the area of immunity 
prescribed by the laws of war."76 The term "war crime" is 
somewhat misleading, for most battlefield crimes of war would 
be crimes in peace, as well. They remain crimes in war 
because they are not held to be legitimate acts of war. 
Thus, for a soldier in combat to assault a fellow soldier is 
a crime; for him to assault an enemy prisoner is a war crime, 
for him to kill an enemy prisoner is a grave breach.
The most serious of war crimes are described as "grave 
breaches" in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The significance 
of this classification is that Parties to the Conventions are 
bound to enact criminal legislation for the punishment of 
persons responsible for such acts, and to bring them to trial 
or, presuming a prima facie case, hand them over to another 
Party for trial.77
Grave breaches include the "wilful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
75DeLupis, The Law of War. 353, citations omitted.
76Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1970), 21.
77Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. II, 215.
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health...."78 So grave breaches, too, often smack of criminal 
offenses punishable in most municipal law systems. It has 
been said of the 1949 Conventions that "few other treaties 
state with such specificity that the violation of its 
provisions constitutes a crime to be punished by 
international law or by the domestic criminal law of the 
signatory states."79
In Vietnam, another definitional aspect of the term, 
"war crime" arose. If a wounded and defenseless enemy 
soldier was captured, then shot and killed on the battlefield 
it was clearly a war crime and a grave breach. But what if 
he were killed while awaiting treatment in a U.S. hospital in 
Saigon? Was it a grave breach, or simply a crime, murder, 
triable under municipal law? If, during a U.S. assault, 
noncombatant North Vietnamese nurses in enemy-held territory 
were executed, it was a grave breach. But what if they were 
noncombatant South Vietnamese villagers, instead? Was it a 
grave breach, or simply murder? Answers were sometimes found 
in military courtrooms.
1,3. The Law of War: From Geneva To Vietnam
From the first Geneva Convention in 1864 through the latest 
protocols of 1977, Hague and Geneva Conventions have formed 
the backbone of modern, codified war law. They represent 
distinct, though not entirely separate trends: "[T]he so- 
called law of Geneva, more particularly concerned with the 
condition of war victims who have fallen into enemy 
hands...and the other,...the law of The Hague, relating to 
the conduct of war proper."80 Geneva Conventions, it is said, 
protect victims of war; Hague Conventions address methods of 
war. By now it might be said that the basic rights and
78Arts. 50, 51, 130, and 147, of Conventions I, II, III, and IV, respectively.
79M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, vol. I, Crimes (NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 1986), 204.
80Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War (Dordrecht: ICRC/Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1987), 7.
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duties contained in the Geneva and Hague Conventions have 
themselves been incorporated into customary international 
law, making them applicable even to non-signatories.81 The 
modern emergence of resistance movements, guerrilla warfare, 
and struggles for national liberation have made Hague 
codifications inadequate in some respects.82 Nevertheless, 
Hague and Geneva Conventions remain uniquely important to the 
law of war.
1.3.a. Geneva. The Hague, and Vietnam The most significant 
treaties regarding modern land warfare are the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions which address the wounded and sick, 
prisoners of war, and the protection of civilians. They are 
"among the most universally accepted agreements in 
contemporary international affairs."83 The Conventions are 
linked not only by certain general principles, but also by 
several common articles. The United States signed the four 
Conventions in 1949 and upon ratification they became 
municipal law.84 In 1957 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
later known as North Vietnam, also signed the Conventions*
The significant 1977 Protocols I and II to the 1949 
Conventions, relating, inter alia, to the treatment of 
civilians, were made effective after the events under 
consideration here. Some consider the Protocols "a major 
achievement in bringing the laws of war into line with 
developments in the conduct of warfare itself.1,85
81DeLupis, The Law of War. 343, 348-49; and Hilaire McCoubrey, International 
Humanitarian Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), 195.
82Cassese, International Law in A Divided World , 262.
83Trooboff, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. 11.
84They were ratified by the U.K. in 1957 and by the U.S. in 1955, with formal 
reservations.
* North Vietnam later informed the ICRC that it refused to apply the POW Convention to 
captured U.S. pilots and would treat them as war criminals. 5 International Rev, of the 
Red Cross (Dordrecht, Netherlands: ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 527-28.
85Peter Rowe, Defence. The Legal Implications (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 
1987), 150.
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Nevertheless, although the U.S. has signed the 1977 
Protocols, it has not ratified them and they are not U.S. 
law.86
The draftsmen of these and earlier Conventions knew that 
no codification could be exhaustive and they were anxious to 
preclude any interpretation that issues not covered were 
ungoverned by customary international law. To close such 
interstitial gaps the authors of the 1899 Hague Convention 
II, at the urging of Russian jurist Fedor F. Martens, 
included what has come to be known as the Martens Clause:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is 
issued...in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted...populations and belligerents remain under the 
protection and empire of the principles of international 
law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilized nations...87
A similar clause appeared in the Hague Convention of 1907 and
analogous language is found in the four 1949 Conventions.88
"It is important to underline the implications of the Martens
clause,"89 as it supplies norms when there are no clear rules.
It is a statement of general moral principle, unique in the
law of war.
86Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War. 2d ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989),461, 468. "The 1977 Protocols do not constitute any advance 
for the law of war, and in many ways constitute a significant step backwards..." W. Hays 
Parks, "Air War and the Law of War," 32 Air Force L. Rev.. I l l  (1990). In the U.S. 
view, significant portions of the Protocols are contrary to, or not in accord with 
customary international law. e.g., the descriptions of proportionality, responsibility 
for protection of civilian populations, and cultural objects. The Protocols language is 
considered sometimes intentionally imprecise or again in disagreement with existing 
law. e.g., definitions of ’attacks,1 and 'civilian objects,' and who is a civilian. Protocol 
II's application is considered narrower than the 1949 Convention's common Art. 3 and 
inconsistent with the 1954 Hague Convention. For detailed discussion of U.S. objections 
see, Parks, 89-224; Daniel Smith, "New Protections For Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts," 120 Military L. Rev. 59 (1988); and Maj.Gen. George S. Prugh,
"Armed Forces and Development of the Law of War," IX Recueils de la Socidtd de Droit
Final Militaire 277 (1982).
87Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. II, 21-22; and Roberts and Guelff, 
Documents on the Laws of War. 4.
88Arts.. 63, 62, 142, and 158 of Conventions I,II,III, and IV, respectively. The
principle is reaffirmed in the 1977 Protocols, as well.
89DeLupis, The Law of War. 157.
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In Vietnam, the usual circumstances for the application 
of Geneva and Hague Conventions were absent: there was no 
declared state of war between two or more sovereign states, 
each fielding an army fighting on a readily identifiable 
battlefront. But the Conventions impose no restrictions on 
their application for those circumstances, and the parties to 
the Vietnam war recognized and agreed to apply the Geneva 
Conventions.90 The National Liberation Front, a South 
Vietnamese anti-government faction engaged in partisan 
warfare,91 averred that it was not bound by the Conventions 
but would follow a humane policy towards prisoners of war.92
Significant segments of American and British society, 
including eminent jurists, contended that for various reasons 
the war in Vietnam was illegal. Assuming, arguendo, they 
were correct, it would make no difference to the application 
of the Conventions. The law of war applies even if the 
resort to force is unlawful.93
1.3.b. League of Nations/ United Nations compared to 
Geneva’s and The Hague’s contributions, the League of Nations 
and the United Nations have had but tangential roles in the 
law of war. The ferocity of World War I and the apparent 
possibility of beginning a new era in international relations 
led to the League of Nations. There was a desire not simply 
to limit the horrors of war, but to attempt its abolition 
altogether. Drafted in February 1919, the Covenant of the 
League of Nations became an integral part of the Great War's 
peace treaties,* collectively called the Treaty of
90Telford Taylor, "Remarks," in Richard A. Falk, The Vietnam War and International 
Law, vol. 4 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 365.
9Graham A. Cosmas and Terrence P. Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam. 1970-1971 
(Wash.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1986), 166.
92DeLupis, The Law of War. 156. See also: Note, "The Geneva Convention and the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam," 80 Harvard L. Rev. 851 (1967).
93Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 407.
* The Treaties of Versailles (June, 1919), St. Germain-en-Laye (Sept., 1919), 
Neuilly-sur-Seine (Nov., 1919), and Trianon (June, 1920).
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Versailles. But from the outset there were problems in the 
wording of the Covenant, and in League membership.94 Because 
of partisan domestic politics the U.S. failed to ratify the 
Treaty of Versailles and never became a member of the League; 
the U.S.S.R. was eventually expelled; three states were 
refused admission; three others later withdrew. Although 
some writers assert that the League's process for containing 
war was materially flawed95 it was a commendable effort to 
achieve world peace. In practical terms the League was not a 
fruitless endeavor. Prior to its formation the waging of war 
was considered a right of nations. "War was in law a natural 
function of the State...a prerogative of its uncontrolled 
sovereignty," wrote Oppenheim-Lauterpacht.96 The League of 
Nations altered that traditional view.
One of the more significant changes which the Covenant 
effected was to make any war between states a matter of 
international concern. War was no longer to have the 
aspect of a private duel but of a breach of the peace
which affected the whole community.97 
The concept of legal and illegal wars, and the notion of 
economic and trade sanctions, were introduced by the 
Covenant, as well.98 The League established the first world 
court (albeit one lacking binding jurisdiction), the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. Efforts to 
establish an international criminal court were "an abysmal 
failure."99 Ultimately, the League failed to fulfill the hopes 
engendered by its formation and proved unable to end, or even
94Manley 0. Hudson, "The Members of the League of Nations," 16 BYIL 130 (1935).
95e.g., Cassese, International Law in A Divided World. 60-62.
96Lassa Oppenheim, International Law. 6th ed., rev., vol. II, Disputes. War and 
Neutrality. Hersch Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green, 1944),145.
"Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 57.
98Arts. 12,13, 15, and 16.
"Leslie C. Green, "The Law of Armed Conflict and the Enforcement of International 
Criminal Law," 22 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3 (1984).
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restrain aggression. It collapsed early in World War II and 
dissolved itself in April, 1946.100
As early as 1941 the Allies were calling themselves "The 
United Nations." In the 1943 Moscow declaration they spoke 
of establishing an international organization based on 
sovereign equality and the pursuit of peace and security. 
Two years later the representatives of fifty-one states 
signed the United Nations Charter. The Charter avoids the 
term "war," referring instead to "act of aggression" and 
"breaches'of the peace."101
A collective security body, the U.N. has had little to do 
with the law of war in any direct sense, though it has, to a 
limited degree, raised the cost of some illegitimate uses of 
Force. "[T]he United Nations long provided the same picture 
as that of the League of Nations period: full attention for 
the maintenance of peace, very little interest for the law of 
armed conflict..."102 Having avoided war in its Charter, it 
might be considered paradoxical or pessimistic to make 
regulations for its control. The Charter's emphasis is on 
negotiated settlement of disputes rather than enforcement 
against violations — a "qualified, even gingerly, 
approach."103 Still, through moral suasion and the potential 
of its international peacekeeping options, the U.N. plays a 
more important role than did the League. Because of its 
universal nature, the Charter's principles relating to 
limitations on the use of force may, like the Geneva 
Conventions, constitute general international law.104
100Charles G. Fenwick, International Law. 4th ed. (NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1965), 26-28; Manley O. Hudson, "The Twenty-fifth Year of the World Court," 41 AJIL 
2 (1947).
101Art. 39: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken...to maintain or restore international peace and 
security."
102Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War. 17.
103Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1991), 226.
104Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 113.
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Additionally, some of the principles of international law it 
has affirmed are relevant to defining war crimes and were 
pertinent to the prosecution of the Son Thang patrol members 
in Vietnam.
1.3.C. Applying international Law to the Individual Knowing 
what international law considers a war crime, what are their 
sanctions? The U.N. plays no role in their trial or 
prosecution, and only states may be parties before the 
International Court of Justice.105 In the Hobbesian view, 
laws exist only if there is a ready mechanism to punish their 
violation. Such a mechanism does exist. Those who argue 
that effective punishments are not yet developed for law of 
war violations,106 or that belligerents are only interested in 
denouncing war crimes committed by their opponents,107 are 
countered by innumerable records of prosecutions indicating 
otherwise. But only recently have discrete sanctions become 
part of customary international law.
"In the extensive literature on the question of 
international crimes and international jurisdiction which has 
appeared since 1920 a considerable number of writers," Ian 
Brownlie suggests, "have envisaged criminal responsibility of 
states alone...." But as to individual criminal 
responsibility, he continues, "it is nevertheless suggested 
that the concept has no legal value, cannot be justified in 
principle, and is contradicted by the majority of 
developments... in international law."108 Brownlie thus 
minimizes the Act of State doctrine. Briefly, that doctrine
105Art. 34.1, Statute of the International Court of Justice. The I.C.J., principal judicial 
organ of the U.N. and a creature of its Charter, is the successor of the League of Nations' 
Permanent Court of International Justice and retains essentially the same statute. 
Shabtal Rosenne, ed., Documents on the International Court of Justice (NY: A.W. Sijthoff, 
1974), ix-x, 61.
106Axinn, A Moral Military. 167.
107Yves Sandoz, "Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law," in Bassiouni, 
International Criminal Law, vol. I, 229; and Joseph W. Bishop, Justice Under Fire (NY: 
Charterhouse, 1974), 289.
108Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 150-52.
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holds that an individual may escape a court's jurisdiction by 
claiming that his otherwise improper conduct was that of a 
sovereign power's agent. The Act of State doctrine, long an 
issue in relation to an individual's war crime liability, was 
rejected by the time of World War II.109 As the international 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg noted in reference to war 
crimes: "Crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced."110 Moreover, "most of the acts 
constituting violations of the rules of warfare are at the 
same time violations of general criminal law, such as murder, 
pillage...rape, and the like."111 Once again, crimes of 
individual criminality. International law, then, defines the 
limits of lawful conduct while municipal law specifically 
proscribes conduct and the sanctions to be imposed. Both 
British and American military legal codes leave no doubt that 
the individual is regarded directly bound by the laws of 
war.112
There are other instances of municipal courts enforcing 
international law; the protection of property of aliens and 
cases of diplomatic and sovereign immunity, for example.113 If 
there is an objection to municipal courts exercising 
jurisdiction over international crimes it is that different 
national courts may tend to hand down conflicting decisions 
and impose varying penalties for similar offenses.114 But that
109e.g., Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law," 550; 
and Oppenheim, International Law. 6th ed., vol. II, 451!
110Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 154, citing Trial of German Major 
War Criminals (London: HMSO, 1946), 41.
11 kelsen, Peace Through Law. 92.
112HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt III, 12th ed., 1972, The Law of War on Land 
(London, 1956),par. 625; Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 18.
113Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law. 10.
114John W. Bridge, "The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice and the 
Formulation of International Criminal Law," 13 International and Comparative L. 
Quarterly 1255, 1270 (1964).
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risk is a negligible price to pay when weighed against the 
advantages of employing an established enforcing "agency."
1.3.d. International Law as Military Law The competence of 
national courts to try accused war criminals, including their 
own nationals, was confirmed in the Treaty of Versailles in 
1919.115 Although one of the first instances of such specific 
recognition, the competence of states to try their own 
nationals for war crimes "had long since developed into an 
accepted part of customary law..."116 The forum for such 
trials might properly be an international tribunal, a 
civilian municipal court, or a military court.117 But court- 
martial has been the forum most often turned to. To consider 
such prosecutions "rare"118 is inaccurate. "Since the mid-19th 
century, with increasing frequency, the major powers have 
utilized military courts for the trial of persons accused of 
war crimes."119 (In 1863 the American Lieber Code went so far 
as to bypass military courts and provide for summary 
execution of soldiers, either Union or Confederate, 
apprehended while committing a violent war crime.)120 During 
America's war with Mexico (1846-48), the American commander 
created "military commissions" with jurisdiction over law of 
war violations committed by his men or by the enemy. An 1865 
U.S. Attorney General's opinion confirmed that, "under 
the...laws of the United States, should a commander be guilty 
of...a flagrant breach of the law [of war, he] would be 
punished after a military trial."121 The British take a
115Treaty of Peace, Arts. 227, 228, 230. Ironically, because it still adhered to the act 
of state doctrine, the U.S. delegation to the Versailles Conference opposed individual 
responsibility for alleged war crimes.
116Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War. 67.
117Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), 561.
118Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law. 278. "It is rare to find a state 
trying its own nationals for war crimes..."
119Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 23.
120General Order 100 of 24 Apr 1863, Art. 44.
12111 Ops. Atty. Gen. 297, 303-04 (1865).
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similar stand, having punished their own troops at court- 
martial for law of war violations as long ago as the Boer War 
(1899-1902) .122 The execution of Lieutenant Harry H. "Breaker" 
Morant, after conviction of having committed war crimes, is 
documented and well-known.123
A post-World War II Nuremberg judgement notes that "it 
has always been recognized that tribunals may be established 
and punishment imposed by the State into whose hands the 
perpetrators fall. Those rules of international law [have] 
been unquestioned."124 As noted, that unquestioned right of 
enforcement applies equally to one's own soldiers.125
Beyond that right, the "common articles" of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions charge signatory states to search for, 
arrest, and "bring such persons [committing grave breaches], 
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts."126 
Those articles comport with the practice of states that 
undertake the prosecution of individuals, their own nationals 
included, who are charged with serious war crimes. "[Q]uite a 
few states take the position that their existing criminal law 
is entirely adequate to cope with the prosecutions of grave 
breaches."127 Although there is no U.S. statute, state or 
federal, that in precise terms makes punishable the 
commission of a war crime,128 that is the position of the 
U.S., and of the U.K. as well - that their municipal criminal 
law is sufficient to the task. Both nations employ existing 
law to prosecute breaches by applying the criminal provisions
122Howard S. Levie, "Criminality in the Law of War,” in Bassiouni, International 
Criminal Law, vol. I, 233-34.
123Kit Denton, Closed File (Adelaide: Rigby Publishers, 1983). A lay account reflecting 
a case history far different from the 1982 film.
124Opinion and Judgement, Proceedings of the Justice Case, Trials of War Criminals 
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. Vol. Ill (Wash.: GPO, 1951), 954, 970.
125James W. Garner, "Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War," 
14 AJIL 70, 71 (1920).
126Arts. 49, 50, 129, and 146 of Conventions I, II, III, and IV, respectively.
127Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War. 69.
128Sweeney, Cases and Materials on the International Legal System. 849.
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of their military codes for enforcement. Moreover, when 
trying one's own forces at court-martial, "there is no need 
to charge war crimes; every army is subject to its own system 
of law and normally has a penal code based on its ordinary 
municipal law. "129
The U.K.'s military penal law is contained in its Manual 
of Military Law; the U.S.'s in its Manual for Courts-Martial, 
implementing the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The two 
nations take somewhat different tacks in prosecuting 
offenders, though. There is no specific jurisdictional 
provision in the British Manual providing for the court- 
martial of British combatants charged with grave breaches. 
Instead, they may be tried in civilian courts under the 
Geneva* Conventions Act, 1957.130 The U.S. directs, in regard 
to U.S. combatants, that "violations of the law of war...will 
usually constitute violations of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and...will be prosecuted under that Code."131 By 
either route, British and American combatants may be tried 
for grave breaches in their own nation's courts. Lord Wright 
has written:
The actual law with its specified offences and penalties 
may not be familiar to a cheesemonger in the City of 
London, but must be taken to be known to all those who 
have to act in the matter to which it relates, ... even to
soldiers of lower ranks.132
An advantage of military courts is that "jurisdiction 
is, of course, easy when the accused is a member of the armed
129Leslie C. Green, "Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man," 8 Canadian Yearbook of 
International L.. 61 (1970).
130§ 1, Punishment of Offenders Against Conventions. However, the Army Act, 1955, 
Sec. 70, incorporates virtually the whole of English criminal law, making violation of 
almost any of that law's provisions, where ever committed, punishable at court-martial. 
It appears possible, then, to try a British soldier for war crimes at court-martial, 
basing jurisdiction on a Sec. 70 charge — with the exception that a court-martial may 
not be convened in the U.K. to try a charge of committing a grave breach of the 1949 
Conventions. Sec. 70, fn. 3(b)(ii).
131Dept. of the Army, Law of Land Warfare, par. 507.b.; and W. Hays Parks, Chief, 
International Law Branch, Dept, of the Army, Washington, to author, London, 27 Mar 
1990.
132Wright, "War Crimes Under International Law," 40 .
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forces of the nation whose courts are involved. Then it is 
easy to try him in accordance with military law or the 
ordinary criminal law...."133
Nor is the verdict of the court-martial merely the 
expression of military law.
The military court, by punishing the acts, executes 
international law even if it applies... its own military 
law. The legal basis of the trial is international law, 
which establishes the individual responsibility of the
person committing the act of illegitimate warfare.134 
By 197 0, trial by court-martial of one's own nationals 
charged with war crimes was so well-established that the fact 
of international law's involvement was often overlooked. So 
it was in the Son Thang trials.
1.4. A Nexus: A Thesis
How related are the customary law of war and America' s 
Uniform Code of Military Justice? If international law could 
be overlooked in court-martial prosecutions in Vietnam could 
it have played a significant role?
There is a firm nexus, although the U.S. position on the 
relationship of its municipal law and law of war is not found 
in a single statute, text, or enactment. The U.K.'s 
approach, on the other hand, is contained in its Geneva 
Conventions Act, 1957, providing that any person, of any 
nationality, in or outside the U.K., who commits, aids or 
abets any grave breach of several specified conventions may 
be tried and punished anywhere in the U.K. The relationship 
of international and municipal law is clearly and directly 
stated in that single source. Sweden's penal code specifies
133Leslie C. Green, "Aftermath of Vietnam: War Law and the Soldier," in Falk, The 
Vietnam War and International Law, vol. 4, 147, 149.
134Kelsen, Peace Through Law. 77. For a contrary view, see, R.R. Baxter, "The 
Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes," 28 BYIL 382 
(1951) .
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seven offenses which are also breaches of the law of war.135 
India's municipal law specifically incorporates the law of 
war.136 Canada’s National Defense Act, in terms similar to the 
U.K.'s Geneva Conventions Act, similarly provides for the 
trial of war crimes.137
U.S. domestic law nowhere defines its interrelationship 
with the law of war in such succinct terms. Their close 
relationship and court-martial application is nevertheless 
apparent from legal legislative history, military and 
civilian appellate opinions, and U.S. legal administration 
throughout the Vietnam War.
The law of war/military law nexus is evident in 
legislative records of the UCMJ's formative stages, pre­
dating the Vietnam War. Testifying before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee a representative of "the Department of 
Justice stated...that a review of existing legislation 
revealed little need for further enactments to provide 
effective penal sanctions for grave breaches."138 "It was 
intended that the [Geneva] Conventions be self-executing 
through existing...legislation that punished violations of 
the laws and customs of war."139 The UCMJ's legislative 
history goes on to note that a general court-martial, when 
trying war crimes, "will operate under the laws of war,"140 
and "any man in any branch of service...who violated the law 
of war would be triable. . ."141
135Referred to in: Peter Rowe, "Murder and the Law of War," 42 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 216 (1991), 219, fn. 14.
1 ^ Geneva Conventions Act, Act No. 6 of 1960.
l37The National Defense Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.N-4 (as amended), § 120.
1 ^ Hearings on Executives D, E, F and G Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
84th Cong., 1st Sess 58 (1955).
l39Comment "Punishment for War Crimes: Duty-or Discretion?", 69 Michigan L. Rev. 
1312, 1320, fn. 55 (1971).
l40Index and Legislative History: Uniform Code of Military Justice (Wash.: GPO, 
1950), 958. 
l4llbid., 961.
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That intended intertwining of law of war and the UCMJ 
was reflected not only in the Code,* but in the first two 
sentences of the first Manual for Courts-Martial edition, in 
1951: "The sources of military jurisdiction include the
Constitution and international law. International law 
includes the law of war."142 Elsewhere, that first Manual also 
specifies that a general court-martial is empowered to try 
"any crime or offense against the law of war," and "adjudge 
any punishment permitted by the law of war,"143 authorizing, 
as does U.K. law,144 the taking of judicial notice of "the law 
of nations, including the law of war..."145
The 1969 edition of the Manual, in effect during much of 
the Vietnam War, reproduced precisely the same language,146 as 
did the post-war 1984 edition in only slightly modified 
terms.147
The considered and close relationship of court-martial 
practice and the law of war is also reflected in appellate 
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court148 and, more immediately 
for military lawyers, in military appellate opinions — even 
before enactment of the UCMJ.149
The Court of Military Appeals has...had the opportunity 
to comment on many aspects of the law of armed
* Article 18: "General courts-martial shall also have jurisdiction to try any person who 
by the law of war is subject to trial..."
142Manual for Courts-Martial. United States. 1951 (Wash., GPO, 1951), 1.
143Ibid., 17, 18.
144/?e Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] AC 586.
145Manual for Courts-Martial. 1951. 274.
146Manual for Courts-Martial. United States. 1969 (Wash., GPO, 1969), 1-1; 4-4,5; 
27 -48 .
147Manual for Courts-Martial. United States. 1984 (Wash., GPO, 1984), 1-1; II- 
7,10,13.
148Coleman v Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878); Ex parte Richard Quirin; In the Matter 
o f the Application o f General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945), leading cases 
bearing on the application of the law of war in U.S. civilian courts.
149 U.S. v Fleming, 3 CMR 312 (ABR, 1951), a pre-UCMJ case. "GCMs have power to 
try any person subject to military law for any crime...punishable by the Articles of 
War. In addition...any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial..." To the 
same effect, U.S. v Schultz, 4 CMR 104 (USCMA, 1952), and U.S. v Mitchell, 45 CMR 
411 (USCMA, 1972).
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conflict...[and] the 1949 Geneva Conventions were 
accepted as the proper source of norms for the United
States armed forces in combat...15®
In a 1955 case, the Court of Military Appeals, the 
highest U.S. military court, held that service custom 
recognized "the laws of war."151 At the height of the Vietnam 
War the military high court cited the Geneva Conventions and 
commented on the killing of a captured Vietnamese 
noncombatant: "[T]o kill under the circumstances of this case 
is unjustifiable under the laws of this nation, the 
principles of international law, or the laws of land 
warfare.1,152
Numerous other Vietnam-era appellate opinions involving 
the murder of Vietnamese noncombatants repeatedly and 
routinely refer to U.S. responsibilities under the Geneva 
Conventions, the military courts' duty to enforce them, and 
cite the regulations implementing those law of war 
responsibilities in Vietnam.153 Foremost among those opinions 
are the Calley holdings of the Army Court of Military Review 
and the Court of Military Appeals,154 both decisions replete 
with references to "war crimes," "the rules of land warfare," 
"the laws of war," and the Geneva Conventions applicable in 
military legal practice. These well-publicized opinions 
emphasizing the military system's dedication to enforcing the 
law of war through courts-martial were necessarily familiar 
to military lawyers of all U.S. armed services, in and 
outside of South Vietnam. Remarked or not, the involvement
150Burris M. Carnahan, "The Law of War in the United States Court of Military 
Appeals," 20 Revue de Droit Pdnal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 331, 344-45 
(1 9 8 1 ) .
151I7.5*. v Dickensen, 20 CMR 154 (USCMA, 1955).
l52U.S. v Schultz, 39 CMR 133, 136 (USCMA, 1969), a well-known Marine Corps 
case. Appellate opinions were routinely provided all military legal offices in the form of 
slip opinions and, eventually, bound volumes.
153Ibid; and U.S. v Potter, 39 CMR 791 (USCMA, 1967); U.S. v Keenan, 39 CMR 108 
(USCMA, 1969; U.S. v Goldman, 44 CMR 471, 477 (ACMR, 1970), to name but four 
notorious cases.
15446 CMR 1131 (1973) and 48 CMR 19 (1973), respectively.
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of customary law of war in military trials involving grave 
breaches was no coincidence.
The UCMJ-law of war bridge is highlighted by the 
writings of publicists, some dating from many years ago:
While the Military Law has derived from the Common Law 
certain of the principles and doctrines illustrated in 
this code, it has also a [n]...unwritten common law of its 
own. This unwritten law may be said to include: 1. The 
•customs of the service*, so called; 2. the unwritten 
laws and customs of war.155
Civilian and military law review articles, many of which are
cited below, regularly emphasize the significant place of
customary law of war in the military justice system. Even
service newspapers occasionally highlight the relationship.156
In Vietnam the UCMJ-law of war nexus was particularly 
evident by virtue of field manual injunctions stressing its 
judicial enforcement through orders and directives issued by 
the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) , and by the 
on-going training mandated for all U.S. personnel — although 
the latter*s effectiveness left much to be desired.
The Army field manual, The Law of Land Warfare, is held 
in the field library of all Army and Marine Corps battalion­
sized, and larger, units. Albeit lacking the force of law,157 
the field manual enunciates official U.S. policy, providing 
"authoritative guidance to military personnel"158 regarding
155William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents. 2d ed., rev. (Boston: Little Brown, 
1921), 41.
156The Son Thang trials received detailed daily coverage in the military newspaper, 
Stars & Stripes, as well as in civilian newspapers. Similar cases continue to receive 
prominent treatment, e.g., that of Army Master Sergeant Roberto Bryan, charged with 
murdering a captured Panamanian soldier during the 1990 U.S. Panamanian incursion: 
"Modern military law on war crimes is based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions....The 
Defense Department requires all military personnel to receive training on the law of 
war..." J. Paul Scicchitano, "What's Special About the Bryan Case?", Army Times. 13 
Aug. 1990, 12, 13.
l57U.S. v Blanchard, 19 MJ 196 (USCMA, 1985); U.S. v Brunson, 30 MJ 766 (ACMR, 
1990.
158Maj. Paul P. Dommer, "The Problem of Obedience to the Unlawful Order," 10 Revue 
de Droit Ptnal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 297, 317 (1971), a particularly 
authoritative article written by a military lawyer in the International Affairs Division 
of the Office of die Judge Advocate, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe.
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treaty and customary law of war, describing them as having "a 
force equal to that of laws enacted by Congress.. .both the 
letter and spirit" to be strictly observed. The manual notes 
that treaties governing land warfare are applicable to all 
U.S. forces,159 and that grave breaches, including those 
committed by one's own forces, "constitute acts punishable 
under the UCMJ," the death penalty being imposable.160 
Notably, the manual further specifies that the fact that 
domestic law, such as the UCMJ, does not impose a penalty for 
an act constituting a crime under the law of war does not 
relieve the accused from legal responsibility under 
international law.161
To implement those pronouncements in Vietnam, MACV’s 
Saigon headquarters included an international Law Division 
within the Staff Judge Advocate's office. That Division's 
responsibilities encompassed "international law for the 
command, including...the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the 
Laws of War.... investigations of alleged war crimes and 
atrocities committed by or against U.S. military or civilian 
personnel. "162
Numerous MACV directives applicable to all U.S. forces, 
including Marines, concerned the law of war-military justice 
nexus. The first such directive dealing specifically with 
war crimes was issued in April 1965 and updated regularly. 
It made each U.S. serviceman responsible for reporting any 
incident which might constitute a war crime.163 The then-MACV 
Staff Judge Advocate relates that:
it was also supplemented by a number of other directives 
pertaining to the Geneva Conventions, war crimes, and 
prisoners of war. MACV Directive 27-5... listed acts
159Dept. of the Army, Law of Land Warfare, pars. 7.b., 8.c.
160Ibid., pars. 506.b., c., and 508.
161Ibid., par. 511.
162MGen. George S. Prugh, Law at War: Vietnam 1964-1973 (Wash.: Dept, of the 
Army/GPO, 1975), 8, 12.
163Ibid., 72-73, MACV Directive 20-4.
43
which constituted war crimes...punishable in accordance 
with...the Uniform Code of Military Justice.164
Another Directive165 provided "protected status for people
clearly excluded by the Geneva Conventions....[Telford]
Taylor has called the instructions 'virtually impeccable'1,166
That directive and others reflected court-martial punishment
for their violation.167 Geneva Conventions Checksheets were
sent to every military lawyer in Vietnam, as well.168
Acts constituting war crimes were also offenses against 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.... [General 
Westmoreland] considered establishing special war crimes 
teams...but this was not done because the laws 
prohibiting war crimes and...judicial machinery...were 
judged adequate....The U.S. military lawyers' role in 
applying [humanitarian rules] brought credit to the legal 
profession...169
Early in the war "a fairly elaborate program"170 was 
undertaken to inform U.S. military personnel of the more 
important provisions of the Geneva Conventions, and periodic 
refresher lectures were mandated. Some individual units 
distributed to their members thousands of pocket-sized 
pamphlets entitled, Soldier's Handbook on the Rules of Land 
Warfare, which detailed the court-martial penalties for grave 
breaches.171 Pocket-sized cards summarily outlining the law of 
war were given every soldier entering Vietnam.* Model law of 
war courses with instructor outlines and guidance were made
164Ibid., 73.
165MACV Directive 381-46, Annex A, found in: Charles I. Bevans, "Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law," 62 AJIL 754, 766 (1968).
166Robert G. Gard, "Remarks," in Falk, ed., The Vietnam War and International Law, vol. 
4, 389.
167MACV Directives 190-3, Enemy Prisoners of War; 20-5, Prisoners of War - 
Determination of Eligibility; and 335-1, Reports of Serious Crimes.
168Prugh, Law at War. 73-74.
169Ibid., 76-78.
170Alfred P. Rubin, "Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident," 49 Oregon L. Rev. 260, 265 
(1970) .
171Ted B. Borek, "Legal Services During War," 120 Military L. Rev. 19, 39 (1988).
* "Nothing short of ludicrous," wrote Lt.Gen. William K. Peers, leader of the My Lai 
cover-up investigation. The My Lai Inquiry (NY: Norton, 1979), 230, fn. 1.
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available.172 One U.S. writer ethnocentrically suggests that 
"the regulatory scheme used by the American Army in Vietnam 
to identify, to investigate, and to report war crimes is 
studied as a model in the community of nations."173
These directives, manuals, and classes combine to 
present a picture of an American army versed in the customary 
law of war, repeatedly advised of its Geneva Convention 
duties, and well aware that the price of violation was 
prosecution by court-martial.
U.S. military lawyers, every one a law school diplomate 
and graduate of a two-month course on military law, were 
presumably familiar with constitutional references to the law 
of nations, and at least some of the law review articles on 
the subject. They certainly were aware of the Manual for 
Courts - Martial' s repeated references to the law of war and 
its enforcement through the UCMJ. Military appellate 
opinions provided all-too-frequent reminders of such 
prosecutions.
The effectiveness of this education and training of 
soldier and judge advocate is another matter. But education 
and training there were, leaving little room for doubt that 
U.S. forces were aware of the law of war and that court- 
martial prosecution would follow its violation. Judge 
advocates similarly appreciated the central role that 
customary law of war played in courts-martial for offenses 
that constituted grave breaches.
Given that clear nexus, a thesis is offered: that
America's obligation to observe the customary law of war and 
the Geneva Conventions calling for sanctions for their grave 
breach, predicted trial, conviction, and punishment for those 
responsible for the events at Son Thang.
172Green, "Aftermath of Vietnam: War Law and the Soldier," in Falk, The Vietnam War 
and International Law, vol. 4, 147, 167-69.
173William G. Eckhardt, "Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea For A Workable 
Standard," 97 Military L. Rev. 1, 7 (1982).
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Further, that America's obligation to observe the law of 
war predicted that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a 
criminal law system and the asserted vehicle for the 
satisfaction of law and treaty obligations, provided a 
legally proper and effective means of meeting the 
responsibilities of customary international law and the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.
Demonstration of the thesis will be through a case study: 
examination of the series of four courts-martial conducted in 
the wake of murders committed in February 197 0 in the village 
of Son Thang, South Vietnam.
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CHAPTER 2. LAW OF WAR TODAY
Serious study of the law of war on its own has this therapeutic quality, that it calls 
attention to its own limitations, and su ggests their remedy.
Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare
By mid-twentieth century, trial by court-martial of one's 
own nationals charged with war crimes was established 
practice. Nevertheless, enforcement of the law of war did 
not come pre-packaged from Geneva to Vietnam and the Marine 
Corps lawyers prosecuting the Son Thang murders. But the 
evolutionary progress in the law of armed conflict had been 
impressively rapid in the twentieth century. Advances from 
the third generation Geneva Conventions of 1929 to the 
Vietnam War in 1965 were perhaps greater than advances in the 
preceding five centuries combined.
In this chapter the emergence of international 
humanitarian laws as a wartime consideration is briefly 
reviewed. The Nuremberg tribunals are examined and the 
question of their contemporary significance posed. The law 
of war is applied in the context of courts-martial and 
Vietnam, as well, with particular attention to the My Lai 
case. Finally, the circumstances of the U.S. Marine Corps in 
Vietnam are examined. The combat performance of the Marines 
was influenced not only by the enemy, but by U.S. 
governmental policy, as well. That policy played an indirect 
role in the murder of sixteen women and children at Son 
Thang.
2.1. Modern Change. Necessary Progress
How to account for the twentieth century's rapid and dramatic 
changes in the law of war? With the coming of 
industrialization the tools of warfare had become terrible in 
their effectiveness. The aeroplane and submarine became 
common weaponry. The machine gun became portable, then
47
pervasive. The deaths of an estimated ten million combatants 
and civilians in World War I added urgency to the work of 
Geneva and Hague conferees. The face of war had changed. 
The means of controlling it had to change as well.
Civilians, hosts to the battles fought in their streets, 
were the victims of World Wars I and II in greater measure 
than in previous wars. The law of war turned;its attention 
to those civilians — to human rights law and' international 
humanitarian law.* Objection is sometimes made that "human 
rights" are a Western concept. They are not. " [T]he justice 
of laws, the integrity and dignity of the individual, 
safeguards against arbitrary rule, freedom from oppression 
and persecution. . .are to be found in very similar form in 
every civilization. ..1,1
2.1.a. Humanitarian Law in Modern War Humanitarian law 
seeks to protect individuals from man-made, and so avoidable, 
suffering. The first Geneva Convention of 1864 is the source 
of international humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflicts. "Of course, rules for the protection of the 
victims of hostilities existed well before 1864, but either 
they were the result of purely moral or religious reasoning, 
or they stemmed from ad hoc undertakings."2 On the eve of the 
twentieth century the Geneva Conventions had devoted 
themselves almost exclusively to the protection of 
combatants, but by the end of World War II civilians had 
emerged much in need of protection. What followed "at a
♦International humanitarian law and international human rights law, although closely 
related, are not the same. The latter, broadly speaking, applies to all people, the former 
to states and certain groups such as POWs, the wounded, and civilians in war zones. See, 
Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 
346; and Meron, "On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and 
the Need for A New Instrument," 77 AJIL 589 (1983).
*Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983), 15.
2Sandoz, "Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law," in Bassiouni, International 
Criminal Law, vol. I, 209.
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staggering pace"3 was a growth of international humanitarian 
law, most prominently codified in Geneva Convention IV of 
1949, protecting civilians in occupied territory in time of 
war. International humanitarian law is described as:
...that branch of the laws of armed conflict which is 
concerned with the protection of...those rendered hors de 
combat by injury, sickness or capture, and also 
civilians. It is founded upon the ideas that those 
...rendered non-combatant are entitled to impartial 
humanitarian concern and...are not legitimate targets in 
hostilities.4
In addition to Geneva Convention IV, civilian 
humanitarian rights are found in the 19 07 Hague Convention
IV.5 (An exception to the dictum that Hague Conventions 
generally address methods and not victims of war.) In both 
the Geneva and Hague documents the defined humanitarian 
rights relate to civilian enemy aliens in a belligerent 
state, and to civilians in occupied territories.6
The civilians killed at Son Thang were not aliens, but 
Vietnamese citizens living in their own nation while war 
raged around them. Nor were American combatants in South 
Vietnam an occupying force. The Son Thang victims were 
protected by the law of war nonetheless. Well before the 
Vietnam War the individual had acquired a status and a 
stature transforming him from merely an object of 
international compassion into a subject of international 
right.7 Nor may one be totally dependent upon formalized 
rules, thinking that subjects and acts not "ruled upon" are 
therefore beyond regulation.
Acts constituting violation of international humanitarian 
law are not undefined. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions
3Cassese, International Law in a Divided World. 289.
4McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law , 1.
5Articles 43-53 o f the Annex.
6Yoram Dinstein, "Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law," in 
Meron, Human Rights in International Law. 349.
7Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1950), 27-47 passim .
BIBL 
LONDIBf. 
UNIV. y
contain a common article three, forbidding, inter alia, 
"violence...in particular murder" of persons taking no active 
part in hostilities. That common article, although 
applicable only to armed conflict not of an international 
nature, is characteristic in describing the aspirational 
approach of contemporary humanitarian law in all 
circumstances. Similarly, article three of the Universal 
Declaration^ of Human Rights, the first catalogue of such 
rights enumerated by the United Nations, includes the right 
to life and the security of person. Similar rights are found 
in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights.* No 
exception is made for circumstances of war in any of those 
prominent human rights treaties.
Those pacts make clear, as do most treaties involving 
international human rights, that "states have an affirmative 
obligation to enact laws guaranteeing this right [to 
life]..."8 The 1949 Geneva Conventions, of course, oblige 
ratifying states to enact legislation to provide penal 
sanctions for grave breaches of the Conventions, which often 
are human rights violations, as well..
Humanitarian law does have international enforcement 
agencies, but they are of questionable value to the 
individual victim of breach. Virtually all of the major 
treaties establish enforcement institutions to provide 
recourse for violations but, except in special circumstances, 
rights accruing from an international wrong are vested in the 
victim state against the wrongdoing state,9 the victim state 
in substance asserting the individual's right of redress.
* Although voting in favor of the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, only in 
1992 did the U.S. ratify the first of the two other conventions mentioned. "The United 
States has not been a pillar of human rights, only a 'flying buttress' - supporting them 
from the outside." Louis Henkin, "Rights: American and Human," 79 Columbia L. Rev. 
405, 421 (1979).
8Richard B. Lillich, "Civil Rights," in Meron, Human Rights in International Law. 121.
9Mann, Further Studies in International Law. 139-40; and Christine Gray, Judicial 
Remedies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), generally.
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Treaties generally do not confer enforceable individual 
rights upon the citizens of contracting states.10 "Thus, there 
is no way for a national or a stateless person to proceed 
against a state."11 Moreover, international enforcing agencies 
usually provide recourse for administrative delicts, rather 
than criminal acts, and presume a prior exhaustion of 
municipal remedies before international enforcement 
jurisdiction vests12 and, some argue, tend toward political 
resolutions.13 "Individuals may now...be called subjects of 
international law, but they are hardly equal members with 
states in international society, and they cannot hope to 
enforce their rights in that society."14
So, while there are means of enforcing international 
humanitarian law, they are ineffective on an individual 
level. For example, in the unlikely event of South Vietnam 
suing the U.S., its military ally and protector, for war 
claims in an international forum on behalf of South 
Vietnamese victims, the suit would have had little relevance 
to the Son Thang villagers, even though the 19 07 Hague 
Convention III requires payment of compensation in proper 
cases.15 In the first instance, "there is no assurance South 
Vietnam would press such a claim for its injured citizens 
even though there may be a valid theory of liability..."16
10Dreyjus v Von Finck and Merck, Finck and Co., 519 F.2d 1001 (1975); 81 ILR 508 
(1 9 9 0 ) .
^Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1964), fn. 9, 24.
12Sweeney, The International Legal System. 580-82, 605-06, 1193-1200. Tel-Oren 
v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. den. 470 U.S. 1003 
(1985), in which Israeli civilian survivors of an armed attack sued Libya and the PLO 
for damages. The lower court's dismissal of the action was affirmed on differing bases - 
essentially lack of jurisdiction and nonjusticiability. Klinghojfer v S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 
90-9060 (2d Cir.), in which the PLO is a defendant, is a similar case.
13John D.B. Miller, "The Third World," in John D.B. Miller and R.J. Vincent, eds., Order 
and Violence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 91.
14R.J. Vincent, "Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention," in Bull, ed., Hugo Grotius 
and International Relations. 249.
15Art. 3.
16Comment, "Punishment for War Crimes: Duty-or Discretion?" 1340, fn. 180.
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Like most international law, then, international humanitarian 
law often looks to municipal law for meaningful enforcement.
The Nuremberg trials, however, may be seen as an instance 
of international enforcement of humanitarian rights.
2.1.b. Nuremberg: Tribunals. Trials and Commissions n o
recent event in the law of war has had such impact in the 
public mind as the post-World War II Nuremberg trials. Nor, 
perhaps, is any other chapter in the law of war so 
misunderstood in the public mind. Judicial prosecution of 
leaders responsible for war is not a new concept. Trials 
assessing responsibility for the Punic Wars were chronicled 
by Polybius in 100 B.C. After Napoleon's escape from Elba 
the Great Powers declared him "an Enemy and Disturber of the 
tranquility of the World," and upon his surrender the British 
banished him to St. Helena to preserve the peace. And 
Bismarck at one point planned an international tribunal to 
try Napoleon III for instigating the Franco-Prussian war 
(1870-71).17
Before Nuremberg, the most publicized attempt to fix 
individual criminal responsibility for the instigation of war 
was that following World War I. In 1919 a Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement 
of Penalties was created by the war's Peace Conference. The 
Treaty Of Versailles eventually contained provision for trial 
of former German Emperor William II, although nothing came of 
that provision because of Dutch refusal to surrender the 
former Emperor for trial.18 while there were several 
convictions of lower-ranking German officers for individual 
malum in se offenses (see section 4.1.a.), no German national
17Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 4, 51.
18Green, "Is There An International Criminal Law?" 254. There is an argument that the 
Emperor could not have been punished under international law in any event. See, Bert
V.A. Roling and C.F. Riiter, eds., The Tokyo Judgement, vol. II (Amsterdam: University 
Press Amsterdam, 1977), 1048-49; and James W. Garner, International Law and the 
World War, vol. II (London: Longmans, Green, 1920), 493-94.
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figure was tried for World War I crimes or for instigating 
the conflict.19
In 1943 the American Secretary of State wrote that Nazi 
leaders should be hanged after summary court-martial.20 In 
Britain, Lord Chancellor Simon and Prime Minister Churchill 
similarly favored disposing of leading war criminals 
summarily:21 "execution without trial is the preferable 
course."22 Instead, presaged by the St. James and Moscow 
Conference Declarations,23 the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission drafted the London Agreement of 1945. This 
agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis had as an annex the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal — the IMT.
The IMT Charter defined three categories of crime for 
which there would be individual criminal responsibility: 
crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. In terms later echoed in Vietnam, the Charter 
decreed that having received an order to commit a charged 
offense would not free a defendant from responsibility for 
his acts.
Crimes against peace referred to the concept of the 
criminality in conducting aggressive war — "a crime reserved 
for losers," remarked one politician.24 Crimes against 
humanity encompassed "murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
19See, Claud Mullins, The Leipzig Trials (London: Witherby, 1921); and James F. 
Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982).
20Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1948), 1289-91.
21Whitney R. Harris, ’Justice Jackson at Nuremberg," 20 International Lawyer 867, 
868 (1986).
22Aide-Memoire from United Kingdom, April 23, 1945, to President Roosevelt, 
reprinted in: Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward 
World Peace, vol. I, Half A Century of Hope (London: Oceana Publications, 1980), 450.
23Quincy Wright, ’The Law of the Nuremberg Trial," 41 AJIL 38, 39 (1947).
24Paul C. Wamke, "Remarks," in Trooboff, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. 187.
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civil population...or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds."25
In one sense, whenever an innocent French woman was 
tortured by the Gestapo, there was a crime against 
humanity. But what is meant by the term...is conduct 
directed against a large section of humanity, such as the
crime of racial or religious extermination....25 
"...Crimes against humanity were to a great extent war crimes 
writ large," Professor Brownlie notes.27
In a technical sense, the offenses tried by the tribunal 
in regard to crimes against peace and crimes against humanity 
had not existed, as such, when the defendants had violated 
them. This led to the considerable criticism of the 
tribunals.
That criticism is not so easily leveled as to the charges 
of individual war crimes, defined as:
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, 
but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave-labor...of civilian population of or 
in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity.2®
11 [0] ffenses over which the Tribunals were afforded 
jurisdiction were in fact war crimes in the traditional 
sense, even though some were described as crimes against 
humanity."29 Other than crimes against peace, over which 
national criminal law would have lacked jurisdiction, 
virtually all of the crimes charged by the IMT could just as 
well have been charged as violations of the law of war or, 
where German nationals were victims, violations of German 
law. "The novelty of the Charter consisted only in 
constituting a competent jurisdiction for the punishment of
25Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, as modified by Four-Power Protocol of 6 Oct. 1945.
26Wright, "War Crimes Under International Law," 49.
27Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. 562.
28Nuremberg Principle Vl.b.
29Green, "Is There An International Criminal Law?" 255.
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what the Law of Nations had constituted an international 
crime before the Tribunal was established."30 Still, one 
should distinguish war crimes as defined in the IMT Charter 
from crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. To 
lump them all under the rubric of "war crimes" confuses 
concepts of different meaning.
In the public mind the Nuremberg trial, the Subsequent 
Proceedings, and the trials pursuant to Allied Control 
Council Law Number 10 are often thought as the single, 
highly-publicized tribunal involving twenty-two of the most 
senior Nazi defendants, including Goering, Hess, and Speer. 
But of course the Nuremberg trials, "a code-name so common 
that it seems silly not to use it,"31 infer a number of 
proceedings held in numerous locations.
The first of the Nuremberg tribunals came to order in 
November 1945. Their companion tribunal, the IMT for the Far 
East, opened in Tokyo in April 1946, to initially try twenty- 
eight senior Japanese defendants. The Far East IMT, with its 
own diplomatic history, employed different, less legalistic 
rules and procedures.32
But in October 1945, before either the Far East or 
Nuremberg IMTs opened, General Tomoyuki Yamashita went on 
trial in Manila before a military commission — neither an 
international tribunal nor an IMT. Yamashita was charged 
with violating the law of war by failing to control his 
troops and permitting them to commit atrocities. On 7 
December 1945, fourth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, 
the five Americans who sat in judgement of Yamashita — all
30Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 168; To the same effect: Rowe, 
Defence. 152; and Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the Law of Nations," pt. 2, 109.
31Best, Humanity in Warfare. 291.
32John A. Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (Indiana: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1954), vii; and, Dept, of the Army, International Law, vol. II, 233-34.
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U.S. Army generals, none trained in the law — found him 
guilty and sentenced him to death.33
Argument regarding Yamashita's culpability and the trial 
procedure employed in his conviction continues today.34 He was 
found guilty of failure "to discharge his duty as commander 
to control the operations of the members of his command, 
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high 
crimes...and he...thereby violated the laws of war."35 Because 
he was found to have either "willfully permitted...or 
secretly ordered"36 the crimes charged, his conviction did 
not, as often asserted, establish a principle of a 
commander's unqualified criminal responsibility for the 
actions of subordinates.37 This distinction was also 
significant in the Calley court-martial and potentially so in 
the Son Thang trials.
Yamashita's conviction was followed by his unsuccessful 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.* The passionate dissenting 
opinions of two Justices ("Our [victor's] standards of 
judgement are whatever we wish to make them, "38 one wrote with 
stinging sarcasm) are often quoted in defending law of war 
violators.
33George F. Guy, "The Defense of General Yamashita," Yearbook 1981 (Wash.: Supreme 
Court Historical Society, 1981), 52-67.
34For a balanced legal assessment see, Richard L. Lael, The Yamashita Precedent 
(Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1982).
35i>i the Matter o f the Application o f General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13-14 
(1945) .
36From the commission's opinion, quoted in Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial 
(Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979), 54.
37Gard, "Remarks," in Trooboff, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. 229
* Actually a writ of habeas corpus application, the Court did not consider the guilt or 
innocence of Yamashita, but only reviewed the power of the military. commission to try 
him.
38//? the Matter o f Yamashita, 35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Yamashita was hanged a mere four months after his trial 
began. .Yamashita's trial did little to add to the trust
of thoughtful people in military justice."39
In the Vietnam War, the acquittal of Captain Ernest L. 
Medina, Calley's immediate superior at My Lai, has been cited 
as evidence that the U.S. applies the Yamashita standard of 
near-strict liability only to its enemies.40 Medina, like 
Yamashita, was charged with culpable negligence in failing to 
control his subordinates. Medina's acquittal, however, was 
grounded upon an instruction given the court-martial panel 
wherein it was stressed that conviction required that Medina 
have had actual knowledge of Calley's platoon's acts. "There 
is general agreement today that the instructions of the 
military judge were wrong."41 The instruction was, however, 
given precisely as requested by the Army prosecutors.42 The 
proper standard, contained in the U.S. law of war field 
manual,43 requires only that the accused reasonably should 
have had such knowledge. The Medina case is merely evidence 
of a careless prosecution and little else. The Yamashita 
principle, that commanders may be held personally liable for 
the war crimes of their troops which they knew of, or which 
they reasonably stood have known of, remains valid and 
applicable.
At Nuremberg, meanwhile, nineteen of the original 
defendants were found guilty of one or more counts. The 
irony of a Soviet judge on the panel that found Germans 
guilty of aggressive war, when the Soviet Union had been
39Arthur E. Sutherland, "The Constitution, the Civilian, and Military Justice," 35 St. 
John's L. Rev. 215, 220 (1961).
40Leonard B. Boudin, "Remarks," in Trooboff, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. 213.
41Lewy, America in Vietnam. 360.
42Eckhardt, "Command Criminal Responsibility," 18, wherein Eckhardt, Medina's 
prosecutor, confirms the error.
43Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 501.
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expelled from the League of Nations only six years earlier 
for the same offense, did not go unnoticed.44
Another thirteen non-IMT tribunals were then held at 
Nuremberg under Control Council Law No. 10 ("Subsequent 
Proceedings"), employing civilian jurists and concluding in 
April 1949.45 At Dachau another 489 non-lMT tribunals were 
held.46 In Tokyo, the Far East IMT trials continued,* as did 
other non-IMT trials throughout the world. Accurate figures 
as to the number tried cannot be known. German postwar 
judges sentenced 5,288 Nazis,47 and as late as 1961 West 
Germany was still averaging one war crime trial every three 
weeks.48 As best as can be determined, the U.S. eventually 
tried 950 cases; the British, 541. France, Australia, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Norway, Canada, China and Greece 
accounted for another 625 cases, and Russia an unknown but 
certainly large number.49 Other nations — Hungary, Rumania, 
Bulgaria — conducted war crimes trials, as well.50
2.1.C. After Nuremberg: New Norms? what was the 
significance for future conflicts of the IMTs, the Yamashita 
commission, and the hundreds of military commissions? Little 
new law was forged, although new norms were articulated and 
defined. Nor have the trials discouraged the internationally 
condemned conduct of tyrants such as Pol Pot and Saddam
44For its Nov., 1939, invasion of Finland the Soviet Union became the only nation ever 
expelled from the League.
45Dept. of the Army, International Law, vol. II, 226-33.
46Sweeney, Cases and Materials on the International Legal System. 795.
* "Of the two tribunals the Far Eastern one never had the same standing among jurists as 
the European one and has carried less moral weight as well." Geoffrey Best, Nuremberg 
and After (Reading: University of Reading, 1984), 10.
47Ingo Muller, Hitler's Justice (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 
274.
48Dept. of the Army, International Law, vol. II, 235.
49Appleman, International Tribunals and International Crimes. 267. Totals vary from 
source to source.
50U.N. War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(London: U.N., 1948), 515.
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Hussein. But even in the cases of simple malum in se war 
crimes, the trials fulfilled a compelling purpose of the 
criminal law in that they replaced private, uncontrolled 
vengeance with the measured process of fixing guilt - this 
alone of significant social value.51
[The tribunal] enabled a public record to be compiled and 
gave the defendants a chance to say what they could in 
their behalf, which for most of them was very little. As 
a result their moral guilt was established more
convincingly in the eyes of the world...52 
"The IMT also went far to re-affirm the validity of the norms 
of international humanitarian law..."53 Nuremberg was a 
providential convergence of world opinion on a scale that 
made feasible the articulation of those previously inchoate 
norms. Beyond the trials themselves, and the reformation of 
international humanitarian law they encouraged, their legacy 
was the Nuremberg Principles.
In December 1946 the U.N. General Assembly affirmed the 
principles of international law contained in the IMT Charter, 
ratified the tribunal's judgements, and asked the U.N. 
International Law Commission to formulate concrete principles 
for U.N. consideration. (The Assembly had affirmed the 
principles without noting what they considered them to be.) 
In 1950 the Commission presented seven Nuremberg Principles 
to the General Assembly.54 (Appendix B) For our purposes the 
relevant Principles are those four which ascribe personal 
responsibility for crimes against international law, exclude 
superior orders as an absolute defense, affirm the right to a 
fair trial, and specify certain crimes under international 
law as war crimes.
5Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), 158.
52Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 229.
53McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law. 217.
54U.N., Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1950. vol. II (NY: U.N., 1957), 
374.
59
But the General Assembly has never affirmed the 
principles,55 in part because of the sensitivity of states 
about recognizing the legitimacy of disobeying superior 
orders.56 "In short," Professor Schwarzenberger writes, "the 
matter was adjourned indefinitely.1,57
Nor have the Nuremberg Principles been explicitly 
incorporated in the military law of any of the four powers 
responsible for the IMT Charter.58 Professor Kelsen criticized 
the IMTs themselves as the acts of captors who created new 
law, conducted the prosecution, and sat in judgement.59 Others 
have been similarly critical of the IMTs. American judge 
Learned Hand referred to them as "a step backward in 
international law, and a precedent that will prove 
embarrassing..."60 Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas 
reportedly thought them "unprincipled."61 Laymen, too, have 
sometimes been less than charitable: "It is difficult to put 
much faith in those who try to play Solomon when they burn 
down the city first and then set up court in the ruins."62 
Other writers refer to Nuremberg and its Principles as "a 
legal anomaly and an historical oddity,1,63 "a political 
football;1,64 and as merely "a noble experiment."65
55U.N., Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1954. vol. II (NY: U.N., 1960), 
149.
56Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations. Divided World (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 20.
57Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. II, 531.
58Ibid., 538. "It is always easier to devise rules for others, especially one's defeated 
enemies, than for oneself."
59Hans Kelsen, "Will the Judgement of the Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War 
Criminals Constitute A Precedent in International Law?" I International Law Quarterly 
153, 167-71 (1947).
60H.K. Thompson and Henry Strutz, eds., Doenitz At Nuremberg: A Reappraisal 
(California: Institute for Historical Review, 1983), 1.
61Ibid., 196.
62Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg (NY: Basic Books, 1977), 302.
63Robert A. Friedlander, "Problems of Enforcing International Criminal Law," in M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, vol. Ill, Enforcement (NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 1987), 16.
64Best, Nuremberg and After. 5.
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The Nuremberg IMT and Principles represent considerably 
more than those things, however. Failure to affirm the 
Principles notwithstanding, Nuremberg is the precedent that 
aggressive war is a crime susceptible of legal proof and 
judicial determination. It demonstrates that there is risk, 
however remote, of prosecution.66 The participation of the 
major powers in the IMTs "constitutes very strong evidence 
that [they] accept as a legal norm the criminality of certain 
acts whenever and by whomsoever committed.1,67 "Numerous states 
have...accepted the Nuremberg Charter as a source of general 
international Law."68 The Principles are testimony to the idea 
that inhumane wartime excesses are of more than military 
concern.
whatever else the Nuremberg Trials did, they firmly 
established in the legal consciousness the proposition 
that there are certain crimes of international concern or 
crimes under international law. ...Treaty practice since 
1945 within several international organizations has 
demonstrated a remarkable range of application of this
principle.69
The Nuremberg and Far East IMTs and the uncounted 
national commissions have other lasting and salutary effect, 
as well. "Perhaps the most significant, and the most 
controversial achievement of Numberg was the application and 
clarification of the doctrine of individual responsibility."70
65Warnke, "Remarks" in Trooboff, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. 190.
66Following the Gulf War there were numerous references to the possibility of 
Nuremberg-style tribunals, e.g.: William F. Buckley, "Nuremberg Left the Precedent," 
International Herald Tribune. 24 April 1991, 4; Mark Nelson, "EC Seeks Trial for Iraqi 
Leader on War Crimes," Wall Street Journal. 16 April 1991, 2; David Gow, "Genscher 
Urges an Iraqi War Trial," The Guardian. 15 April 1991, 8; Jill Smolowe, "A Case of 
Nuremberg II?" Time (11 March 1991), 38. Americans also fell under suspicion: 
Simon Tisdall, "US Navy Ignored Iraqi White Flag," The Guardian. 13 June 1991, 22; 
"Iraqi Soldiers 'Shot as They Surrendered1," Daily Telegraph. 13 June 1991, 9.
67Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 175.
68Ibid., 191.
69Roger S. Clark, "The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on the Development of 
International Law," in George Ginsburgs and V.N. Kudriavtsev, eds., The Nuremberg 
Trial and International Law (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990), 253.
70Benjamin B. Ferencz, "War Crimes Law and the Vietnam War," 17 American 
University L. Rev. 403, 408 (1968).
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Additionally, in future trials charging malum in se war 
crimes, the IMTs confirm the responsibility of commanders, in 
certain circumstances, for the illegal acts of their 
subordinates71 and expand the principle that individuals, 
senior and junior, may be held criminally liable under 
international law for war crimes.72 (See section 4.3.) "Such 
trials...demonstrate by acts louder than words that human 
rights can be vindicated and inhuman offenses can be 
punished.1,73
Despite the continuing proliferation of armed conflicts, 
with Nuremberg the law of war reached a high water mark. 
"Victor’s justice it may have been but justice for the most 
part it remained.1,74 The nature of the crimes charged were 
such that both prosecution and judgement must have been by 
victor nations over vanquished foes — the worldwide scope of 
Axis aggression left few neutrals.
2.1.d. Applying Law of War: International or Municipal Law?
A state's armed forces, as any category of state official, 
are agents of that state and usual principles of legal 
responsibility apply. That is, the state itself may be 
liable for its failure to control its armed forces when, 
under the circumstances, it is reasonable that a duty of 
control be imposed.75 But the Son Thang murders, unauthorized 
criminal acts, were not acts of state.76 Accepting that the 
murders raised individual accountability, what law applied —
71W. Hays Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes," 62 Military L. Rev. 1. 77 
(1973); Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial. 55; Best, Nuremberg and After. 21.
72Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 82-83.
73Quincy Wright, "War Criminals," 39 AJIL 257, 285 (1945).
74Best, Nuremberg and After. 26.
75Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, pt. I (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), 140; and, N.A. Maryan Green, International Law , 3d ed. 
(London: Pitman, 1987), 260.
76For discussion of factors which might make a state responsible for its soldiers' 
criminal acts, an application of the act of state doctrine, see Brownlie, ibid., 159-66.
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international or municipal? When, if ever, does 
international law become municipal law?
The relationship of international law and the individual 
has been described. (See section l.3.c.) "The only effective 
sanction for crimes against peace is the punishment of the 
individual... directly responsible."77 International law 
clearly applies to individuals as well as to states but it 
"cannot work without the constant help, co-operation, and 
support of national legal systems....International law cannot 
stand on its own feet without its 'crutches', that is
municipal law."78 That is in large part due to the absence of
judicial settlement rules concerning international law and 
convention.79
The great difference between international law and any 
system of national law lies in the reality and
effectiveness of the sanctions attending breaches of the 
latter. One famous school of jurisprudence maintains 
that there is simply no law where there is no sovereign 
power to enforce it.8®
The enforcement mechanisms in modem international law apply
to states and, as noted, seldom reach individuals in any
direct way.
Is municipal law in a position, then, to impose
individual responsibility for international criminality? It 
is. Beyond serving national interests, international law 
requires municipal legal systems to provide the institutional 
machinery and forums for development of international legal 
order.81 By serving these ends municipal law — the national or 
internal law of a state82 — ensures that international law
77Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. 154.
78Cassese, International Law in A Divided World. 15.
79DeLupis, The Law of War. 320.
80Best, Humanity in Warfare. 11.
81Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, xi, 65.
82Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law. 43. Another description of 
municipal law is that of Ian Brownlie: "Municipal law applies within a state and 
regulates the relations of its citizens with each other and with the executive." Principles 
of Public International Law. 33.
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does indeed provide individual punishment for its breach. 
War crimes are such an instance.
The principle that law of war violators are liable to 
trial by municipal courts of the injured state, particularly 
when those violations are also offenses against general 
criminal law, is settled, affirmed by the Institute of 
International Law as long ago as 1880.83 Following World War I 
the principle of first competence of municipal courts to try 
law of war violations was upheld by treaty.84 That was 
recognition that "war crimes in the narrower sense of the 
term are at the same time violations of national (municipal) 
law in so far as they constitute crimes according to the 
general criminal law of the State..."85
With the Geneva Conventions of 1949 what had previously 
been a national option became a duty of contracting parties, 
where grave breaches are concerned: a duty to provide
"effective penal sanctions" under the signatories' own 
municipal law. Contracting states agreed to search out those 
alleged to have committed grave breaches and to bring them 
before their own courts, or hand them to another contracting 
party making out a prima facie case.86 "Thus," Professor 
Schwarzenberger wrote, "in these Conventions, a universal 
criminal jurisdiction of a mandatory character under 
internationally postulated municipal law has been created."87
Referring to the trial of enemy war criminals, the 
British Manual of Military Law reads:
War crimes are crimes ex jure gentium and are thus 
triable by the courts of all states....Persons accused of 
war crimes are properly charged not with an offense
83Gamer, "Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War," 71.
84Sandoz, "Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law," in Bassiouni, 
International Criminal Law, vol. I, 214. The Treaty of Vereeniging, May, 1902, ending 
the Boer War, which reserved the right to try Boers before military tribunals for law 
of war violations, preceded the Treaty of Versailles in this regard.
85Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law," 531.
86Arts. 49, 50, 129, and 146 of Conventions I, II, III, and IV, respectively.
87Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. II, 459.
64
against the municipal law...but with an offense or 
offenses against the laws and customs of w a r . . . **8
Few states, however, have enacted legislation specifically 
providing penal sanctions for breaches, choosing instead to 
ratify the Conventions89 and rely on their own existing 
criminal law.90
Problems of international criminal jurisdiction remain, 
as well. (In fact, since the 1949 Geneva Conventions came 
into force, no case is known of any prosecution in any state 
for having committed a grave breach, as such. Instead, 
violators have been tried for the corresponding common crime 
under domestic law.)91 Nevertheless, the 1949 provisions 
represent a significant advance in procedural law and a 
"momentous departure"92 from customary law. Although an 
international consensus regarding the principal of universal 
jurisdiction remains elusive, the 1949 Conventions raise the 
principle of universal jurisdiction over war crimes in treaty 
form, making them triable in municipal courts.
The concept of universal jurisdiction is more complex 
than it initially appears. In exercising universal 
jurisdiction in the trial of war crimes, what law does the 
community of nations anticipate being applied? What courts 
are recognized to possess universal jurisdiction in applying 
that law? International law does not necessarily accept
88HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. Ill, par. 637. Commencing with the 1914 edition, 
part III of the Manual, a separate volume, was concerned solely with law of war. Written 
by scholars the calibre of Oppenheim (1914 edition) and Lauterpacht (1956 edition), 
it provided a summary of the law, and reprinted pertinent treaties and conventions. 
Editions of the Manual subsequent to 1956 dispense with part III, anticipating its 
replacement by Joint Service Manual # 385, The Law of Armed Conflict. JSM 385, 
however, has met continuing delay and the long-out-of-print 1956 part III continues to 
be consulted.
89Fr6d6ric deMulinen, "Law of War and Armed Forces, " IX Recueils de la Socittt 
Internationale de Droit Pinal Militaire. 35, 43 (1982).
90Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War. 69.
9 herald  I.A.D. Draper, "Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality," in Michael 
Howard, ed., Restraints on War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 153-54.
92Cassese, International Law in A Divided World. 275. Cassese argues that the very 
boldness of their departure renders them ineffectual in practice. "A dead letter." 
Vietnam-era prosecutions suggest the error of his assertion.
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whatever definition of international crime a municipal law 
may proffer. "Rather, what is left to municipal law is the 
adoption of international law as the governing law of what is 
an international crime."93 Municipal law does not have 
jurisdiction to try a municipal offense which is similar to, 
but not identical to, an international crime.
If a country introduces legislation describing some 
offense under its own criminal law as constituting, for 
example, piracy, and includes within that term offences 
which do not strictly fall within the international law 
definition, then that law can only be invoked to 
establish jurisdiction against nationals or residents of
the country in question...94 
Only when municipal law adopts as its own the international 
law definition of a crime is jurisdiction applied in regard 
to the municipal law recognized as the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction under international law.95 Then, Professor 
Lauterpacht notes, "rights and duties created by 
international law are directly applicable to individuals 
through the instrumentality of municipal courts..."96
Armed forces commonly try their own members for law of 
war offenses. Members charged with breach of Geneva 
conventions are often tried by court-martial without 
requiring war crime charges per se.97 U.S. practice regarding 
the charging of breaches is three-pronged. War crimes are
charged as such only if "they are committed by enemy 
nationals or by persons serving the interests of the enemy 
state."98 Breaches by individuals subject to military law are 
charged according to provisions of the U.S. military criminal
93Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth, 65 Australian L. J. 521, 540 (1991), a 
particularly instructive case that examines, inter alia, universal jurisdiction vis-a- 
vis municipal law.
94Leslie C. Green, "International Crimes and the Legal Process," 29 International and 
Comparative L. Quarterly 567, 571 (1980).
9$Polyukhovich v Commonwealth, 541.
96Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the Law of Nations," pt. I, 448.
97Green, "Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man," 61.
98Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 507.b.
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justice system." Finally, violations by nonmilitary persons 
usually constitute and may be charged as violations of state 
or federal criminal law.100 "[Military] command, 
administrative, and judicial authorities are expected to 
apply the full body of relevant international law to a war 
crimes case, but the charges themselves are municipal law 
charges."101 In the latter two instances, charges against 
civilians and one's own soldiers, the law applied is 
municipal law, effectively raising international legal 
responsibility in the trying forum.102
When the infrequent law of war issue s trie to sensu 
appears before a municipal court, however charged, it is 
tried in accordance with international law, not by the 
municipal law of the trying nation. Occasionally the law of 
war may be adapted to local custom,103 but generally its rules 
are of universal application, there being "a general duty to 
bring internal law into conformity with obligations under 
international law."104
Given the. firm link between courts-martial and the 
international law of war, and that the U.S. tries its own 
soldiers for breaches, what law is applied in those courts- 
martial — international law or municipal? There may be 
departures between the two with implications for substantive 
law, procedure, and review.
With the exception of some special defenses (see 
6.1.b.), U.S. municipal law, as enacted in the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ), is applied in trials of law of 
war violators. It must be recalled, however, that the law of
"Municipal courts lack in personam jurisdiction over enemy persons for war crimes 
committed as part of belligerent operations. George A. Finch, "Jurisdiction of Local 
Courts to Try Enemy Persons For War Crimes," 14 AJIL 218 (1920). See, Coleman v 
Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878), to that effect.
100Ibid., Finch.
101O'Brien, "The Law of War, Command Responsibility, and Vietnam," 618.
102DeLupis, The Law of War. 352.
103£.g., Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (London: Luzac, 1940).
104Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. 36.
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war, an aspect of international law, is inextricably 
interwoven into the UCMJ and its implementing Manual for 
Courts-Martial. (See section 1.4.) Therefore, it may 
correctly be said that national and international law are 
both applied at court-martial. But it is a national law 
scaffolding upon which the international law implementing 
mechanism is erected. The U.S. soldier-violator, then, faces 
charges brought under the UCMJ.
That he is also subject to international law, in 
particular the laws of war, and in addition to his own 
military or national law, is not doubted.... Since a 
prosecution under national law is likely to raise many 
fewer practical problems for both the prosecution and the 
defense than one under international law, the former is
clearly to be preferred...10^
And "it does not appear that the courts of the United States 
have been so sophisticated as to allege that they were 
applying international law while covertly invoking municipal 
law. "106
International law is clearly a part of the law of the 
United States, and "where there is neither a [contrary] 
treaty, statute, nor controlling judicial precedent...all 
domestic courts must give effect to customary international 
law."107 Its breaches are recognized as punishable 
independently of internal law.108 Accordingly, prosecutions 
under the UCMJ may be grounded in international law and, in 
fact, that is common court-martial practice when construing 
status of forces agreements,109 post-World War II peace treaty 
duties,110 and other multi-national matters.111
105Rowe, "Murder and the Law of War," 226.
106Baxter, "Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes," 
383.
10748 C.J.S. International Law §4 (NY: American Law Book Co., 1954), 8, citing 
Farmer v Roundtree, 149 F. Supp. 327 (D.C. Tenn., 11953), cert, denied 357 U.S. 
906.
108Republica v deLongchamps.
m U.S. v Sinigar, 20 CMR 46 (USCMA, 1955);(/.S. v Cadenhead, 34 CMR 51 (USCMA, 
1963); U.S. v Carter, 36 CMR 433 (USCMA, 1966).
n 0 U.S. v DeLeo, 17 CMR 148 (USCMA, 1954); U.S. v Vierra, 33 CMR 260 (USCMA, 
1963).
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So, too, is the law of war a part of U.S. law.112 "The
customary law of war will be strictly observed by U.S.
Forces...and, insofar as it is not inconsistent with any 
treaty to which the United States is a party, is binding 
upon. . .persons serving the United States."113
Discussing war crime prosecutions and their relationship 
to international law, Major General George Prugh, former 
Judge Advocate General of the Army, says of the UCMJ:
[Legal personnel] are familiar with it....If you commit a 
murder, for example, of a civilian which amounts to a 
violation of the Geneva conventions, why not charge it 
simply as a murder? You have the same basic elements
that have to be proven.11'1
So grave breaches involving the murder of Vietnamese
noncombatants were tried as common law crimes under U.S.
municipal law, charged as offenses under the UCMJ regardless
of the victim's nationality.115
Insistence that these trials be held by the regular... 
military tribunals provides a certain standard of justice 
and procedure and insures familiarity of the court....
This minimizes the danger that the courts will deprive
the accused of rights because of ignorance.11^
An application of the customary law of war at U.S. 
court-martial was the trial of Captain Eugene M. Kotouc, 
intelligence officer of the parent command of Lieutenant 
Calley's unit at My Lai. Kotouc was initially accused, inter 
alia, of being a principal to murder by standing by while 
South Vietnamese soldiers murdered two Vietnamese civilians
111 U.S. v Weiman and Czertok, 11 CMR 216 (USCMA, 1953), jurisdiction over aliens 
employed by extraterritorial U.S. forces; U.S. v Mitchell, 45 CMR 114 (USCMA, 
1972); and U.S. v Taylor, 45 CMR 343 (USCMA, 1972), application of a U.S. Executive 
Order in Japan.
112Dommer, "The Problem of Obedience to the Unlawful Order," 306, 315.
113Ibid., 318, paraphrasing Dept, of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. I.e.
114Scicchitano, "What's Special About the Bryan Case?" 13.
n5prugh, Law at War. 102.
116Waldemar A. Solf, "A Response to Telford Taylor's Nuremberg and Vietnam," 5 Akron 
L. Rev. 43, 65 (1972). To the same effect: Bishop, Justice Under Fire. 291.
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suspected of being Viet Cong.117 Such mute complicity is 
itself a war crime.118 Though eventually tried for lesser 
offenses, Kotouc's acts were specifically charged as war 
crimes,119 one of the few such instances in the Vietnam War.
The My Lai incident illustrates another potential 
application of the law of war at court-martial. Testifying 
in the court-martial of Calley, his company commander, 
Captain Medina, admitted that the day prior to assaulting My 
Lai he had directed Calley "to utilize prisoners to lead the 
elements through the mine fields."120 Medina was not charged 
with that violation of Geneva Convention III121 because 
occasion to carry out his direction never arose. Had it 
arisen, whether or not injury to prisoners actually resulted, 
both Medina and Calley could have been charged with law of 
war violations — grave breaches denominated as UCMJ 
infractions. Had a death resulted, Calley could have been 
charged with murder for carrying out the order, illegal on 
its face,122 and Medina charged as a principal; Medina's 
participation in all acts constituting the crime would not 
have been required,123 only his sharing of criminal intent and 
purpose.124 Had Medina's order been executed and no injury to 
a prisoner resulted, Calley still would have been liable to
117Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, Four Hours in My Lai: A War Crime and its Aftermath 
(London: Viking, 1992), 148
118U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, 
Rauer Case, 133, 115-17.
119Peers, The My Lai Inquiry. 222. Another My Lai accused, IstLt. Thomas K. 
Willingham, was charged with offenses specifically denominated "war crimes." In both 
his and Kotouc's case the specifications (charges) were otherwise worded as ordinary 
UCMJ offenses. Eventually, charges against Willingham were dropped and Kotouc was 
acquitted.
l20U.S. V Calley, 46 CMR 1131, 1182.
121Arts. 13, 23, 52.
122Dommer, "The Problem of Obedience to the Unlawful Order," 308: "A subordinate 
who carries out the orders of a superior under circumstances evidencing a concert of 
purpose between the superior and subordinate and a conscious sharing of criminal intent 
on the part of the subordinate is considered a principal offender."
l23U.S. v Lyons, 28 CMR 292 (USCMA, 1959).
124t/.S. v Buchanan, 41 CMR (USCMA, 1970).
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prosecution under the UCMJ for assault, and Medina for 
solicitation.
It must be acknowledged that law of war offenses do not 
always neatly correspond to UCMJ breaches. In U.S. v Hodges 
a soldier decapitated the bodies of two VC and, with others, 
posed for photographs with the bodies — a war crime, although 
not a grave breach.125 Hodges was convicted only of an Article 
134 offense, conduct to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline,126 akin to conviction under section 69 of the 
U.K.'s Army Act, 1955. Hodges' charges and punishment are 
not detailed. The maximum confinement imposable upon 
conviction of Article 134, however, varies from one year to 
twenty years, depending on the specific charge, but most 
offenses under this "catch-all" article carry only a three or 
five year maximum,127 "and circumstances might well present 
themselves where this sentence might not be considered to be 
adequate."128 Any grave breach that comes to mind, however, 
suggests a corresponding specific UCMJ charge, the conviction 
of which allows for a substantial maximum punishment.
Nor does the admixture of international law and 
municipal law raise an impediment to appellate review. The 
UCMJ does not contain specific authorization for the Court of 
Military Appeals to apply international law, but neither does 
it specify where the Court is to find it's law.129 As an early 
Court of Military Appeals judge wrote, "this Court is freer 
than any in the land — save again the Supreme Court — to find
125Dept. of the Army, Law of Land Warfare, par. 504.C.
126U.& v Hodges, cited in Lewy, America in Vietnam. 329. Lewy's unreviewable source 
was the Dept, of the Army. There is no reported appellate opinion to reveal if Hodges was 
acquitted of any other charge, or convicted of the sole charge alleged. An additional 
violation of Art. 92, failure to obey an order (a MACV Directive), with a possible 
further six years confinement, appears appropriate.
127Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 127.C, Table of Maximum Punishments.
128Rowe, "Murder and the Law of War," 220.
129Art. 67(d).
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its law where it will, to seek...for principle.. .,,13° indeed, 
"the whole catalog of sources of law is available to the 
Court of Military Appeals.... [A] s a practical matter it can 
use any source of law that it feels suits the needs of proper 
interpretation."131 "When occasion demands the Court 
has...felt free to draw upon the international law of armed 
conflict in reaching its decisions."132 The Courts numerous 
decisions invoking that law, as well as the customary law of 
war, demonstrate the correctness of that assertion and 
emphasize the free application of the law of war in trials by 
U.S. courts-martial.
2.2. Vietnam. 1970
The history of the Vietnam War has been related often and 
well. Here, it is sufficient to recall that a U.S. Marine 
Corps brigade landed at Da Nang in March 1965, marking the 
beginning of the escalation of the war.133 U.S. strength in 
Vietnam peaked in April 1969. By February 197 0, when Randy 
Herrod and his patrol were charged with the murder of sixteen 
Vietnamese at Son Thang, troop strength had declined to about
475,000 and would continue to drop until final withdrawal of 
American combat units in 1973, following the Paris Peace 
Accords.134 Throughout the Vietnam War the legal circumstances 
of the American personnel were unique.
2.2.a. American Forces. Vietnamese Law in a criminal 
proceeding conducted in Vietnam for the murder of Vietnamese 
victims, what prevented Vietnamese officials from asserting
130Paul W. Brosman, "The Court: Freer Than Most," 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 166, 167
(1953). Italics in original.
131Guy A. Zoghby, "Is There A Military Common Law of Crimes?" 27 Military L. Rev. 
75 (1965), 91; 107.
132Carnahan, "The Law of War in the United States Court of Military Appeals," 333.
133Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam. 1965 (Wash.: U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1978), 235.
134U.S. Dept, of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics (Wash.: Directorate for 
Information, 1983), 128.
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legal authority? The Vietnamese civil police and courts 
continued to operate throughout the American presence.135 
Normally, territorial jurisdiction is exclusive and complete. 
Yet the Son Thang trials were conducted solely in American 
military courts.
Jurisdiction, the power of a particular court to hear and 
decide a case, is examined later (see sections 5.1.c.,d.), 
but before reaching the courtroom consider the U.S. 
serviceman's status in Vietnam — his legal standing or 
capacity in the eyes of the host nation. Status, a concept 
of diminishing importance in modern jurisprudence, was 
significant in determining the forum that heard the Son Thang 
cases.
A state generally has no duty to control the activities 
of private individuals, its nationals, beyond the bounds of 
state territory.136 Control of its extra-territorial armed 
service personnel, agents of the state, is another matter.
Whenever armed forces are on foreign territory in the 
service of their home State, they are considered 
exterritorial and remain, therefore, under its 
jurisdiction. A crime committed on foreign territory by 
a member of these forces cannot be punished by the local 
civil or military authorities, but only by the commanding 
officer of the forces or by other authorities of their 
home State. This rule, however...does not apply, if, for 
example, soldiers belonging to a foreign garrison of a 
fortress leave the rayon of the fortress, not on duty but 
for recreation and pleasure, and then and there commit a 
crime. The local authorities are in that case competent
to punish them.137 
The rule described by Professor Oppenheim, whereby a host 
state surrenders jurisdiction over visiting forces in certain
135Charles A. Joiner, Public Administration in the Saigon Metropolitan Area (Michigan: 
Agency for International Development, n.d.), 41, 73; and Prugh, Law at War. 27-29.
136Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, pt. I, 165. A state may 
incur international responsibility, however, should it fail to exercise due diligence in 
preventing harm to another state - storming of an embassy, for example.
1370ppenheim, International Law, vol. I, Peace. 4th ed., ed. McNair, 670.
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circumstances138 has a long history in the U.S.,139 Great 
Britain,140 and other Western nations.141
During World War I, however, the millions of troops on 
foreign soil raised a need for specific articulation of the 
jurisdictional status of visiting troops, rather than 
dependence upon a general rule. The British Empire and 
France entered such an agreement in 1915, followed by similar 
conventions involving other ally nations.142
In American and British practice since World War II, the 
legal standing of visiting forces has been a matter of 
negotiation between the host state and the U.S. or U.K., 
usually commemorated in a status of forces agreement, or 
SOFA. "[W]here a crisis situation does not prevail in the 
host state, various delicate factors will have to be weighed" 
in determining the question of status and, ultimately, 
criminal jurisdiction over visiting troops.143 Whether or not 
one considers "a crisis situation" to have prevailed in 
Vietnam when escalation of the war began (there had been an 
armed American presence in the country since 1954) there 
existed no Vietnamese-American SOFA.
Instead, the parties looked to informal practice and the 
Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina,144 
commonly referred to as the Pentalateral Agreement, to define 
jurisdictional issues. The Pentalateral Agreement was 
concluded between Vietnam, France, Cambodia, Laos, and the
138The varying situations where, absent other agreement, jurisdictional "waiver” does 
or does not apply are exhaustively explored in three articles by G.P. Barton, "Foreign 
Armed Forces," 26 BYIL 380 (1949), 27 BYIL 186 (1950), and 31 BYIL 341
(1954) .
139The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
Chung Chi v The King.
141 The Casablanca case (1909), Hague Court Reports, i. 110.
142Archibald King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," 36 AJIL 539 
(1942) .
143D.S. Wijewardane, "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Forces With Special 
Reference to International Forces," 41 BYIL 122, 196 (1965-66), the most 
authoritative article on the subject.
1442 U.S.T. 2757, T.I.A.S. No. 2447.
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U.S. in 1950, long before the 1965 landings. Less than six 
pages long, including annexes, the Agreement's terms were 
broad and general. Like similar pacts with other nations, 
the Pentalateral Agreement provided that American forces 
entering Vietnam would be considered members of the U.S. 
diplomatic mission with the same legal status as actual 
members of the mission of corresponding grade. Military 
personnel were divided into three categories: senior military 
members of the mission with full diplomatic status and full 
immunity; a lesser undefined category which also would enjoy 
exclusion from Vietnamese civil and criminal jurisdiction; 
and the third category, whose membership was again undefined, 
with the similarly undefined legal status of clerical 
personnel of the diplomatic mission. In 1958, the U.S. 
advised the Vietnamese government that it would consider top 
U.S. commanders to be in the first category, all other 
officers to be in the second category, and enlisted men to be 
in the third category, in terms of legal status then, these 
"extremely liberal treaty provisions"145 viewed U.S. 
infantrymen as diplomatic mission clerks.
In normal diplomatic practice involving similar 
agreements with other states — Belgium, Nationalist China, 
and Norway, for example — personnel of the third category 
enjoy no immunity whatsoever and are subject to the full 
jurisdiction of the receiving [host] state."146 Not so, where 
the Pentalateral Agreement was concerned. " [T]he general 
issue...was a matter of interest and discussion in early 1965 
in Saigon," recalls the Army's then-senior lawyer in Vietnam. 
"There was no interest on either the US or the RVN side to 
change the modus vivendi that existed via the Pentalateral 
Agreement."147
145Wade S. Hooker, Jr., and David H. Savasten, "The Geneva Convention of 1949: 
Application in the Vietnamese Conflict," 5 Virginia J. of International L. 243, 244.
146Serge Lazareff, Status of Military Forces Under Current International Law 
(Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971), 51.
147MGen. George S. Prugh, California, to author, London, 29 Nov. 1991.
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The Pentalateral Agreement and 1958 advisory (addendum) 
specifying the U.S. military's status under it, are the 
accords referred to by General William Westmoreland when he 
writes that "under agreements preceding American commitment 
...discipline of American troops was to be an American 
responsibility.1,148 Although apparently unaware of America's 
international practice to the contrary as to enlisted 
personnel, Westmoreland's statement was accurate, for the 
usual international practice was not applied in South 
Vietnam.
When the Pentalateral Agreement was signed in 1950, the 
signatory parties obviously meant the agreement to apply 
to the activities of the small U.S. Military Advisory 
Assistance Group...There were 200 to 300 of these...it is 
unlikely that the diplomats ever imagined that its simple 
provisions would govern the legal status and activities
of almost 600,000 Americans in Vietnam.149 
The vague Pentalateral Agreement remained in force, seeming 
to grant enlisted personnel an undefined, semi-diplomatic 
immunity. A clearer or more detailed agreement was never 
negotiated and jurisdiction over low-ranking U.S. troops 
charged with murdering Vietnamese could not be predicted with 
assurance. That was because although the practice was for 
the U.S. military to discipline its own, the Agreement 
neither required that approach, nor specified immunity from 
host nation laws for third category U.S. forces — the low- 
ranking combat troops who were most likely to fall afoul of 
the criminal law.
2.2.b. The "Mere Gook Rule" South Vietnam is a nation 
divided into provinces, each province subdivided into 
districts. Districts have many villages, most made up of 
several hamlets. The Vietnamese are an agrarian society
148Gen. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (NY: Doubleday, 1976), 247. 
There was another agreement as to civilian personnel (MACV Directive 190-1 of 23 
June 1967) but not as to service personnel. MACV Directive 27-1 of 16 April 1965, 
par. 10, did explicate U.S. military jurisdictional status in much the same terms as the 
Agreement and its advisory.
149Prugh, Law at War. 118.
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whose loyalties have always been decidedly local. For those 
not uprooted by the war, life centered around family and 
hamlet.150
The South Vietnamese encountered in the combat zone were, 
by Western standards, unsophisticated and unschooled. It was 
impossible to differentiate the peasant farmer from the 
enemy. Roughly speaking, the Vietnamese enemy fell into 
three categories: local militia, or Viet Cong (VC), who
often were also local farmers; and main force regulars.151 The 
uniform of the VC was the dress of the peasant population: 
the thin, black ao abab, a pajama-like tunic and trousers 
worn by both males and females.
[T]he population did not try to sit out the war...The 
people were the enemy. It was a brutal war of snipers, 
ambushes, and old women who planted booby traps — and 
where the Search & Destroy doctrine was most cruelly 
interpreted by frustrated and inexperienced U.S.
forces.15^
While this pessimistic view did not reflect the attitude of 
all Americans toward the South Vietnamese it was that of a 
substantial portion and gained ascendancy as the conflict 
wore on. Early in the war, U.S. troops were better trained 
and disciplined, with fewer Reservists involved in the 
fighting. Over time, increased manpower needs, lowered 
recruiting standards, and the war's political unpopularity 
were reflected in the soldiers' attitudes toward the
Vietnamese. After repeated instances of children killing 
U.S. soldiers from ambush and women victimizing soldiers
through booby traps and deadly ruses, servicemen grew wary
and suspicious of all Vietnamese, regardless of sex or age.153
150Ibid., 17.
151Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (NY: Pantheon Books, 1961; NY: Schocken 
Books, 1972), 350. This is a simplified description of the enemy force. A detailed, 
authoritative breakdown is in: Douglas Pike, PAVN: The People's Armv of Vietnam (NY: 
Presidio Press, 1986), 89-91, 247-51.
152Keith W. Nolan, Death Valley (California: Presidio Press, 1987), 22.
153Dept. of the Army, Review of the Preliminary Investigation into the My Lai Incident. 
hereafter: Peers Inquiry (Wash.: Dept, of the Army, 1970), ch. 8.I., reprinted in
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"So you begin to think they're all your enemies. And that 
all of them are something not quite human...You give them 
names to depersonalize them, to categorize them. ..They become 
dinks and slopes and slants and gooks...1,154 "The rule in 
Viet-Nam was the M.G.R. — the 'mere gook rule': that it was 
no crime to kill or torture or rob or maim a Vietnamese 
because he was a mere gook."155 "The trouble is no one sees 
the Vietnamese as people. They're not people. Therefore it 
doesn't matter what you do to them."156
Colonel David J. Cassady was a judge advocate in Vietnam. 
He recalls prosecuting a Marine charged with rape. The 
accused, against whom the evidence was clear, raised consent 
as a defense. The officer-jurors found the accused not 
guilty. Colonel Cassady later spoke to the officer who had 
been the senior juror and recalls him saying: "There's not 
much doubt what happened there, but we're not going to ruin 
the lives of these young Marines for some Vietnamese. 
'Vietnamese' wasn't the word he used," Colonel Cassady added. 
"This became referred to — and there were other cases similar 
to that one...the mere gook theory."157
The word "gook" originally referred not to Vietnamese, 
but to Nicaraguans, its first use noted during the U.S. 
intervention in Nicaragua in 1912.158 The term was common in 
Vietnam.
Callousness toward the Vietnamese was also caused by the 
writings and pronouncements of many American journalists 
and politicians who...for years exaggerated the faults of 
the South Vietnamese...and gradually created an image of
Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz, The My Lai Massacre and Its 
Cover-up (NY: Free Press, 1970), 199.
154Richard Hammer, One Morning in the War (NY: Coward-McCann, 1970), 71.
155Richard Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley (NY: Coward-McCann & Geoghegan, 
1971), 392.
156Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 171.
157Col. David J. Cassady, interview by author, 4 Nov. 1986, Wash., tape recording 
6493, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
158John R. Elting, Dan Craig and Ernest Deal, A Dictionary of Soldier Talk (NY: 
Scribner's, 1985), 135.
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Ipeople not worth defending, if not altogether 
worthless.^
"[0]rdinary soldiers under the strains and stresses of modern 
warfare can hardly be expected to bear [law of war] 
injunctions in mind,H writes Professor L.C. Green, "when the 
enemy...has been denigrated by their high command, their 
political leaders and the media to the level of uncivilized 
sub - humans. "160
But passing the buck of societal prejudice to the media 
and senior commanders is too easy, too facile. Few wars have 
had so little propaganda raised against the enemy by national 
or military leadership. Significant segments of the U.S. and 
British populations even viewed the Viet Cong with respect 
and admiration. The mind-set illustrated by the "mere gook 
rule," ubiquitous in conversation among U.S. forces of all 
ranks in Vietnam, reflected casual, unthinking racism and 
cultural arrogance. True, combatants have always used 
appellations of varying crudeness to describe their enemies; 
redcoats, rebs, and krauts, for example. Nor does the
military hold a copyright on the use of such terms. But
"wherever such antipathies exist, the prospects for
limitation, restraint, and humanity in warfare have always 
been.. .poor indeed. "161
Lieutenant General William Peers, senior member of the 
panel that investigated the My Lai incident and its cover-up, 
reported:
The most disturbing factor we encountered was the low 
regard in which some of the men held the
Vietnamese...considering them subhuman, on the level of 
dogs....Some of the men never referred to Vietnamese as 
anything but "gooks"....We thought that perhaps the units 
had included an unusual number of men of inferior 
quality....The result [of a personnel analysis] concluded
159Lewy, America in Vietnam , 310.
160Green, "Aftermath of Vietnam," in Falk, The Vietnam War and International Law, vol. 
IV, 147, 172.
161Best, Humanity in Warfare. 220.
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that the men.. .were about average as compared with other 
units in the Army."16^
Sociologists are familiar with the result of such 
dehumanization.
when victims are dehumanized...the moral restraints 
against killing or harming them become less effective.
Groups of people who are systematically demonized, 
assigned to inferior or dangerous categories, and 
identified by derogatory labels are readily excluded from 
the bonds of human empathy and the protection of moral
and legal precepts.163 
The part played by the "mere gook rule" in the Son Thang 
murders cannot be documented but was surely significant.
2.2.C. Free Fire Zones: Fire at Will a significant nonlegal 
factor in the Son Thang courts-martial was the free fire 
zone. Throughout the Vietnam War, unless actually being 
fired upon, it was necessary for U.S. combat forces to obtain 
explicit permission to employ their weapons against the enemy 
— and this constraint was generally enforced, often to the 
puzzlement and anger of U.S. personnel endangered by it. 
Enforced, that is, unless the unit was operating in a free 
fire zone.*
In 1966, certain areas in South Vietnam were designated 
by the Vietnamese government as being uninhabited and 
declared cleared areas, known as "free fire zones." A free 
fire zone was ostensibly free of Vietnamese populace and 
approved for employment of military fire and maneuver.164 
Often the populace had been forcibly removed to refugee camps 
in order to clear the area. In a resulting free fire zone 
the enemy could be taken under fire as soon as detected.
i62peers, The My Lai Inquiry. 230-31; to the same effect: Peter Karsten, Law. 
Soldiers, and Combat (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 35.
163Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience (Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 163.
* Officially, the term "free fire zone" was replaced in 1967 by "specified strike zone." 
No one outside General Westmoreland’s headquarters paid attention to the semantic 
change. :.~
164Dept. of the Army, Peers Inquiry, ch. 9.B.1.C, in Goldstein, The My Lai Massacre. 
2 1 2 .
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Otherwise, permission to fire was first required from a 
military coordinator and the Vietnamese province chief via 
time-consuming radio relays. The theory was that the VC 
lived among the rural civilian population. If, as postulated 
in free fire zones, the population were removed, whoever 
remained must be the enemy.
But villagers were often unhappy with life in the refugee 
camps to which they were moved. "People did not return at 
the end of the work day and others crept off to return to old 
homes, more concerned with what the VC could do to them [in 
the refugee camps] than what the Americans could do for 
them."165 Or out of sympathy for the VC they drifted back into 
cleared areas or managed to evade resettlement in the first 
instance. Hence, they were in harm's way during any local 
combat operation. While "it is not likely that these 
civilian casualties raise an issue of criminal liability as 
long as adequate notice of the designation of an area as [a 
free fire zone] was given,"166 they remained potential victims 
of war. The only way to establish control over some VC- 
dominated parts of the country, General Westmoreland wrote, 
"was to remove the people and destroy the village. That 
done, operations could be conducted without fear of civilian 
casualties."167 Unfortunately, that assumption often did not 
correspond to reality.
The village of Son Thang was on the edge of a free fire 
zone where prior permission to fire was not required.168 Later 
trial testimony indicated that the South Vietnamese 
government had urged its residents to move to secure areas, 
warning them that their huts bordered a free fire zone. 
Villagers who remained were considered, with some basis, to
165Nolan, Death Valley. 43.
166Lewy, America in Vietnam. 229.
167Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. 152.
168Lt.Gen. Charles G. Cooper, Interview by Benis Frank, session 10, 14 Aug. 1986, 
transcript, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash., n.p.; and, 
Lt.Col. Richard E. Theer, California, to author, Wash., 24 Feb. 1989.
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be, at the least, VC sympathizers. Enemy sympathizers, "mere 
gooks," on a free fire zone border: elements that set the 
stage for what was to come.
2.2.d. Impact of the Calley Case in November 1969, three 
months before the Herrod patrol was alleged to have murdered 
noncombatants at Son Thang, Army First Lieutenant William L. 
Calley, Jr., was charged with the premeditated murder of "not 
less than" 109 Vietnamese at My Lai.169 Even before the 
official charges were served, world-wide publicity made 
Calley and My Lai infamous.
In 1975, the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General took a 
conservative, but seemingly correct, legal view of the crimes 
committed at My Lai in 1968:
Technically, of course, the killing of those South 
Vietnamese people was not a war crime. The victims were 
citizens of an allied nation, not enemies protected under 
the Geneva Conventions, but citizens protected by the law 
of Vietnam.. .within the scope of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, the My Lai murders were not legally
distinguishable from other homicides...17®
Telford Taylor, former chief prosecutor for the subsequent 
Nuremberg proceedings, disagreed, pointing out that My Lai 
was regarded as VC-controlled and armed and enemy resistance 
was expected. "It would be highly artificial," Taylor wrote, 
"to say that this was not 'hostile* territory within the 
meaning of the Hague Convention, or to question the 
applicability of the laws of war..."171
Neither Taylor nor the Judge Advocate General are 
entirely correct in assessing the law. Article 4 of the 1949 
Geneva Convention IV, specifying those protected by the 
Convention, reads: "[N]ationals of a co-belligerent State," 
as South Vietnam was, vis-a-vis the U.S., "shall not be 
regarded as protected persons..." Nor does protected status
169Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley. 46-47.
170Prugh, Law at War. 102.
171Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 134.
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turn on the hostile character of the territory, as Taylor 
suggests, even under the Hague Conventions he apparently 
refers to.172 The particular law of war Taylor invokes was not 
applicable. But the Judge Advocate General's assertion that 
the killings were not war crimes, as that term is commonly 
defined, is too narrow and similarly incorrect. Under 
customary law of war, the Nuremberg Principles,173 or the U.S. 
Army's own tautological definition,174 My Lai was a war crime. 
In its appellate opinion reviewing the Calley case, the Army 
Court of Military Review noted without elaboration, "Although 
all charges could have been laid as war crimes, they were 
prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice."175
Even under the 1949 Conventions cited by the Judge 
Advocate General, the prisoner of war Convention was arguably 
breached at My Lai. The My Lai civilians had not taken up 
arms to resist Calley and his platoon, but uncertainty as to 
that fact raised the question in the minds of Calley's men as 
to the civilians' status as combatants. The Vietnamese were 
believed to be VC supporters, if not actual VC cadre. But 
were they? "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons 
...belong to any of the [POW] categories enumerated," 
Convention III reads, "...such persons shall enjoy the 
protection of the present Convention..."176 Ambiguities in the 
Conventions should be resolved in favor of their widest 
possible coverage consistent with their humanitarian 
purposes.177 While there may be room for argument, the status 
of the My Lai victims, combatants or civilians, should
172The Hague Conventions respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land of July 29, 
1899 and Oct. 18, 1907, which 1949 Geneva Convention IV supplements (Art. 154).
173Principle Vl.b. (See Appendix B.)
174The Army’s definition: "The term 'war crime' is the technical expression for a 
violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every 
violation of the law of war is a war crime." U.S. Dept, of the Army, The Law of Land 
Warfare, par. 499.
175U.S. v Calley, 46 CMR 1131, 1138 (ACMR, 1973).
176Art. 5.
177Note, "The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam," 
854-55 .
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reasonably have been in doubt and POW status accorded them 
until that doubt was resolved.
Calley was convicted by court-martial of the premeditated 
murder of twenty-two Vietnamese and one assault with intent 
to commit murder. He was sentenced to loss of all pay, 
dismissal from the Army, and confinement at hard labor for 
life. Fourteen soldiers had been charged, four tried, but 
only Calley was convicted of criminal acts involving the My 
Lai killings and their subsequent cover-up.
Upon initial review, Calley's confinement was reduced to 
twenty years. Final military review left the reduced 
sentence undisturbed.178 President Richard Nixon, in an 
apparently political response to public dissatisfaction with 
the court-martial verdict,179 released Calley from confinement 
pending appellate review of his case, ordering him into 
guarded officer's quarters to await further consideration of 
his case. The Secretary of the Army then reduced Calley*s 
confinement to ten years and he was released in November 
1974, pending further appeal. After the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied certiorari the Army transferred Calley to a brig 
until, within four months and three weeks, he was eligible 
for release by reason of having served one-third of his 
sentence, with credit for pretrial confinement.180
To the dismay of many who served in Vietnam, Calley was 
lionized by large segments of the public, unfamiliar with the 
law of war and largely ignorant of the circumstances of My 
Lai. A judge advocate wrote of the Calley case:
[S]ome who seemingly bathe in unawareness have even 
suggested that to prosecute a person who violates the law 
of war is to make the accused a scapegoat. Certainly 
this is a confusion of terms in that 'scapegoat' implies
a sacrifice of an innocent thing.181
178 U.S. v Calley, 48 CMR 19 (USCMA, 1973).
179Comment, "Punishment for War Crimes: Duty - or Discretion?" 1346, fn. 203.
180Prugh, to author, 29 Nov. 1991.
181Jordan J. Paust, "My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility," 57
Military L. Rev. 99,108 (1972).
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Still, seventy-nine percent of the respondents in a Gallup 
poll disapproved of Calley! s having been tried. Only nine 
percent approved.182 Entire draft boards resigned in protest 
over his trial. Patriotic organizations raised legal fees 
for him. State capitols flew flags at half mast.
More importantly, My Lai immediately changed the way 
America's armed forces were trained.
The operations in...Vietnam and the United States courts 
martial arising therefrom demonstrate that there was 
something gravely lacking in the education being given to 
United States armed forces.182
Regulations had long required minimal training and periodic
updating of instruction in the law of war during initial
indoctrination of enlisted personnel. Refresher training had
been required for troops in Vietnam, as well.184 But that
training, if given at all, was perfunctory.185 Newly
commissioned Marine Corps officers received no training,
perfunctory or otherwise, during their schooling.186 During
thirteen months spent in Vietnam in 1966-67, Brigadier
General Michael E. Rich, Director of Marine Corps Judge
Advocates, but then an infantry captain, received none of the
required law of war training, ("Zero," as he put it), nor did
the men in his charge. ("Zero," he repeated.)187 Former
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General P.X. Kelley, who
spent two years in Vietnam combat, says neither he or his men
received the training. ("None.")188 But another Marine
officer, a brigadier general while in Vietnam, recalls that
182Kelman and Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience. 169.
183Leslie C. Green, "The Man in the Field and the Maxim Ignorantia Juris non Excusat," 
19 Archiv des Volkerrechts 169, 181 (1980/1981).
184Prugh, Law at War. 74-75.
185Lewy, America in Vietnam. 366.
186Maj. Herbert D. Williams, "The Army Lawyer as an International Law Instructor" 
(Thesis, U.S. Army School of the Judge Advocate General: Virginia, 1976), 8.
187BGen. Michael E. Rich, interview by author, 26 Aug. 1990, London, tape recording, 
author's collection.
188Gen. Paul X. Kelley, Interview by author, 12 Dec. 1990, Wash., tape recording, 
author's collection.
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"there was a presumption that all officers were schooled in 
these matters as part of their regular military 
education....This would probably apply to noncommissioned 
officers, too."189 That presumption was not correct. "The law 
of war," wrote a Marine Corps lawyer, "is often viewed 
as...an unnecessary, unrealistic restraining device 
inhibiting the combat commander..."190
After My Lai, expanded training courses were initiated 
for all U.S. armed forces. The Army's Judge Advocate General 
admits:
It's no secret that we had gotten lax in the military 
about teaching...the Hague and Geneva conventions — the 
law of war....After the Peers commission...all hell broke 
loose and we started teaching law of war day and 
night.191
New directives were issued containing combat-related examples 
applying law of war, and providing instruction for officers 
and noncommissioned officers regarding their duty to report 
its violation. "Since murder is so obviously a major crime," 
General Westmoreland wrote, "surely it was unnecessary to put 
out a specific order...not to murder unarmed civilians."192 
Training films were produced.193 Compliance with the newly 
mandated training was closely monitored.
Still, the Army's post-My Lai Judge Advocate General 
argues that it is incorrect that "there was little attention 
paid to Law of War matters until after My Lai, [or that] then 
there was a panic reaction."194 He points out that:
Much law of war material... does sprout from basic 
morality and common sense. It is very late to try to 
teach an eighteen- or nineteen-year old rifleman, as he
189BGen. Edwin H. Simmons, interview by author, 17 Dec. 1990, Wash., tape 
recording, author's collection.
190W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," pt. I, Marine Corps Gazette. Aug. 1976, 21.
191MGen. William K. Suter, interview by author, 11 December 1990, Virginia, tape 
recording, author's collection.
192Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. 288.
193"What the Army is Doing to Prevent Another My Lai," U.S. News & World Report. 12 
April 1971, 24-25.
194Prugh to author, 29 Nov. 1991.
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is about to enter combat, that he should carefully 
distinguish combatants from noncombatants and that he
should not kill helpless people.^
Perhaps the most significant outcome of My Lai was that 
the law of war became a constant consideration in the minds 
of commanders. The result of allowing or disregarding 
breaches had been dramatically highlighted and few officers 
were likely to ignore the moral and legal responsibilities 
they now understood themselves to carry. Military cynics 
might have added that neither would they overlook the career- 
ending damage a cover-up would wreak, once discovered.
That awareness and sense of responsibility did not reach 
as far as the Son Thang patrol members, though it did reach 
far enough to ensure their courts-martial.
2.3. U.S. Marines in Vietnam
South Vietnam was a nation of sixteen million people. Forty 
percent of the country is uninhabited, covered by jungle, 
scrub brush, elephant grass, and swamp. A thin strip of 
arable land extends along the coast, where the bulk of the 
populace lives. Throughout the war South Vietnam, 
partitioned from North Vietnam at the 17th parallel, was 
divided into four military and governmental regions: Corps 
Tactical Zones I, II, III, and IV. A demilitarized zone 
extended five kilometers on each side of the 17th parallel. 
The I Corps Tactical Zone, referred to simply as I ("Eye") 
Corps, was just inside South Vietnam's border, immediately 
south of the demilitarized zone. The U.S. Marine Corps had 
responsibility for American combat operations in I Corps. 
The U.S. Army was responsible for the three more southerly 
zones.
2.3.a. i Corps Marines Some of the war's heaviest fighting 
occurred in I Corps.
195Ibid.
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The Demilitarized Zone and northern I Corps were an ideal 
battleground for the Vietnamese....Their lines of supply 
and reinforcement were obviously shortest along the 
Demilitarized Zone, and whenever a Vietnamese unit needed 
to break off a fight it could easily gain sanctuary 
across the DMZ....The land...is broken even along the 
coast, with hills, stretches of sand dunes, and swamps 
interspersed among the rice fields. The...mountains
beyond are among the wildest on earth...^
In mid-1969 U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam began in 
incremental stages. By February 197 0, the time of Herrod's 
Son Thang patrol, 55,000 Marines remained in I Corps.
The senior Marine unit in I Corps, and Vietnam, was the 
3d Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) , with headquarters at Da 
Nang. Two infantry divisions were III MAF's operating units. 
A Marine Corps infantry division was comprised of about
28,000 men.
Of the two divisions, the 3d Marine Division operated in 
the far north of I Corps, where contact with uniformed, main- 
force enemy units was the norm. Combat engagements were 
often sustained and fierce. The 1st Marine Division, on the 
other hand, operated in central and southern I Corps, where 
the enemy was often the elusive VC irregular. Combat for the 
1st Division was more often brief; a land mine, or momentary 
firefight with only a fleeting view of the enemy — if that. 
"Both approaches were equally lethal, but the frustration in 
the [southern] DaNang area would be the greater because of 
the near impossibility of retaliating."197 The differing types 
of combat encountered by the 3d and 1st Marine Divisions was 
marked and significant. Herrod*s Son Thang patrol came from 
the 1st Marine Division, in central I Corps.
The Duke of Wellington reputedly said there are no bad 
troops; there are only bad captains. Wellington was never in 
Vietnam. In 197 0 the Marines had problems besides those 
raised by the VC. During that period there was an alarming 
general breakdown of discipline, not only in I Corps Marines,
196Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie (London: Jonathon Cape, 1989; Picador, 1990), 
638-39 .
197Lewis B. Puller, Fortunate Son (NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 98.
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but among all U.S. forces in Vietnam. "The morale, 
discipline and battleworthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, 
with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any 
time in this century and possibly in the history of the 
United States," wrote a respected commentator.198 Another 
writer noted: "Standards had collapsed; morale was a farce; 
and discipline in many units resembled something very close 
to anarchy."199 The unrest in the military reflected divisions 
wracking American society as a whole, including the war's 
ever-growing unpopularity. Court-martial rates were higher 
than ever before. Marijuana sale and use was so prevalent 
that they overloaded the military justice system and, when 
discovered, often did not even result in trial. Murder and 
aggravated assault, of Marines by Marines, were no longer 
unusual. The Da Nang brig was filled with men so hardened 
that first-time offenders were seldom allowed to be confined 
there. Racial incidents, long a serious problem in Vietnam, 
had become frequent and alarmingly violent. Marine Corps' 
accounts reflect that 1969 and 197 0 were the Corps' 
"disciplinary nadir."200 To be sure, most Marines carried out 
their duties reliably and without incident, but the pervasive 
breakdown of discipline was felt in every combat unit. The 
problem was based, in significant part, on the quality of 
individual the armed services were accepting during those 
turbulent years.
2.3.b. The Impact of Project 100.000 Few outside the ranks 
of Vietnam-era military officers realize the harm done the 
armed services, and the conduct of the war in Vietnam, by 
Project 100,000. Few Americans would even recognize the
198Col. Robert D. Heinl, "The Collapse of the Armed Forces," Armed Forces Journal. 7 
June 1971, 30.
199Rick Atkinson, The Long Grev Line (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 366.
200Lt.Col. Gary D. Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam (Wash.: U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1989), 140-41; to the same effect, Cosmas, U.S. Marines in Vietnam. 1970- 
1971. 369.
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term. Having dealt with the criminality that Project 100,000 
engendered, military lawyers were particularly aware of its 
disservice.
In 1964 a U.S. Federal task force found that the military 
services rejected about 600,000 men each year who failed to 
meet intelligence standards. The task force suggested that 
some of these men were suitable for military duty. With the 
war's increased manpower needs in mind, Project 100,000, "an 
ill-conceived program,"201 was implemented, requiring the 
military to accept some of those previously rejected.
Armed forces entrance examinations, standard for all 
services, classify prospective entrants into five 
intelligence categories. Those scoring in categories I, II, 
and III are automatically acceptable for service; those in 
category V are automatically rejected. A small number of 
category ivs had always been accepted, but now all services 
were required to accept many more. In October 1966, 40,000 
category IVs, "cat-fours," were ordered accepted for service 
the following year and 100,000 more each year thereafter. It 
became necessary to turn away better qualified volunteers to 
meet the mandatory "cat-four" quota. "Through 'Project 
100,000' they had to accept men of lower intelligence ratings 
who were ill-suited for the exacting demands of a 
counter insurgency war like Vietnam. The results could have 
been expected."202
The influx of "cat-fours" had an immediate negative 
effect on discipline. General Westmoreland bluntly said: 
"Category IV is a dummy...That [program] introduced a weak- 
minded, criminal, untrained element....When those people came 
to Vietnam.. .that's when disciplinary problems began on the 
battlefield."203 "Cat-fours" had both desertions and court-
201 Puller, Fortunate Son. 77.
202Lewy, America in Vietnam. 331.
203Laura Palmer, "The General, At Ease: An Interview With Westmoreland," MHO. The 
Quarterly Journal of Military History. Autumn 1988, 34.
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martial convictions at about double the rate of other 
servicemen. General Robert E. Cushman, commander of Marine: 
forces in Vietnam from mid-1967 to mid-1969, said: "We just 
had a hell of a time with quality....I was always massaging 
the numbers and trying to get the mental Group IVs down to 
the lowest possible level."204 General Leonard F. Chapman, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps at the height of the war, 
vowed: "We're going to fight to the highest levels of
government projects like Project 100,000....We're going to do 
everything possible to get rid of them. "205 But the 
requirement continued until June, 197l,206 their two-year 
enlistments extending until after the war's end.
By 197 0, seven percent of Marine Corps enlisted strength 
was "cat-four,"207 their relatively small numbers illustrating 
the military adage that commanders spend ninety percent of 
their time dealing with ten percent of their men. Many "cat- 
fours" were virtually untrainable, requiring constant close 
supervision. Leadership standards, as well, tended to fall 
as the war progressed and the necessary supervision was often 
lacking. Many "cat-fours" became disciplinary problems, 
requiring the attention not only of commanders but military 
police, investigators, judge advocates, and warders. 
Ultimately, the manpower dividend of Project 100,000 resulted 
in a manpower deficit.
Of the five Son Thang patrol members, three appear to 
have been "cat-fours."
2.3.C. Personnel Turbulence An advantage of the British 
regimental system is the strong unit identification 
engendered in each regimental member. Many British soldiers
204Gen. Charles E. Cushman, jr., Interview by Benis Frank, n.d. 1984, transcript, Oral 
History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash., 344, 361.
205Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., remarks before General Officer's Symposium, Wash., 
1970, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
206Capt. David A. Dawson, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash., to author, London, 6 
March 1992.
207Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam. 74, 203.
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pass their entire military careers in the same regiment. 
Robert Graves wrote of his World War I service in the Royal 
Welch Fusiliers: " [W] e all agreed that regimental pride
remained the strongest moral force that kept a battalion 
going as an effective fighting unit; contrasting it 
particularly with patriotism and religion.1,208 No less was 
true a half-century later in Vietnam, but the unifying 
element of unit integrity was not employed there.
U.S. troops served for one year in Vietnam then left for 
assignment elsewhere. The known length of tour was 
considered beneficial to morale. "A limited tour is 
particularly desirable in Vietnam," wrote General 
Westmoreland, "because of the intensity of combat and the 
debilitating climate and environment of Southeast Asia."209 
But another view was expressed by Colonel Bui Tin of the 
enemy North Vietnamese army:
Only one year! He spends six months learning; for three 
months he is a good fighter, but for the last three 
months he is trying to...make sure he stays alive. About 
the time he is ready to fight, he was ready to leave! I
do not understand such a policy.2*0 
Eventually, even General Westmoreland agreed with Colonel 
Tin: "It may be that I erred..."211
But that was not his stance while the conflict was in 
progress. At the war's outset, whole units came to and 
departed Vietnam as cohesive entities. By 197 0 combat 
deaths, woundings, sickness, and various other factors led to 
personnel, both officer and enlisted, joining and leaving 
units individually. "The problem was to maintain unit 
efficiency and cohesion, and develop teamwork in the face of
208Robert Graves, Goodbye To All That (London: Jonathon Cape, 1929; Penguin Classics, 
1960), 157.
209Gen. William C. Westmoreland, "The State of the Command," in Report on the War in 
Vietnam, sec. II (Wash.: U.S. GPO, 1969), 242; and, Anthony Kellett, "The Soldier in 
Battle: Motivational and Behavioral Aspects of the Combat Experience," in Betty Glad, 
ed., Psychological Dimensions of War (California: Sage Publications, 1990), 222.
210Morley Safer, Flashbacks (NY: Random House, 1990), 23.
21 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. 417.
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a high personnel turnover rate....The one-year tour... 
stretched the experienced leadership available from career 
personnel very thin..."212 The staged withdrawal of U.S. 
forces exacerbated this "personnel turbulence," as military 
manpower chiefs termed it: whole units were to be withdrawn 
from Vietnam though many in the withdrawing unit had not 
completed their year-long tour of duty. The Marine Corps' 
solution was Operation Mixmaster, which sent those with time 
remaining to other units and replaced them with men from 
still other units whose year was nearly completed.213
Marine commanders almost universally deplored the iirpact 
of the "mixmaster" on unit effectiveness and on the well­
being of the individual Marine....Mass personnel 
transfers resulted in the loss of key Marines and
undermined morale and efficiency.214 
In a sociological sense "the policy was ineffective and 
disruptive,"215 minimizing the importance of personal 
attachments.
Of the five Son Thang patrol members, Herrod, the patrol 
leader, had joined the company little more than two months 
previously; another patrol member had been transferred to the 
unit a week before the patrol; a third, only five days 
previously.
2.3.d. 1st Battalion. 7th Marines in the American Marine 
Corps, infantry units, in descending order of size, are: 
division, regiment, battalion, company, and platoon. The Son
212Gen. Bruce Palmer, The Twenty-Five-Year War (Kentucky: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984), 170.
213Keith Fleming, The U.S. Marine Corps in Crisis (SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1990), 7.
214Cosmas, U.S. Marines in Vietnam. 1970-1971. 333. In the 1980s, unit transfer, 
rather than individual transfer, became Marine policy. "Nothing will be more 
important in the manpower business," wrote the commander of Marine forces in the Gulf 
War,"than putting Marines in units and letting them stay there." MGen. Walter E. 
Boomer, "Smaller and Better in the 1990s," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , May 
1990, 106.
215Roger W. Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," in Morris Janowitz, 
ed., The New Military (NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), 221. The writer's subject 
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Thang patrol came from the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines. 
(In Marine Corps usage, the defining term, "regiment" is 
omitted, it being understood — by Marines, if few others — 
that an ordinal number followed by the word "Marines" in fact 
refers to a regiment.) Battalion and regimental designations, 
when written, are denoted in the form of a fraction. Thus, 
the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, is written "1/7" and 
pronounced "one-seven."
The 1st Marine Division was headquartered at Da Nang. 
The Seventh Marines, 3,951 strong, was one of three infantry 
regiments that made up the 1st Marine Division. The first 
battalion of the Seventh Marines, 1/7, numbered 1,225 men, 
and was one of three infantry battalions that comprised the 
7th Marines.
The regiment, along with other units, was responsible for 
protecting Da Nang and its heavily populated suburbs from the 
enemy. Its responsibility was to patrol the mountainous 
jungle to the west of Da Nang, the Que Son Valley, and a 
portion of the coastal plain. Although removed from the 
Demilitarized Zone where fighting was frequently fierce, 1/7 
and other 1st Division units were not in any rest area. In 
the last half of 1969 the Division had suffered 419 killed.
Clearly, 1/7 was a combat-experienced battalion. In 
heavy fighting during late 1969, its commander had been 
killed in action. In the ninety days prior to the Son Thang 
patrol, 1/7 was engaged in combat every day. In the week 
before the Son Thang patrol the battalion suffered thirteen 
killed and thirteen wounded; the month before that another 
thirteen had been killed and forty wounded.216 And 1/7 gave as 
good as it got. An officer who was in the battalion
216l/7 Command Chronology, Jan. and Feb. 1970. Combat Records Section, Marine 
Corps Historical Center, Wash. All battalion- and larger-size units were required to 
maintain a monthly command chronology detailing combat and garrison activities - an 
invaluable historical source.
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throughout that period recalled that 1/7 was "operationally 
keen and efficient...a well-oiled war machine."217
The battalion*s chronology (war diary) for the month of 
January 197 0 includes the notation that it "operated within 
assigned areas of operations, concentrating on platoon, squad 
and Killer Team patrols."218 It was one of those killer teams 
that was sent into Son Thang on 19 February 197 0.
217Col. Raymond A. Hord, interview by author, 8 May 1990, Virginia, tape recording, 
author’s collection.
2181/7 Command Chronology, Jan. 1970, 6.
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CHAPTER 3. THE SON THANG INCIDENT
The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
Thucydides
How many combat patrols were undertaken by U.S. forces in 
the course of the Vietnam War? Half-a-million? A million? 
How many of that number led to criminal misconduct? Among 
the infinitesimally small percentage of combat actions that 
involved grave breach of the law of war the Song Thang 
incident remains among the most stark examples of wartime 
excess.
Besides those directly involved in the case, there were 
commanders, lawyers and supporting personnel, all leaving 
their mark on the resulting criminal trials.
In this chapter those with a direct impact on the case 
are introduced and the Son Thang incident itself is depicted. 
There were more heinous war crimes committed in Vietnam, by 
Korean, VC, and North Vietnamese forces, as well. But few 
are as well-documented; few so starkly illustrate law of war 
issues played out in a domestic court setting.
3.1. LEADERS AND LAWYERS
During the six months preceding the Son Thang patrol, all 
three battalions of the 7th Marines were in constant contact 
with the enemy. Five men of the regiment were awarded the 
Medal of Honor during that period, all posthumously. Can one 
be swayed to criminal action by overly-aggressive leadership? 
Such questions are largely bypassed by the criminal law, more 
interested in concepts like knowledge, intent, and 
reasonableness. But the leadership of the Son Thang patrol 
was a volatile mixture of aggressiveness and inexperience.
3.1.a. The Battalion The commander of 1/7 was Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles G. Cooper, a veteran of Korea. Before
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assuming command of 1/7 he was a 1st Marine Division 
headquarters staff officer, a billet in which he reportedly 
was not happy. "Charley was very frustrated. . .He was coming 
up for general [and] even though he was a lieutenant colonel 
his time to shine was probably going by the wayside unless he 
got a battalion..."1 He got his battalion, his first combat 
command in twenty years, only to deal with the Son Thang 
incident a month later. The 1st Marine Division*s assistant 
commander said of Cooper: "He had a wonderful reputation and 
career pattern. He had had all the right jobs and was 
obviously destined to a splendid career...He was regarded as 
a very good battalion commander."2 Fifteen years later Cooper 
would retire as a lieutenant general. But in February 197 0 
he was new to his job and had not yet had time to shape the 
battalion to his standards.
Cooper recalled that when he took command, the battalion 
was beset by disciplinary, racial, and morale problems. With 
no noticeable lack of modesty, however, he believed he was 
just the man to remedy 1/7*s problems: "I kind of feel like
the good Lord put me on the face of the earth to take over an 
outfit that was down, that was disillusioned and discouraged, 
and to bring them back to life."3 Cooper's negative view of 
the battalion was not unanimous,4 but by 197 0 the Marines of 
1/7 were not the stuff of recruiting posters. A company 
commander complained that:
his company was a body of teenagers The grunts were 
mostly new graduates or dropouts from high school, and 
most of his noncommissioned officers had been promoted 
early due to the manpower drain of Vietnam. He had 
sergeants who weren't old enough to drink beer
Kelley Interview, 12 Dec. 1990.
2BGen. Edwin H. Simmons, Interview by author, 10 May 1990, Wash., tape recording, 
author's collection.
3Cooper interview.
4Theer, to author, 24 Feb. 1989. "Cooper's remarks...simply reflect his lack of 
understanding of what the war at the company level was really like."
97
legally. His platoon leaders were all rushed through 
a shortened version of Basic School for one use only.6
Still, 1/7 was a rough, aggressive unit, beset by occasional
allegations of mistreatment of prisoners6 that would later be
confirmed in courtroom testimony unrelated to Son Thang. A
1/7 noncommissioned officer said of that period:
We definitely did not go over and just blow civilians 
away for no reason at all....We did kill every duck, 
chicken, and water buffalo that we came across....These 
people were all supporters of the NVA [North Vietnamese 
Army] and VC, and they deserved whatever happened to 
them. But unless a gook had a weapon we didn't kill 
him.^
The battalion's command chronology for February records that 
1/7 "deployed rifle companies in areas of operation with the 
mission of conducting rice denial/search and clear 
operations... extensive small unit patrols and ambushes to 
interdict enemy movement."8 Unmentioned in the chronology is 
that one of those patrols resulted in sixteen murders.
3.1.b. The Company and Platoon Lewis R. "Ron" Ambort 
assumed command of Company B, 1/7, in October 1969, shortly 
after his promotion to first lieutenant. He had just turned 
23 - years of age and had been a Marine for only sixteen 
months.9 Lieutenant Colonel Cooper recalled Company B and its 
commander as "certainly the brightest and most aggressive 
company in 1/7... [Ambort] had by far the preponderance of 
successes and kills...."10 But Cooper later added an 
inconsistent qualifying note: "I was very concerned about the 
morale and operational effectiveness of Company B."11
5Nolan, Death Valley. 80.
6Ibid., 60.
7Ibid., 29-30.
81/7 Command Chronology, Feb. 1970.
91/7 Command Chronology, Sept.-Oct. 1969; and USMC, Combined Lineal List (USMC: 
Wash., 1971), 161.
10Cooper interview.
^LtGen. Charles G. Cooper, Virginia, to author, Wash., 12 Sept. 1988.
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Major Richard E. Theer, the battalion's operations 
officer, thought Cooper over-estimated Company B's combat 
prowess:
If one believed all the reports of contacts and confirmed 
kills submitted by B Company, then perhaps one's opinion 
could have been swayed. I am sure... Cooper' s opinion was 
based on "false" reports submitted by Lieutenant Ambort 
on several occasions....Ambort was aggressive, cocky and
extremely eager to impress...12 
Like the allegations of prisoner mistreatment, Ambort's false 
combat reports would soon be a matter of legal record. A 
review of 1/7 command chronologies indicates that Company B 
was no more effective than other companies in the battalion. 
More aggressive, perhaps, but no more effective.
The Son Thang patrol came from the second platoon of 
Company B. The platoon commander was twenty-two-year old 
Second Lieutenant Robert B. Carney. A Marine officer for 
eight months, six of which had been spent at officer's 
school, Carney was an inept novice leader. At the time of 
the Son Thang patrol he had been in the company for'only 
twelve days and had not received instruction on rules of 
engagement.13 Even at that early juncture the battalion 
operations officer thought him "a non-entity as an officer. 
Most everyone knew the platoon was really led by his platoon 
sergeant."14
3.1 ,c. The Quality of Leadership American Professor Guenter 
Lewy, writing about incidents like My Lai and Son Thang, 
notes:
Probably the most important single element, present in 
almost all incidents, was weak leadership. Strong and 
effective commanders managed to keep their subordinates 
under control even in situations of great stress; but 
such leaders were often in short supply, especially at
the platoon and company level.^
12Theer, to author, 24 Feb. 1989.
13Record of trial, U.S. v Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz, 45 CMR 852 (NCMR, 1971), 396.
14Theer, to author, 24 Feb. 1989.
15Lewy, America in Vietnam. 330.
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"None of these factors justify the atrocities," Lewy wrote, 
"but they help provide explanations for them,"16 A senior 
officer on General Westmoreland's Saigon staff agreed:
Underlying and aggravating all the other factors...was 
inadequate leadership where it was most important, at 
the noncommissioned officer and junior officer 
level....In the rapidly expanded Army and Marine Corps, 
men became sergeants and lieutenants who were inadequate 
in character, intelligence, experience, and 
motivation....The failure of leadership at the small-
unit level was particularly devastating.17 
Another Army general said: "It is easy to blame the quality 
of the enlisted men or the lack of support on the home front 
for all this. But let's state it straight — the problem... 
was one of ineffective leadership..."18
Company B and its second platoon were not well led. But 
neither was their leadership notably worse than that of many 
infantry units at that stage of the war.
3.1.d. Marine Corps Judge Advocates There were twenty-six 
Marine lawyers — judge advocates — assigned to the 1st Marine 
Division in 197 0. That number rose and fell through the year 
as judge advocates ended their tours of duty in Vietnam and 
were replaced by others. Roughly forty lawyers filled the 
twenty-six billets in the course of the year.
The four or five senior lawyers were career Marines who 
had served in a variety of legal billets. They possessed 
broad experience in military criminal law. As in the British 
Army before 1948,19 the Marine Corps had (and still has) no 
separate legal corps, or judge advocate corps, despite the 
career lawyers in its ranks.
16Ibid.
17LtGen. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988, 
618.
18Gen. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (New Hampshire: University Press of New 
England, 1977), 112.
19Michael Barthorp, The Armies of Britain. 1485-1980 (London: National Army 
Museum, n.d.), 288.
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The twenty-or-so junior judge advocates were, to a man, 
reservists; volunteer officers serving their first and, in 
all but two cases, last tour of uniformed service. Upon 
arrival at Da Nang they were assigned to defend or prosecute, 
according to legal office vacancies. After serving their 
tour in Vietnam they would return to the U.S. for another 
year's assignment to complete their three years of 
contractual military duty, then return to civilian life.
They were the lawyers who tried whatever cases went to 
trial. They were possessed of the enthusiasm and willingness 
so admirable in new lawyers. When assigned major cases 
involving complex litigation or novel issues, however, 
inexperience could betray dedication. Particularly when a 
seasoned civilian defense lawyer was retained and brought to 
Vietnam by a military accused. That is permissible under 
U.S. military law20 and was surprisingly common throughout the 
war. At such trials the visiting civilian defense counsel 
often made short work of the opposing military judge 
advocate. However, there was little choice but to assign 
tyro lawyers to major cases. There was no one else to try 
them and caseloads were at record levels. Throughout 197 0 it 
was not unusual for 1st Division judge advocates to try 
several murder cases in a single month.21 For the military 
lawyer a year or two out of law school it was trial by fire.
In the Son Thang courts-martial the inexperience of 
military prosecutors and the expertise of civilian defense 
counsels had its effect in each case.
3.2. SON THANG KILLER TEAM
In one Son Thang court-martial the prosecuting judge advocate 
— the trial counsel, in military parlance — asked his witness
20UCMJ, Art. 38.(b). Civilian counsel is permitted under British military law, as 
well. HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. I, ch. Ill, par. 26; Rule of Procedure (Army), 
79(1) .
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to describe the mission of a killer team. The corporal, who 
had been on several such teams, testified:
A: "A killer team is to go out and rove around and try to catch the
enemy off guard, trying to hit as quick and fast and try to get
out of the area as quickly as possible without getting any 
casualties."
Q: "Basically, what rules of engagement do you abide by?"
A: "At that time, anything out after about eight o'clock was
considered the enemy if it was moving at all outside the ville,
inside and around."22
To the same question another witness, an experienced platoon
sergeant, replied: "They go out in small teams of four to
five men and search out hamlets for weapons, rice, different
types of caches and to make contact with the enemy and kill
as many as possible.1,23 The company commander, Lieutenant
Ambort, described a killer team's mission as being:
...to search out, locate, and destroy the enemy. Its
purpose is to provide an effective reconnaissance type 
force....An ambush only covers one point and your chances 
of catching the gooks moving in that one point are a lot 
slimmer than they are if you've got the people roaming
around.^
The battalion commander. Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, in his 
trial testimony, added yet another shade of meaning to the 
killer team's mission:
So, the expression troops use, and quite accurately 
is, 'Anything that moves at night is fair game.' Now, 
this doesn't mean in the villes. My troops had
* Any Vietnamese inhabited area, large or small, was referred to as a "ville."
22Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 370. The same corporal was asked to describe a 
killer team he had led: "Yes, sir. Like, let's see....There was five of us and we went into a 
ville area. There was movement and talking in this one hooch....This man from another 
bunker starts hollering....He's got a rifle, or something. So I went over and fragged him. 
[Threw a fragmentation hand grenade.] Then, when I did that, all of the women started to 
run for the hooch — went around back. So my men opened up on the three mamasans. 
And, the next morning we came back, we found one man and one mamasan dead."
Judge advocate to judge: "Colonel, the government requests that this witness be
warned of his rights [against self-incrimination]."
Judge to Judge Advocate: "It’s a bit late in the day, isn't it, Captain?"
23Ibid., 188.
24Ibid., 346
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authority...to search villes at night just because we 
knew there were numerous [VC] meetings at night...26
Was the killer team mission one of "hit and run,"
reconnaissance, search, or just kill whatever is encountered?
The understanding of the mission obviously was unclear to
those who undertook it, but all agreed that any Vietnamese,
including civilians, outside a ville after dark were subject
to being shot on sight, no questions asked. No one,
including the lawyers, evidenced awareness of that policy's
questionable legality under international law,26 or questioned
the knowledge of the South Vietnamese populace of the shoot-
to-kill policy. Although the Marines recited varying degrees
of indoctrination regarding rules of engagement, from private
to colonel there apparently was no awareness of the 1949
Geneva Conventions or the general law of war.
"Killer teams" do not appear in the training syllabi of
any Marine Corps instructional program or school. They are
unmentioned in any official account of the Vietnam War except
in relation to the Son Thang incident and are rarely
encountered in any appellate record or account of the war.*
Unrecorded even in the parent 7th Marine's command
chronology, killer teams appear to have been largely unique
to 1/7. Their genesis is unknown. Lieutenant Colonel Cooper
erroneously ascribes their development to Lieutenant Ambort.27
The battalion operations officer writes that he learned of
them only after Son Thang,28 overlooking their prior mention
in the command chronologies he was involved in preparing.
Whatever their etymology, they were common practice in
1/7. Neither listening post nor observation post, neither an
25Ibid., 290.
26//i re Lippert (Holland, D.Ct. of Arnhem, May, 1950), 17 ILR 432 (1950), which 
holds such a policy violative of the law of war.
* There is reference to "hunter-killer teams" in U.S. v Schultz, 39 CMR 133 (USCMA, 
1969), and to "killer teams" in a professional journal article: Col. Michael D. 
Wily,"Light Infantry and Vietnam," Marine Corps Gazette. June 1990, 58.
27Cooper interview. Killer teams figure in battalion chronologies before Ambort 
assumed command of Company B.
28Theer, to author, 24 Feb. 1989.
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ambush nor intelligence related, killer teams were nighttime 
roving bands with a vague and elastic mission interpreted 
differently by different Marines. After Son Thang the term, 
if not the practice, was discontinued.
3.2.a. LCpl. Randell D. Herrod Herrod was the leader of the 
Son Thang patrol. In February 197 0, he was a twenty-year old 
lance corporal, sixteen months a Marine.29 When he first 
arrived in Vietnam he had been assigned to the 3d Marine 
Division, near the demilitarized zone. His platoon commander 
then was First Lieutenant Oliver L. "Ollie" North. Herrod 
was seriously wounded in July 1969 in an action in which he 
retrieved a wounded and unconscious Lieutenant North and 
shielded him from enemy fire with his own body.30 For this 
action, Herrod was recommended for the Silver Star Medal, a 
prestigious award for valor seldom given enlisted men.
When the U.S. began withdrawing from Vietnam, Herrod's 
original unit was one of the first designated to leave. 
Since his one-year tour was incomplete, Herrod was 
transferred south to the 1st Marine Division, assigned to 1/7 
in compliance with Operation Mixmaster directives. Before 
reporting to his new unit Herrod took unauthorized absence in 
Da Nang for two months, finally surrendering to Marine 
authorities. He was tried by special court-martial for that 
offense, considered relatively minor at that point in the 
war, given the many more serious cases being dealt with. As 
punishment, Herrod was to be reduced to the rank of private 
and spend three months in confinement. As a matter of 
clemency, however, the confinement portion of the sentence 
was suspended and Herrod went directly to 1/7.31 While 
Herrod's court-martial was being reviewed, he remained a
29Record of trial, U.S. v Pvt. Randell D. Herrod, (summarized) NCM 70 2970.
30PFC Randell D. Herrod, Silver Star Medal citation, n.d., USMC Medals and Decorations 
Branch, Wash., and author's collection.
31Randy Herrod, Blue's Bastards (Wash.: Regnery Gateway, 1989), 94-97.
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lance corporal. Upon approval of the proceedings his 
reduction to private would become effective.
He had been in the second platoon of Company B for two 
months when selected to lead the killer team into Son Thang. 
At the time, Herrod was a machine-gunner, thought well of and 
respected for his combat experience, as well as for his 
recommended but not yet awarded Silver Star. His platoon 
sergeant described Herrod as, "very aggressive and...a good 
leader.1,32
3.2.b. Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz Like Herrod, Schwarz had 
been transferred to 1/7 from the 3d Marine Division. He had 
been in Vietnam for four months. His background was 
checkered.
Dropping out of school at the age of sixteen, he had 
enlisted in the Marine Corps33 either by forging his parents' 
written consent or with their fraudulent written statement 
that he was seventeen, the minimum legal age of enlistment. 
His remarkably low intelligence score indicates that Schwarz 
was an intelligence category IV enlistee — a "cat four."*
Schwarz' disciplinary record, even for those troubled 
times, was extremely poor. In three-and-a-half years he had 
been the subject of two special courts-martial, a lesser 
summary court-martial, and five nonjudicial punishments — 
commander's minor disciplinary hearings.** In any other 
period Schwarz would not have been accepted for enlistment 
and, if accepted, soon would have been administratively 
discharged for his repeated misconduct. Though his offenses 
were all minor absences and drunkenness, their metronomic
32Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 188.
33Brief for Appellant at 9, U.S. v Schwarz. In the U.K. one may enlist as a "Junior 
Leader" at 15 years, 11 months, with parental consent. (Army Youth Training Scheme, 
regulation 4).
* His General Classification Test (GCT) score, closely akin to an IQ score, was 74. One 
hundred is considered average, 74 exceptionally low.
** Similar, in British military law, to action under §76, Army Act (1955); Rule of 
Procedure (Army) 7-10.
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regularity indicated his basic unsuitability for military 
service.
On 19 February, having joined Company B only five days 
previously,34 Schwarz volunteered to join the Son Thang killer 
team.
3.2.C. P.F.C. Samuel G. Green. Jr. Green was eighteen years 
old when he volunteered to accompany Herrod and Schwarz, and 
his enlistment was also suspect. During the Vietnam War it 
was not uncommon for U.S. civilian courts to give young 
accuseds a choice between jail or military enlistment.35 
Similarly, confinement was sometimes shortened if military 
enlistment immediately followed a prisoner's release. Though 
such enlistments were prohibited by military regulations, 
military recruiters often were parties to such arrangements.36
Following charges of truancy, runaway, drug abuse, and 
incorrigibility, which resulted in four separate juvenile 
proceedings,37 Green had served twenty-three months 
confinement in a juvenile facility prior to joining the 
Marine Corps.38 If that confinement were known to his 
recruiter his enlistment was contrary to service regulations. 
If the confinement was not known to the recruiter, Green 
materially misrepresented his background upon enlisting. In 
either case, his enlistment was voidable.
But Green's brief military service was until then 
unblemished. He had been in the Marine Corps for less than
34Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 109.
35Francis A. Gilligan and Fredric I. Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure (Virginia: 
Michie, 1991), vol. 1, 23, fn.105.
36U.S. v Catlow, 48 CMR 758 (USCMA 1974); U.S. v Russo 1 MJ 134 (USCMA,
1975), companion post-Vietnam cases which made such enlistments, when discovered, 
voidable. "Constructive enlistments" often resulted, however.
37Green v Wylie, Commandant, Disciplinary Command, 43 CMR 231 (USCMA, 1971).
38Record of Article 32 pretrial investigation, U.S. v Herrod, Schwarz, Green, Boyd & 
Krichten, 232. Hereafter: Pretrial investigation. Such confinement would not have 
been documented in his service record or he would not have been acceptable for 
enlistment.
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six months, in Vietnam for ten days,39 and Company B for a 
week.40 His platoon sergeant later testified, "He was a good 
man. He followed orders."41 He did indeed.
3.2.d. P.F.C. Thomas R. Boyd: LCpl. Michael S. Krichten
Little is known about Private First Class Boyd and Lance 
Corporal Krichten. There are no surviving court-martial 
records directly involving them, and the civilian custodians 
of their service records, stored in federal repositories, 
fail to make them available upon official military request. 
Trial records of the Son Thang proceedings involving others 
mention Boyd and Krichten only infrequently.
It is known that both had been in the Marine Corps for 
slightly more than one year, both were nineteen years old 
and, significantly, they had been together in the same squad 
for seven months.42 Both reportedly had been wounded.43 Of the 
five Son Thang patrol members, Boyd and Krichten were the 
only two who knew each other before the day of the patrol.
3.3. THE SON THANG PATROL. 19 FEBRUARY 1970
Company B, patrolling in the Que Son Valley west of Da Nang, 
had recently been in daily contact with the enemy. Since 
November the company had suffered fourteen killed and eighty- 
five wounded. Nine of the fourteen dead were killed in the 
week preceding the Son Thang patrol. Women and children had 
been involved in several of the incidents that resulted in 
casualties, usually as lures or diversions, sometimes as 
actual combatants.44
39l/.5'. v PFC Samuel G. Green, Jr., NCM 70 3811 (unpublished NCMR appellate opinion, 
19 May 1971), 6.
40Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 566.
41Ibid., 566.
42Record of pretrial investigation, charge sheets.
43Stars and Stripes. 2 March 1970; 25 June 1970.
441/7 Command Chronologies, November 1969-February 1970.
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On the afternoon of 19 February, the men of Company B 
approached Hill 50, where they would spend the night. While 
establishing their defensive perimeter Private First Class 
Richard Whitmore was killed by a VC boobytrap.45 As dusk fell, 
the company commander, Lieutenant Ambort, directed Lieutenant 
Carney, leader of the second platoon, to form a killer team, 
the only patrol to be employed that night. Herrod, Schwarz, 
Green, Boyd, and Krichten volunteered.46 Upon volunteering, 
Herrod was appointed team leader despite his being a junior 
lance corporal.* Normally noncommissioned officers — 
corporals or sergeants — led such patrols.
Asked why he appointed Herrod the patrol leader despite 
knowing him to be junior, Lieutenant Carney testified that 
Herrod was good at map reading, essential if fire support had 
to be called for, and "he was cool under fire. He was 
aggressive... .He seemed like a natural leader with the men."47 
Indeed, many in Company B were junior, from the company 
commander on down. Lieutenant Colonel Cooper later added, 
"Usually such teams were led by noncommissioned officers, 
but...[Herrod] was considered bush-wise and more mature than 
most of his comrades... .At this date and time in Vietnam, 
this type of jury-rigging was unfortunately not unusual..."48
Cooper's assertion notwithstanding, assignment of a 
junior Marine to lead a combat patrol was, at the least, odd. 
But authority is sometimes derived from the position 
occupied, without the supporting military rank.49 Particularly 
when, like Herrod, the authority-holder was recommended to
45Report of Casualty #250-70, 24 February 1970, Marine Corps Historical Center, 
Wash.
^Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 281, 343-344, 347.
* Trial testimony conflicts as to Herrod's rank on the date of the patrol, lance corporal 
or private. Although rank insignia often were not worn in combat, the confusion related 
to the date the reduction from Herrod’s prior court-martial was effective.
47Record of pretrial investigation, 506.
48Cooper, to author, 12 Sept. 1988.
49Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," in Janowitz, ed., The New 
Military. 213. To the same effect: Nico Keijzer, Military Obedience (The Netherlands: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 43, 111.
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receive a prestigious combat award, "...a person whose action 
had been officially recognized as making an exceptional 
contribution to the mission of the organization....perceived 
by the recipient's peers as...an inspirational symbol..."50
A squad leader in Herrod's platoon later testified at the 
Son Thang pretrial investigation that he and the five patrol 
members discussed the upcoming mission, prior to the killer 
team departing:
Q. "Do you recall...a conversation you had with these individuals 
in which they said they were going to go out and kill more 
than you got on your killer team?"
A. "We were just joking around, and I had gotten four, one night
before that — we were all kidding around... .and they said,
maybe we can get more than you got...."
Q. "Do you remember who said that?"
A. "Herrod I think said it....He said, 'I'd like to get more than
you got, maybe I'll beat your record,' or something. He was
just joking around."5*
3.3.a. The Briefing Just before leaving the company's 
position on Hill 50 the patrol was briefed by the company 
commander. After going over the team's route Ambort, 
according to his own remarkably candid trial testimony, 
addressed the five:
I gave them a pep talk...I didn't want any 
casualties.... since they were out there alone there 
wouldn't be much I could do. And I emphasized the fact 
to not to take any chances; to shoot first and ask 
questions later. I reminded him of the nine people 
[Marines] that we had killed on the twelfth of February, 
and I reminded him of Whitmore, who had died that day. I 
said, "Don't let them get us any more. I want you to pay
these little bastards back!"52 
Before the team moved out the platoon sergeant, Sergeant 
Harvey Meyers, took Herrod aside. Meyers later testified:
I heard this rumor that the killer team was supposed to 
kill anything that moved, so I asked Private Herrod about 
it — exactly what he was told to do. And he said that 
the skipper [the company commander, Ambort] told him to 
kill anything that moves. And I told him not to do it. I
50Ibid., Little, 203.
51Record of pretrial investigation, 585-86.
52Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 348.
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said, "Don't do anything stupid. Just go out and get 
some. 53
Asked what the term "get some" meant, Sergeant Meyers 
replied, "It means going and getting as many kills as 
possible; make contact with the VC or NVA; kill as many as 
possible.1,54
As darkness fell the team moved out. There was a bright 
moon as they approached the hamlet of Son Thang,* a meager 
collection of five or six thatched-roof, bamboo-framed huts. 
The hamlet lay only 500 meters from Hill 50.
3.3.b. "Kill Them All" Court-martial records reveal what 
happened when the killer team reached Son Thang. Approaching 
a hut, Herrod directed Schwarz to order its occupants out, 
which Schwarz did in pidgin Vietnamese. Four individuals 
gathered in front of the hut on what was subsequently 
referred to as the "patio." One of the Vietnamese, a woman, 
suddenly broke and ran toward a nearby tree line. Herrod 
shot her. The woman fell to the ground, screaming.
Testifying under a grant of immunity, Krichten related 
what next transpired:
Then he [Herrod] told Private Schwarz to go over and 
finish her off....All I heard was the .45 [caliber 
pistol] go off....Herrod gave the order to kill the rest 
of the people, and I told him not to do it....Then he 
says, "Well, I have orders to do this by the company 
commander, and I want it done," and he said it again, "I 
want these people killed." And I turned to PFC Boyd, and 
I said to PFC Boyd, "Is he crazy, or what?" And Boyd 
said, "I don't know, he must be." ...And then everybody 
started opening up on the p e o p l e . . . . 55
The range was estimated to be ten to fifteen feet. Schwarz, 
testifying in his own court-martial, said:
53Record of pretrial investigation, 549.
54Ibid., 550.
* Like most hamlets, Son Thang was known by one name to Americans and by another to 
Vietnamese. My Lai was initially known to U.S. soldiers as "Pinkville," and to the 
Vietnamese as "Xom Lang." Son Thang was designated "Son Tra (4)" on U.S. military 
maps, and known to its inhabitants as "Son 4, Thang Tra Hamlet."
55Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 286-87.
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A. "...All of a sudden Herrod started yelling, 'Shoot them, shoot
them all, kill them.1"
Q. "What was in your mind at that time?"
A. "To get some....I grabbed my rifle, started firing, got with
them in the direction they were firing and fired the same 
way...."
Q. "And, what was in your mind at this minute?"
A. "That we had some 'gooks' in the bushes firing at us."
Q. "What about the people [on the patio]?"
A. "I didn't even see the people. I didn't even remember. I had
forgotten completely about the people. I didn’t know where 
they were at."
Q. "And, how did the firing stop?"
A. "Someone yelled, 'Cease fire,' ....Then it dawned on me that
these people — a bunch of people were lying there in front of
me... .
According to trial records, the patrol then formed in a 
column and, without discussion, walked towards another hut. 
They left behind two women, one of them blind, and two 
girls, aged eight and six. All four were dead.
At a second hut much the same events occurred. Schwarz 
entered, this time, and marched out six occupants. According 
to Krichten, as the Vietnamese stood on the patio Green 
shouted that one of the women was reaching into her trousers 
for something. It was Herrod, Krichten believed, that shot 
the woman. Then, Krichten testified:
Schwarz was just coming out of the hooch, and Boyd and 
myself were just coming up on line, when Private Herrod 
gave the order to kill them all; and everybody hesitated.
Then again he hollered at us, and said, "I want these
people killed immediately." And then everybody started
firing.57
Schwarz testified concerning the same event:
A. "...all of a sudden Herrod yelled, 'Open up, shoot them, kill 
them all.'"
Q. "What was in your mind at that time?"
A. "The 'gooks' had come back. We had more 'gooks.'...Then I was 
firing and it dawned on me the women and people were right 
there in front of me...."58
The firing stopped. Again without discussion, the team
turned and moved on to a nearby tree line. This time they
56Ibid., 406-07.
57Ibid., 289-90.
58Ibid., 408-09.
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left behind a Vietnamese woman of twenty, three boys aged 
thirteen, eight, and six, and two thirteen-year-old girls, 
dead in front of the hut.
At a third hut the scene was repeated yet again. Schwarz 
called out its six occupants and Herrod told the patrol 
members to form a line facing the Vietnamese. Krichten:
I don't know who shot first, but I think it was a '79 
that went off first, and then Herrod said to kill them 
all, and everybody hesitated again, and he hollered at us 
again, "I told you that I want these people killed, and I 
mean it." By that time everybody started opening up on
the people.69 
Schwarz testified:
A. "...Herrod said, 'Open up, kill them all, kill all of 
them.'.. .He fired his '79, then he reloaded. And, all this 
time he was reloading, he was yelling, 'Shoot them, kill them 
all, kill all of them bitches.'..."
Q. "Did you ever fire your .45 [pistol]?"
A. "Yes, sir, I did....All of a sudden I started catching these 
flashes...so I started firing through there....I thought they 
were muzzle flashes...."
Q. "What about the people [on the patio] ? Did you shoot at these 
people?"
A. "I shot towards the people, but I didn’t shoot at the people.
Q. "You shot between them?"
A. "Yes, sir. I was trying to put my rounds between them.. .Then 
someone yelled, 'Cease fire,' sir."
Q. "What happened after that?"
A. "...I heard a baby cry and Herrod said, 'go shoot the baby and 
shut it up....' When I found the one that was crying...I put 
my .45 down and fired two rounds over the right shoulder."
Q. "You didn’t hit anybody?"
A. "No, sir. I know definitely I didn't hit anyone."6®
Krichten testified: "1 heard Private Herrod tell Private
Schwarz to go shoot the baby that was crying, but I don't 
know if he did. I don't know if he did. All I heard was a 
.45 go off."61 (The officer who first viewed the bodies the 
next day testified that a dead woman at the third hut was 
clutching a dead child, "about five or six years old, at the
*M-79 grenade launcher, a 40mm, smooth bore, single shot, shoulder weapon filling 
the gap between a shotgun and a mortar. Herrod carried the only M-79 in the patrol. He 
employed buckshot rounds.
59Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 294.
60Ibid., 411-12.
61Ibid., 295.
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most.... [I]t's head had just been blown apart, and its grey 
matter was laying on the ground.")62 At the third hut the 
killer team left four females, aged forty, thirty-five, 
thirteen, and eight, and two boys, ten and six, all dead.
Nowhere in the numerous written statements, in the 
pretrial investigation, nor in the surviving records of 
trial, is a motive alluded to, or attributed to the patrol 
members. Another squad leader’s testimony, very reluctantly 
given at the pretrial investigation, described Herrod later 
telling him that the team had agreed to simultaneously fire 
on their victims on a count of three.63 That testimony was not 
repeated at trial.
3.3.C. Cover-up and Investigation The firing in Son Thang 
was heard on Hill 50, raising concern for the patrol. Herrod 
was instructed by radio to return to Company B's position. 
Upon arriving he reported that the team had met an enemy 
patrol and killed six VC. Herrod and Ambort conferred to 
formulate the required contact report. Herrod told the 
company commander that there could have been as many as 
twelve to sixteen enemy killed. Indicating his immediate 
suspicion, or awareness, of the report's falsity, Ambort 
called for an enemy rifle that had been captured several days 
before and sent it to battalion headquarters with the contact 
report to add veracity to the claim of six enemy killed.
The false report, now embroidered with detail, was 
entered in the battalion operations journal at 8:30 that 
night: "Spotted 15-20 VC, some carrying arms, with no packs, 
moving southwest along trail. Set up hasty ambush, killed 6 
NVA and 1 female. Patrol withdrew...."64
The next morning another 1/7 patrol in the vicinity of 
Son Thang was approached by a Vietnamese woman complaining
62Record of pretrial investigation, 61.
63Ibid., 596-98.
64111 Command Chronology, Feb. 1970, Operations Journal entry 192030H.
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that Marines had killed people in her hamlet the night 
before. The information was radioed to the 1/7 command post 
at FSB Ross, where it was received by the battalion 
operations officer, Major Theer. On his third tour of duty 
in Vietnam, Theer was the most combat-experienced Marine in 
the battalion, and a mainstay. Directed by Theer, the patrol 
detoured to investigate the woman's report and discovered the 
bodies of sixteen women and children laying before three 
huts, along with a large number of spent U.S. cartridge 
casings. After reporting its findings, the patrol assisted 
the villagers in burying the dead.
Theer knew there had been enemy contact reported in that 
location the night before and wondered if there was a 
connection. After approval by the battalion commander, Theer 
cut short Company B's operation and recalled it to the 
battalion headquarters at FSB Ross. Later, in court, Major 
Theer was asked:
Q. "When he mentioned that sixteen women and children [were 
dead], this raised no suspicion in your mind?"
A. "No, because it was in the hamlet where they had a contact on 
the nineteenth, and I had no reason to doubt that those people 
might have died as a result of fire between the Marines and 
the enemy, in that contact. That happens, you know, in war."
Q. "....Did you find it unusual that there were no men 
ment ioned?"
A. "Not at all...The men that you see out there are usually past 
the age of seventy or below the age of ten."^
Nevertheless, to ensure that there had been no Marine 
involvement in the deaths, Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, the 
battalion commander, ordered Theer to investigate. Upon 
questioning, Lieutenant Ambort quickly admitted to Theer that 
his contact report of the previous night was false in that 
the enemy rifle had not been recovered by the killer team. 
Theer next separately interviewed each member of the patrol, 
after warning them, in writing, of their rights against self- 
incrimination and to have judge advocate counsel 
representation, including the lawyer's presence at any
65Record of pretrial investigation, 309.
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questioning.* Each of the five read the rights advisement and 
initialled each individual right, indicating his 
understanding, and then signed the form. Each readily agreed 
to an interview by Theer and each declined legal counsel.
All five gave written, sworn statements similar to the 
oral reports they had allegedly given Lieutenant Ambort upon 
their return from Son Thang the night before: As they
approached the hamlet, their statements read, they heard 
men's voices from a large group gathered on a patio. 
Thinking they had stumbled onto a meeting of VC, they 
approached the hut, only to find the males gone. As they 
detained the remaining women and children they were taken 
under fire. They returned the fire. Then, hearing noises in 
another hut, they forced its occupants outside, whereupon the 
patrol again came under fire. And again, they returned the 
fire. Implicit in their recitations describing the two 
encounters — the third incident was unmentioned — was that 
the women and children had been caught in the crossfire. 
Major Theer later testified that "in each case their 
statements were almost identical, with a few discrepancies. 
And...I know that no five people could see the same thing."66
The next day, accompanied by another patrol, an 
interpreter, and a scout dog, Theer made his own examination 
of Son Thang.
...I had searched the area quite carefully. I could find 
no evidence that an enemy sniper had been in the area. I 
had searched each tree, each of the individual houses, 
looking for...bullet impact marks. I had searched all of 
the tree lines and hedge rows in the immediate vicinity 
and found no traces of footprints, enemy empty cartridges 
or bent back brush. ..that would indicate that a sniper or 
enemy soldier had been lurking there....trying to get an 
idea for myself where a sniper might locate himself based 
on what the men had told me....And I found nothing.67
* Similar to, but broader than, warnings required by the British Manual of Military 
Law, part I, ch. V, par. 2.3.
66Record of pretrial investigation, 216.
67Ibid., 210, 257, 355.
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Theer also determined that there were no places of hiding
from which the patios of the victims' huts could be fired
upon, or even seen. Theer later added:
There were numerous freshly expended [American] M-79, M- 
16, and .45 caliber casings lying on the patio. There
were also considerable blood stains and gore....[My]
patrol probed the entire scene in a 180 degree fan... 
without finding any expended enemy brass...or any sign of 
blood, drag marks, footprints or broken vegetation....At 
that point I seriously began to doubt the statements the
patrol had given to me.^
Upon returning to FSB Ross, Theer learned that after 
Company B had been called back to the FSB, but before he had 
conducted his interviews of the patrol, Lieutenant Ambort 
apparently had second thoughts about the team's report to 
him. Ambort had gathered the patrol members and told them 
that events were taking a very serious turn; that it would be 
best to simply tell the truth, and that he intended to do so 
himself, starting by revealing his own false contact report.
Theer was concerned that the statements he had 
subsequently taken might have been subtly coerced, without 
his having known, by Ambort's comments to the patrol. Theer 
testified:
I felt that perhaps each of these men might have been 
under some duress, and I could recall the colonel 
[Cooper] had told me that we must ensure that each man's 
rights were preserved... .Having been a company commander 
myself once before, you have a family relationship 
....There are very tight bonds. If the commanding 
officer said something, I'm sure that the men would feel 
like that might be what — they would take it as
authoritative. Like your father speaking to you.®*
"...It is in the nature of military organizations to 
recapitulate the psychodynamics of an authoritarian family 
group, one in which the paterfamilias can do no wrong."70 
Theer decided to re-interview the patrol members.
68Theer, to author, 24 Feb. 1989.
69Record of pretrial investigation, 190.
70Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Jonathan Cape,
1976), 218.
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At the same time he sent word up the chain of command of 
what appeared to be unfolding. In consequence of Theer's 
report the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division sent 
an "eyes only" message to his senior, the commander of III 
MAF: "This is an initial report of possible serious incident 
involving elements of B-l/7 and Vietnamese civilians....Full 
scale inquiry commencing immediately."71
3.3.d. Discovered At the second interviews Theer again 
advised each of the men, in writing, of their rights to 
counsel and against self-incrimination, and added a further 
typewritten admonition: "I should not be influenced into
making a statement merely because my commanding officer. 
First Lieutenant Ambort, told me to tell the truth and tell 
the whole story." Additionally, following the recitation of 
rights, the form read: "I do desire/do not desire to withdraw 
my [initial] statement which was made on 21 February."72 The 
men acknowledged this preliminary advice by again initialling 
each paragraph of the typed form and by lining out the 
appropriate clause at the bottom.
One by one, Theer called the patrol members to his 
quarters for second interviews. Herrod said he would stand 
by the statement he had already given. Green opted to let 
stand his initial statement, but offered to orally respond to 
new questions. Major Theer testified:
I asked Green to go over the circumstances again...and he 
began to tell me this in his narrative, and then he 
mentioned sniper fire. When he said that, I said, "Now 
wait a minute, Sam. You know and I know that there 
wasn't any sniper fire." And he became very hostile at 
that point and turned towards me with fire in his eyes 
and said, "What do I care about a gook woman or child?
It's them or me. If they get in my way, that's too bad."
And then I asked him to go on, and mentioned, he 
mentioned the next house and also taking sniper fire from 
it and I told him, I said, "I've been out there. The 
area that you are describing was impossible for anyone to
71USMC, CG First MarDiv msg 202322Z Feb 70, Marine Corps Historical Center, 
Wash., and author's collection.
72Record of pretrial investigation, exhibits 35, 37, 40, 42, 46.
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see where you were, if you were standing on the patio."
And with that he turned around and said that he wasn't 
going to answer any more questions... .that he had been in 
jail for some 23 months prior to coming in the Marine 
Corps, and that he wasn't going back. And I said, "Okay,
Sam. The interview is terminated. You may return to 
your post.73
Then Schwarz entered and, like the others, was again 
advised of his right against self-incrimination, to have 
legal counsel present, to decline further interview, and to 
retract his statement of the day before. The additional, 
tailored advice was also given him. Theer testified:
When Schwarz came into my quarters that night he had a 
very bold approach. Very confident air about 
him....While we were going over this narrative...he 
became nervous and continued to smoke cigarettes one 
after another, and I, I felt that he was under some 
pressure. And I asked him...if what he had been telling 
me was the truth and he indicated that it had not been 
the truth....I asked if he was willing to make another 
written statement or modify the one that he had already 
presented me. He said that he would....I gave him a pad 
and a pen. He went in to the desk [in another room] and 
commenced writing another statement. And it took him a 
long time to write this statement. During the course of 
the time he was writing this statement I could hear him 
sobbing in there, crying in the o f f i c e . . . 74
In his seven-page, handwritten statement Schwarz, twenty-one 
years-old, the married father of a three-year old son, wrote:
.. .The team leader said we had the go ahead to kill 
anything on our rought and I could walk point.... [At the 
first hut] the team was orderd to kill them and when they 
opened fire I joind in. When the fireing quieted all the 
people were dead....[At the second hut] the team leader 
orderd to kill them all. I started to fire along with 
everyone else as order. Again all the women and 
childeren were killed....[At the third hut] the team was 
agaid orderd to shot every one. The team hesetated and 
were again orderd to fire, so we did. We them were 
called back to the poss [position on Hill 50] and 
debreived. The C.O. ask what realy happen and was told.
.He said that as soon as he heard the shooting he knew 
Harred had gone to wipe out a ville and that was a thing 
he didn't want. He also said "I know you men are killers 
so am I, but you just can't go in to a vill and start 
killing people"....The team leader told we had recieved 
sniper fire of witch we all when along with for fire of
73Ibid.,. 232.
74Ibid., 327-28.
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what would had if it was descuverd what had really 
happen... .When I relised what was happening I got scard 
and sick but was orderd to shot the people and knew if I 
did not obay the order I could get court mariald. From 
the time we started shotting I regetted ever going with 
this team....The patol resicved no sniper fire....I saw 
no one that I consiter enemy during the whole patrol not 
even a bobby trap, (sic)76
Schwarz swore to the truth of his statement and signed it.
Boyd and Krichten subsequently submitted new statements
admitting all, focusing blame on Herrod.76 On 23 February
197 0, all five were placed in pretrial confinement.
75Ibid., exhibit 47.
76Ibid., exhibits 38, 43.
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CHAPTER 4. WAR CRIMES AND WAR CRIMES ISSUES IN
VIETNAM
A tight rein on aggression is mandatory in a profession whose stock in trade and solution 
to most problems is physical violence.
Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence
It may be argued that the Son Thang murders were a 
violation of the customary law of war, breaching the 
Nuremberg Principles,1 1949 Geneva Convention III,2 and 
international human rights agreements.3 That the victims were 
unarmed women and children lent the crime no greater or 
lesser legal effect, but made the human misfortune all the 
more poignant.
International, municipal, and military law 
notwithstanding, war crimes have occurred throughout the 
history of war, the same offenses repeated with saddening 
regularity. In this chapter war crimes trials through 
history are briefly reviewed, noting their forums and 
results. The modern battlefield conundrum, distinguishing 
combatants from noncombatants — a particularly difficult 
problem in Vietnam — is examined. The extent of the Vietnam 
War's reported battlefield war crimes is noted, preparatory 
to discussing the criminal law issues raised, and not raised, 
by the Son Thang incident. The chapter's final section 
examines obedience to superior orders, the defense most 
frequently interposed in battlefield war crime prosecutions, 
and just as often rejected. The justice of its out-of-hand 
rejection is obliquely raised, as well.
As wartime crime goes, the Son Thang incident was 
pedestrian. Its uniqueness lies in the clarity of its law of 
war/criminal law issues, the availability of the record of
1 Principle VI. b.
2Art. 5, par. 2.
3IMT Charter, section II (b); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 53; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 56(1).
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the cases’ dispositions, and the outcomes of its trials. But 
the issues raised at Son Thang were not novel. They were 
common battlefield war crime tragedies.
4.1. War Crimes
In 1415, near the village of Agincourt, Henry V faced the 
French army. As the battle neared conclusion, Henry feared 
his prisoners would overpower their guards and join an 
eminent French attack. He ordered the several hundred 
prisoners killed.
Comprehensible in harsh tactical logic; in ethical, 
human and practical terms much more difficult to 
understand. Henry [was] versed in the elaborate code of 
international law governing relations between a prisoner 
and his captor....Its most important provision was that
which guaranteed the prisoner his life...4 
As at Son Thang, Henry's subordinates at first refused to 
obey. A detail of archers finally carried out the King's 
order.5 Perhaps not the first war crime, to apply a modern 
term to the medieval age, but a notable one. No trial 
followed. Lesser soldiers have been less fortunate.
4.1.a. War Crimes Through History a forerunner of 
contemporary international war crimes trials was that of 
Peter von Hagenbach, governor of Breisach, Germany, under 
Charles of Burgundy. After several years of rule — during 
time of military occupation, not war — Hagenbach was tried by 
a tribunal of twenty-eight judges from the allied states of 
the Holy Roman Empire, charged with murder, rape, and arson. 
Stripped of his knighthood, he was executed in 1474.6
In medieval times heraldic courts tried mercenaries, 
usually for engaging in military acts without war having been 
declared. "The rights under the 'law of arms'...were minutely
4John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976; Penguin, 1978), 109.
5M.H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1965), 158, 179.
6Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. II, 462.
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governed, and argued with considerable subtlety by civilians 
and canon lawyers before military tribunals in which 
experienced knights and heralds often acted as judges..."7 In 
1689, James II relieved Count Rossen of his military duties 
for murdering civilians in the siege of Londonderry.
Following the U.S. war with Mexico (1846-48) an American 
colonel responsible for illegal acts during the campaign in 
Mexico was tried by a municipal court and received a personal 
$95,855.38 civil judgement, later upheld by the Supreme 
Court.8
After America's Civil War (1861-65), Major Henry Wirz, 
Swiss doctor and commandant of the Andersonville prisoner of 
war camp where 12,000 Union soldiers died, was tried by a 
military commission. Like von Hagenbach 300 years before, 
Wirz pleaded that he was obeying superior orders. Like von 
Hagenbach, Wirz was executed.
An unusual Civil War case involving a soldier's burning 
of a Kentucky courthouse resulted in a municipal civil trial 
and imposition of damages upon the soldier.9 Some 2,000 cases 
were tried by military commission during the Civil War and 
the subsequent Reconstruction, several for war crimes. Dr. 
Samuel Mudd and seven other civilians were tried by such a 
commission, charged with violating the law of war for their 
complicity in assassinating President Lincoln, a quite 
unusual instance of a U.S. citizen and civilian, charged with 
a war crime allegedly committed within the U.S.10
Following the Spanish-American War (1898) , a number of 
American soldiers and Marines were tried by U.S. courts- 
martial. "[T]heir trials would have been denominated 'war
7Gerald I.A.D. Draper, "Grotius Place in the Development of Legal Ideas about War," in 
Bull, Hugo Grotius and International Relations. 185.
8Mitchell v Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
9Christian County Court v Rankin & Tharp, 63 Ky. 502 (1866).
10Ex parte Mudd, 17 F. Cas. 954 (No. 9899) (S.D. Fla. 1868), cited in Jordan J. Paust, 
"After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District 
Courts," 50 Texas L. Rev.. 6 (1971).
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crimes trials' if they had been tried by an enemy or an 
international court."11 Among those tried was an Army 
Brigadier General convicted of inciting, ordering and 
permitting subordinates to commit atrocities. In approving 
the general's conviction, President Theodore Roosevelt could 
have been writing about Vietnam:
That warfare is of such character as to afford infinite 
provocation for the commission of acts of cruelty by 
junior officers and the enlisted men, must make the 
officers in high and responsible position peculiarly 
careful...to keep a moral check over any acts of an
improper character by their subordinates.12
During the Boer War (1899-1902), the British court- 
martialed both Boers and her own soldiers for war crimes.13 By 
the time of the first World War the U.K.'s Manual of Military 
Law had been in effect for thirty years. Flogging was 
abolished in 1881 but capital punishment remained common upon 
conviction by field general court-martial. But the 346 
traceable British Expeditionary Force executions were all for 
military offenses; none the result of war crimes.14 Similarly, 
none of the ten U.S. wartime executions were for law of war
^Levie, "Criminality in the Law of War," in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law. 
vol. I, 233.
1217.S. v BGen. Jacob H. Smith, an unreported case described at: S. Doc. 213, 57th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 5-17. Smith's written order to a patrol leader reads: "I want no prisoners.
I wish you to burn and kill; the more you burn and kill, the better it will please me." 
Smith instructed that anyone capable of bearing arms, down to ten years of age, should be 
killed.
13Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979; Futura, 
1988), 449, 538-39, 561. This exceptionally brutal war first saw concentration 
camps, organized guerrilla forces (guerrillas first having appeared in the Franco- 
Spanish Peninsular campaign of 1808-09), and standard issue dum-dum bullets.
14Anthony Babington, For the Sake of Example (London: Leo Cooper, 1983), 189. 
Another source puts the number at 350: Julian Putkowski and Julian Sykes, Shot at 
Dawn (London: Leo Cooper, 1989). Yet another text asserts that "in nearly every 
instance, the [British] Army's court martial procedures seem to have hampered a fair 
trial." Brian Bond, ed., The First World War and British Military History Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 300.
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offenses.15 There were numerous courts-martial of German 
troops by German authorities, as well.16
Following World War I, pursuant to the Treaty of 
Versailles, 896 alleged German war criminals were identified 
by a commission formed for that purpose. For political 
reasons the list eventually shrank to forty-five. The 
commission recommended that a "High Tribunal" undertake their 
trial while the Treaty spoke of "military tribunals." 
Germany protested trial of its nationals by a foreign court 
and was finally allowed to try its own citizens for the 
alleged war crimes. Twelve of the forty-five were tried 
before the Supreme Court of the Reich sitting in Leipzig. 
"The doctrine of superior orders and the plea of military 
necessity were elevated to paramount legal principles..."17 
Six of the twelve were acquitted and three received sentences 
to confinement of less than a year. A major, convicted of 
shooting wounded prisoners, was sentenced to a mere two years 
imprisonment. • Two submarine officers, claiming they had been 
ordered to fire on life boats of the ship they had sunk, the 
Llandovery Castle, were sentenced to four years confinement 
but soon escaped, apparently with official connivance.18 
Allied outrage at the leniency of the trials ("The Leipzig 
trials, as a whole, were.. .a farce.")19 was not forgotten when 
the Nuremberg Tribunals were initiated.
Throughout the Second World War the Wehrmacht- 
Untersuchungsstelle fur Verletzungen des Volkerrechts (Bureau 
for the Investigation of War Crimes) was an active unit of 
the German army. It regularly gathered evidence for the
15Ibid., Babington, 190.
16Elbridge Colby, "War Crimes," 23 Michigan L. Rev. 482, 504 (1924-25).
17Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," 21 
BYIL 58, 84 (1944).
18Sheldon Glueck, "By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders be Tried?" 56 Harvard L. 
Rev. 1059 (1942-43); and, Leon Friedman, ed., The Law of War: A Documentary 
History, vol. I (NY: Random House, 1972), 777.
19Alan M. Wilner, "Superior Orders As A Defense to Violations of International Criminal 
Law," 26 Maryland L. Rev. 127, 134 (1966).
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court-martial of German soldiers charged with war crimes and 
death sentences often resulted.20 The post-World War II 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs are reviewed elsewhere. (See section
2.1.b) Also during the post-war period, Axis civilian 
nationals were prosecuted for war crimes by municipal courts 
and military tribunals.21
War crimes cases in recent years include those of Adolph 
Eichmann22 and John Demjanjuk23 in Israel, and Klaus Barbie in 
France,24 each in municipal forums. Andrija Artukovic, 
deported to Yugoslavia, awaits trial.25
Heraldic courts, commissions, boards of officers, 
courts-martial, municipal courts, tribunals, and 
international military tribunals have tried war crimes cases. 
Both military and civilian courts act as agents of 
international order, as well as constituent institutions of 
the national order. In Vietnam issues arose that, if not 
new, were of greater relevance and difficulty than ever 
before.
4.1.b. Who is the Enemy. Who is A Civilian? Asked his 
understanding of the difference between a combatant and a 
noncombatant, Lieutenant Ron Ambort testified with unknowing 
sophistication: "A noncombatant is a momentary thing. It's 
somebody who's sitting there right now, not doing anything."26
The need to and reasons for distinguishing between 
civilians and combatants in warfare hardly require 
discussion. The 1949 Geneva Conventions set the criteria for
20Alfred M. deZayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau. 1939-1945 (Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 10, 18, 20-21, 86.
21Willard B. Cowles, "Trial of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg)," 42 AJIL 299 
(1948) .
22Attorney-General o f Israel v Eichmann (Israel, D. Ct. of Jerusalem, Dec. 12, 1961), 
36 ILR 18, 277(1962).
23Matter o f  Demjanjuk, 603 F.Supp. 1463 (1984) and Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, 776 
F.2d 571 (1985), U.S. cases relating to Demjanjuk's deportation to Israel for trial.
24Court o f Cassation (Criminal Chamber), 6 Oct. 1983; 78 ILR 132 (1983-84).
2579 ILR 386.
26Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 351.
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protected combatant status as a force commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates, having a distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance, openly carrying arms, and 
conducting operations in accordance with the laws of war.27 If 
those criteria are not met the combatant is unprotected by 
the Conventions.
The term "civilian" is rarely found in Geneva 
Convention IV. Rather, it addresses "protected persons," 
characterizing them as individuals who "in any manner 
whatsoever, find themselves... in the hands of a Party to the 
conflict.28 But co-belligerents, the Convention specifies, are 
excluded from protected status.29 The South Vietnamese 
civilians of Son Thang were certainly in the hands of a Party 
at the time of their deaths. But as nationals of a U.S. co­
belligerent, they apparently were excluded from the 
Conventions* protection. (But see section 4.2.a.) The theory 
behind such exclusion is that regular diplomatic protections 
available to co-belligerents make the added protection of 
Convention IV superfluous.30 The 1977 Protocols I and II, 
which supplement Convention IV's identification of civilians, 
have been ratified by neither the U.K. nor the U.S.
Restrictions on attacks upon civilian populations date 
back at least to the turn of the century and the Regulations 
upon Land Warfare annexed to the 1899 and 19 07 Hague 
Conventions. "But history shows that civilians, in spite of 
this protective regime [against attack], are increasingly at 
risk in war."31
The mobilization of an entire population behind the war 
effort, and the imagery of the "home front," makes the 
traditional conception seem superficial...For example, 
was a cypher clerk working at Bletchley, engaged in 
cracking enemy codes, to be classed as a combatant or
27Arts. 13, 13, and 2 of Conventions I, II, and III, respectively.
28Art. 4.
29Ibid..
30Dept. of the Army, International Law, vol. II, 132-33.
31DeLupis, The Law of War. 241.
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not? [He] was probably more dangerous to the enemy than 
any front-line soldier.32
Today the distinction between combatant and noncombatant is 
"largely illusory, now that the whole of a country's economy 
is geared to the war effort."33 The killing of civilian 
factory workers may produce military advantage un-imagined a 
century ago. Civilians like Britain's Observer Corps were 
critical to the World War II combat effort. There have 
always been exceptions to the combatant-noncombatant 
distinction* but today "the distinction has been so whittled 
down...that it has become more apparent than real... 
[Belligerents] have extended the definition of combatant to 
include almost all important elements of the enemy's civilian 
population."34 The British view of civilians vis-a-vis the 
enemy, for example, is expansive:
One of the consequences [of war] is that every subject 
of the one State becomes an enemy to every subject of 
the other. It is impossible to sever the subjects from 
their State... [although] civilians must not be made the 
object of attack directed exclusively against t h e m . 35
Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, Marshall of the R.A.F. who 
directed the World War II bombing of Hamburg, Dresden, and 
other German cities, wrote:
But the point is often made that bombing is specially 
wicked because it causes casualties among civilians 
....International law can always be argued pro and con, 
but in this matter of the uSe of aircraft in war there
is, it so happens, no international law at all.3^
32Clark, Waging War. 92.
33Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law. 272-73.
* e.g., civilian workers in a legitimate target, collateral (indirect and unintentional) 
injury, siege/blockade victims, and reprisals. World War II's bombing of dams, atomic 
bombing, fire bombings, and targeting of population centers are now sometimes regarded 
by military planners as within the bounds of the law of war.
34Lester Nurick, "The Distinction Between Combatant and Noncombatant in the Law of 
War," 39 AJIL 680 (1945). To the same effect, Clyde Eagleton, "Of the Illusion That 
War Does Not Change,” 35 AJIL 659, 660 (1941).
3^HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. Ill, par. 13.
36Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (London: Greenhill Books, 1990), 176-77.
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That assertion, questionable before World War II, in light of 
the 1923 Hague Commission of Jurists, was certainly incorrect 
after the Nuremberg principles were accepted (but not 
adopted) by the U.N.37
The U.S. position is similar to Britain's: Civilians of 
an opposing state are "enemies" who offer no resistance and 
who may not lawfully be the direct subjects of violence.38
Should a civilian deliberately and directly harm his 
enemy his protection under international law, such as it is, 
is withdrawn.39 As Geoffrey Best notes:
The moment they did offer resistance or become in any 
other way involved in the war apparatus...their title to 
indulgence disappeared...even where it was 'not their 
fault1 but simply by accident of war...for example...in
the cross-fire between armies.4®
Area bombing and atomic bombing of civilian targets during 
World War II confirmed that even that distinction is largely 
honored in the breach. Unlawful combatants — mercenaries and 
terrorists — enjoy no protection under the law of war and are 
always legitimate targets for belligerent action.
Where did that leave the South Vietnamese civilian, a 
co-belligerent and ostensible U.S. ally who, despite the 
advice of his own government, often opted to remain in his 
native hamlet? He was not a munitions worker, defense 
employee, or factory hand, but a simple subsistence farmer. 
If the civilian-combatant distinction has been rendered 
illusory, was the indigenous Vietnamese "fair game"? Of 
course not. While the distinction has faded in a strategic 
sense, that does not give soldiers on the battlefield license 
to assault or kill civilians. The difference is that of the 
pilot who bombs an arms factory, resulting in a civilian's
37The Commission's Air Rules were not adopted, but were persuasive. For other 
conventions regulating air warfare, see Rowe, Defence. 123-24.
38Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 25.
39Robert W. Gehring, "Loss of Civilian Protections Under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention," XIX Revue de Droit Penal Militaire 15, 18 (1980).
40Best, Humanity in Warfare. 55.
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death, and an infantryman who points his pistol at an unarmed 
civilian and kills him: moral choice and criminal intent. A
more difficult question is when such a killing is a war 
crime.
Throughout the Vietnam War the civilians* status was 
clouded by insurgents who indistinguishably intermingled 
their soldiers with the general population, eluding 
discrimination while depending on the U.S. attempt to 
discriminate, "relying upon the principle of noncombatant 
immunity while acting in such a way as to undermine it."41 
True, the farmer often was part of the insurgency, and even 
if he wasn't a part-time guerrilla he was suspected of it by 
U.S. troops.
In essence... [to U.S. forces] the entire civilian 
population became the military enemy because of their 
sympathies or activities, because of their status as 
potential recruits, or even because they were visually
indistinguishable from insurgent soldiers.42 
"Here we come to the heart of the contemporary problem in 
respect of the law of land war. The accommodation of 
guerrilla warfare within the law of war..."43 Lieutenant 
Calley expressed widespread military opinion in Vietnam when 
he railed:
These people, they're all the VC. ...if those people 
weren't all VC then prove it to me. Show me that 
someone was for the American forces there. Show me that 
someone helped us and fought the VC. Show me that
someone wanted us: One example only!44 
Perhaps Calley recognized a response to his plea when the 
military judge in his court-martial instructed the jurors:
Noncombatants detained by the opposing force, regardless 
of their loyalties, political views, or prior acts, have 
the right to be treated as prisoners until released,
41R.L. Phillips, War and Justice (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 98.
42Richard A. Falk, "Remarks," in Trooboff, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. 38.
43Geoffirey Best, "Restraints on War by Land Before 1945," in Howard, Restraints on 
War. 31.
44John Sack, Lieutenant Calley: His Own Story (NY: Viking Press, 1970), 79. Italics in 
original.
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confined, or executed in accordance with law....Summary 
execution of detainees or prisoners is forbidden by
law. 45
Confusingly, though, the terms "prisoner," "detainee," 
"guerrilla," "VC suspect," or "refugee" could all describe 
the same Vietnamese captive, depending on how the U.S. 
military commander chose to see him in reports to higher 
headquarters.46
Lieutenant General Charles G. Cooper, who commanded 1/7 
as a lieutenant colonel, recently wrote:
It concerned me no end that the mystery of identifying 
who the enemy was never was resolved, nor could it have 
been. Basically you responded to fire, and often that 
was too late...The trooper rightly never understood why 
we could order an air strike on a village that was the 
source of fire, but a more definitive rule of conduct 
applied to the man with the rifle. There is a 
difference, a big difference, but can you explain that 
satisfactorily to a man who saw his best friend just 
killed in an ambush triggered by a 10-year old with an 
AK-47?47
Despite experience, one still hopes the answer is yes.
4.1.C. Military Necessity and Reprisals in defense of the 
Son Thang incident could the killer team's acts be considered 
a reprisal, or military necessity? These issues, though 
apparently inapplicable to the facts of the case, merit brief 
attention.
Today, because it is so infrequently invoked, "military 
necessity" is a term more familiar to civilian jurists than 
to judge advocates. First encountered around 1900 in 
Germany's Kriegsraison theory, military necessity essentially 
holds that the method is permitted if it is necessary for 
success, laws to the contrary notwithstanding. Besides its 
application on the battlefield, the concept is linked to the
45Jury instructions, U.S. v Calley, quoted in Friedman, The Law of War, vol. II, 1703, 
1721.
46Jonathan Schell, The Real War ( London: Corgi Books, 1989), 177.
47Cooper to author, 12 Sept. 1988.
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Ic o n t i n u e d  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  s t a t e . 48 O ur c o n c e r n  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  
t h e  fo rm e r  u s a g e ,  t a c t i c a l  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y .
I t  h a s  b e e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  i n  t im e  o f  u n iq u e  t a c t i c a l  n e e d  
o r  d a n g e r  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y  s u s p e n d s  t h e  c r i m i n a l  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  c e r t a i n  w a r  c r im e s  a n d  c o n v e r t s  th e m  i n t o  l e g i t i m a t e  
a c t s . 49 T h u s , s u r v i v o r s  o f  s u b m a r in e  t o r p e d o i n g  h a v e  b e e n  
m a c h in e  g u n n e d  t o  h i d e  t h e  s u b m a r i n e 's  p r e s e n c e 50 a n d  
p r i s o n e r s  e x e c u t e d  t o  f r e e  a n  e n d a n g e r e d  u n i t  o f  t h e i r  
b u r d e n .51 B u t, a s  t h e  T r ib u n a l  i n  t h e  K rupp  c a s e  s a i d :
[The] rules and customs of warfare are designed 
specifically for all phases of war....To claim that they 
can be wantonly — and at the sole discretion of any one 
belligerent — disregarded when he considers his own 
situation to be critical, means nothing more or less
than to abrogate the laws and customs of war entirely.52 
" T h is  v ie w  o f  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  t h e  la w s  o f  w a r  m u s t b e  
a b s o l u t e l y  r e j e c t e d . . . . I t  w o u ld  e n a b le  c o m b a ta n ts  t o  j u s t i f y  
a n y  d e v i a t i o n  f ro m  t h e  la w s  o f  w a r o n  t h e  r e a l  o r  s u p p o s e d  
g ro u n d  o f  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y .  "53
U .K . a n d  U .S .  v ie w s  a r e  i n  a c c o r d  i n  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  
c o n c e p t . 54 C o n v e n t io n a l  a n d  c u s to m a r y  r u l e s  o f  w a r f a r e  a r e  
a lw a y s  b i n d i n g  a n d  c a n n o t  b e  d i s r e g a r d e d  e v e n  i n  c a s e s  o f  
p u r p o r t e d  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y . 55
Neither international law nor even the domestic laws of 
civilized communities recognize a claim that an
48Dept. of the Army, International Law, vol. II, 9-10.
49DeLupis, The Law of War. 333. (DeLupis notes and rejects that argument.)
50U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals , vol. I, The 
Peleus Trial, 1.
51Ibid., vol III (1948), Trial o f Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert, 56.
52Judgement, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. 
IX (Wash.: GPO, 1950), 1347.
53Erik Castr6n, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
Kirjallisuuden, 1954), 66.
54Dept. of the Army , The Law of Land Warfare, par. 3.a.; HMSO, Manual of Military 
Law, pt. Ill, par. 633. Until after World War I, however, the U.S. position was that of 
Kriegsraison. U.S. War Dept., Rules of Land Warfare. 1914 (Wash.: War Dept., 1914), 
par. 11.
55N.C.H. Dunbar, "Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials," 29 BYIL 442, 444 
(1 9 5 2 ).
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individual is entitled to sacrifice others to ensure his 
own survival. Domestic legal systems universally
condemn such a sacrifice as a crime.56 
In any event there was no suggestion that the Son Thang 
patrol considered the killing of its victims necessary for 
completion of the mission or to preserve its own safety.
In customary international law, reprisals and collective 
punishment of civilians offering resistance in occupied areas 
have been considered permissible and "a legitimate means of 
ensuring compliance with the law of war by the enemy."57 
Reprisals usually refer to the actions of states, with which 
we are not here concerned. But there are also what may be 
referred to as battlefield reprisals. Professor Ingrid 
DeLupis defines that type of reprisal as:
Acts...by a belligerent directed against groups of 
civilians, prisoners-of-war or other persons hors de 
combat, in response to an attack by persons of 
unprivileged status or by persons not immediately
connected with the regular forces of the enemy.58 
"Reprisals by definition are unlawful acts deliberately done 
to punish and deter an unlawfully behaving enemy."59 Could the 
actions of the Herrod patrol, having witnessed the death of a 
fellow-Marine just hours before, be considered a reprisal? 
Or simply retaliation and revenge? Since reprisal presumes a 
prior illegal act by the enemy, characterizing the Son Thang 
killings as a reprisal seems bootless.
In very limited circumstances, U.S.' law allows 
reprisals, but only after an implementation process that 
transpires at a far-higher than tactical level.60 British law, 
while not as confining, similarly takes reprisals from the 
hands of the individual soldier.61 The 1949 Geneva Conventions
56Louis F.E. Goldie, "Remarks," in Trooboff, Law and Responsibility. 85.
57Anthony V.P. Rogers, "Armed Forces and the Development of the Law of War," IX 
Recueils de la Soci£t€ Internationale de Droit Pdnal Militaire 201, 205 (1982).
58DeLupis, The Law of War. 255.
59Best, Humanity in Warfare. 267-68.
60Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 495-497.
61HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. Ill, par. 642-649.
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prohibit collective punishments and reprisals against 
protected civilians62 — a notable change since, despite its 
Charter specifying the killing of hostages a war crime, not 
even the Nuremberg tribunals declared reprisals against 
civilians always illegal.63 Some argue that all reprisals have 
been rendered contrary to international law by the U.N. 
Charter,64 though such arguments strike others as 
unconvincing.
In circumstances similar to the Son Thang patrol's, 
Lieutenant Calley urged his court-martial to view his actions 
as a reprisal. The military appellate opinion, released 
after the Son Thang trials, addressed Calley1s assertion, 
leaving little doubt as to the U.S. military's legal view:
In an argument of extraordinary scope, appellant asks us 
to hold that the deaths of the My Lai villagers were not 
legally requitable....The premises for this view are 
first, that the history of operations around Pinkville 
discloses villager sympathy and support for the Viet 
Cong, so extensive and enduring as to constitute all the 
villagers as belligerents...not entitled to the 
protections of peaceful civilian status....Participation 
in irregular warfare is done by individuals, although 
they may organize themselves for the purpose. 
Slaughtering. many for the presumed delicts of a few is 
not a lawful response....villagers [of toddler age] were 
indiscriminately included in the general carnage.... The 
argument is in essence a plea to permit summary 
execution as a reprisal for irregular villager action 
favoring the Viet Cong. Reprisal by summary execution 
of the helpless is forbidden in the laws of land
warfare.66
Despite Lieutenant Ambort's direction to Herrod to "pay 
these little bastards back," the Son Thang incident was not a 
battlefield reprisal. The patrol lacked an intent to execute
62Convention IV, Art. 33.
63Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (The Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971), 334; 
and U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. VIII, 
7 6 -8 8 .
64Brownlie, International Law and the Use as Force. 223, referring to Art. 2: "All
members shall refrain...from the threat or use of force...."; also see: Quincy Wright, 
"Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation," in Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko, and Robert J. 
Lifton, eds., Crimes of War (NY: Random House, 1971), 187.
65U.S. v Calley, 46 CMR 1131, 1174 (1973).
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a lawful act of reprisal which was, in any event, beyond its 
authority to conduct. The killings were simply war crimes.
4.1.d. The Extent of U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam There were 
directives applicable to all troops in Vietnam on the subject 
of war crimes, first issued in 1965 and updated regularly. 
They directed that all personnel were responsible for 
reporting suspected war crimes.66 Many in fact were reported 
and the U.S. did try by court-martial a significant number of 
its nationals.
Assessing the true extent of battlefield war crime in 
any conflict is impossible since significant offenses go 
unreported and undiscovered. Assessing the number of Vietnam 
convictions for breach of the law of war is similarly 
problematic. Only the U.S. Army kept count of its war crimes 
cases; no other armed service did so.67 There was no central, 
all-service reporting authority.
[General Westmoreland's headquarters] had considered 
establishing special war crimes teams and having the 
Army maintain centralized files...for all services, but 
this was not done because the laws prohibiting war 
crimes and the...machinery for investigating and
punishing such offenses were judged adequate.6**
Nor can one make a determination by reviewing appellate 
records since not all cases are appealed, not all appellate 
opinions are published, and those published seldom refer to 
the offenses as war crimes, describing them instead as 
murder, assault, rape, et cetera. A few war crimes, as in 
one instance involving dismissal of charges ostensibly for 
reasons of national security, were not even prosecuted.69
There does exist an all-service record of convictions 
for serious offenses involving Vietnamese victims — but not
66Prugh, Law at War. 72-74.
67Lewy, America in Vietnam. 350.
68Prugh, Law at War. 77.
69Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. 367-68, describes dismissal of charges against 
seven Green Beret officers involved in the murder of a South Vietnamese intelligence 
agent.
134
all such offenses are necessarily war crimes. One U.S. 
soldier whose case figures in the totals, for example, was 
convicted of murdering a Vietnamese drug dealer.70 Still, the 
number of South Vietnamese serious crime victims is 
revealing. The following two tables are based on Department 
of Defense and Department of the Army figures.
C o u rt-M a rtia l  C o n v ic t io n s In v o lv in g  V ie tn a m e s e  V ic tim s , 1 9 6 5 -1 9 7 3 71
O ffense  Army Navy M arine Air F orce
Murder 41 3 27 0
Rape 25 1 16 0
Mutilation of Corpse 2 0 1 0
M anslaughter 26 2 15 1
The second table accurately indicates war crime trials, but
only reflects offenses alleged against U.S. Army personnel:
A lle g a t io n s  A g a in s t  A rm y P e r s o n n e l ,  O th e r T h a n  My Lai, 19 6 5 -1 9 7 5 72
Pre-My Lai Post-My Lai Total
Allegations made:
Unsubstantiated/unfounded 19 144 163
Substantiated 31 47 78
Total 50 191 241
C a se s  referred to  court-m artial:
Convicted 22 14 36
Acquitted/dismissed 15 5 20
Offenses of which convicted:
M urder/manslaughter 6 3 9
Rape 3 0 3
Mutilation 3 2 5
Other war crime tabulations said to be from official 
sources vary in minor ways, there being no way to determine 
which figures are accurate.73 Still other tabulations cover
70U.S. v Stamats, 45 CMR 765 (ACMR, 1971).
71Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," pt. I, 18.
72Lewy, America in Vietnam. 348.
73Aubrey M. Daniel, "The Defense of Superior Orders," 7 U. of Richmond L. Rev. #3, 
477, 495 (1973).
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only a portion of the war,74 or fail to reflect a reliable 
source.75 How a war-crime/non-war-crime distinction was made 
by military officials is unspecified, although directives in 
effect throughout the conflict describe war crimes in terms 
of Geneva Convention grave breaches.76 Telford Taylor would 
differentiate on the basis of where the crime occurs, 
friendly territory, or enemy territory.77 Major General Prugh, 
Judge Advocate General from 1971 to 197 5, suggests an 
operational/ non-operational dichotomy:
Serious incidents involving assault, rape, and murder 
that were not directly connected with military 
operations in the field were not characterized as war 
crimes but were reported through military police 
channels as violations of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.7**
In any event, the number of war crimes indicated in the 
foregoing tables, the best official estimates available, is 
so low as to clearly suggest their unreliability as an 
indicator of actual offenses. The number of Army war crime 
trials may be known but ultimately the number of Vietnam war 
crimes cannot even be accurately estimated.
4.2. Preliminary Son Thana Trial Issues
By discovering and promptly initiating legal proceedings 
against the Son Thang patrol members the Marine Corps was 
spared many of the problems encountered by the Army^ My Lai 
prosecutors. Within ninety-six hours of the charged acts, 
the Herrod patrol was jailed, awaiting a preliminary judicial 
inquiry. In contrast, it was over a year before the My Lai 
allegations were first aired, another five months before
74Solf, "A Response to Telford Taylor's 'Nuremberg and Vietnam','' 67; Goldstein, The 
My Lai Massacre and its Cover-up. 15, n.7.
75U.S. News & World Report. 19 April, 1971, 20; Bishop, Justice Under Fire. 291.
76£.g., MACV Directive 20-4, dated 10 July 1970, Annex D, Inspections and 
Investigations: War Crimes.
77Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 134.
78Prugh, Law at War. 76.
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charges were brought against Lieutenant Calley, and yet 
another fourteen months before his trial began, half a world 
away from the crime scene. Though much of the delay was no 
fault of the Army's, throughout the nineteen months between 
revelation and trial world-wide publicity made My Lai 
infamous and provided fertile ground for defense issues.
The Son Thang trials, because of their prompt 
disposition near the crimes' occurrence, were to be 
uncommonly "clean" cases, free of allegations of command 
influence, prejudicial publicity, or political interference. 
While there were numerous preliminary issues, they tended to 
be straightforward and subject to courtroom resolution.
4.2.a. Civilians as Protected Persons upon first impression 
the Son Thang victims, nationals of a co-belligerent state, 
appear excluded from the protection of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, though U.S. military courts had previously 
disregarded the seeming exclusion.79 America's 1863 Lieber 
Code made clear that "the unarmed citizen is to be 
spared...as much as the exigencies of war will admit," and 
"wanton violence" against such persons, whether ally or 
enemy, shall be punished.80 No distinction is made between co­
belligerent and other civilians. The 1907 Hague Convention 
IV is to the same effect.81 The U.N.'s War Crimes Commission 
notes treaty and case law on point, as well:
On a narrow interpretation, the Hague Convention [1907 
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Law and Customs of 
War on Land] does not protect civilians outside of 
occupied territory...but this has not in fact prevented 
courts from extending the protection of the laws and 
usages of war.... In the Hadamar Trial.. .various accused 
were found guilty of taking part in the deliberate 
killing of... civilians... [That they were] not in
79 U.S. v Schultz, a noncombatant murder case wherein Convention IV is prominently 
relied upon as authority.
80Arts. 22 and 44, respectively.
81 Art. 46.
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occupied territory, was treated as irrelevant. Another 
example among the many, is the Belsen Trial.82
But legal and philosophical distinctions based upon notions
of humanity may be forgotten as one gets closer to the sound
of guns.
If the Son Thang victims were protected noncombatants, 
"such killings would be classical examples of 'war crimes'."83 
The most calloused infantryman would recognize a young blind 
girl as a noncombatant; six of the dead were six- and eight- 
year old children, obviously not combatants. But were they 
protected persons? Were they VC and unlawful combatants?
He who engages in combat by night, while purporting to be 
a quiet civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a 
combatant. He is an unlawful combatant, who is deprived 
of the protection of international law (in the form of
entitlement to the status of a prisoner of war).. ,84 
Noncombatants, as well as unlawful combatants, normally 
cannot claim prisoner of war (POW) status,85 but compelling 
facts indicate that the Son Thang victims were entitled to 
such standing.86 Hague Convention IV of 1907 notes that 
belligerent armed forces may consist of combatants and 
noncombatants and both, if captured, "have a right to be 
treated as prisoners of war."87 Article 5 of the 1949 POW
82U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV, 85- 
86, citations omitted.
83Nigel S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), 154.
84Yoram Dinstein, "The Distinction Between Unlawful Combatants and War Criminals," 
in Dinstein, ed., International Law at a Time of Perplexity (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1989), 105.
851949 Convention III, Art. 4.
86In support of such a determination, see: Stanley L. Paulson and John S. Banta, "The 
Killings at My Lai: 'Grave Breaches' Under the Geneva Conventions and the Question of 
Military Jurisdiction," 12 Harvard L. Rev. (!971), which makes the argument that the 
similarly situated My Lai victims should have been considered POWs. The same 
argument is persuasively made in: Note, "The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of
Prisoners of War in Vietnam," 854-55; and in Carnahan, "The Law of War in the United 
States Court of Military Appeals," 340, 344-45. Not all writers agree, however: 
Donald L. Shaneyfelt, "War Crimes and the Jurisdiction Maze," 4 International Lawyer 
924 (1969-70); and Dinstein, "The Distinction Between Unlawful Combatants and War 
Criminals."
87Art. 3.
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Convention addresses persons whose eligibility for POW status 
is uncertain: "Should any doubt arise as to whether
persons...belong to any of the categories enumerated [for POW
status] such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined..." Having forced their captives from their huts, 
the killer team reasonably should have harbored doubt 
concerning their status; doubt sufficient to have rendered 
them protected persons until their actual status could be
determined. Son Thang bordered a free fire zone; the VC,
including women and children, were well-known to be operating 
in the area — the battalion operations journal reflects that 
two days before the Son Thang patrol "a child"88 lured a squad 
of Marines into an ambush that resulted in two dead and three 
wounded; two days before that an enemy female soldier had 
been killed;89 the day before that a VC estimated to have been 
eleven years old was taken under fire, captured, and 
detained;90 Herrod and his patrol purported to have seized 
their victims on the basis of suspected VC presence in Son 
Thang; and most importantly, a MACV directive ordered that 
Geneva Convention POW protections should extend to "[p]ersons 
who when detained were not openly engaged in combat and whose 
status may be: innocent civilian, returnee, prisoner of war, 
or civil defendant."91
Nor did the captives' lack of uniform or fixed 
distinguishing sign, called for by Convention III,92 rule out 
POW status. The Court of Military Appeals noted in a 1969 
opinion involving a single Vietnamese civilian held, then 
killed by a patrol in virtually identical circumstances:
881/7 Command Chronology, Feb. 1970, 20, entry 171315H.
89Ibid., 19, entry 151115H.
90Ibid., 18, entry 141620H.
91MACV Directive 20-5 of 15 March 1966, par. 19, quoted in Paulson and Banta, "The 
Killings at My Lai," 348, fn. 18.
92Art. 4 A.(2)(b).
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There is not an iota of evidentiary support that the 
victim was a Viet Cong or its sympathizer... .But, even if 
we were to assume the contrary, accused had taken his 
victim prisoner. The conduct of the accused...had to be 
governed by...Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of w a r . . . 93
The military Court clearly regards the Conventions as policy
norms to be applied in light of their humanitarian purposes,
rather than technical entitlements created solely by the
Conventions themselves.94 Whether unprotected civilians, POWs,
or combatants, "humane treatment is still the general
principle.1,95 The 1907 Hague Convention’s Martens clause long
ago laid to rest the misconception that what is not expressly
prohibited in warfare is permitted.96
Before taking action against their captives Herrod and 
his patrol had a duty to await a determination by responsible 
authority of their status — a determination not for them to 
make. The ICRC notes in that regard, "decisions which might 
have the gravest consequences should not be left to a single 
person, who might often be of subordinate rank."97 Once 
seized, the sixteen Vietnamese should have been considered 
POWs, protected by 1949 Geneva Convention III, and their 
killing was a grave breach of the law of war.
4.2.b. Insanity Turning from the victims to the accused, 
other pretrial issues arise. Having been ordered by Herrod, 
their patrol leader, to kill four unarmed female civilians,
93U.S. v Schultz, 136, citations omitted. Though uncommon in post-World War II 
trials, a similar result did sometimes obtain where lack of uniform or distinctive sign 
was in issue: U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
vol. IX, Trial o f Skorzeny, et al., 90, which involved use of the enemy's uniform. The 
issue is largely mooted by Protocol I, Sec. II, Arts. 44-45, which grants civilian- 
combatants such as the VC POW status in Son Thang-like situations.
94Camahan, "The Law of War in the United States Court of Military Appeals," 340.
95Percy E. Corbett, "The Vietnam Struggle and International Law," 348, 375, in 
Richard A Falk, ed., The International Law of Civil War (Maryland: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1971).
96Rowe, Defence. 145.
97Jean S. Pictet, ed., Commentary. Ill Geneva Convention: Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1960),77.
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one of whom was obviously blind, Krichten asked Boyd, "Is he 
crazy, or what?" "He must be," replied Boyd. Given the 
nature of the charged offenses, the issue of mental 
responsibility immediately comes to mind.
Under U.S. military law applicable during the Son Thang 
trials, if reasonable doubt existed as to the mental 
responsibility of the accused he could not be convicted of 
any offense. The test of mental capacity was a modified 
version of the England's M'Naghteii98 standard: "A person is 
not mentally responsible...unless he was, at the time, so far 
free from mental defect, disease, or derangement as to be 
able...both to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to 
the right."99
But insanity was not raised as a defense in any Son 
Thang trial. In Herrod's court-martial the civilian defense 
team did call as a witness in its case-in-chief a civilian 
psychiatrist who testified without having examined the 
accused. "The psychiatric evidence we presented," wrote 
Herrod's counsel, "...was very persuasive, I think."100 
Persuasive of what, one wonders? Subsequently the defense 
made a motion to dismiss all charges against Herrod "due to a 
lack of mental responsibility on the part of the 
defendant,"101 a motion perhaps based upon the civilian 
practice with which Herrod's civilian defense counsel was 
familiar. There is no such ground for dismissal of charges 
in military practice and the motion was withdrawn immediately 
upon being made.
4.2.c. Partial Responsibility The Son Thang accuseds may 
have lacked a legitimate insanity defense, but if they
9%M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
" Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969 (Wash.: GPO, 1969), par. 120.b. See U.S. v 
Frederick, 3 MJ 230 (USCMA, 1977) for comprehensive description of the insanity 
defense in military law to that date.
100Denzil D. Garrison, Oklahoma, to author, Wash., 22 August 1988.
10Record of trial, U.S. v Herrod, 991. (The summarized record is oddly numbered.)
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suffered from a lesser abnormal mental condition it would 
have been a relevant consideration in determining guilt or 
innocence. In U.S. military law, partial mental 
responsibility does not amount to a general lack of mental 
responsibility which would excuse criminality. It does, 
however, result in an inability to form specific intent or a 
premeditated design to kill,102 and would have been a partial 
defense. Since specific intent and premeditation are not 
required for a finding of guilt of unpremeditated murder, 
guilt of that offense would not have been precluded.103 An 
appropriate showing of partial mental responsibility does 
not, however, result in commitment, as does a successful 
insanity defense.104
But neither was partial mental responsibility raised as 
a defense, although in two cases the eventual outcomes were 
the same as if it had been: findings of guilt to the lesser 
charge of unpremeditated murder. Still, experienced defense 
counsel might reasonably have been expected to raise the 
issue of partial mental responsibility, pleading, for 
example, provocation related to recent combat stress adequate 
to cause a loss of normal self control.105 All of the accuseds 
except Green had been engaged in combat for a considerable 
period; a company member had been killed in their presence 
only hours before the charged crimes; civilians in the 
vicinity of Son Thang, including women and children, had 
frequently engaged them in combat; other friends had recently 
been killed or wounded. But the issue was not raised.
4.2.d. Principals. Aiders and Abettors There was later 
argument as to who among the five patrol members fired at the
l02U.S. v Kunak, 17 CMR 346 (USCMA, 1954).
103Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 120.C.; U.S. v Chappell, 41 CMR 236 
(USCMA, 1970).
104Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law. 2d ed. (Minnesota: West 
Publishing, 1986), 369.
105Edwin R. Keedy, "A Problem of First Degree Murder: Fisher v. United States," 99 U. 
Pennsylvania L. Rev. 267, 277-90 (1950), describes such a circumstance.
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Vietnamese at Son Thang and who merely fired. All five were 
charged with having actually fired at the women and children. 
But what if the prosecution lacked proof that each of the 
accused in fact shot at the victims?
The concept of aiders and abettors applies in the law of 
war as in general criminal law. British practice is to 
charge an accused with being "concerned in" committing a 
specific war crime; the English civilian law of principals 
and accessories is analogous.106 "The possible range of 
persons who may be held guilty of war crimes...is not limited 
to those who physically performed the illegal deed. Many 
others have been held to be sufficiently connected with an 
offence to be held criminally liable..."107 Following World 
War II, not surprisingly, there were numerous war crime 
convictions grounded on the principle of complicity, the 
parallel of aiding and abetting.108 "It is a universally 
recognized principle of modern penal law," said a World War 
II tribunal, "that accomplices during or after the fact are 
responsible in the same manner as actual perpetrators....That 
is a principle recognized equally in the field of war 
crimes."109
The U.S. code of military law, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, reads:
... [M] ere presence at the scene is not enough nor is 
mere failure to prevent the commission of an offense; 
there must be an intent to aid or encourage the persons 
who commit the crime. The aider and abettor must share 
the criminal intent....An accused, without intent to 
kill and without active participation in a homicide, is 
a principal guilty of murder committed by those with 
whom he voluntarily associated himself in the execution 
of an unlawful design [that] involves a hazard to 
life.110
106U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV, 79.
107Ibid.
108See citations in: Paust, "My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader 
Responsibility," 167-69.
109U.N., Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. VIII, Trial o f Franz Holstein, 32.
110Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 156: UCMJ, Art. 77
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At trial here was no evidence that Green had shot at any of 
the victims; he was prosecuted "as a principal to murder by 
virtue of his having aided and abetted those actually 
shooting the victims..."111
4.3. Issues in The Defense of Superior Orders
The defense of obedience of superior orders clearly would be 
central in the Son Thang trials. Of that issue Professor 
Lauterpacht wrote: "The problem raised by the plea of
superior orders is, by general admission, one of great 
complexity both in international and in municipal law....The 
law oscillates..."112 In drafting the Protocols to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions the issue of superior orders was so 
contentious that the Conference could not adopt an acceptable 
proposal concerning the subject. Each state is left to apply 
its own understanding of the law of superior orders.113
Superior orders is raised as a defense in war crime 
trials more frequently than any other.114 Peter Hagenbach 
unsuccessfully raised the plea in 1474, as did the guard 
commander at the execution of Charles I, where the court 
held:
[The colonel] justified that all he did was as a 
soldier, by the command of his superior officer, whom he 
must obey or die. It was...no excuse, for his superior 
was a traitor...and where the command is traitorous, 
there the obedience to that command is also 
traitorous.116
In the 17th century Grotius wrote, "If the authorities issue 
any order that is contrary to the law of nature or to the 
commandments of God, the order should not be carried out."116 
Yet the British Military Code of 1715 provided that refusal
1111/.S', v Green, 5.
112Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," pt. I, 70-71.
113Howard, Restraints on War. 156.
114U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV, 157.
n 5 AxtelVs Case (1661), Kelyng 13; 84 E.R. 1060.
116Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Paris Libri Tres (Paris: Buon, 1625), book I, chap. 
4, § I; cited in Bull, Hugo Grotius and International Relations. 24.
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to obey a military order was a capital offense, no 
qualification being made as to the lawfulness of the 
command.117 Still, in 17 84 Horatio Nelson breached 
international law and successfully pleaded superior orders.118 
The shooting of disobedient prisoners was accepted under 
certain circumstances during the Boer War.119 Nazis, of 
course, raised the defense after World War II, as did 
Lieutenant Calley and others in Vietnam. Civilians have 
pleaded superior orders.120 After Nuremberg one might have 
thought the defense of superior orders had been scrapped. 
Such is not the case.
4.3.a. The Defense of Superior Orders The American Marine 
Corps considers itself an elite unit and is zealous in 
maintaining its reputation for soldierly bearing and military 
discipline. "[T]he U.S. Marine Corps is more than a crack 
military machine. It is a fraternity bonded in blood."121 
While some psychologists maintain that such a self-image 
produces "criminogenic factors,"122 there is a "long-standing 
Marine assumption that discipline, as exemplified by 
immediate obedience to orders, is the overriding factor in 
combat success."123 Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, 
assistant commander of the Son Thang patrol's parent 
division, notes that "there is a predisposition...stronger in 
the Marine Corps than it might be in other services, to 
accept orders without question....In many cases, the better
117Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," 73.
118Alffed T. Mahan, The Life of Nelson, vol. I (Boston: Little Brown, 1923), 54.
119H.L. Stephen, "Superior Orders As Excuse For Homicide," 65 L. Quarterly Rev. 87 
(1 9 0 1 ).
120Wilner, "Superior Orders As A Defense to Violations of International Criminal Law," 
127.
121Clare Booth Luce, forward to First To Fight. Victor H. Krulak (Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1984), xii.
122Dr. Erwin Beckert, "Influence of the Armed Forces Upon the Aggressiveness of 
Military Men," XXIII Revue de Droit Pdnal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 41, 46 
(1 9 8 4 ).
123Fleming, The U.S. Marine Corps in Crisis. 4.
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the Marine, the less apt he would be to challenge an illegal 
order."124 Before Son Thang the Marine Corps' near-automatic 
obedience to orders had been pleaded in defense of murdering 
Vietnamese civilians. In rejecting that Marine ethos, a 
military appellate court wrote: "A Marine is a reasoning
agent, who is under a duty to exercise judgement in obeying 
orders..."125
The "reasoning agent" standard was not always the 
measure of a soldier's judgement. In America the defense of 
superior orders was defined first in non-military civil and 
criminal cases which rejected the defense if the order on 
which the subordinate relied was illegal in the abstract, 
without regard to the order's appearance of legality to the 
subordinate.126
In an 1813 civil case involving a police officer, U.S. v 
Jones,127 the court enunciated today's U.S. standard: 
obedience to a superior order is not a defense if the 
subordinate knows or ought to know the order is illegal. An 
analogous English military case, Regina v Smith, reached the 
same formulation.128 "By focusing.. .on the state of mind of 
the actor and the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable 
belief in the legality of the orders would exculpate the 
defendant by negating the requisite mens rea.1,129
But the military standard of that period was far 
different: "Individuals of the Armed Forces will not be
punished for these offenses in case they are committed under 
orders or sanction of their government or commanders. The 
commanders ordering the commission of such acts...may be 
punished...."130 Contrary U.S. civilian case law
124Simmons interview, 17 Dec. 1990.
125 US. v Keenan, 39 CMR 108 (USCMA, 1969).
126Little v Barreme, 1 U.S. (2 Cranch) 465 (1804); U.S. v Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232 
(C.C.D. Pa., 1809).
12726 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D. Pa.).
128(1900), 17 Special Court Reports of Cape of Good Hope, 561.
129Daniel, "The Defense of Superior Orders," 483.
130War Dept., Rules of Land Warfare. 1914, par. 366.
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notwithstanding, obedience to orders was an absolute defense, 
according to both the U.S. and British law of war manuals.131 
This divergence continued through the First World War, 
accounting for the lack of allied war crimes courts-martial, 
and continued into World War II. Interestingly, German 
military law consistently applied the more harsh civil 
standard of U.S. v Jones, as evidenced in the post-World War 
I Llandovery Castle and Dover Castle convictions.132
"During the Second World War, bearing in mind possible 
future trials of German atrocities, [allied] opinion 
changed..."133 Ironically, in 1944 Britain adopted the German 
approach, amending her law of war manual to allow compliance 
with orders, with lack of knowledge of their illegality to be 
considered in determining individual responsibility.134 Seven 
months later the U.S. amended its manual, as well: "...The 
fact that the [law of war violations] complained of were done 
pursuant to the order of a superior. . .may be taken into 
consideration in determining culpability, either by way of 
defense or in mitigation of punishment."135
These changes to a more stringent standard of course 
represented a significant volte-face. The difference between 
the two nations' provisions was that the British allowed the 
prosecution of one who obeyed orders that he knew were 
unlawful; the accused's mistake of law, however, remained a 
defense. The U.S., on the other hand, provided no guidance, 
leaving unstated when obedience to orders should be a matter 
in defense and when a matter in mitigation. "It was a most
131 James E. Edmonds and Lassa Oppenheim, Land Warfare. An Exposition of the Laws and 
Usages of War on Land (London: HMSO, 1929), par. 443.
13277ze Dover Castle (Case o f Karl Neumann), and The Llandovery Castle (Case o f  
Dithmar and Boldt), both: German Supreme Court, German War Trials, Cmd 1450 
(1921). See also, "Judgement in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt Hospital Ship 
'Llandovery Castle'," 16 AJIL 708 (1922).
133Keijzer, Military Obedience. 168.
134U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. I, 18.
135Dept. of War, Rules of Land Warfare. 1914. change 1, 15 November 1944, par. 
345.1.
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unsatisfactory formulation."136 Still in conflict with both 
U.S. and U.K. municipal law, the force of these changed 
military administrative regulations was uncertain. 
Lauterpacht noted that the British amendment "is not believed 
to represent a sound principle of the law of war, and is in 
no sense binding upon Great Britain in the international 
sphere."137 No American expert was so frank.
Article eight of the Nuremberg IMT Charter differed 
significantly from both the old and the amended U.S.- U.K. 
regulations: "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to 
order...of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment...." 
Nuremberg's rule was one of absolute liability.
Clearly, the Nuremberg standard of obedience to superior 
orders is a much stricter standard than any applied by 
American courts since United States v. Jones allowed an 
apparently legal, though actually illegal, order to be a 
defense....The international law rule, as expressed by 
the Nuremberg standard, was quite different from and
much stricter than the existing American rule.13**
In practice, however, Nuremberg saw a new, ameliorating 
factor injected: "The true test," noted a Nuremberg military 
tribunal, "which is found in varying degrees in the criminal 
law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but 
whether moral choice was in fact possible.1,139 This "moral 
choice" test, which effectively and unofficially modified the 
IMT Charter by only half accepting its rejection of the plea 
of superior orders, led to the requirement of duress as a 
necessary part of a successful defense of superior orders at 
Nuremberg.140 Application of the "moral choice" test is 
apparent in several trials, for example, the Flick, Farben,
136Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 49.
137Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," 69, fn. 2.
138Daniel, "The Defense of Superior Orders," 491-92.
139U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, U.S. 
v Ohlendorf, the Eisensatzgrupen Case, Opinion and Judgement, 411, 471.
140The imprecision of the moral choice test test is discussed in Greenspan, Modem Law 
of Land Warfare. 493-95.
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and Krupp judgements.141 So, despite Article eight of the 
Charter, many defendants did raise the defense of superior 
orders, pleading lack of moral choice, and a few were 
acquitted on the basis of the plea when the "moral choice" 
issue was also considered. "In general, however, the 
[harsher] rule adopted at Nuremberg applied, and this defense 
was considered only in mitigation and not in exoneration of 
guilt."142 "In fact, the [Nuremberg] tribunal did not accept 
the plea of superior orders in regard to any of the 
accused...and the plea was specifically rejected in the 
judgements on the two military leaders, Keitel and Jodi."143
Since World War II the defense of obedience to superior 
orders has remained unchanged in British military law.144 
Several British soldiers have been prosecuted in civilian 
courts for killing suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland, 
the only conviction tangentially involving superior orders.145 
The defense remained constant in U.S. application until 1956, 
when The Law of Land Warfare field manual was re-published. 
Once again, the U.S. softened its position.
The defense, reads the current manual, is not available 
unless the accused "did not know and could not reasonably 
have been expected to know that the act ordered was 
unlawful."146 This formulation, an affirmative defense 
involving mens rea, was echoed in the revised Manual for 
Courts-Martial that became effective in 1969: "An act
performed manifestly beyond the scope of authority, or 
pursuant to an order that a man of ordinary sense and
141U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV, 156.
142Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes. 312.
143Greenspan, Modern Law of Land Warfare. 495.
144HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. Ill, par. 627: "Obedience to the order of 
a...superior...affords no defense to a charge of committing a war crime but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment."
145ff. v Thain (24 Oct. 1985), discussed at, HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. II, 10th 
ed., 5-10.
146Dept of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 509.a.
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understanding would know to be illegal...is not excusable."147 
That the individual was acting pursuant to orders "may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment,"148 however. That 
remains the state of the law. Those who would raise the 
defense still face significant problems: was there an actual 
"order" given? Was it unlawful as a matter of law? Did the 
accused have actual knowledge of its illegality? Can a lack 
of intelligence rise to a defense?149
The U.S. defense of obedience to orders, then, has both 
subjective ("did not know"/"would know") and objective 
("manifestly") elements, the latter having been added by the 
1969 Manual for Court-Martial. Although neither element is 
simple in application, there are cases interpreting both. 
Most of those cases arose in Vietnam, which saw more 
prosecutions of Americans for killing noncombatants than any 
previous war.
4.3.b. Illegal Orders and Malum in Se Crimes The subjective 
element of the defense of superior orders was central to most 
Vietnam cases, a few of which resulted in acquittal,150 
although most, like Calley's, ended in conviction.
The soldier*s conflicting obligations are often cited, 
usually in garish terms: "The position of a soldier is in 
theory and may be in practice a difficult one. He may.. .be 
liable to be shot by a court-martial if he disobeys an order, 
and be hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys it."151 In fact, 
no American or British soldier will be either shot or hanged
147Par. 216.d.
148Dept of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 509.a.
149At least one post-World War II war crime case, In the Trial o f Gerbsch (1948), 
recognized as a mitigating circumstance that the accused's "mental faculties were 
defective and undeveloped" at the time of his crimes, as well as at trial. U.N., Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XIII, 132, 137.
150C7.5. v Hutto, e.g., a My Lai case which, because an acquittal, has no appellate citation.
15 Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. 10th ed. 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1959), 303.
150
f o r  s im p le  d i s o b e d i e n c e  o f  a  l a w f u l  o r d e r ,  b u t  t h e  c o n f l i c t  
i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  a p p a r e n t .*
The major problem...is, first, that more often than not 
the soldier will be quite ignorant as to whether or not 
the order is legal; second, that the jurists and 
legislators of different nations often disagree quite
vehemently on the finer points of international law.152 
S c h o l a r s  o f t e n  m ake m uch o f  t h e  p r o b le m  o f  s u b j e c t i v e l y  
d e te r m in in g  t h e  l e g a l i t y  o f  o r d e r s ,  a s  w e l l :
How, indeed, is the soldier to make a determination on 
the legality of the order.. .having but a partial view of 
the field of battle and being incapable of judging 
whether a particular operation is strictly militarily 
necessary or not?....[H]ow can the individual soldier 
reach a reasoned judgement? Even if he could, is he a 
free agent?....[H] ow far is the soldier required to go 
in incurring personal penalties...in resistance to
orders known to be in contravention of the laws of
war?
A n o th e r  p r o f e s s o r  w r i t e s :  " I t  i s  e a s y  t o  i n s t r u c t  m e n . . . .B u t 
t h e r e  i s  n o  a t t e m p t  t o  t e l l  t h e  s o l d i e r  how  h e  i s  t o
d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  n o n -c o m b a ta n t  c h i l d  f ro m  a  b o y  s o l d i e r . . . t h e  
o r d i n a r y  v i l l a g e  p o p u l a t i o n  fro m  g u e r i l l a  u n i t s . . . " 154
B u t t h i s  m akes t o o  much o f  b a t t l e f i e l d  w ar c r im e s ,  w h ic h  
a r e  u s u a l l y  s im p l e  m alum  i n  s e  o f f e n s e s .  T h e r e  a r e  n o  
V ie tn a m - e r a  m u rd e r  p r o s e c u t i o n s  f o r  h a v in g  m is ta k e n ,  i n  g o o d  
f a i t h ,  a  c i v i l i a n  f o r  a  c o m b a ta n t .  H e r ro d  o r d e r e d ,  " K i l l
th e m  a l l ! "  C a l l e y  d em an d ed , "Why h a v e n ' t  y o u  w a s te d  th em  
y e t ? "  I n  a  c a s e  n o t  d e t a i l e d  h e r e ,  a  C a p ta in  Ogg com m anded, 
"T ak e  [ t h e  p r i s o n e r ]  down t h e  h i l l  a n d  s h o o t  h i m ." 155 G iv e n
*Disobedience of a lawful order, even in wartime, is not and was not a capital offense 
under the UCMJ. Britain’s Army Act, 1955, similarly specifies imprisonment as 
punishment for such a violation. (Pt. II, §34. Disobedience of an order in the presence
of, and with intent to assist the enemy, however, does render one subject to the death
penalty. Pt. II, §24.) In the Second World War, German soldiers were on occasion
summarily shot for disobeying orders. See: Keijzer, Military Obedience. 149, fn. 41.
152Julius Stone and Robert K. Woetzel, eds., Toward A Feasible International Criminal 
Court (Geneva: World Peace Through Law Center, 1970), 261.
153Clark, Waging War. 81.
154Green, "Aftermath of Vietnam," in Falk, ed., The Vietnam War and International Law, 
vol. 4, 172.
155U.S. v Griffen, 39 CMR 586, 588 (ACMR, 1968).
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such circumstances, does a soldier require a class on the 
Geneva Conventions to recognize the manifest illegality of 
such orders? Will any nation's jurists consider those to be 
legitimate orders? Might any soldier believe such orders to 
be in execution of a lawful reprisal — a mistake of fact?156 
Can possible disciplinary action for not obeying such an 
order excuse the obeying of it? Or will one say, with the 
prosecutor in The Peleus Trial, "it must have been obvious to 
the most rudimentary intelligence that it was not a lawful 
command, and that those who did the shooting are not to be 
excused for doing it upon the ground of superior orders?"157 
Recognizing the clear illegality of such orders requires 
neither superior intelligence nor academic accomplishment. 
There are improper orders of less clear illegality, no doubt, 
subtle in their wrongfulness, requiring a fine moral 
discernment in their execution to avoid criminality. But 
such orders are rare on the battlefield. Too few 
commentators distinguish between combat zone illegal orders 
and illegal orders more appropriately constituting crimes 
against peace.
Mistake of fact and mistake of law, of course, would 
excuse an accused. "If the illegality of the order was not 
known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been 
expected to know of its illegality, no wrongful 
intent... exists."158 But such innocent, subjective states of 
mind are unusual in battlefield violations of the law of war.
Recognizing the objective element of the defense of 
superior orders, at least two court-martial judges in Vietnam 
refused to instruct the members (jurors) on the superior
156See, e.g., Joseph B. Keenan and Brendan F. Brown, Crimes Against International Law 
(Wash., Public Affairs Press, 1950), 136-37, where the authors apply the mistake of 
fact defense to individual soldiers who, the authors aver, grandly conceive of war in 
just-unjust terms.
157TTie Peleus Trial, U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, vol. I, 12.
158Capt. Luther N. Norene, "Obedience to Orders As A Defense to A Criminal Act" 
(Thesis, U.S. Army School of the Judge Advocate General: Virginia, 1971), 48-49.
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orders defense.159 In both cases the charges involved shooting 
to death detained Vietnamese upon the order of a superior. 
Appellate courts upheld the refusal to instruct in both 
instances, noting that "the killing of a docile prisoner 
taken during military operations is not justifiable 
homicide.1,160 The orders were held to be manifestly illegal as 
a matter of law. In a 1958 opinion an Israeli court wrote:
[T] he distinguishing mark of a "manifestly unlawful 
order" should fly like a black flag....Not formal 
unlawfulness, hidden or half-hidden, nor unlawfulness 
discernible only to the eyes of legal experts.. .but a 
flagrant and manifest breach of the law...on the face of 
the order itself, the clearly criminal character of the 
acts ordered to be done, unlawfulness piercing the eye 
and revolting the heart, be the eye not blind nor the 
heart stony and corrupt — that is the measure of 
"manifest unlawfulness" required to release a soldier 
from the duty of obedience....161
in a Vietnam court-martial involving a patrol's killing of
noncombatants, prior to the Son Thang cases, the military
judge instructed the members:
...The acts of a Marine done in good faith and without 
malice, in the compliance with the orders of a superior 
are justifiable, unless such acts are manifestly beyond 
the scope of his authority and such that a man of 
ordinary sense and understanding would know them to be 
illegal. Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused under the circumstances of his 
age and military experience could not have honestly 
believed the order issued by his squad leader to be 
legal under the laws and usages of war, then the killing
of the alleged victim was without justification.162 
That instruction is contained in every military judge's bench 
manual, to be tailored to incorporate the facts of each case 
to which it is applicable.
Brigadier General Simmons relates an anecdote that says 
much about the Vietnam-era Marine's lack of understanding of 
lawful orders. General Simmons explains that units in
159U.S. v Schultz’, and U.S. v Griffen.
160Ibid., U.S. v Griffen, 588.
161 Chief Military Prosecutor v Melinki and Others, 44 Pesakim Elyonim 362 (1958), 
cited in A.G., Israel v Eichmann.
162£7.& v Keenan.
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Herrod's parent division, of which Simmons was then assistant 
commander, were routinely rotated to the relative security of 
division headquarters for several day's rest, re-fit, and 
training. The general himself regularly conducted a class on 
proper conduct in combat:
I was talking to thirty or forty corporals and 
sergeants, stressing the matter of legal and illegal 
orders. I was using the My Lai incident as a case in 
point. As a dramatic device, while I was discussing it,
I looked around and there was an army sergeant, a Green 
Beret, standing outside the pavilion, listening with a 
great deal of interest.... I thought I would use him as 
an example of the most outrageous and absurd, illegal 
order I could think of....I said, "What's that S.O.B. 
doing eavesdropping on us?" I pointed to a sergeant in 
the front row and said, "Take your .45 and go shoot that 
son-of-a-bitchl" And he got up out of his seat and 
started toward the Green Beret. I said, "Wait! Wait!
Don't you realize that I was giving you an illegal order 
— a completely ludicrous order?" He said, "I thought 
the general knew something I didn't know." And I think 
there's a lot to that. 1^ 3
The defense of superior orders, although central in only one
defense, was raised in all of the Son Thang trials except
that of Boyd.
4.3.C. Respondeat Superior and Duress t o  accept the 
defense of superior orders does not eliminate criminal 
responsibility for a law of war breach, it simply shifts its 
locus upwards. The converse of the defense of superior 
orders is respondeat superior, let the superior answer; the 
doctrine that a subordinate is not responsible for actions 
taken pursuant to orders, resting on the assumption that the 
superior is.
The superior's responsibility, moreover, is not limited 
to the situation where he has given affirmative orders.
A commander is responsible for the conduct of his 
troops, and is expected to take all necessary action to 
see that they do not, on their own initiative, commit 
war crimes.
163Simmons interview, 17 December 1990.
164Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 52-53.
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The principle that a commander may be responsible for the 
acts of his subordinates is long-standing. During America's 
Black Hawk War (1832) Abraham Lincoln, then a militia 
captain, was convicted by court-martial of failing to control 
his men, who had broken into liquor rations. Lincoln was 
sentenced to carry a wooden sword for two days.165 The U.S. 
Civil War's Lieber Code recognized respondeat superior, as 
did the 1914 Rules of Land Warfare.166 Before World War II, 
U.S. manuals, reflecting the then-current interpretation of 
the superior orders defense, placed responsibility for 
troops' depredations fully upon their commanders:167 
"Obedience to orders is the first duty of a soldier.... 
justice requires the punishment of the officer who is 
responsible for the order rather than the simple 
soldier...who has no power of judgement or discretion."168
Like much of the current law of war, respondeat superior 
reached the apex of its modern interpretation in the 
Nuremberg and Far East tribunals, which examined the 
responsibility not only of the immediate battlefield 
commander, but of more senior officers, as well. Yamashita 
addressed the responsibility of the commander with a broad 
brush, establishing a strict "constructive knowledge" 
standard; the High Command and Hostage cases (opinions 
rendered by judges, rather than laymen, as in Yamashita) 
provided greater detail. "The commanding general..." the 
tribunal said in the trial of Field-Marshal Wilhelm List, 
"will not be heard to say that a unit taking unlawful orders 
from someone other than himself was responsible for the crime 
and that he is thereby absolved from responsibility."169
165Solf, "A Response to Telford Taylor's 'Nuremberg and Vietnam,'" 67.
166Art. 71 and par. 366, respectively.
167War Dept., Rules of Land Warfare. 1914. par. 366; and, Dept, of the Army, The Law 
of Land Warfare, par. 347.
168Gamer, "Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War," 84.
169U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. VIII, The 
Hostages Trial; Trial o f Wilhelm List and Others, 69.
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Still, the IMT resulted in a more lenient "actual knowledge" 
standard, not entirely in accord with Yamashita.
Under today's U.K. and U.S. military law,170 the 
commander who knows that his troops are committing war crimes 
pursuant to orders from his superiors, passed down 
independently of him, must act to stop the offenses. But in 
no instance is any soldier, commander or private, held 
responsible for the acts of another, absent the establishment 
of some sharing of mens rea.171
In Vietnam, what was the commander's responsibility for 
crimes such as those committed at Son Thang? Neither 
Yamashita, nor the High Command or Hostage cases impose a~ 
standard of absolute liability upon commanders, although 
Yamashita came close to doing so with its strict constructive 
knowledge standard. A commander is responsible for the war 
crimes of subordinates if he orders the offenses, or has 
actual knowledge of them, or should have knowledge, through 
reports or other means, of the crimes being committed by his 
troops — a "reasonableness" test rather than one of strict 
liability. Those who assert that a commander may be convicted 
for a subordinate's war crimes on the basis of respondeat 
superior, without a showing of knowledge,172 misinterpret the 
holding of Yamashita. Those who assert that the acquittal of 
Calley's commander at My Lai, Captain Medina, demonstrates 
U.S. unwillingness to apply the Yamashita criterion to its
170HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. Ill, par. 631; Dept, of the Army, Law of Land 
Warfare, par. 501.
171Parks, "Command Responsibility," 103.
172£.g., Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 180-81, whose argument is repeated in U.S. v 
Calley, 382 F. Supp. 650, 696 (1974).
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own commanders,173 are unaware of the erroneous legal standard 
concededly applied in Medina.* (See section 2.1.b.)
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, should 
Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, commander of the Son Thang 
patrol's parent battalion, have shared in the patrol's 
culpability? No. He gave no improper orders. He neither 
knew, nor is there any indication that he should have known, 
of the murders as they were happening. Nor was he aware of 
any pattern of past murders.
May Cooper's subsequent performance be questioned? "The 
actions of the commander. . .at the time of the discovery of 
the offense will determine whether he is deemed to have 
acquiesced in the offense."174 Immediately after hearing the 
first unconfirmed report of the patrol's illegal acts, 
Colonel Cooper took steps to investigate the allegations. 
Upon gaining actual knowledge of the crimes he took prompt, 
decisive action to initiate a formal investigation and charge 
the suspects. The law of war can ask no more.
Was the record of U.S. war crimes in Vietnam such that 
commanders senior to Cooper — the division commander or 
higher — should have been charged? Although General 
Westmoreland's possible awareness of battlefield war crime 
was later investigated,175 the answer is again, no.
First, despite facile accusations, it is really not 
established that the record of torturing, mistreatment, 
and killing of civilians in Vietnam is so widespread and 
clear that the facts speak for themselves, thus imposing 
an indirect liability [on] commanders. Second, the 
record of command efforts to prevent, repress, and 
punish is sufficiently strong so that it cannot be
173e.g., Best, Nuremberg and After. 21; Richard B. Lillich and John N. Moore, Readings 
in International Law From the Naval War College Review, vol. 2 (Rhode Island: Naval 
War College, 1980), xx.
♦The same erroneous standard, initially applied in a similar pre-Medina case, U.S. v 
Goldman, 44 CMR 471 (ACMR, 1970) was quickly realized and reversed in a 
subsequent, and no doubt embarrassed, reconsideration. 44 CMR 711.
174Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes," 82.
175Lewy, America in Vietnam. 239. Such an investigation goes unmentioned in 
Westmoreland's autobiography, A Soldier Reports.
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brushed aside on the ground that the record of 
violations proves these efforts to have been so
ineffectual as to constitute negligent failure.^
The Son Thang patrol acted on the orders of Lance Corporal 
Herrod. No higher-ranking authority was involved and no 
allegation of more senior involvement was made in the 
subsequent courts-martial.
Between the extremes of respondeat superior, under which 
the knowing commander is always responsible for illegal 
orders, and full subordinate responsibility, under which the 
trooper would be required to investigate the legality of 
every order before its execution, the law of war attempts to 
find an equitable doctrine of limited responsibility. The 
fulcrums upon which that limited responsibility balance are 
the soldier's knowledge of wrongfulness and, less frequently, 
duress.
If a soldier is aware that the order given is beyond the 
pale, but the commander facing him holds a weapon, the issue 
of duress may be raised. Indeed, that is often the case when 
illegal orders are given in combat. Herrod had a .45 caliber 
pistol on his hip and held a loaded grenade launcher while 
issuing his orders in Son Thang. To plead superior orders 
one must show an excusable ignorance of their illegality; to 
plead duress one recognizes the illegality but risks 
immediate personal harm if he disobeys. A possible court- 
martial for failure to obey an order is one thing;* the risk 
of being killed by your own commander is another. Again, the 
Nuremberg trials provide a guideline:
Let it be said at once that there is no law which 
requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life or 
suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime
1760'Brien, "The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam," 655.
*Under the UCMJ, five years confinement, loss of rank and pay, and a dishonorable 
discharge is the maximum permissible punishment for disobeying an officer; a less 
onerous bad conduct discharge and six months confinement for disobeying a 
noncommissioned officer. In practice the punishments imposed, even in a combat zone, 
are far lighter than the maximums permitted. Herrod, it will be recalled, wasn't even 
anNCO.
158
which he condemns. The threat, however, must be 
imminent, real and inevitable.177
In municipal law this is the defense of necessity. At
Nuremberg various tests for necessity/duress were applied:
not a mere presence of danger to the one raising the defense,
but a subjective, "actual bona fide belief in danger..."178
The act done must "avoid an evil severe and irreparable; that
there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the
remedy was not disproportional to the evil;"179 "A clear and
present danger" at the time of the offense;180 "Circumstances
such that a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in
such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to
choose the right and refrain from the wrong."181 The term "no
moral choice" was frequently heard. But the duress defense
was generally rejected at Nuremberg because the threats
invoked were not considered direct enough.182
In American military practice duress has seldom been
raised in superior order cases.183 Although there is a degree
of coercion inherent in the mere giving of an order by a
superior to a subordinate that is obviously insufficient to
put the subordinate in reasonable apprehension of immediate
death or serious bodily harm and so does not rise to duress.
Moreover, there sometimes is a certain elasticity in
compliance with orders in the combat zone. After My Lai,
those soldiers who refused Calley's orders to fire on
civilians did not suffer for their refusal and apparently did
not expect to — suggesting all the more the blameworthiness
of those who did obey.
177U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. VIII, The 
Einsatzgruppen Trial, 91.
178Ibid., vol. X, The Krupp Trial, 148.
179Ibid., 149.
180Ibid., vol. IX, The Flick Trial, 20.
181Ibid., vol. XII, The High Command Trial, 72.
182Keijzer, Military Obedience. 149.
183f7.Sl v Fleming, 23 CMR 7 (USCMA, 1957), and U.S. v Olson, 22 CMR 250 (USCMA, 
1957), post-Korean War cases in which duress was unsuccessfully raised by two 
former American POWs as a defense to collaboration charges.
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In any event, duress is not a defense to murder in 
either U.S. or U.K. criminal law.184 The defense is not 
specifically recognized in U.S. military law in regard to any 
offense. The Army's international law manual takes note of 
it, saying it requires an "honest belief" that the actor will 
be subjected to "serious wrong" outweighing the consequent 
harm to others if he fails to obey the illegal order.185 This 
applies whether it is friendly or enemy personnel who are 
being tried. The defense, then, may be raised in courts- 
martial as a substantive defense to crimes other than murder, 
and in sentence mitigation, even in murder cases.
It would appear to be equitable that the same standards 
should apply to the defense of necessity as are applied 
to the plea of superior orders....As in the case of 
superior orders, the fact that a person offended out of 
necessity should certainly be taken into consideration
in assessing sentence, in mitigation of punishment.185 
Under U.K. military law, too, duress is a specific defense to 
war crimes except those involved in "the taking of innocent 
life"187 and may be considered in mitigation of sentence.
Though a colorable defense of duress was available to 
the Son Thang patrol subordinates,* the issue went 
unmentioned.
184John Beaumont, "Duress As A Defence to Murder," 3 Dalhousie L.J. 580 (Oct. 
1976). English courts once allowed the defense in murder trials where the accused was 
not a principal (DPP v Lynch [1977] AC 653), but have since abolished the principal/ 
accomplice distinction (DPP v Howe [1987] AC 417); see also, Leslie C. Green, 
Superior Orders in National Law and International Law (The Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 
1976), 17-34.
185Dept. of the Army, International Law, vol. II, 248.
186Greenspan, The Modem Law of Land Warfare. 501-502.
187HMSO, Manual of Military Law, p t III, par. 629.
* Though only if the accused argued that he fired only in the victims1 direction but not at
them. As duress is not a defense to murder, the accused would have had to argue he did
not in fact murder the victims. So, while never mentioning duress, Schwarz testified he 
fired near the victims; Krichten testified that Boyd fired over the victims; and Green 
argued there was no evidence he actually hit any victim.
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4.3.d. Illegal Orders in A Combat Environment Cicero's
assertion that in time of war the laws are silent, is clearly 
incorrect. But is modern combat subject to unique norms 
that render the Geneva Conventions, training, and manuals, of 
questionable meaning?
What soldiers actually think about conduct in war, and 
how their thoughts affect their conduct, is an 
area...very little explored. The legal literature, 
understandably enough, takes no notice of the 
possibility that within armed forces a kind of sub­
culture or 'private' culture may exist, the norms and 
tendencies of which may conflict with those prescribed
in the manuals of military conduct, etc.188 
"'Battle', for the ordinary soldier," we are told, "is a very 
small-scale situation which will throw up its own leaders and 
will be fought by its own rules — alas, often by its own 
ethics."189 In combat a group dynamic tends to overtake 
individual judgement, one's normal behavior submerged in the 
behavioral commonality of the unit; sometimes the lowest 
common behavioral denominator. "The military group provides 
powerful incentives for releasing forbidden impulses, 
inducing the soldier to try out formerly inhibited acts which 
he originally regarded as morally repugnant."190
The combat situation was one of mutual dependence. A 
man's life depended literally and immediately upon the 
actions of others; he in turn was responsible in his own 
actions for the safety of others. This vital 
interdependence was closer and more crucial in combat 
than in the average run of human affairs... .The group 
was thus in a favored position to enforce its standards
on the individual.191 
That men fight for their comrades, rather than abstractions 
like democracy and country, is a truism. And past wars have 
demonstrated that combat-fostered intimacy "extended little
188Howard, Restraints on War. 24.
189Keegan, The Face of Battle. 47.
190I.L. Janis, "Group Identification Under Conditions of External Danger," 36 British J. 
of Medical Psychology 227 (1963).
191Stouffer and others, The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, vol. II (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), 98-99.
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farther than the platoon and company..."192 "[I]n a crisis and 
if forced to make a choice, a man would think first of his 
loyalty to a buddy..."193 Perhaps that loyalty is even greater 
in organizations like the Marines, who see themselves as an 
exclusive fraternity. "Among Marines there is a fierce 
loyalty....Woven through that sense of belonging, like a 
steel thread, is an elitist spirit. Marines are convinced 
that, being few in number, they are selective, better, and, 
above all, different."194 "The bond, the loyalty to the Corps 
is almost mystical in its power."195
...Marines went into harm's way because they knew that 
the rest of their squad, or platoon, or company counted 
on them to go....their buddies had faced similar risks, 
and now it was their turn. They knew that they had to 
do their share for the unit to survive. . . .bonds are 
formed and mutual dependence emerges, often by sharing
hardship and even tragedy.195 
It will be remembered that, except for two, the Marines on 
the Son Thang patrol had met only that afternoon. Three of 
the five had been in the Marine Corps for little more than a 
year, one for only six months. But they were Marines and 
presumably felt the bond that the title "Marine" 
traditionally imparts.
Of the five patrol members, the oldest was twenty-one. 
Three were teen-agers. The most senior in rank among them 
was a lance corporal awaiting reduction to private as a 
result of recent court-martial. Except for their leader, 
Herrod, their written statements reveal a marked lack of 
education and intellect. During the patrol they were on 
their own, at night, beyond friendly lines. A member of 
their company had been killed only hours before. What, then,
192Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," in Janowitz, ed., The New 
Military. 204.
193Ibid., 201.
194Krulak, First To Fight , 175.
195Safer, Flashbacks. 105.
196Col. Fred T. Fagen, "Time For A One-Eighty,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 
February, 1991, 48.
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passed through their minds when ordered to fire on unarmed 
women and children? Who among the four subordinates might 
have considered the legality of their instruction or refused 
the order?
In battle "the relatively abstract commands of the
Conventions are not likely to bear much relation to reality
in the mind of a serviceman who is not.. .attuned to the
niceties of the law,"197 and the group's standards become 
those of the individual.
Not only do normal moral principles become inoperative, 
but — particularly when the actions are explicitly 
ordered — a different kind of morality, linked to the
duty to obey superior orders, tends to take over.*9**
To the extent that others obey, the definition of the
situation as requiring obedience is strengthened. "The man 
who refuses to obey an order which his friends are carrying 
out finds himself in an intolerable position in a combat 
situation..."199 Superior orders can override an individual's 
own sense of morality.200 "Even when the facts of a situation
are clear, moral choice may demand more moral courage than
even a competent professional can muster..."201 It can be 
done, to be sure. A private first class and a specialist 
fourth class refused Calley's orders to fire on civilians at 
My Lai. But who among the benighted Son Thang accused was a 
candidate to speak out and refuse Herrod's orders?
A judge on the Court of Military Appeals, the highest 
American military court, said of one Son Thang accused:
What alternative does Sam Green have if he’s ordered to 
kill those people? If he disobeys the order and the 
order was valid, he goes to prison. If he obeys the
order and the order is not valid, he goes to prison.
197Rubin, "Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident," 265.
198Kelman and Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience. 16.
1 "Rubin, "Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, "268.
200Dt. Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," 67 J. of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology 371 (1963).
201 Anthony E. Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making (Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1989), 123.
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What does sad Sam Green, with an IQ of 7 8, do in that 
moral dilemma?....The people in Brussels and the Hague 
would have difficulty putting themselves in that 
position....It1s a burden that soldiers carry, and maybe
the court-martial understands the burden.2®2 
Sociologists confirm that "the risk of punishment discourages 
him from challenging the legitimacy of the order and makes 
him more likely to obey.... [I]t reinforces the already strong 
push toward obedience built into the structure of the 
authority situation. "203
Yet, could any Son Thang accused, however dull, however 
obedient, actually fail to appreciate the magnitude of wrong 
they were ordered to carry out, not once, but three times?
The trigger is always part of the gun, not part of the 
man. If they are not machines that can just be turned 
off, they are also not machines that can just be turned 
on. Trained to obey "without hesitation," they remain
nevertheless capable of hesitating.2®4 
How were guilt, innocence, and justice to be apportioned?
In the summer of 197 0, four courts-martial reached 
diametrically opposed answers to that question.
202Judge Walter T. Cox, interview by author, 7 December 1990, Wash., tape recording, 
author’s collection.
203Kelman and Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience. 94.
204Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (London: Allen Lane, 1978), 311.
164
CHAPTER 5. THE SON THANG COURTS-MARTIAL
"In the Armed Forces, as everywhere e lse , there are good men and rascals, courageous 
men and cowards, honest men and cheats.”
Ball et al. v United States 
366 U.S. 393 (1961)
Four days after the alleged murders, on 23 February 
197 0, the five Son Thang killer team members were placed in 
pretrial confinement in the Third Marine Amphibious Force 
brig, south of DaNang. The Staff Judge Advocate of the 1st 
Marine Division directed that a preliminary hearing be 
convened.
The My Lai incident, revealed eleven months before, had 
only come to public attention ninety days prior to the Son 
Thang murders. By acting quickly the Marine Corps hoped to 
avoid the already apparent problems of the Army's My Lai 
prosecution. International law and the law of war would soon 
be applied in Vietnam, the vehicle of its application the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
This chapter examines how America implements law of war 
sanctions. Several jurisdictional issues were raised by U.S.
courts-martial in Vietnam. Those issues are noted and their
resolution seen in trial. American military criminal law is 
codified in the UCMJ. The evolution of the Code is briefly 
summarized, then seen in application in the courts-martial of 
the Son Thang accuseds, with particular attention to the 
difficulties of practicing military law in Vietnam. Also 
considered are the basic rights applicable to Americans in 
uniform, and the lack of a stated theoretical framework for 
military law. The trials themselves are reviewed, as well.
As so often in criminal practice, the results were
unexpected. Anticipated or not, the trials demonstrate that 
the U.S. system for trying law of war violations and grave 
breaches is workable, even in a combat zone.
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5.1. Law of War Applied: Vietnam
"Execution of an international convention implies the 
implementation of its provisions in practice," Professor 
Ingrid DeLupis writes. "Without such execution the document's 
value in practical terms will be much reduced..."1
In Vietnam, implementation of Geneva and Hague 
conventions by the U.S. was achieved through instructions 
promulgated, at the highest level, by Department of Defense 
directives initiated by the nation's political agencies. 
Those Department of Defense directives were in turn 
implemented by the individual armed services through Army, 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force orders. The service-wide 
orders, in the Marine Corps' case, were passed to the troops 
by various division, base, and fleet orders. Individual unit 
training schedules in compliance with, for example, a 
division order, directed specific officers or noncommissioned 
officers to carry out the orders by instructing the 
individual Marines of their units. "Lesson plans" for the 
instruction were appended to the orders. Lesson plans — 
outlines containing main points to be covered — usually 
listed additional informational sources, although those 
sources were rarely available at the implementing level. The 
Geneva/Hague Convention instruction was sometimes grudgingly 
or ineptly given, but the operative fact was that it was 
ordered, and having been ordered it was done.
Three-inch by five-inch cards entitled, "The Enemy in 
Your Hands," were distributed to all Army personnel entering 
Vietnam and, later in the war, to all entering Marines. The 
cards contained on one side, basic Vietnamese language 
phrases ("put up your hands," "lay down your gun"); on the 
reverse side, five admonitions for the proper treatment of 
prisoners. No assurance of the cards' continued possession 
or eventual use was possible.
DeLupis, The Law of War. 320.
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By such means was a continuing awareness of 
international law and the Conventions, first raised in basic 
training classes, imparted to the lowest-ranking combatant. 
The sometimes sketchy compliance with orders to disseminate 
the Conventions received much closer attention after My Lai.
5.1.a. Enforcing Law of War speaking of modern states 
generally, one writer notes that "on careful analysis the 
enforcement procedures turn out to be less defective than is 
normally claimed..."2 Signatories of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions are bound to search for those who commit grave 
breaches and "bring such persons, regardless of their 
nationality, before its own courts."3 Accordingly, in Vietnam 
"a war crime is the business of the United States, regardless 
of the nationality... of the victim."4 As decided at 
Nuremberg, "crimes against international law are committed by 
men...and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."5
The killing of civilians under the circumstances of Son 
Thang was at the same time a war crime, a grave breach, and a 
criminal offense. Although court-martial was the forum to be 
employed in such instances, other forums were, and are, 
possible.
5.1.b. War Crime Commissions. Tribunals, and Other Venues
The U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial in effect in 197 0 reads, 
in pertinent part:
The agencies through which military jurisdiction is 
exercised include: Military Commissions and Provost
Courts....Subject to the applicable rule of international 
law...these tribunals will be guided by...principles of 
law and rules of procedure and evidence prescribed for
courts-martial.5
2Cassese, International Law in A Divided World. 408.
3Arts. 49, 50, 129, and 146 of Conventions I, II, III, and IV, respectively.
4Axinn, A Moral Military. 126.
5U.N., The Charter and Judgement of the Nurnberg Tribunal (NY: U.N., 1949), 41
6Par. 2, Military Jurisdiction.
167
A provost court is a variety of military tribunal 
usually employed in occupied territory to try civilians. 
They operate "with whatever rules are prescribed for them,"7 
often applying court-martial procedures, and sometimes local 
law.
Commissions, a variety of military tribunal distinct 
from courts-martial, are wartime courts with jurisdiction 
over enemy law of war violators.8 War crimes of a nation*s 
own nationals may be tried by a commission, but in practice 
are dealt with by courts-martial administering national 
military law.9 Commissions were1 first employed in the U.S.- 
Mexican War (1846-48) to try soldiers of the Mexican army for 
common crimes as well as violations of the law of war. 
Commissions have been employed by the U.S. in all its 
subsequent wars except Vietnam,10 their jurisdiction having 
been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court half a century ago.11
Commissions and tribunals are authorized by military law 
to try war crime cases, as are courts-martia 1.12 Strictly 
speaking, tribunals apply municipal rather than international 
law. But "the military court, by punishing the acts, 
executes international law even if it applies at the same 
time norms of its own military law."13
Tribunals such as the Nuremberg IMT and the "high 
tribunal" envisioned by the Treaty of Versailles, are sui 
generis, international in nature, with jurisdictional bases 
and trial procedures independent of any single nation's legal 
code.
7Index and Legislative History: Uniform Code of Military Justice. 1061.
810 U.S. Code 821 (1956). See, Glueck, "By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be 
Tried?", 1063.
9Wright, "War Criminals," 275, 277.
10For histories of the employment of commissions see, Colby, "War Crimes," 485-87; 
Shaneyfelt, "War Crimes and the Jurisdiction Maze," 929-31; and, Elbridge Colby, 
"Courts-Martial and the Laws of War," 17 AJIL 109 (1923).
^E x  Parte Quirin; Matter o f Yamashita\ Madsen v Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
12Dept of the Army, Law of Land Warfare, par. 13.
13Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law," 536.
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Neither the U.S. Constitution nor legislation mandate 
that law of war violations must be tried before military 
tribunals. Although that power is "well established"14 in the 
military, no legislation grants the military exclusive 
jurisdiction over war crimes. Nor has any U.S. case been 
found specifically addressing civilian court jurisdiction 
over war crimes, although during the Civil War and both World 
Wars civil courts sometimes found jurisdiction concurrent 
with military tribunals.15
5.1 .c. Jurisdiction and the Law of War in international 
law, the jurisdiction of a state refers to the state's 
entitlement to subject certain categories of persons or 
events to its rules of law. It is not necessarily correct 
that the same rules apply in a municipal legal system. In 
the international system jurisdiction refers to a state's 
jurisdiction as a whole, not to that of its constituent units 
or political divisions. The jurisdictional question in 
international law is whether the U.S., for example, is 
entitled to try an individual; not where or by what court in 
the U.S. the individual might be tried.16 In exercising 
jurisdiction a state claiming competence to act has broad 
discretion. "All that can be required of a state is that it 
should not overstep the limits which international law places 
upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to 
exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty."17 A state may 
make any jurisdictional claim not explicitly prohibited by 
international law.18
14Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950).
15Sweeney, The International Legal System. 779, citing U.S. v Canella, 63 F. Supp. 377 
(S.D. Cal 1945), and Kennedy v Sanford, 166 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1948), cert, denied, 
333 U.S. 864 (1948).
16From the standpoint of international law, and the court which serves as its organ, 
municipal laws are merely facts. German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) 
(1926), PCU, Ser. A, no. 7, 19.
l l The Lotus, P.C.I.J. Reports, Ser. A, No. 10, 19 (1927).
18Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order. 25.
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Universal jurisdiction over accused war criminals, a 
concept first raised in the 1922 Treaty of Washington19 (and 
some suggest before that)20 is ubiquitously noted in modern 
law of war writings.* "War crimes and genocide are now widely 
accepted as being susceptible to universal jurisdiction,"21 
although this jurisdictional basis has never been utilized 
except, arguably, in the Eichmann case.22 (Invocation of 
universal jurisdiction was a necessity because it was the 
sole source of Israeli jurisdiction, since the crimes alleged 
took place before formation of the nation of Israel.) Thus, 
under the banner of universal jurisdiction, "even in the 
absence of any domestic enactment, states may properly punish 
offenders against the laws and customs of war..."23 The 
requirements of the 1949 Conventions, for trial and 
punishment of those convicted of grave breaches, reflects 
acceptance of universal jurisdiction.
5.1.d. Jurisdiction and the Vietnam War By what domestic 
authority did the U.S. exercise jurisdiction over her 
soldiers? The American constitution gives Congress the right 
to punish "offenses against the law of nations."24 Courts- 
martial, while having no specific jurisdiction set apart 
under the constitution, do have a constitutional source, 
being established under the Congress's power to make rules 
for the government and regulation of the armed forces.25 
Military personnel are subject to the U.S. military justice
19Sandoz, "Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law," in Bassiouni,
International Criminal Law, vol. I, 215.
20Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. 561, urges "the latter half of the 
nineteenth century..."
* The conceptual scope of war crimes and of grave breach are not identical. (See 1.2.d.)
21Rebecca M.M. Wallace, International Law: A Student Introduction (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986), 104.
22Sandoz, "Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law," in Bassiouni,
International Criminal Law, vol. I, 230.
23Glueck, "By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried?", 1081.
24U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, clause 10.
25Ibid., clause 14.
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system by virtue of Article 2 of the UCMJ, itself federal 
law.26 A nation's jurisdiction over its own forces, being in 
personam rather than territorial, continues when those forces 
are dispatched to foreign locations.
Accepting the not surprising proposition that the U.S. 
had jurisdiction over its own troops in Vietnam, how was that 
jurisdiction implemented, in light of South Vietnam's 
competing jurisdictional claim based upon territoriality? 
The answer, through concurrent jurisdiction, is well-settled 
law.
When one nation's armed forces are granted permission to 
enter another nation's borders, the host nation's "generally 
recognized"27 jurisdiction based upon territoriality also 
applies to the guest force, unless waived or ceded. In 1812 
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue:
A...case in which a sovereign is understood to cede a 
portion of his territorial jurisdiction is, where he 
allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his 
dominions....The grant of free passage...implies a waiver 
of all jurisdiction over the troops...and permits the 
foreign general to use that discipline...which the
government of his army may require.2**
That opinion, The Schooner Exchange, is "the most commonly 
quoted statement of the principle" of jurisdictional waiver,29 
or immunity. The opinion is referred to by Lord Atkin as "a 
judgement which has illuminated the jurisprudence of the 
world."30 In recent times the practice of basing troops on 
foreign soil has been controlled by host nation-guest nation 
compacts.31 Such compacts, status of forces agreements,
26Title 10, §§ 1-835, United States Code.
27Brownlie, Public International Law. 4th ed., 310.
2877ze Schooner Exchange, 139. To the same effect: Oppenheim, International Law. 4th 
ed., vol. I, sec. 445.
29Brownlie, Public International Law. 4th ed., 325.
30Chung Chi v The King, 168.
31 King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," 550-53.
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commonly provide for some degree of concurrent host-guest 
criminal jurisdiction over visiting forces.32
The lack of a U.S.-South Vietnamese status of forces 
agreement clearly delineating criminal jurisdiction has been 
noted. (See section 2.2.a.) Instead, both countries looked 
to the brief and loosely worded Pentalateral Agreement which 
spoke of diplomatic rights, duties, and privileges. The U.S. 
maintained exclusive jurisdiction over its troops in South 
Vietnam through an amendment, "Change 1," to the Pentalateral 
Agreement. The pertinent section of that change reads, in 
full: "Under Article 4 and Annex B of the Agreement, immunity 
from criminal and civil jurisdiction is granted to US 
military personnel in Vietnam along with certain categories 
of civilians."33 Major General Prugh, the Army's Judge 
Advocate General in the War's latter stages, points out:
The United States has never relinquished jurisdiction 
over its armed forces during combat; to do so in Vietnam 
would have been as unprecedented as it would have been 
impractical. During World War II, for example, the 
United States kept jurisdiction over U.S. troops in the
United Kingdom.34
"Providing the visiting forces have an efficient court- 
martial system," writes another author, "there is no 
practical reason why a host country should insist on trying 
visiting soldiers in its own courts."35
In punishing war crimes committed by "all persons, 
including members of a belligerent's own armed forces,"36 the 
UCMJ is the U.S. military criminal law charter. Under 
Article 18 of that Code, war crimes are incorporated into 
military law, within the jurisdiction of general courts-
32Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure. 83.
33Par. I.B., Ch. 1, Directive Number 27-1, HQ MACV, 30 September 1965, "SOP for 
Litigation Actions Under the Pentalateral Agreement."
34Prugh, Law At War. 89.
35Archibald Cox, "Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign 
Armed Forces," 40 AHL 257, 278 (1946).
36Dept of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 506.b.
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martial.37 UCMJ Article 21 grants war crimes jurisdiction to 
"military commissions, provost courts, or other military 
tribunals," as well. Again, that jurisdiction is personal, 
not territorial38 — military courts have jurisdiction of 
military personnel regardless of the army's location.
The U.S. usually punishes war crimes, denominated as war 
crimes per se, only if committed by enemy nationals.39 The 
U.S. law of war manual further limits the scope of 
jurisdictional application, saying:"...[M]ilitary commissions 
and similar tribunals have no jurisdiction of such purely 
military offenses specified in the UCMJ as are expressly made 
punishable by sentence of court-martial..."40 In other words, 
when a U.S. serviceman or woman commits a war crime, which 
war crime is also an offense under the UCMJ, he or she will 
be tried, not by commission or provost court, but under the 
Code for the criminal law offense. No reference to war 
crimes is necessary.
5.2. U.S. Military Law. 1970
A former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations recently 
wrote: "The military have a Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and a manual for courts-martial. This law extends very much 
to the rules of cross-national conduct as codified and agreed 
to in treaties."41 That Manual and the UCMJ were a long time 
in gestation.
5.2.a. The UCMJ and Courts-Martial. 1970 in 1775 the 
Continental Congress adopted the first American code
37Art. 18, Jurisdiction of General Courts-Martial, reads, in pertinent part: "General 
courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject 
to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of 
war."
38Coleman v Tennessee; See also, Willard B. Cowles, "Universality of Jurisdiction Over 
War Crimes," 33 California L. Rev. 177, 204 (1945).
39Sweeney, The International Legal System. 773.
40Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 13.
41Moynihan, On the Law of Nations. 135.
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governing land armies, based on the British Articles of War. 
The Rules for the Regulation of the Navy, adopted the 
following year, also followed the British model. Britain's 
military law for land armies had evolved from that of 
Gustavus Adolphus, rather than from the English common law, 
and her navy's code was distant relative to that of the 
Phoenicians.
Over the next 17 5 years American military law, of both 
land armies and the sea, underwent evolutionary change, but 
"despite subsequent alterations by Congress, the American 
military justice code still retains certain substantive and 
procedural aspects of the 18th century British code."42
Until 1950 the U.S. Army and Air Force were governed by 
the Articles of War, the Navy and Marine Corps by the 
Articles for the Government of the Navy. Both codes had 
fallen into public and political disfavor. World War II, 
with its millions of citizen soldiers, focused attention on 
the shortcomings of military justice and in 1948 a primarily 
civilian committee, assembled by presidential order and 
chaired by a Harvard law professor, began writing a new 
military criminal code. In 1950 this major reform and 
consolidation, the UCMJ, became law. The UCMJ and a new 
Manual for Courts-Martial, an Executive Order "loosely 
described as the 'Bible' for military practice,"43 to 
implement the Code, were applicable to all U.S. armed forces. 
One familiar with the British Manual of Military Law will 
find America's Manual for Courts-Martial quite similar. Trial 
administration and procedure are much alike, as are the 
offenses.
The 1950 Code was a landmark improvement, but over the 
years flaws and gaps inevitably surfaced. In 1969 the 
preceding year’s Military Justice Act took effect. It
42Edward F. Sherman, "The Civilianization of Military Law," 22 Maine L. Rev. 3 
( 1970) .
43Benjamin Feld, "Courts-Martial Practice: Some Phases of Pretrial Procedure," 23 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 25, 26 (1956).
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significantly revised the 195 0 UCMJ and implemented an 
entirely new Manual for Courts-Martial. They were the 
military criminal law in effect during the Son Thang trials.
The revised 1969 UCMJ brought military trial procedure 
into line with civilian federal court practice. For the 
first time, military judges — senior military lawyers with 
lengthy trial experience — were mandated in virtually all 
courts-martial, with powers roughly equivalent to those of 
civilian federal judges. Another significant change required 
that, except in rare circumstance, a judge advocate represent 
every military accused, free of charge, from confinement or 
charging, through appeal. Of the many revisions those two 
alone dramatically altered military law practice. A critic, 
upon reviewing the new procedures, conceded that the 
revisions:
...extended substantially new due process rights to 
servicemen, some of them more favorable than were then 
provided in civilian courts, and its changes in court- 
martial procedures, especially the general court- 
martial, considerably replaced the old disciplinary
flavor with a judicial one.44 
From 19 69 onward, there were "relatively few important 
procedural differences between civilian and military trials, 
and some of the obvious ones are indicative of form rather 
than substance.1,45
The UCMJ provides for three types of court-martial. The 
summary court is a brief, one-officer hearing designed, as 
the name implies, to summarily dispose of minor disciplinary 
infractions. Lawyers are not involved; the accused has no 
legal representation. The hearing officer, usually from the 
accused's battalion, hears the evidence, protects the 
accused's rights, decides the issues and, upon a guilty
44B. Wasserstein and MJ. Green, eds., With Justice For Some (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1970), 77.
4  ^Charles A. Shanor and Timothy P. Terrell, Military Law in A Nutshell (Minnesota, 
West Publishing, 1980), 114. (This book applies only to the Manual for Courts- 
Martial. 1969.1
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finding, imposes punishment. Acquittal is unusual, but the 
maximum punishment is light — confinement in excess of one 
month is precluded — and a finding of guilt is considered an 
administrative matter, not a federal conviction.46 
Significantly, an accused may refuse a summary court-martial. 
In such instances the commander initiating the summary court 
may either take the charges to a non-judicial administrative 
forum, or up-grade the case to a special court-martial. Most 
offenders accept trial by summary court-martial knowing that 
if their rights are not as rigorously observed, neither are 
the potential consequences as Draconian as in other forums — 
much as an Englishman might opt for trial at magistrate's 
court rather than in a Crown Court. Typical summary court- 
martial offenses include brief unauthorized absences, minor 
fights, disrespect to junior noncommissioned officers, and 
the like.
A special court-martial, the second type, requires a 
verbatim record, lawyer representation of the accused, and a 
certified military judge. At the option of the accused, 
trial may be before the military judge alone, or before a 
panel known as "members" in military practice — essentially 
jurors in uniform. Conviction by a special court is a 
federal conviction, with the attendant disabilities and 
stigma. Most military trials are special courts-martial. 
The maximum possible punishment includes a bad-conduct 
discharge from the service, reduction in grade to private, 
loss of all pay for six months, and six months confinement at 
hard labor — "six, six, and a kick." Roadside trash pick-up 
is considered "hard labor."
The final type proceeding, the general courts-martial 
(GCM), is reserved for serious criminality such as rape, 
murder, desertion, and war crimes. All the procedural 
aspects of a special court are present at a GCM, where the 
maximum punishment, if authorized for the charged offense, is
46Middendorf v Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
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death.* Only experienced special court-martial judges are 
selected fdr assignment as GCM judges.
In considering the trial of war crimes, the authors of 
the Manual for Courts-Martial originally viewed the GCM, 
acting as a tribunal rather than a court-martial, as a trial 
forum for enemy spies and saboteurs — but not for the trial 
of U.S. military personnel charged with war crimes.47 The 
subsequently issued Manual, which fixes military rules of 
practice,48 negated that intent and prescribed the GCM as the 
forum for war crime trials of U.S. service personnel.
All GCMs must be preceded by a formal pretrial hearing 
to establish probable cause, called an "Article 32" for its 
placement within the UCMJ's 140 articles. The Article 32 
investigation is the military analogue to the civilian grand 
jury proceeding. (See section 5.3.) The pretrial hearing 
officer is a usually a judge advocate, although that is not a 
Code requirement, and the accused is represented by lawyer 
counsel. The rules of evidence are relaxed and defense 
discovery is extremely liberal at such hearings. The defense 
need present no evidence whatever at an Article 32.
The 1969 revisions, for the first time, provided for 
either members (jury) or bench trial, at the option of the 
accused. Prior to 1969 all courts-martial had been decided 
by members. Military rules of evidence, closely akin to 
federal rules of evidence, are applicable throughout trial. 
All rulings and opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court are 
binding on military courts.49 As in civilian jurisdictions, a 
body of military case law, regularly reported in bound 
volumes, applies to military trials.
*No Marine has been executed pursuant to sentence of court-martial since 1817. No 
U.S. serviceman, of any service, has been executed since 1961. James E. Valle, Rocks 
and Shoals (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 8-9, 103-110.
47Index and Legislative History: Uniform Code of Military Justice. 958-61.
48 C/.5. v Villasenor, 19 CMR 129 (USCMA, 1955).
49Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lee D. Schinasi, and David A. Schlueter, Military Rules of 
Evidence Manual. 3d ed. (Virginia: Michie Company, 1991), x; 6.
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Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) offices are part of every 
division or equivalent-size headquarters. The court-martial 
convening authority, with the advice of the SJA's office, 
decides whether to proceed with a special or general court, 
although serious charges usually make the choice self- 
evident. For both special and general courts, the SJA 
assigns lawyer counsel for both the accused and the 
government, requests a military judge, and assigns a 
tentative trial date. The military judge, once assigned to a 
case by his judicial superiors, has final authority over case 
progress, including continuances, witness requests, and other 
pretrial matters. During trial the military judge is the 
sole arbiter and authority. The 1969 amendments removed 
judges from local command authority for any purpose (watch 
and duty rosters and performance ratings, for example) and 
made them answerable only to their senior military judge.
The original 1950 UCMJ brought military justice toward 
the mainstream of civilian criminal practice. The 1969 
revisions continued that "civilianizing" trend, making 
-courts-martial much like civilian municipal criminal court 
systems. Indeed, civilian defense lawyers make frequent 
appearances in military trials without need of special 
briefing or familiarization.
But trying cases in a tin-roofed hut in Vietnam was not 
the same as trying cases in any municipal system, no matter 
how improved the military system. Harvard University's 
Professor Arthur Sutherland points out, in regard to the 
application of military law:
There is a difference between "forces in the field" and 
forces in garrison....There is a difference between 
matters overseas and matters at home; our airman at a 
base in the peaceful English countryside are scarcely "in
the field" in any conventional sense...^
The UCMJ makes no allowance for its application in combat or 
field circumstances. All peacetime procedure and precedent
50Sutherland, "The Constitution, the Civilian, and Military Justice," 217-18.
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remain fully effective, peacetime standards of military 
justice equally applicable in time of war.51 A review of the 
UCMJ's legislative history reveals no consideration of the 
possibility that courts-martial might be conducted anywhere 
other than in the controlled environment of peacetime 
courtrooms.
British military law, on the other hand, provides for 
Field General Courts-Martial when forces are "on active 
service,"52 that term defined as being engaged in operations 
against the enemy, or engaged elsewhere than in the United 
Kingdom in operations for the protection of life or property, 
or, finally, in military occupation of a foreign country.53 
Regulations for Field GCMs provide for a diminished number of 
members, lowered grades (ranks) of participants, and even the 
possibility of omission of judge advocate participation. 
There is no U.S. analogue to the Field GCM.
British military law allows latitude in the application 
of the evidentiary Rules of Procedure when "the exigencies of 
the service render compliance with all or any of the 
provisions of the Rules... impracticable"54 The latitude 
granted extends only to the production of witnesses for 
cross-examination and minor documentary matters, but that 
could be significant in combat zone trials. Again, there is 
no analogous provision in American military law.
Before the Vietnam War U.S. courts-martial had been 
conducted under field conditions, but never on a sustained 
basis involving every case referred to trial, as in Vietnam. 
Upon reviewing its legislative history, one might reasonably 
conclude that the Code's framers did not consider the 
eventuality that occurred in Vietnam: the court-martial
process transpiring from charging to initial review, over a
5lCurry v Secretary of the Army, 595 F.2d 873, 194 (U.S. App. D.C., 1979).
52HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. I, ch. Ill, par. 5.
53Army Act of 1955, sec. 224.(1).
54HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. I, Rules of Procedure (Army), 1972, rule 103.- 
( 1).
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period of years, in the field. During the Korean War, when 
the UCMJ was initially implemented, combat zone-based crimes, 
few as they were, were often tried in Japan and the potential 
difficulties never surfaced.
The Vietnam War was the first real application and test 
of the Code's reformed procedures under combat conditions. 
On a practical level, combat conditions imposed formidable 
limitations, raising evidentiary, procedural, and technical 
difficulties. Often it was not possible to examine a crime 
scene, or go to a village in search of witnesses because the 
place in question was an unsecured area. Court recording 
equipment, dependent upon electrical power, often failed due 
to gasoline-powered generator problems, leading to loss of 
the mandatory verbatim record of trial. Despite efforts to 
"reconstruct" such truncated records, subsequent reversal of 
convictions for want of the required verbatim record often 
resulted.55 Incoming enemy fire was treated as an unscheduled 
recess. A judge advocate wrote, "I recall one trial 
interrupted by sniper fire and two interrupted by fire 
missions which required members of the court, witnesses, and 
the accused, to man their posts. It was interesting..."56
Securing the presence of witnesses for combat zone 
trials was a constant problem, the Jbete noire of prosecutors 
who, under U.S. military law, are required to produce both 
government and defense witnesses. Pre-war case law raised a 
low threshold for establishing witness materiality at trial 
and Vietnam defense counsel frequently discovered a pressing 
need for testimony from witnesses located half-a-world away. 
Depositions are provided for in the UCMJ,57 permitted, in 
fact, in a broader range of circumstances than in the
55BGen. John R. DeBarr, interview by author, 2 Oct. 1986, Wash., tape recording 
6491, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
56Col. John T. Fischbach, Kentucky, to author, Washington, n.d., Marines and Military 
Law in Vietnam collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington.
57Art. 49.(a).
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civilian Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.58 But 
depositions would not do, the defense counsel would aver and 
trial judges, bound by case law, often granted the witness 
requests. The mechanics of flying a witness — perhaps a 
mother, or a discharged former squad-mate — to Vietnam, 
securing their billeting and transportation to and from the 
rudimentary courtroom each day, were daunting...and at 
government expense.*
Even the production of Marine witnesses from within 
Vietnam presented problems. A Marine judge advocate 
recalled:
On one occasion...before the matter [a rape charge] 
could go to trial, one of the defendants was killed in 
combat and the other was medically evacuated from RVN 
with a broken leg....On still another occasion...I 
discovered, just as I was about to conclude my opening 
argument, that my witness had been sent home two days 
prior to trial, forcing me to grudgingly join with the
defense in a motion to dismiss the charges.5^
There was not then, and there is not now, provision in the 
UCMJ for such occurrences. Wounded or killed witnesses, 
military or Vietnamese, are unavailable witnesses. The 
recorded testimony from a preliminary hearing (Article 32 
investigation) , however, is admissible in subsequent 
proceedings and testimony was sometimes preserved by that 
means. If affidavits were fortuitously recorded before 
wounding or death — so rare as to be unheard of in Vietnam — 
or if prior testimony in another judicial proceeding had been 
transcribed, it could be used.60 But seldom was that the 
case. If unavailable testimony was crucial to proving the 
government's case, or to corroboration or establishment of a
58American Bar Association, Comparative Analysis: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and Military Practice and Procedure (Washington: ABA, 1982), 39.
* Civilians could not be forced to attend trials in Vietnam. In dicta, the combat zone was 
held to present wsuch a grave danger to a civilian witness" that a deposition would 
suffice. U.S. v Hodge, 43 CMR 252 (USCMA, 1971).
59Maj. Donald Higginbotham, Texas, to W. Hays Parks, Wash., 15 Jan. 1977, Marines 
and Military Law in Vietnam collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
60U.S. v Wheeler, 45 CMR 242 (USCMA, 1972).
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defense, the prosecution or the defense simply failed. Harsh 
as that may be, discussion of Vietnam trials with numerous 
Vietnam-era judge advocates reveals only a few prosecution 
cases lost because of that fact, and no defense cases.
In the same vein, documents lost to combat action were 
considered just that: lost. The best evidence rule61 allowed 
the substitution of copies, if available in that time before 
Xerox machines, but a document's loss due to combat action 
was not, and is not today, specified as a situation allowing 
substitution of copies. The matter is for the military 
judge's discretion. In sum, the rules of evidence were, and 
are, neither set aside nor relaxed for reason of combat.
Brigadier General Simmons, assistant division commander of 
the 1st Marine Division when the Son Thang cases were tried, 
wrote:
[S]enior officers say that our experience in Vietnam 
"proves1' that...the present cumbersome system of military 
justice will "work" in a combat environment.... [But] we 
must find ways of keeping the extraneous administrative 
functions in the rear, out of the objective area.6^
Some judge advocates thought that, in light of the thousands
of Vietnam courts-martial that were tried, the UCMJ worked
well in the combat zone.63 Others, like General Simmons,
disagreed. Brigadier General Duane L. Faw, the Vietnam-era
Director of the Judge Advocate Division — the Marine Corps'
senior lawyer — bluntly says:
I'm one of the people that thinks that the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice failed in Vietnam....There were too 
many people who were guilty of very, very serious crimes 
who were never brought to trial because of the 
difficulties of getting witnesses, keeping witnesses [in
country], and so forth..
6Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 143.a.(l).
62BGen. Edwin H. Simmons Vietnam service debriefing to Commanding General, Fleet 
Marine Force, Pacific, 24 May 1971, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
63e.g., BGen. James P. King, interview by author, 5 Nov. 1986, Wash., tape recording
6478, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
64BGen. Duane L. Faw, interview by author, 8 October 1986, California, tape recording
6470, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
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Another Marine lawyer, a veteran of two Vietnam tours, 
concurs, pointing out other difficulties raised by the UCMJ's 
failure to consider the impracticality of its implementation 
in combat:
Defense requests for numerous character witnesses from 
the U.S.; requests for psychiatric examinations in the 
U.S.; requests for expert witnesses from the U.S.; 
requests for delay while the accused attempted to obtain 
civilian counsel in the U.S....All of these, combined 
with the witness problems...made the trial of a serious
or complex case very difficult to get off the ground...66
What solution presents itself? Many senior lawyers with 
Vietnam experience recommend major change in the UCMJ to, in 
effect, bring it into line with British field practice. (See 
section 8.3.C.) Major General Prugh, former Judge Advocate 
General of the Army, in conjunction with General William 
Westmoreland, proposed draft wartime modifications to the 
UCMJ,66 but they received scant attention.* Changes to 
accommodate field conditions are not anticipated.
5.2.b. Members — the Military Jury Members trials were 
anticipated for the Son Thang accused. Since their 
introduction in the 1950 UCMJ, members, and their selection, 
have been the frequent target of critics.
The UCMJ requires selection of members "best qualified 
...by reason of age, education, training, experience, length 
of service, and judicial temperament."67 At the division 
level, where GCMs are convened, members are selected from a 
roster of division officers, usually. The actual selection 
is made by an administrative officer, often the adjutant, or
65Col. Curtis W. Olson, California, to author, Wash., 27 October 1986, Marines and 
Military Law in Vietnam collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
66Gen. William C. Westmoreland and MGen. George S. Prugh, "Judges in Command: the 
Judicialized Uniform Code of Military Justice," 4 Harvard J. of L. and Public Policy 199 
(1974) .
* Significant changes recommended by Prugh and Westmoreland that have been adopted 
include videotaping of depositions and testimony, and limiting the accused to one military 
counsel. Many significant modifications they suggested remain unadopted, however.
67Art. 25.
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his/her assistant. Member selection is random, guided by 
availability and common sense: operations officers are seldom 
selected because they must be constantly available to carry 
out their critical duties; military police officers and 
provost marshalls go unpicked for the possibility of their 
disqualifying familiarity with pending cases. Occasionally, 
selection is by service number - captains or colonels whose 
service numbers end in the digit six, for example. There is 
no standard maximum number of jurors. The minimum number for 
GCM is five. The officers selected are assigned to a panel, 
sometimes for a single case, more often for a series of 
unrelated cases. The order appointing them members is signed 
by the only officer with authority to convene GCMs, the 
commanding general. In a sense, then, military jurors are 
"selected" by commanders. In fact, selection is an 
administrative matter accomplished by a mid-level officer on 
the commander's staff who has no idea what cases may come 
before that panel. Instances of commanders deleting or 
adding officers to a members list in order to bias the panel 
are rare,68 and the mere "appearance of impurity"69 is 
sufficient to overturn a conviction rendered by a panel 
discovered to be so tainted.
At the special court-martial level, usually a battalion, 
the same members selection process applies. For special 
courts the minimum number of members is three.
Critics argue that commanders need not make changes to 
panel assignments; the mere fact that jurors come from the 
officer ranks is sufficient bias in and of itself to ensure 
conviction.
Because of the systematic exclusion of the young, the 
inexperienced, and those with a minimal amount of service 
background.... the convening authority has the ability to
6*U.S. v Hedges, 29 CMR 458 (USCMA, 1960), is one.
69Ibid.
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turn the court into a well-controlled panel of 
disciples
Ignoring what such a broad charge implies about officer 
integrity and intelligence, true random member selection 
involving all ranks is in fact possible and is sometimes 
practiced. Only rarely, however. Its non-use is justified 
on the ground that junior enlisted jurors, privates and lance 
corporals, eighteen- and nineteen-year olds, are not those 
"best qualified," as called for by the UCMJ.
An accused may request that enlisted personnel be 
included on his panel, in which case at least one-third of 
the jurors must be enlisted.71 Seldom, however, are any but 
senior enlisted personnel assigned — unlike British court- 
martial practice, which allows only officers to serve as 
members. In U.S. courts-martial most accused prefer to take 
their chances with an officer panel, rather than risk an 
unknown sergeant major's judgement. The common belief, 
unsupported by experience, is that enlisted jurors always 
vote for conviction.
Critics further charge that members, predominantly 
college-trained officers accustomed to following 
instructions, are not peers of a military accused.72 But trial 
lawyers recognize that "peers" are rare in any jurisdiction, 
including civilian:
In courtrooms across the country, juries with tenth-grade 
educations are responsible for deciding complicated 
...cases, not because they are...fair, but because they 
are the only ones available. .. .Experienced litigators 
know no one is ever unbiased, what they are looking for
70G. Edward Rudloff, "Stacked Juries: A Problem of Military Injustice," 11 Santa Clara 
Lawyer 362, 372 (1970-71). Also see, Luther C. West, "A History of Command 
Influence on the Military Judicial System," 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1970), the leading 
article on the subject, although pre-dating the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial.
7 Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 41.d(2).
72William L. Standard, Aggression: Our Asian Disaster (NY: Random House, 1971),
108; Rudloff, "Stacked Juries," 372.
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are jurors who will be partial to their client's case and 
prejudiced against their opponents.73
F. Lee Bailey, a prominent American lawyer, writes: "In my
opinion, despite all the criticism leveled at the military,
the odds are that a military court will produce a more
accurate verdict in a disputed issue of fact than a civilian
jury. "74
Courts-martial have an undeniably high conviction rate. 
In 197 0, the year of the Son Thang trials, 94.6 percent of 
the Army's 2,647 GCMs resulted in conviction.75 Marine Corps 
figures are unavailable but no doubt comparable.76 In 49.8 
percent of the Army GCMs 'not guilty' pleas were entered. 
The conviction rate in those cases was a lower 89 percent. 
'Not guilty' pleas heard by a military judge sitting without 
members resulted in a conviction percentage of 92; those 
decided by members, 83 percent.77 The following year the 
members/judge alone difference was more pronounced: 90
percent convictions by judge alone, 65 percent convictions by 
members,78 demonstrating that military juries have 
significantly lower conviction rates than do judge-decided 
cases. Such figures rebut assertions of military jury bias.
A significant factor elevating the military's overall 
conviction rate is the military's unique offenses — 
unauthorized absence, culpable loss of government property, 
breaking restriction — common charges, the courtroom proof of 
which is administrative simplicity. Another factor is the
73Roy Gnitman and Bill Thomas, Lawyers and Thieves (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 
119, 122.
74F. Lee Bailey, The Defense Never Rests (NY: Stein & Day, 1971), 259.
75R. Rex Brookshire, "Juror Selection Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice: Fact 
and Fiction," 58 Military L. Rev. 71, 86 (1972).
76Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Annual Report of the U.S. Court of 
Military Appeals. 1970 (Wash.: GPO, 1971), 26-30, lumps Navy and Marine Corps 
convictions together.
77Brookshire, "Juror Selection Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice," 86.
78Colonel Wayne E. Alley, "Determinants of Military Judicial Decisions," 65 Military L. 
Rev. 85, 102-103 (1974).
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common military practice of administratively disposing of 
cases that lack reasonably strong proof.*
Countless books and scholarly articles both extoll and 
excoriate military justice in detail. In the end, the system 
is much better than its critics would believe, and more 
imperfect than its proponents would admit.
5.2.C. Military Law and Individual Rights Military justice 
has never lacked for critics. The late Supreme Court Justice 
William 0. Douglas, in an oft-repeated opinion, referred to 
military justice as: "a system of specialized military
courts, proceeding by practices different from those 
obtaining in the regular courts and in general less favorable 
to defendants." He added that, "courts-martial as an 
institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice 
subtleties of constitutional law.1,79 While that statement, 
agreed with or not, pre-dated the major 1969 amendments, the 
opinion in some lay and civilian legal circles remains that 
military courts are inherently unfair, oriented solely toward 
the maintenance of discipline at the expense of justice. 
Most jurists and legal scholars, however, have a greater 
confidence in contemporary military justice, realizing its 
commitment to the basic rights enjoyed by all U.S. citizens.
At its initial session in 17 89, the first American 
Congress submitted twelve Constitutional amendments for the 
consideration of the state delegates. The amendments were 
intended to clarify certain individual and state rights not 
enumerated in the Constitution and to guarantee the 
preeminence of civil over military power.80 Ten of the twelve 
proffered amendments, the Bill of Rights, were eventually 
ratified.
* A practice criticized in: Glanville Williams, "Letting Off the Guilty and Prosecuting the 
Innocent," 1985 Criminal L. Rev. 115.
^  O'Callahan v Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
80Chief Justice Earl Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military," 37 New York 
University L. Rev. 181, 185 (1962).
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When the Bill of Rights was written it was already long­
standing practice in British courts-martial that the ordinary 
criminal procedure of civilian courts be followed, except as 
otherwise provided in the articles of war.81 Eventually, U.S. 
courts-martial would follow suit, but not for many years. 
American civilian courts at first made clear the fact of 
their authority over military courts, as well as the weak 
role of the Bill of Rights in limiting that dominance: "[T]he 
power of the Congress in the government of the land and naval 
forces and of the militia," the U.S. Supreme Court flatly 
said in 1866, "is not at all effected by the fifth or any 
other amendment. "82
Nor was the Bill of Rights initially considered to apply 
to those in uniform.83 "[T]he Founders...never thought of 
extending to soldiers the guarantees of common-law criminal 
procedure that they wrote into the Bill of Rights for the 
protection of civilians."84 The founders' original intent, 
however, has by now been rendered academic.
Congress has gradually extended the serviceman's 
protection by statute, and today the Court of Military 
Appeals is giving to the statutory provisions a content 
which, in most instances, is indistinguishable from that 
of the constitutional norms regularly formulated and
applied in the federal courts.8^
The civilian court' s view of its relationship to the 
enforcement of rights within the military has changed, as 
well. Thirty years ago the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court evidenced that transition in saying:
So far as the relationship of the military to its own 
personnel is concerned, the basic attitude of the Court 
has been that the latter's jurisdiction is most 
limited....The most obvious reason is that [civilian]
81 Gordon D. Henderson, "Courts-Martial and the Constitution," 71 Harvard L. Rev. 293, 
317 (1957).
82Ec Parte Lambdin P. Milligan, 71 U.S. 281, 301, 4 Wall. 2 (1866).
83Frederick B. Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice," 
pt. I, 72 Harvard L. Rev. 1, 44 (1958).
84Ibid., pt. II, 72 Harvard L. Rev. 266, 293 (1958).
85Ibid., 294.
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courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon 
discipline that any particular intrusion upon military 
authority might have. Many of the problems of the 
military society are...alien to the problems with which
the judiciary is trained to deal.**6 
At the same time the Chief Justice warned, "citizens in 
uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because 
they have doffed their civilian clothes,"87 an admonition also 
contained in several recent Supreme Court opinions.88 The 
military's high court, the Court of Military Appeals, 
reinforces that view, noting that "the Bill of Rights, except 
those which are expressly or by necessary implication 
inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces."89
Some basic rights are even more expansive in military 
proceedings than in civilian courts: warnings against self- 
incrimination; the accused's right to the substance of the 
expected testimony of prospective witnesses against him; and 
information as to all evidentiary matter in prosecution 
hands, for example. Military trial procedure may be 
considered superior in some respects, as well.
In the armed forces, there are no reports of corrupt 
military judges; no defendants waiting months or years 
until trial; no defendants told by the judge to plead 
guilty or suffer the consequences; no defendants 
impoverished by the need to retain counsel or forced to
be represented by incompetents.9®
Still, there is no question that "service in the armed 
forces, in both war and peace, entails substantial 
restriction on fundamental rights."91
86Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military," 186-87.
87Ibid., 188.
88<?.g., Bums v Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953); Brown v Glines, 444 U.S. 348 
(1980) .
89U.S. v Jacoby, 29 CMR 244 (USCMA, 1960). Although the U.S. Supreme Court now 
assumes the Bill of Rights to apply to the military, it has yet to squarely hold them 
applicable.
90Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vol. I, 36.
91 Robert E. Quinn, "The United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual Rights in 
the Military Service," 35 Notre Dame Lawyer 491, 493 (I960).
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What, then, are the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights and which of them are, for the military, restricted? 
Of the ten specified rights, five are clearly inapplicable to 
the uniformed individual: the right to keep and bear arms, 
the prohibition against quartering soldiers in one's home 
without consent, the right to trial by jury in suits 
exceeding twenty dollars value in controversy, the 
reservation to the states of those powers not delegated to 
the federal government, and the enumeration of constitutional 
rights as not being a denial of other, retained rights — the 
second, third, seventh, ninth, and tenth amendments.
The sections of the Bill of Rights not relating to 
limitations on federal powers have been applied to the 
separate states by incorporation, employing the Due Process 
clause of a later Constitutional amendment, the fourteenth.92 
Similarly, those sections of the Bill of Rights have, with 
some limitations, been integrated into the UCMJ, but by case 
law and statute, rather than by incorporation.
The five amendments enumerating personal liberties in 
the Bill of Rights — the ones of possible application to 
service personnel — are the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and 
eighth. The first amendment centers on free speech.
Freedom of speech has never been absolute, of course. 
The guarantee does not protect "the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or 'fighting* words..."93 As to those in 
uniform, the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has 
written, "The military need not encourage debate or tolerate 
protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the 
civilian state by the First Amendment..."94 In another opinion 
he expounds:
While members of the military are not excluded from the 
protection granted by the First Amendment, the different
92See, Abraham S. Goldstein and Leonard Or land, Criminal Procedure: Cases and 
Materials (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 26; 594.
9^Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
94Goldman v Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986).
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character of the military community and of the military 
mission require a different application of those 
protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, 
and the consequent necessity for imposition of 
discipline, may render permissible within the military 
that which would be constitutionally impermissible 
outside it.95
Thus, in modern U.S. (and British) military law, limitations 
are placed upon a service person's speech that, for instance, 
counsels desertion, interferes with accomplishment of the 
military mission, or military morale and discipline.96 
Additionally, there are speech-related offenses unique to the 
military: disrespectful or insubordinate language to those 
superior in rank,97 and offenses against order and discipline. 
But the Department of Defense98 and the Court of Military 
Appeals have continuously made clear that they will allow 
only those limitations on the right to speak that are 
essential to military discipline and order.99
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures of one's person, house, papers, and 
effects, is embodied in numerous military appellate decisions 
which closely follow civilian rules.100 It is generally true 
that decisions in the Federal system interpreting the fourth 
amendment serve as precedent in determining military search 
and seizure issues.101
The principal difference between the military and 
civilian procedure relates to issuance of a warrant...
The military practice does not provide for a warrant. In 
its place, however, is the requirement that the search be 
authorized by the commanding officer... The exercise of
95Parker v Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
96Walter T. Cox, "The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military 
Justice," 118 Military L. Rev. 1,23 (1987); Army Act 1955, secs. 60, 63A.
97UCMJ, Arts. 89, 91; Army Act 1955, sec. 33.
98D o D  Directive 1325.6 (1969), directs commanders to preserve service persons' 
"right of expression...to the maximum extent possible, consistent with good order and 
discipline and the national security."
"Quinn, "The United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual Rights," 497.
100e.g., U.S. v Ezell, 6 MJ 307 (USCMA, 1979).
101American Bar Association, Comparative Analysis. 86.
191
authority to search must be predicated upon probable 
cause. 102
The "shakedown" search of days past — search of entire 
living areas such as barracks, with probable cause, if any, 
only relating to the entire undifferentiated area — has been 
so radically narrowed by case law as to be a thing of the 
past.103
In recent years, random, involuntary urinalysis has been 
the continuing subject of concerted attack by the military 
defense bar and civil libertarians on fourth amendment 
grounds. Generally, however, appellate courts have supported 
the practice, when carried out in accordance with Department 
of Defense and service directives, and the voluminous 
military case law on the subject.104 Indeed, civilian 
jurisdictions have followed the military's lead in crafting 
legislation and court decisions that affirm the state's right 
to lawfully seize bodily fluids in protection of the public 
welfare.
Even in such modern application of the fourth amendment 
its provisions have full effect in the armed forces. The 
Court of Military Appeals has written:
While certain [Bill of Rights] protections have been 
deemed inapplicable, neither this Court nor the Supreme 
Court has ever held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
shield the American service person. "Indeed, the opposite 
is true."103
The military is specifically excluded from the fifth 
amendment's right to a grand jury indictment, the only time 
the armed forces are mentioned in the Bill of Rights. The 
other rights enumerated in that amendment, those against 
self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and the right to due 
process of law, are all applicable to the service person. 
The most significant of those in terms of war crimes
102Ibid. See also, U.S. v Drew, 15 USCMA 449 (1965).
m U.S. v Middleton, 10 M.J. 123 (USCMA, 1981).
104l/.S. v Harris, 5 M.J. 44 (USCMA, 1978), and its progeny.
105 U.S. v Middleton, 126-27, citations omitted.
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adjudication is the right against self-incrimination, first 
recognized in courts-martial in 17 9 5.106
UCMJ Article 31, the military version of the familiar 
warnings against self- incrimination, is broader than the 
fifth amendment's requirements in that Article 31 applies to 
non-custodial, as well as custodial, situations.107 Also 
broader than some civilian jurisdictions' requirements, 
military case law requires that evidence extraneous to a 
suspect's confession "establish the probable existence of 
each element of the offense charged;"108 The uncorroborated 
confession which bedevils British courts is inadmissible in 
courts-martial.
Protection against double jeopardy is contained in 
Article 44(a) of the UCMJ, which corrected an inequity 
endured under the UCMJ's predecessor, the Articles of War and 
the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Until 
prohibited by regulation, the Articles allowed 
"reconsideration": technically, there was no court-martial 
judgement until the reviewing authority acted and that 
authority could return the record to the trial court for 
reconsideration and "revision" which baldly directed 
imposition of a more severe sentence, that procedure now 
recognized as a fifth amendment violation.109 During World War 
I, fully one-third of all Army court-martial acquittals were 
reportedly "revised" to findings of guilty.110
106Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights," pt. II, 277.
l07U.S. v Wilson, 2 USCMA 248 (1953).
10*U.S. v Snearley, 15 USCMA 462, 463 (1965); U.S. v Gaines, 44 CMR 375 (ACMR,
1971).
109Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights," pt. II, 272-77.
110William T. Generous, Jr., Swords and Scales (NY: Kennikat Press, 1973), 8. This 
assertion is disputed by MGen. Prugh, who objects that Professor Morgan, a principle
author of the UCMJ who originally made the claim, was unsupported by facts. Wiener,
"Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights," pt. II, 273, however, agrees with Generous.
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The revision procedure that continues in today's British 
military law allows only for sentence suspension or 
remission.111
Although the term "due process" defies easy definition, 
that fifth amendment concept is fundamental to modern common 
law. It, too, is fully applicable to the military 
individual.
[M] ilitary due process begins with the basic rights and 
privileges defined in the federal constitution....The 
letter and the background of the uniform Code add their 
weighty demands to the requirements of a fair trial. 
Military due process is...not synonymous with federal 
civilian due process. It is basically that, but 
something more, and something different. How much more 
and how much different is indefinable in general
terms...112
From its earliest decisions, defined or not, the Court of 
Military Appeals has recognized and applied the concept to 
the armed forces.113
Speedy trial, an impartial jury, and the assistance of 
counsel are rights embodied in the sixth amendment. 
Technically, the military does not have the right to trial by 
jury.114 Some contend that the authors of the Bill of Rights 
never intended that service people be given that right.115 
Service personnel instead have the right to be tried by a 
panel of officers — members — with provision for enlisted 
members;116 a semantic distinction without a difference, 
perhaps, but a distinction that differentiates military from 
civilian practice.117
111HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. I, app. Ill, par. 9-27.
112Robert E. Quinn, "The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due 
Process," 35 St. John's L. Rev. 225, 232 (1961).
U3e.g„ U.S. v Clay, 1 CMR 74 (USCMA, 1951); U.S. v Lee, 1 CMR 212 (USCMA, 
1952).
^  O'Callahan v Parker.
115Henderson, "Courts-Martial and the Constitution," 304.
116UCMJ, Art. 25.
117c /, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 which requires trial by jury unless 
waived by the defendant with approval of the court and consent of the government. UCMJ 
Article 25 leaves the option entirely to the accused.
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Military practice is "much more protective"118 of the 
individual's right to a speedy trial than is U.S. federal 
practice. Under Vietnam-era military law, in the absence of 
a defense request for continuance, an accused in pretrial 
confinement must have been brought to trial within ninety 
days. Failure to meet that burden resulted in dismissal of 
charges.119
The sixth amendment's right to counsel was first 
statutorily assured the military accused in 1920.120 Today, 
and at the time of the Son Thang trials, military standards 
for provision of counsel equal or exceed those that prevail 
in the U.S. civilian community.121 Every military accused 
facing possible criminal conviction, regardless of financial 
status, is provided, without charge, from pretrial stages to 
final appeal, appointed military counsel.122 That counsel must 
be a law school diplomate, the member of a civilian bar, a 
graduate of a judge advocate's training course, and certified 
competent by his service's judge advocate general. A defense 
counsel must meet the standard of "customary skill and 
knowledge which normally prevails...within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."123 Every 
accused may additionally request a military lawyer of his own 
selection and, if that counsel is reasonably available, as is 
often the case, the requested counsel must be made available 
— not instead of, but in addition to, the appointed 
counsel.124 The military accused may also hire, at his own 
expense, civilian counsel.125 Under the law applicable during 
the Vietnam War, then, it was possible for an accused to
118ABA, Comparative Analysis. 120.
n 9 U.S. v Jacoby, U.S. v Burton, 44 CMR 166 (USCMA, 1971); UCMJ, Art. 33.
120Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights," pt. II, 300.
121Cox, "The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution," 26.
122UCMJ, Arts. 27, 32, 38, 49, 70; U.S. v Booker, 5 MJ 238 (USCMA, 1972).
l23U.S. v Rivas, 3 MJ 282, 289 (USCMA, 1977).
124UCMJ, Art. 26; U.S. v Vanderpool, 16 CMR 135 (USCMA, 1954).
125U.S. v Sears, 20 CMR 377 (USCMA, 1956).
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simultaneously be represented by three lawyers: appointed 
counsel, requested counsel, and civilian counsel.*
At the height of the war civilian lawyers frequently 
represented military clients in Vietnam. (More than one 
civilian lawyer withdrew his demand to view the scene of the 
alleged offense upon being issued a helmet and flak 
jacket.)126 Civilian lawyers often waive their fees to defend 
military clients. Like witnesses, civilian attorneys were 
brought to and from Vietnam on government aircraft and 
billeted in officer*s quarters at the convening unit *s 
headquarters.
The last of the Bill of Rights of possible application 
to service persons, the eighth amendment, prohibits cruel and 
unusual punishment. That other aspect of the amendment 
prohibiting excessive bail has never pertained to the armed 
services.127 Suggesting a weak explanation for the military’s 
exclusion of bail, one publicist offered:
Since the purpose of the bail requirement is to allow an 
accused to remain free until and unless he is convicted 
of a crime, the requirement is inappropriate in the 
military where the individual has no freedom of movement 
but rather is at all times subject to control by his
superiors.128
A more likely explanation is that bail was not previously 
available to service members and the drafters of the UCMJ 
felt no need to establish the practice. Its constituency, 
after all, was limited and suspect and its omission had the 
additional benefit of mollifying those against the Code's 
withdrawal of authority from commanding officers — who are 
also the confining authorities who would be involved in the 
bail process, were it mandated. In British military
* The Manual for Courts-Martial. 1984 (Wash.: GPO, 1984), amended this right, 
limiting an accused to two lawyers: one military counsel and civilian counsel.
126Col. Thomas P. Casey, Colorado, to author, Wash., 9 Oct. 1989, Marines and Military 
Law in Vietnam collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
127Z,evy v Resor, 37 CMR 399 (USCMA, 1967); DeChamplain v Lovelace, 48 CMR 506 
(USCMA, 1974).
128Henderson, "Courts-Martial and the Constitution," 316.
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\practice, bail is available only to the convicted person 
whose denied appeal is being further appealed to the House of 
Lords.129
In lieu of bail, UCMJ Article 13 provides that an 
accused's pretrial confinement not be "any more rigorous than 
the circumstances require to insure his presence" at trial. 
Defense counsels regularly petition convening/confining 
authorities to release on their own recognizance their 
clients awaiting trial, arguing the military standard: that 
the accused would be present for trial and presented no 
threat to command discipline and safety.130 Such petitions are 
seldom successful.
As for cruel and unusual punishment, flogging remained 
legal under U.S. military law until 1861; branding until 
1872.131 Today, the UCMJ prohibits all corporal punishment.132
Until the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial revisions, all 
sentences to confinement specified that such confinement was 
to be "at hard labor." Asked the meaning of the term, Felix 
E. Larkin,* the Code's principal author replied: "Hard labor, 
I think, generally is construed to mean work while in 
conf inement."
sjcsfc
Mr. Gavin : "Well, what kind of work?"
Colonel Dinsmore : "Trimming lawns, picking up garbage, digging 
ditches, maybe....Improving the roads around posts, 
general police work — just the ordinary run of 
housekeeping..."
Mr. Gavin: "What about this rock-pile business...?"
Colonel Dinsmore:"Never heard of it, sir."133
129Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act, 1968, par. 42.
130l/.& v Malia, 6 MJ 65 (USCMA, 1978).
131 Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights," pt. II, 290.
132Art. 55. U.S. v Wappler, 9 CMR 23 (USCMA, 1953), holds that Art 55 ”grant[s] 
protection covering even wider limits [than] afforded by the Eighth Amendment."
* Assistant General Counsel, Department of Defense, testifying on 23 March 1949 
before a House of Representatives subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Forces, 
examining provisions of the proposed UCMJ.
** U.S. Representative, member of the subcommittee.
*** Member of the UCMJ drafting committee.
133Index and Legislative History: UCMJ. 972-73.
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In practice, "confinement at hard labor" entailed 
general area police and light maintenance, often on details 
outside the confines of the brig. Digging ditches and 
breaking rocks were not among a military prisoner's tasks. 
Long-term prisoners who consent to enrollment commonly 
participate in civilian education programs and training 
courses such as furniture repair and industrial arts. Under 
the UCMJ, hard labor has never been onerous labor, and since 
1984 the term has been excised from courtroom usage, although 
the practice continues, in fact.134
By the time of the Vietnam War the court-martial had 
developed into a court of general criminal jurisdiction, 
trying capital felonies throughout the world, "an integral 
part of the federal judiciary."135 The U.S. Chief Justice of 
that period said, "the Court of Military Appeals can be an 
effective guarantor of our citizens' rights to due process 
when they are subjected to trial by court-martial.1,136
5.2.d. Military Procedure and Procedural Models if the
rights of an individual contained in the Bill of Rights by- 
and-large pertain to service personnel, and if courts-martial 
are a part of the federal judiciary, why is a separate 
military criminal code and code of procedure necessary? Why 
not simply employ the civilian criminal law and procedure 
contained in Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, of the 
United States Code?
In fact, and due partly to the British tradition of 
subordination of the military to civil authority, criminal 
law and procedure in courts-martial have more closely
134Manual for Courts-Martial. 1984. R.C.M. 1113 (d)(2)(B).
135Robert E. Quinn, "Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice," 
46 Military L. Rev. 77,96 (1969).
136Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military," 189.
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assimilated that of common law courts than any other 
independent U.S. court system.137
Before 1916, the entire body of jury-trial rules, as 
practiced by the Federal Courts, was the lawful guide for 
courts-mart ial. But in that year a wholesome and 
flexible independence was given by empowering the
President to make the rules.138
Since the signing of the Constitution the Congress139 
and, since 1916 the President as commander-in-chief, through 
authority vested in him by Congress, have had the power to 
provide for the trial and punishment of military offenses, 
including the enactment of rules of evidence and procedure. 
That power is separate and independent from Congress' similar 
authority over civil courts.140 Significantly, while Congress 
has always had discretion to regulate military courts, 
including the authority to "confer upon lower Federal courts 
jurisdiction with regard to military...offenses, it has not 
done so."141 Nor has Congress ever made courts-martial 
proceedings subject to direct review by Federal courts.142 
Instead, recognizing that military society is distinct from 
civilian society, with differing goals and needs, Congress 
has promulgated and maintained separate codes of criminal law 
and procedure for the two.
Military society does differ significantly from civilian 
society. What has been written of multinational law might 
also be said of military versus civilian law: " [N] ational 
legal institutions, like most other things national, differ 
infinitely,...what works well in one country would work ill,
137John H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law. 3d ed., vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1940), 99.
138Ibid.
139U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, clause 14.
l40Dynes v Hoover, 61 U.S. 838, 839, 20 How. 65 (1857), citing as authority 
England's Mutiny Act of 1689.
141Index and Legislative History: UCMJ. 118.
142Ibid., 117.
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or not at all, in another..."143 " [T]he unique nature of 
military life with its extraordinary risks, stresses, and 
lifestyle, coupled with the need for discipline, mandates a 
separate legal system."144 The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes 
that the "military is, 'by necessity, a specialized society 
separate from civilian society.'"145 The U.S. Civil War 
leader, General William Tecumseh Sherman, himself a lawyer, 
wrote:
[T]he civil courts...belong to a totally different system 
of jurisprudence. The object of the civil law is to 
secure to every human being in a community all the 
liberty, security, and happiness possible, consistent 
with the safety of all. The object of military law is to 
govern armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable 
of exercising the largest measure of force at the will of 
the nation. Those objects are as wide apart as the 
poles, and each requires its own separate system of laws,
statute and common.14^
Similar distinctions apply to rules of criminal procedure, 
since "procedural rules can be seen as no more than technical 
devices to make possible the direct sanctioning processes of 
law."147
The drafters of the UCMJ, while recognizing that they 
could not ignore the military circumstances of its operation, 
consciously designed the UCMJ to resemble the U.S. civilian 
federal court system.148 Although it was impractical to 
engraft the civilian rules of evidence and procedure, with 
their continuously changing construction and differing 
interpretation from district to district, the UCMJ specifies 
that:
The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before 
courts-martial... shall, so far as...practicable, apply 
the principles of law and rules of evidence generally
143Carleton K. Allen, Legal Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1931), 253.
144Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vol. 1, 4.
l45Brown v Glines, 354, citing Parker v Levy, 743.
146Quoted in Index and Legislative History: UCMJ. 780.
147Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence (London: Butterworths, 1989), 66.
148Index and Legislative History: UCMJ. 606.
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recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United 
States district courts... ^ 9
The Court of Military Appeals, from its initial opinions,
looked to the civilian federal courts for precedent,150
seeking independent systems of law and procedure able to meet
the demands of its specialized society while remaining as
close as possible to its civilian, democratic jurisprudential
foundations.
Unspoken in either the legislative history of the 1950 
UCMJ or its subsequent modifications is a recognition that 
the shape of its criminal process affects the substance of 
its criminal law. Many of the original Code's provisions 
were refinements of prior military regulations, but there 
also was much that was new. Each of the Code's two major 
revisions, effective in 1969 and 1984, added further changes 
in both process and substance. While neither drafters nor 
revisionists explicitly considered it, the criminal process 
system, or model, that the military employs depends upon 
value choices reflected in that process. Procedural fairness 
and equity call for employment of the criminal process model 
best-suited to the particular society's criminal justice 
needs. Several civilian models reflect aspects of the U.S. 
military's approach to criminal procedure.
Packer's well-known and often criticized "due process" 
model,151 for example, has many elements found in the military 
process: presumption of innocence, unrestrained availability 
of counsel, procedural impediments to conviction, and 
insistence on formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding in 
public forums by impartial tribunals, with a low demand for 
finality and a broad appellate system. Differing from
149Art. 36.(a), UCMJ, 1950. Subsequent versions of the Code repeat the point in 
slightly varying language.
150Quinn, "The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process," 242; 
e.g., U.S. v Knudson, 16 CMR 161 (USCMA, 1954): "We have repeatedly held that 
Federal practice applies to court-martial procedures if not incompatible with military 
law ..."
15 Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1969), 157, 161, 163-65, 172, 228-29, 232-35.
201
Packer's due process model, military procedure avoids 
significant anti-authoritarian limitations on official power, 
and severely limits collateral attack upon its judgements.
The U.S. military model is functionally akin to the 
European process in the investigatory and pretrial stages152: 
both present liberal advance disclosure of issues and 
evidence, encouraging fact-finding impartiality and 
efficiency — though the military process stresses content, 
relegating form to a secondary importance, unlike the 
continental system.
Damaska's common law-based "adversary" model also finds 
congruence in the military process:153 evidentiary barriers to 
conviction, with complex strictures on admissibility of 
evidence, and a lay jury rather than a professional tribunal. 
Unlike some adversary models, the UCMJ does not require jury 
unanimity for conviction, thereby easing the prosecutorial 
burden.
In deciding which, if any, model might better meet the 
court-martial's procedural needs there are no statistical 
comparisons,154 nor theoretical writings by military or 
civilian authors defining the military model in practice. 
Civilians, one suspects, have little interest in theorizing 
on the military process, and military authors have not been 
prone to the creation of conceptual models. Instead, 
military criminal procedure merely evolves, its theoretical 
bases unstated, its unknowing practice that it is "better to 
borrow or adopt parts of foreign procedures and not the 
whole..."155 The resulting military model remains unique.
152See Leonard H. Leigh, "Liberty and Efficiency in the Criminal Process-The 
Significance of Models," 26 International and Comparative L. Quarterly 516 (1977).
153Mirjan Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study," 121 University of Pennsylvania L. Rev. 506, 512- 
13, 522-30, 536-42. (1973).
154Ibid., 509, fn. 3.
155Leigh, "Liberty and Efficiency in the Criminal Process," 518.
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5.3. Son Thang War Crimes at Court-Martial
Pretrial hearings — Article 32 investigations — precede every 
GCM to determine whether probable cause exists to believe a 
crime was committed and that those charged committed it. On 
12 March, 197 0, a joint Article 32 investigation was called 
to order. At the same time a "Secret" message was sent to 
Marine Corps headquarters in Washington, D.C., noting the 
fact and reporting that the verbatim record would be used as 
a war crimes investigative report, as required by a MACV* 
directive.156 The five accused, Herrod, Schwarz, Green, Boyd, 
and Krichten, confined since 23 February, were present at the 
investigation, each represented by assigned military defense 
counsel. Two lawyer-captains represented the government. 
The investigating officer was an experienced lawyer, a major 
from the SJA's office.
The killer team's platoon leader, a very green second 
lieutenant who was the grandson of a former Chief of Naval 
Operations, related his recollection of the events of 19 
February. Asked about the rules of engagement, he testified:
I was never briefed on the rules....most of it is common 
sense as to who you can shoot and who you can't 
shoot....[I] f we spot someone at night, we kill them; if 
the VC spot someone, they'll kill them. .. .Most of them 
[villagers] won't even go to the bathroom at night, out 
of the hootches... .So, it's just been a company policy 
that anything that moves at night, we kill.157
He also related hearing, on the night of the charged
killings, "a long burst of heavy automatic weapons fire....I
thought it was an M-60 machine gun."158 Though the patrol's M-
16 rifles were capable of automatic fire, like a machine gun,
* Military Advisory Command, Vietnam, Directive 20-4, Inspections and Investigations: 
War Crimes, dated 10 July 1970.
156Son Thang daily report, number 6; From: 1st Marine Division commander, To: 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (Hereafter: Son Thang daily report). These numbered 
messages, classified "Secret - Marine Corps Eyes Only," continued for four months, in 
lesser frequency as the trials progressed, keeping Washington informed of case-related 
events.
157Record of pretrial investigation, 536.
158Ibid., 511.
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the patrol had no actual machine gun, the sound of which is 
different from an M-16 and distinctive to the experienced 
ear. Nor had any of the accused mentioned machine gun fire 
in their various pretrial statements. The Schwarz, Boyd, and 
Krichten statements specifically denied receiving enemy fire 
of any nature.
The patrol's platoon sergeant, on his second tour of 
Vietnam duty, testified that the patrol had been the first 
led by Herrod, and that after the team left the company area 
that night, he too heard long bursts of machine gun fire.159
A squad leader, who again testified to hearing a machine 
gun, related that upon the patrol's return Green had referred 
to the rest of the team as "cold-blooded killers."160 
Asked what the other patrol members had said, the squad 
leader replied, "They said they ran into some gooks. . . .They 
weren't supposed to be out, so they just blew them 
away....Gooks are gooks. That's all there is to it."161 He 
also reluctantly confirmed having heard Herrod say the patrol 
had lined up its victims then, Herrod reportedly said: "Now, 
when I count to three, I'll open up and the rest of you open 
u p . "162
Lieutenant Ambort, the company commander, also testified 
to hearing machine gun fire,163 then freely described his 
briefing of Herrod:
...More or less a pep talk....I told Herrod I didn't want 
any more casualties. ... I reminded him of the 12th and of 
this day, the 19th [when casualties were suffered], and I 
told him to "pay the little bastards back." I told him 
to go out and get some.... to shoot first and ask 
questions later, shoot anything that's moving
around...16^
159Ibid„ 567, 552.
160ibid., 595.
161Ibid., 592-93.
162Ibid., 595-96.
163Ibid„ 623, 634, 668.
164Ibid., 619-20. This account differs in minor detail from the account on page 1, 
herein. The page 1 account is from U.S. v Schwarz, verbatim record of trial, 348, 
rather than the verbatim record of pretrial investigation.
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Asked about the rules of engagement, Ambort replied, "I 
remember some officer gave me some publication — about a 
thousand pages long, so I didn't get through it."165 He later 
added, "That was the rules of engagement: anything moving 
around out there — blow it away."166
After twelve days of sworn testimony and chaotic 
wrangling among the eight judge advocates, the Article 32 
investigation closed. The government had presented its 
probable cause case. No accused took the stand. The 
investigating officer dryly noted that Green read magazines 
during much of the proceedings.
Twenty-seven days later, in written reports, the 
investigating officer recommended that all five patrol 
members be tried by general court-martial, charged with 
sixteen specifications (counts) of premeditated murder in 
violation of UCMJ Article 118. In a separate, unrequired 
recommendation, Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, the accuseds' 
battalion commander, recommended that Herrod and Schwarz be 
charged with unpremeditated murder, Green and Boyd with 
manslaughter, and Krichten be charged not at all.167 Cooper's 
several contemporaneous newspaper interviews were similarly 
at pains to defend his men.168 The investigating officer later 
wrote of Cooper, "He could never quite accept as true that 
his Marines could commit murder."169 The commanding general, 
to whom both recommendations were directed, disregarded 
Cooper's.
With My Lai then a major story, press interest in the 
Son Thang cases was intense,170 but the prosecutions proceeded 
normally. The SJA, responsible for overseeing the cases'
165Record of pretrial investigation, 659.
166Ibid., 676.
167Son Thang daily report #19.
168e.g., Los Angeles Times. 27 February 1970; Pacific Stars & Stripes. 1 March 1970, 
6 .
169Col. Robert J. Blum, North Carolina, to author, Wash., 2 March 1989.
170Col. Robert M. Lucy, Interviewer un-named, 24 June 1970, Tape recording #4814, 
Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
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resolution, recalled, "I don't remember any pressure from 
anybody to do anything other than to bring them to trial.... 
We were not going to put it under the table. We were going 
to bring everything out in the open and get it done."171
5.3.a. The United States v Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz Death 
is the maximum punishment authorized by the UCMJ for murder. 
But the court-martial convening authority, the 1st Marine 
Division's commanding general, referred Schwarz' case to 
trial with the special instruction that it was to be a non­
capital case, thus limiting the maximum punishment to 
confinement for life.172 Two months before trial the 
commanding general also granted Schwarz' co-accused, 
Krichten, immunity from prosecution in return for his 
testimony in the trials of the remaining four accused.173
On June 15, one hundred and seventeen days after the 
alleged murders, Schwarz went to trial. Unsuccessful in his 
effort to retain a civilian lawyer,174 he was represented by 
twenty-eight-year-old Marine Captain Daniel H. LeGear, Jr., 
who had graduated from law school three years before.175 The 
prosecutor ("trial counsel," in military practice) was Franz 
P. Jevne, a captain of twenty-seven, also three years from 
law school. Jevne was assisted by another captain-judge 
advocate of similar experience.
The military judge, one of three or four Marines in 
Vietnam certified to sit in GCMs, was Lieutenant Colonel Paul 
A.A. St.Amour. An experienced jurist respected by convening 
authorities, he had, on occasion, differed with those
171Col. Robert M. Lucy, Interview by author, 22 June 1991, London-St.Louis, tape 
recording, author's collection.
172Charge Sheet, p. 4, record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz , 174.
173Son Thang daily report #17. Whether transactional or use immunity was granted is 
unreported.
174Ibid.
175USMC, Combined Lineal List. 1971. 85. At that time, a marine judge advocate's first 
nine months of active duty were spent solely in training.
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officers over the conduct of trials.176 As in any 
jurisdiction, the military judge could exert significant 
influence over the trial of the case.
In an initial day-long evidentiary hearing, defense 
counsel LeGear fought to keep Schwarz1 damming pre-trial 
statement, with its admission of the crimes, out of evidence. 
After calling several witnesses, he argued that the statement 
had been coerced by the company commander's — Ambort's — 
conversation with the killer team the day after the patrol. 
Ambort had assembled the five, told them that events had 
become serious, and that it would be best to tell the truth. 
Shortly after that exhortation all five gave written, sworn, 
exculpatory statements to the battalion operations officer, 
first assigned to investigate the allegations. After his own 
examination of the crime scene, and upon learning of Ambort's 
meeting with the team, the operations officer had feared 
Ambort's conversation with them had tainted their initial 
statements. Three days after Ambort's conversation, and with 
well-documented opportunity to retract or amend their initial 
statements, Schwarz, Boyd, and Krichten made their written 
admissions. Green and Herrod stood by their original 
exculpatory accounts.
According to defense counsel LeGear, Ambort's words had 
improperly influenced the men into making their incriminating 
statements; the subsequent written opportunity to amend, and 
the re-advisement of rights that Schwarz signed were, LeGear 
urged, ineffective in the face of Ambort's suggestive remarks 
and the strain under which Schwarz had been functioning.177
It was a slim reed upon which to base a motion to 
exclude evidence and the statement was admitted. The members 
would eventually read Schwarz* sworn, hand-written admission 
that he and the others had committed war crimes by firing on
176it is not uncommon for strong-minded convening authorities to grumble about 
equally strong-minded military judges and their handling of courts-martial, usually to 
no effect.
177Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 153-56.
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unresisting, noncombatant women and children at three 
locations in Son Thang. Schwarz' statement added that "it 
was deside back at the cp [command post] that we would say we 
had resived sniper f ire." (sic.)178
Under military rules of evidence the judge's ruling only 
admitted the statement into evidence; the defense could still 
argue the probative value, or "weight" it should be given, in 
an effort to persuade the members to disregard its 
contents.179
At the same pretrial hearing the government offered 
photographs into evidence. The Marines who had discovered 
the crime the next day helped the Son Thang villagers bury 
the victims.* Before doing so a corpsman took nine color 
photographs of the dead. The defense counsel argued the 
photos' inflammatory nature while the trial counsel declaimed 
their probativeness to show the victim's lack of resistance 
and cause of death.180 The military judge, perhaps recalling 
an admonition from judge's school that juries should be 
allowed to view an accused's "handiwork," admitted the photos 
into evidence.181 Between the photos, the accused's 
incriminating statement, and Krichten's anticipated immunized 
testimony, it was going to be a difficult trial for the 
defense.
A panel of eight officer members was then seated: a 
colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and five majors. Six of 
the eight had served in infantry units, though not in 
Vietnam. The trial on the merits proceeded rapidly.
178Record of pretrial investigation, exhibit 47.
179Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 140.a.(2).
* Thus precluding autopsies. That the victims were in fact dead, and causes of death, 
elements of the charged offenses, were established through medical testimony based upon 
the photographs of the bodies.
180Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 40-43.
181In support of such admission, U.S. v Mobley, 28 MJ 1024 (AFCMR, 1989); Purtell 
v State , 761 S.W. 2d 360 (Tex. Crim. App., 1988), cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 1972 
( 1989) .
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Lieutenant Colonel St.Amour, the military judge, recalls the 
prosecution and defense lawyers:
Neither Jevne nor LeGear struck me as being 
professionally distinctive. Frankly, these [judge 
advocates] were obviously young and inexperienced, 
determined to get on as best they could with what was no
easy task under very trying conditions. 182 
Throughout the trial two civilian lawyers, representing 
patrol leader Herrod, sat in the back of the cramped 
courtroom, previewing the government's evidence. They 
reportedly agreed with St.Amour's unimpressed assessment, and 
wondered at the defense counsel's failure to highlight 
ambiguities and contradictions in the case, and his lack of 
witness cross-examination.183
In its case-in-chief the defense position was that, 
contrary to the accused's written statement, the killer team 
had been fired upon by the VC, after all. Schwarz had only 
obeyed the orders of Herrod to fire, attempting to avoid 
hitting the villagers who were between the patrol and the 
enemy.
Defense witness Ambort, under cross-examination, wounded 
the defense case by again relating his "pay the little 
bastards back" briefing of the patrol.184 Neither Ambort nor 
other defense witnesses, however, were asked about having 
heard machine gun fire from Son Thang.
The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, also 
testified for the defense — unusual in itself — and stressed 
the dangerous nature of the Son Thang area. On another tack, 
LeGear asked Cooper:
Q. "In your battalion and throughout your Marine Corps career, have you 
ever given any instruction regarding when the individual Marine has
182Lt.Col. Paul A. A. St Amour, Maine, to author, London, 4 March 1991.
183Herrod, Blue's Bastards. 154-55. Herrod's account, however, is riddled with 
inaccuracies and misstatements. His detailed account of his court-martial (159-209), 
with lengthy and erroneous testimonial quotations, despite the lack of a verbatim trial 
record, are typical. As a whole, his book must be considered unreliable and highly 
suspect.
184Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 348.
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a duty to disobey an order?"
A. "...In my 20 years commissioned service, I know of no time or period 
of instruction where an individual Marine was told when he could 
disobey an order....During the instruction to the men on the rules 
of engagement, the subject of war crimes was briefly mentioned, but 
as far as I know no instruction given.. .would indicate to a man on
any certain occasion that he could disobey an order. ”185
Taking the stand in his own defense, Schwarz conceded 
that he, unlike Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, had received 
instruction that some orders could be disobeyed.186 Explaining 
why he had nevertheless obeyed Herrod1s orders, Schwarz 
testified:
I figured there had to be some reason that the team 
leader yelled, "Open up." He just wouldn’t yell, "Open 
up” for no reason. . . .He kept yelling the order to 
reload and fire again. I thought he knew what he was
doing, because he ordered it.187 
Attempting, under cross-examination, to rationalize his 
written statement that the patrol had received no fire, and 
his in-court testimony that they had, Schwarz was asked:
Q. "Which one of those statements is true, Private Schwarz?"
A. "Both of them, sir."
Q. "Both of them are true?”
A. "Yes, sir. The statement says ’in my opinion.' My opinion is we
could have, yet we could not have, taken sniper fire."I88
Following that lame explanation, he repeated that in firing
at the enemy muzzle flashes coming from directly behind the
Son Thang victims he had tried to fire between the
villagers.189 The military judge, referring to "this absurd
defense,"190 asks: "What was [defense counsel] LeGear to do?
He played out the game as best he could..."191
In his closing argument the trial counsel summarized the
defenses his opponent had offered:
185Ibid., 390-91.
186Ibid., 414-15.
187Ibid., 423, 427, 429.
188Ibid., 418. In fact, his statement says no such thing.
189Ibid., 428.
190St.Amour, to author, 4 March 1991.
191Ibid.
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The first defense: that Schwarz did knowingly
participate in those three shootings, knowing what he 
was doing but believing that it was okay because he was 
doing it pursuant to a lawful order. Or defense #2: in 
the alternative, that Schwarz didn't knowingly 
participate in each of these shootings. Rather, that on 
each of the three occasions he was firing at the 
attacking enemy and it was just a mistake that the 16 
women and children at the three different locations just 
happened to be in the line of fire. Gentlemen, I ask
you to note the inconsistencies of these defenses.192
At the court-martial's conclusion the panel had been 
reduced to seven officers, one of their number having been 
removed in mid-trial. (That juror, in the officer's club, 
had told a prosecution witness that he had done a good job 
and that he, the juror, had been on another panel involving 
premeditated murder. That accused, he said, had been "a real 
shitbird."193 Upon learning of the conversation, judge 
St.Amour and both counsel questioned the major, on the 
record. Despite his assurances that he could decide the 
present case solely on the evidence, he was immediately 
dismissed.)
After being instructed by the military judge, the court 
closed for the members' deliberations. Upon reopening, 
Schwarz was found guilty of twelve of the sixteen counts of 
premeditated murder.194 Although not specified, he apparently 
was found not guilty of the counts arising at the second hut 
where testimony indicated Schwarz could have still been 
inside when the team fired on its four occupant-victims.
Immediately following findings, the sentencing phase of 
the trial began. In military practice, sentencing is by the 
same members who decide guilt. Like the findings stage, the 
sentencing stage is adversarial, both sides offering evidence 
relevant to sentencing and arguing before the court. Because 
the evidence the prosecution may introduce is statutorily 
limited to data from the accused's official record, the
192Record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz, 505-06.
193Ibid., 271-76.
194Staff Judge Advocate's review of GCM, case of Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz, par. 2, n.d., 
contained in record of trial, U.S. v Schwarz., vol. I.
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procedure favors the defense. But in this instance, the 
prosecution presented evidence of Schwarz' three prior 
courts-martial, which the members could consider in 
formulating an appropriate sentence.195 The defense, in 
mitigation and extenuation, offered a letter from Schwarz' 
mother saying that he was a good son and father. Schwarz 
again took the stand and made a brief statement of regret.
Schwarz was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge from 
the Marine Corps, loss of all pay and allowances, and to be 
confined at hard labor for life.
Neither war crimes nor the law of war were explicitly 
mentioned during the court-martial, but the conviction was 
clearly for war crimes and the law of war had just as clearly 
been executed.
Private First Class Boyd, the next killer team member 
scheduled to be tried, was coincidentally outside the 
courtroom when Schwarz' sentence was announced. He broke 
into tears and had to be physically restrained from entering 
the courtroom. "I want to look at them," he cried. "I just 
want to look at the pigs."196 Boyd's court-martial began the 
next day.
5.3.b. The United States v PFC Thomas R. Boyd unlike 
Schwarz, Boyd was charged with sixteen counts of 
unpremeditated murder. The military judge again was 
Lieutenant Colonel St.Amour.
In U.S. military practice a judge is not necessarily 
disqualified for having presided in a related case. It is a 
discretionary matter for the judge involved, subject to 
appellate review.197 If in the earlier case the judge had 
determined that a witness had lied, or that he would not 
believe a witness to be called in the second trial,
195Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 75b(2), and 75d.
196Phoenix Gazette. 22 June 1970.
197t/.S. v Elzy, 25 MJ 416 (USCMA, 1988).
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disqualification would result. If the accused in the later 
case was heavily implicated in the initial trail, recusal 
might be called for.198 While disqualification might have been 
an issue in Boyd's court-martial, the matter was not raised 
by the defense and the military judge did not recuse himself. 
Practically speaking, there were so few general court-martial 
judges in Vietnam that the question of judge disqualification 
was delicately approached by all concerned.
For the first time, a Son Thang accused would be 
represented by a civilian lawyer. Mr. Howard Trockman, "an 
outspoken critic of the Vietnamese war,"199 had been referred 
to the case by a friend. He undertook Boyd's defense pro 
bono publico.
On 22 June the court was convened. In a bold move Boyd 
and his lawyers, Trockman and Marine captain Michael P. 
Merrill, opted for trial by judge alone. Along with Herrod's 
civilian lawyers, Trockman had attended the final two days of 
Schwarz’ trial. Though Boyd would have been tried by a fresh 
panel, Trockman was displeased by the military jurors:
I was impressed with the demeanor of the judge...However,
I had much concern over the [members]... who, I felt, 
were tightly bonded together as a "law and order" group 
which had little regard for Schwarz* defense of having
carried out his leader's order....200 
Though concerned with the reception of Schwarz' obedience to 
orders defense, at the same time, Trockman said, "I was 
certain that this defense would not 'fly'."201
The day before trial Trockman sought out the military 
judge. "I asked him, simply, whether he would be willing to 
try the case solo. . .and if he could hear the evidence... 
'fresh' without, in any way, being affected by the previous
198Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vol. I, 525-26.
199Howard P. Trockman, Indiana, to author, London, 17 April 1991.
200Ibid.
201Ibid.
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trial..."202 Based on St.Amour's affirmative response, the 
accused requested trial without members.
The court-martial lasted but two days, sped by the lack 
of members and need for their instruction, or to have them 
leave the courtroom whenever evidentiary arguments arose. 
Krichten, again testifying for the government, swore that 
Boyd, with whom he had served in the same squad for seven 
months, "fired well over heads when they [the victims] were 
already on the deck....He was aiming over the people by about 
five feet and was the last to fire in all three shootings."203 
Krichten had not mentioned those facts in his written 
statements, nor in the Schwarz trial. That testimony from 
the principal prosecution witness, of which the defense had 
advance notice,204 made Boyd's defense considerably easier. 
Lieutenant Colonel St.Amour, however, writes that Krichten's 
assertions were not dispositive:
My intuitive feeling at trial and now was/is that Boyd 
did...shoot at one or more of the victims. However, 
there was insufficient evidence introduced to this 
effect. Boyd's guilt was simply not established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Krichten1s testimony that Boyd fired 
above the victim's heads was at best of marginal 
credibility.206
Later, Schwarz' civilian appellate lawyers also took note of 
Krichten's testimony, referring to him in their appellate 
brief as "a remarkable Marine. . .able to describe in detail 
the positions of every man in his patrol in each of three 
occasions....a characterless weakling whose incredible memory 
was exceeded only by his desire to save his own skin."206 Even 
Herrod thought "he was lying."207
202Ibid.
203Stars and Stripes. 24 June 1970.
204Trockman, to author, 17 April 1991.
205St. Amour, to author, 4 March 1991.
206Brief for appellant at 8, U.S. v Schwarz.
207Herrod, Blue's Bastards. 156.
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Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz, outside the court 
room on the second day of his court-martial
L.-R.: IstLt. Louis R. Ambort, Pvt. Randell D. 
Herrod, and lstLt. Oliver L. North, outside the 
courtroom during Pvt. Herrod's court-martial.

Since verbatim records are not required in military 
cases resulting in acquittal,208 it is not possible to assess 
prosecution and defense tactics. The crucial fact was that 
guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt in the 
mind of the fact finder.209 After less than two full days of 
trial, the military judge acquitted Boyd of all charges.
5.3.C. The United States v PFC Samuel G. Green. Jr. Green 
was black — one of only two blacks involved in the Son Thang 
incident. The other, Captain Robert C. Williams, was 
Herrod*s originally-appointed defense counsel. His 
responsibilities, however, were soon assumed by Herrod's 
civilian lawyers. In 197 0, blacks constituted about 13 
percent of the draft-age American population and 11.2 percent 
of Marine Corps enlisted strength.210 The Marines had 
reputedly undergone greater integration in the twenty years 
preceding the Vietnam War "than the larger society managed in 
over 100 years."211 Still, blacks, often lacking a basis for 
deferment, were more likely than whites to be drafted, to 
serve in infantry units and, hence, to be killed or 
wounded.212 For example, the Marine Corps' 11.2 percent 
overall black population constituted 20.1 percent of its 
infantry population.213 As the Vietnam War's unpopularity grew 
in the U.S. civilian community and the world at large, so did 
unrest grow in the military. "By 197 0, black unrest had
208Art. 54(a), UCMJ.
209For an exposition of the military judge’s decision-making process (which appears 
reflective of any civilian jurist's) see, Alley, "Determinants of Military Judicial 
Decisions."
210Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military (Wash.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1982), 42-43.
21 Donald W. Perry, Racial Discrimination and Military Justice (NY: Praeger, 1977), 
80.
212Palmer, The 25-Year War. 83.
213Binkin and Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military. 172.
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Ibegun to hinder the fighting effort,"214 and racial violence 
became a major problem in the combat zone.215
But military justice in Vietnam was apparently blind to 
race. Unlike civilian jails, black and white prisoners were 
represented in equal proportions in military brigs, sentences 
were unaffected by race, and there was no evidence of 
institutional racism in disciplinary enforcement.216
On 13 August, seven weeks after Boyd's acquittal, the 
United States opened its case against Green who, like Boyd, 
was charged with sixteen counts of unpremeditated murder. 
Once again the military judge was Lieutenant Colonel St.Amour 
— the now-stronger case for his disqualification or recusal 
notwithstanding. The prosecution team was the same that had 
already tried the case twice. Like Schwarz, Green had 
unsuccessfully attempted to retain a civilian lawyer217 and 
instead went to trial represented by twenty-eight year-old 
Marine Captain John J. Hargrove. Green requested a members 
panel that included enlisted members and his case was heard 
by two lieutenant colonels, a major, and two first sergeants. 
Although none of the five had served in an infantry unit in 
Vietnam,218 three were on second tours of Vietnam duty.219
Like many trial records of that era, the verbatim record 
of Green's court-martial has been lost. It is possible to 
discern the trial events, however, through interview of his 
defense counsel and study of the appellate opinion and 
briefs.
214Ibid., 37.
215For details of racial violence including murders, fraggings, and intramural 
firefights see, Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam. 110-11; 127-31; 134- 
38; 193-96.
216Perry, Racial Discrimination and Military Justice. 75, 82-83.
217Son Thang daily report #12.
218James H. Webb, "The Sad Conviction of Sam Green," 26 Res Ipsa Loquitur 11. 18 
(Winter 1974).
219U.S. v Samuel G. Green, Jr., 11.
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Defense counsel Hargrove* initially moved for a change 
of venue, based upon prejudicial pretrial publicity. The 
jurors were voir dired and all acknowledged having read or 
heard about the case. Armed Services Vietnam radio station 
records, and newspaper clips, were offered in support of the 
motion, which was nevertheless denied.220
The government was now wary of its own witness* s 
testimony after Krichten essentially aided in gaining Boyd's 
acquittal. The prosecution proceeded against Green not on 
the theory that he had personally killed any particular 
victim, but that he was guilty of murder as a principal by 
virtue of having aided and abetted those who actually shot 
the victims.221 "He was pretty much a principal," defense 
counsel Hargrove later conceded. "He was out there and he 
was part of the whole situation."222 Over defense objection, 
the nine color photos of the victims were admitted into 
evidence. Again, Krichten testified that he didn't see Green 
shoot any particular victim, although he did observe him fire 
at them.223 Presumably the battalion operations officer was 
called to testify as to Green's response when he challenged 
his, Green's, initial assertions of enemy fire: "What do I 
care about a gook woman or child," Green had said. "It's 
them or me. If they get in my way, that's too bad."224
The defense was similar to that which had succeeded in 
the Boyd trial: put the government to its proof, bolstered by 
stressing Green's youth — eighteen — his newness to the 
Marine Corps — less than six months at the time of the 
killings — his short time in Vietnam — ten days — and that
* Hargrove has gone on to a distinguished career as a federal judge.
220U.S. v Green, 14.
221Ibid., 5.
222John J. Hargrove, Interview by author, 29 Aug. 1991, London-California, tape 
recording, author's collection.
223U.S. v Green, 11, 12.
224Record of pretrial investigation, 232.
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the Son Thang patrol was the first in which he had 
participated. Hargrove recalled:
Herrod and Schwarz were really the primary actors....I 
just tried to highlight the actions of the other guys; 
keep Green in the background. He was there, but we 
weren't sure what he did... .Krichten helped out when he 
said, "I really didn't see Green shoot anybody. I 
can't say that I saw Green point his weapon and fire 
and someone fell." But he did say that Green did
shoot ,226
Hargrove urged that combat neophyte Green believed Herrod's 
orders to fire on the victims were lawful.226 Judge St.Amour 
notes that while Green may have honestly believed Herrod1s 
orders to be legal, that is legally insufficient. "There is 
a pivotal and crucial difference," St.Amour points out, 
"between 'honest belief' and 'reasonable belief."'227
Lieutenant Colonel Cooper again testified for the 
defense that, in his experience, he never recalled a Marine 
receiving instruction on when not to obey an order; Marines, 
he said, are taught to always obey orders.228 Like Schwarz, 
Green opted to ignore available testimonial evidence that 
machine gun fire had been heard in the Son Thang area while 
the patrol was there.229
After both sides rested there were no specially 
requested defense instructions. Even after twice being 
queried by the military judge on the specific point — a broad 
hint that a trial lawyer should heed — the defense 
specifically declined to request an instruction on accomplice 
testimony.230 Such an instruction would have warned the 
members to accept Krichten's testimony, the government's 
principal proof, only with great caution. That instruction's 
absence would be later noted, to Green's legal detriment.
225Hargrove interview.
226 U.S. v Green, 5, 8.
227St.Amour, to author, 4 March 1991.
228Webb, "The Sad Conviction of Sam Green," 16.
229Garrison, to author, 22 Aug. 1988.
230U.S. v Green, 12, 17.
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Green was convicted of fifteen of the sixteen counts, 
acquitted of the count concerning which testimony indicated 
Herrod and Schwarz, alone, had killed a woman.231 Apparently 
giving Green the benefit of his youth and inexperience in 
their sentence, the members sentenced him to reduction to 
private, loss of all pay, a dishonorable discharge, and 
confinement at hard labor for only five years. There are no 
sentence guidelines or mandatory minimum sentencing statutes 
in military law,232 and laymen are often hard put to fashion 
appropriate sentences.233 Unlike British military procedure, 
the U.S. military judge (judge advocate, in British practice) 
does not advise the members on the appropriate level of 
sentence.234
Now, only the patrol leader remained to be tried.
5.3.d. The United States v Pvt. Randell D. Herrod Death had 
been excluded as a possible punishment when the convening 
authority referred Herrod1s case to trial as non-capital. He 
stood accused of sixteen counts of premeditated murder.
Herrod, a six-foot, four-inch tall, twenty-one-year- 
old, 235 was defended by civilian attorneys Gene Stipe and 
Denzil D. Garrison, both state senators from Herrod*s home, 
Oklahoma, where public interest in the case was high.* 
Garrison had served in Korea with Herrod*s uncle and 
responded to the uncle's request for assistance, bringing 
Stipe, an experienced trial lawyer, into the case. " [We] 
received no fee for our services.... [and] spent a
231Ibid., 4.
232James K. Gardner, "Apples and Oranges: A Comparison of Civilian and Military Trial 
Courts," 38 Federal Bar News and J. 192, 197 (May 1991).
233Robert D. Byers, "The Court-Martial As A Sentencing Agency: Milestone or 
Millstone," 41 Military L. Rev. 81, 84 (1968).
234Rowe, Defence. 21.
235Ben Bradlee, Jr., Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North (NY: Donald I. 
Fine, 1988), 87.
* 160,000 Oklahomans petitioned the Marine Corps to release the "unjustly confined" 
Son Thang accused. Lewy, America in Vietnam. 356.
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considerable amount of our own money on the trial...," 
Garrison recalled.236 Stipe and Garrison also brought two 
other civilian lawyers to DaNang to act as research and trial 
assistants. Herrod's military lawyer would also assist in 
the defense, as would other Marine defense lawyers in the 
SJA's office237 — the latter in an unofficial capacity. In a 
tactically sound maneuver, Stipe, the lead counsel, had 
previously delayed Herrod's trial date, pleading an inability 
to prepare before July.238 In the meantime, he became familiar 
with the government's case, having seen it presented at least 
once.
Herrod's court-martial began on 20 August. For the most 
significant of the Son Thang trials there was a new 
prosecution team: Marine Captains Charles E. Brown and Gary 
E. Bushell, both twenty-eight-years-old and practicing 
lawyers for three years, and Captain James L. Skiles, twenty- 
seven, with two years experience.239 Captain Jevne, lead 
prosecutor in the three previous Son Thang trials had 
returned to the United States, his tour of Vietnam duty 
having ended.240
There would be a new military judge, as well. On the 
eve of trial and before his Vietnam tour of duty was 
scheduled to end, Lieutenant Colonel St.Amour was 
unexpectedly transferred. He believes his relocation was 
directly related to official dissatisfaction with his 
performance in the Son Thang cases, which suggests his recent 
acquittal of Boyd. "And if you really want to stir up the 
muck," St.Amour suggests, "ask Faw [Brigadier General Duane 
L. Faw, Director of the Judge Advocate Division at that time, 
overseeing all Marine lawyers] whether or not my transfer to 
Japan was in any way related to the pending Herrod
236Garrison, to author, 22 Aug. 1988.
237Lt.Col. Paul J. Laveroni, South Carolina, to author, Wash., 1 Oct. 1987.
238Son Thang daily report #26.
239USMC, Combined Lineal List. 1971. 84, 87.
240Charles E. Brown, Ohio, to author, London, 13 Nov. 1991.
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trial..."241 Asked about St.Amour's implication, and the 
appearance of having manipulated judging assignments, General 
Faw diplomatically responds: "He was simply out of place as a 
military judge in a combat environment and I moved him to 
where both he and the military could be better served by his 
talents."242 Defense counsel Stipe took another, not 
unreasonable, view: "We had cause to be concerned about
command influence, because the general had just fired the 
judge and run his butt plumb out of the country!"243 Military 
judges lack tenure, however, permitting their reassignment 
for virtually any reason, contrary as that may be to an 
independent judiciary.244 Whether or not there was an improper 
manipulation of judicial assignments the new military judge 
was Navy Commander Keith B. Lawrence. Marine Corps cases 
were usually tried by Marine Corps judges, but the sister 
services did occasionally provide judges and counsel for each 
other's cases, and Commander Lawrence had previously heard a 
number of Marine cases. As allowed by the Manual For Courts - 
Martial,245 Stipe rigorously examined the new military judge 
in an effort to determine and ensure his fairness. .^ ''JThe Code 
has got a provision that enables you to voir dire the judge; 
it's a hell of a tool," Stipe said. "We don't have anything 
similar to that in civilian practice.... I spent three days, I 
think, voir dire-ing this one."246
From the outset the Herrod defense was clearly going to 
be aggressively pressed home. Pretrial motions were 
numerous, each supported by witnesses and legal authority. 
There were motions for a new pretrial investigation (denied), 
a change of venue (denied), production of service records and
241Lt.CoL Paul A.A. StAmour, Maine, to author, London, 14 Feb. 1991.
242BGen. Duane L. Faw, California, to author, London, 13 July 1991.
243Gene Stipe, interview by author, 14 Dec. 1990, Virginia-Oklahoma, tape recording, 
author's collection.
244Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vol. I, 555.
245Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 62b.
246Stipe interview.
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billeting assignments of those involved in the case (records 
denied/billeting granted), production of all messages 
mentioning the case, including classified messages (granted), 
suppression of the nine photographs (granted — a significant 
defense victory), release of Herrod from confinement 
(denied), "relief from all of the other oppressive procedures 
of the UCMJ" (denied) , for the Marine Corps to hire and pay 
for attendance of a civilian psychiatrist (granted), for an 
all-enlisted panel (denied), and numerous other motions, the 
disposal of which took five days.247
Late on 24 August the government opened it's case-in­
chief before a panel of one colonel, four majors and a 
captain. Less than eight in-court hours later the government 
rested.
Presentation of the defense case took three days. 
Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, who had completed his Vietnam duty 
and returned to the U.S., returned to Vietnam to testify in 
Herrod's behalf.248 Stipe also presented and stressed evidence 
of an American machine gun having been re-captured from the 
VC in the Son Thang area, after the incident. He augmented 
that evidence with the testimony of those who had heard 
machine gun fire while Herrod's patrol was in Son Thang, 
buttressing the defense contention that the killer team had 
been returning enemy fire and the victims were killed in 
crossfires. "...A very important facet of evidence," said co­
defense counsel Garrison. "Schwarz and Green did not have 
that testimony to corroborate their story."249 Unaware of the 
machine gun evidence, Major Theer, the battalion operations 
officer and a prosecution witness, never rebutted it by 
explaining that the machine gun had actually been re-captured 
fifteen miles southwest of Son Thang.250 The prosecution, 
unaware of the machine gun's existence until raised by the
247Summarized record of trial, U.S. v Randell D. Herrod.
248Cooper, to author, 12 Sept. 1988.
249Garrison, to author, 22 Aug. 1988.
250Theer, to author, 24 Feb. 1989.
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defense, did not contest or inquire into the place of its 
recapture.
First Lieutenant Oliver L. North, who was to gain 
notoriety as a lieutenant colonel seventeen years later, was 
a defense witness. He paid his own way from the U.S. east 
coast to DaNang to testify in behalf of Herrod, who had saved 
his life in combat thirteen months before, earning the Silver 
Star Medal in the process. "I couldn't believe Randy was 
guilty," North wrote. "[0]nly a coward would murder unarmed 
civilians, and Randy Herrod was certainly no coward."251
Finally Herrod, "a true liar," in the opinion of 
Lieutenant Colonel St.Amour,252 took the stand. He repeated 
that the victims had been killed in crossfires between his 
team and the enemy. He told the members: "I do not now, and 
I did not then, feel that I had killed anyone it wasn't 
necessary to kill."253
Defense counsel Stipe was later asked if his defense 
theory included obedience to a superior's — Ambort's — 
orders. He laughed and replied:
I wouldn't describe our defense as one of superior 
orders....We did throw it in there, just for the jury to 
consider. You never know what a jury sinks their hooks 
in, to justify their acquittal....We had a defense with a
lot of options for the jury...
Asked if he had considered the law of war in formulating the 
defense strategy, Stipe replied: "We never did frame it in 
the context of a violation of the Geneva Convention. First 
of all, because we had a more immediate problem: it was our 
government that we were having to tangle with. They were the 
problem! ',255
The court-martial lasted twelve days. Before resting, 
the defense made several motions for mistrial based upon
25101iver L. North, Under Fire (NY: Harper Collins, 1991), 122.
252Lt.Col. Paul A. A. St Amour, Maine, to author, London, 22 May 1991.
253Bradlee, Guts and Glory. 92.
254Stipe interview.
255Ibid.
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purported prosecutorial misconduct, as well as renewing 
motions previously denied, motions to dismiss, and • for 
acquittal based upon Herrod1s asserted but unsupported lack 
of mental responsibility. All were denied by the military 
judge.256
After closing arguments, the members were instructed and 
retired to deliberate. Upon returning they announced their 
findings: as to all charges, not guilty. "We walked the 
patrol leader," Garrison said, seemingly amazed.257
The officer who conducted the Son Thang pretrial 
investigation opined that the acquittal was based upon 
Herrod's Silver Star Medal, the "mere gook rule,1,258 and the 
judge's exclusion of the photographs of the victims.259 
Lieutenant Colonel St.Amour uncharitably said of the verdict, 
"The best defense in a court-martial has always been a weak 
trial counsel along with an inadequate military judge."260 
The military judge himself described the acquittal as one of 
"public policy."261
The court was simply not willing to convict a young 
corporal (sic)....There was an element of self-defense, 
but I did not feel it was a strong element.. .because it 
lacked reasonableness....in summary, there was adequate 
evidence of guilt to have supported a conviction, but the 
court concluded that to convict would result in an
injustice.262
Trial lawyers seldom ask jurors upon what facts they based 
their verdicts, for their answers are often disturbingly 
unrelated to the evidence. Nevertheless, upon being asked, a 
surviving Herrod juror,* either not recalling or not
256Summarized record of trial, U.S. v Herrod.
257Robert Timberg, "The Private War of Ollie and Jim," Esquire. March 1988, 144, 
152.
258Col. Robert J. Blum, North Carolina, to author, Wash., n.d.
259Col. Robert J. Blum, North Carolina, to author, Wash., 20 Feb. 1989.
260St.Amour, to author, 14 Feb. 1991.
261Capt. Keith D. Lawrence, Pennsylvania, to author, London, 19 March 1991.
262Ibid.
* By 1989, three of the six jurors had died.
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appreciating the distinction between honest belief and 
reasonable belief, said:
Personally, I remember waiting, when the prosecution 
rested, for the defense counsel to move for a directed 
verdict of not guilty. I simply did not see where a 
crime had been committed....the prosecution had failed to 
show any deliberate act of unprovoked killing and had 
been unable to overcome defense testimony that Herrod and 
his team truly believed themselves to be under hostile 
attack....Herrod's civilian lawyers did a brilliant
j ob. 263
Another juror related that "the defense regarding the machine 
gun fire the patrol was subjected to was probably the most 
persuasive fact in the verdict....The prosecution did not 
contest the MG fire."264 But a third juror had a contrary 
recollection of the case:
There was certainly enough evidence to convict....My 
impression was that he was certainly guilty. He had a 
good defense and they had succeeded in discrediting some 
of the witnesses...and creating some reasonable doubt in 
the minds of some of the more senior members of the
court.265
Under the UCMJ, conviction requires only a two-thirds 
majority vote of the members. Their initial vote was three 
for conviction, three for acquittal. As they then considered 
the lesser included offenses, the vote swung not toward 
conviction of a lesser offense, as one might expect, but 
toward acquittal.266 After three hours' deliberation they 
reached their 'not guilty' verdict.
Herrod was immediately released from confinement. In a 
muted ceremony he was presented the Silver Star Medal, award 
of which had been delayed pending the outcome of his trial. 
A few days later he was returned to the U.S. and discharged
263Maj. David W. Hardiman, Oregon, to author, London, 20 June 1991.
264Maj. Albert G. Borlan, California, to author, London, 24 June 1991.
265Lt.Col. John J. McDermott, interview by author, 17 Dec. 1990, Virginia-Califomia, 
tape recording, author's collection.
266Borlan, to author, 24 June 1991.
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from the Marine Corps, his enlistment having expired while 
his charges were pending.267
On 30 August 197 0, the Son Thang courts-martial were 
concluded. Whether or not justice had been fully served, the 
1949 Geneva Conventions had been complied with. The U.S., 
upon learning of a grave breach of the Conventions had 
identified those responsible, utilized already-enacted 
municipal legislation to bring them to trial, and imposed 
penal sanctions upon those convicted.
Do the court-martial results contradict an assertion 
that American courts-martial were the effective workings of 
the law of war? They do not. Unlike the post-World War I 
Leipzig trials, the Son Thang courts-martial were in no way 
show trials. As demonstrated by the Schwarz verdict and 
sentence, each trial held the genuine potential of findings 
of guilt and imposition of substantial penalties. The fact 
that two of the four courts resulted in acquittal, rather 
than indicating official connivance or juridical charade, 
reflects the unpredictable course of particular cases in the 
common law system; the negligible sentence of the Green case 
reflects the vagaries of the lay jury which, in U.S. military 
practice, imposes sentence as well as determining guilt or 
innocence. While one might hope for uniformity of outcome 
and sentence, they cannot be ordered, even in courts-martial. 
The best one may expect are fair trials with vigorous 
representation on both sides, results occurring as they may. 
So it was in the Son Thang trials.
The men involved in the process made little of their law 
of war roles but played their parts effectively. The U.S. 
Uniform Code of Military Justice fulfilled its international 
law function with equal effectiveness, its criminal sanctions
267Col. Peter N. Kress, Virginia, to author, Wash., 24 Jan. 1989, Marines and Military 
Law in Vietnam collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.; and Washington Post 
(Wash.), 23 Dec. 1986.
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timely brought to bear in the combat zone. Quod erat 
demons trandum.
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CHAPTER 6. POST-TRIAL ISSUES AND APPELLATE 
RESOLUTIONS
History keeps her secrets longer than most of us. But sh e  has one secret that I will 
reveal to you... Som etimes there are no winners at all.
John le Carr§, The Secret Pilgrim
Press coverage of the Son Thang murders ended with the 
final court-martial, but the cases were not concluded. In 
many respects the UCMJ grants convicted service personnel 
broader appellate rights than those convicted in civilian 
jurisdictions. The Son Thang trials and their verdicts had 
raised basic questions about the effectiveness of courts- 
martial in trying war crimes committed by one's own troops. 
Some of those questions were answered in the appellate 
opinions.
This chapter also addresses those questions by briefly 
reviewing the tactics employed in the courts-martial, 
examining them for law of war issues.
If, as some contend, courts-martial and the military 
appellate system are inappropriate for the trial of war 
crimes, what is an appropriate forum? Historigal efforts to 
establish an international criminal court where war crimes 
might otherwise be tried are surveyed and the efficacy of 
establishing such a court examined.
If courts-martial are appropriate for the trial of war 
crimes, the resulting sentences should reflect the 
seriousness of the offenses. The punishments imposed for war 
crimes committed in Vietnam raise questions in that regard. 
The issue of sentences, and whether the Son Thang sanctions 
met the purposes and goals of criminal sentencing, are 
examined and compared to sentences imposed for similar 
offenses in other jurisdictions, military and civilian.
Military appellate rights and the appellate process, 
circa 197 0, are examined. The appellate outcomes of the Son 
Thang cases are detailed, including one which did not reach
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the appellate stage because it did not go to trial: that of 
Lieutenant Ambort, whose case may have fallen short of 
international law's mandate to prosecute war crimes.
Only when the last Son Thang appeal was decided were the 
courts-martial concluded, and even after that there were 
echoes still to be heard.
6.1. The Son Thang Trials Redux
A lesson learned from the Son Thang cases is that trial- 
experienced judge advocates, familiar with the law of war, 
are best-suited to try war crimes charges. Review of the Son 
Thang proceedings illustrates that more effective 
prosecutions — and defenses — might have resulted could that 
lesson have been observed.
6.1.a. Judge Advocates in the Combat Zone No contested 
trial unfolds as planned. One may question the Son Thang 
lawyers' tactics, but judicial rulings and the evidence 
appear to have decided, as they should have, three of the 
four cases.
If the Marine Corps judge advocates had a shared 
shortcoming, it was one beyond their remedy: a lack of trial 
experience. "They are usually fresh out of law school, and 
assigned to the courtroom for one or two years before being 
rotated to their next assignment."1 Any advocate in a 
contested, multiple murder trial, only a year or two from 
law school, might have been overwhelmed. As the 1st Marine 
Division's Staff Judge Advocate said, "They were not real 
experienced lawyers, there's no doubt about that....But they 
were getting experience in a hurry..."2 Finally, they did 
creditable, professional work, even if it involved a degree 
of on-the-job training.
Gardner, "Apples and Oranges: A Comparison of Civilian and Military Trial Courts," 
197.
2Lucy interview, 22 June 1991.
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While subject to rocket assaults and sapper attacks, 
with meager law libraries and technical support, and few 
seasoned lawyers to turn to for advice, they conducted major 
contested trials as if in a civilian forum. But reflecting 
their training and experience, they appear to have been 
- insufficiently mindful of the law of war issues and defenses 
available in such cases.
6.1.b. Trial Tactics and Fact Finders1 Choices in defending 
Schwarz, Captain LeGear heard the testimony of numerous 
witnesses at the pretrial investigation describe hearing 
machine gun fire in the area of Son Thang. If correct, such 
fire could only have come from the enemy, buttressing 
Schwarz1 in-court assertion that the victims were killed in a 
crossfire when he and the other Marines returned fire. But 
at trial LeGear did not raise the matter of machine gun fire. 
Without that testimony his central argument that Schwarz was 
returning enemy fire pursuant to Herrod's orders lacked 
essential substantiating evidence.
There was little that LeGear could do to counter 
Krichten's immunized eyewitness testimony that there had been 
no enemy fire and that Schwarz had fired on the victims. 
Schwarz' own written statement to the same effect confirmed 
the government's witness. LeGear argued well but in vain to 
keep that damning statement from the members. The judge's 
ruling admitting the statement might as easily have been 
decided otherwise, had he considered it coerced by Lieutenant 
Ambort's exhortation to admit all. The record of trial shows 
it to have been a close issue.
Nor could prosecutorial experience have countered 
Krichten's unexpectedly pro-defense testimony in the Boyd 
trial that the accused, Krichten's squadmate in combat for 
seven months, had fired over, but not at, the victims. If 
the military judge discounted Krichten's assertion and still 
was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of Boyd's guilt, 
as the judge has since confirmed, one suspects that nothing
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would have convinced him. Boyd's written statement3 was no 
less damning than Schwarz' and the evidence convicting 
Schwarz, presented by the same prosecutors, was no different 
than in Boyd's trial. Nor does the civilian defense 
counsel's in-court argument that Boyd was actually a 
pacifist, opposed to the taking of life,4 seem overwhelmingly 
persuasive. Again, the judge might just have easily found 
Boyd guilty. Or might Schwarz, too, have been acquitted, had 
he been tried by military judge alone?
Green's defense was that of putting the government to 
its proof, a legitimate, if passive, tactic. Defense counsel 
Captain Hargrove, like Captain LeGear, made no mention of the 
several witnesses who heard machine gun fire emanating from 
Son Thang. At least the government had no self-inculpatory 
written statement with which to bludgeon Green. Hargrove had 
Green's inexperience as a Marine and combat veteran to argue. 
If the defense was ineffective in influencing the jurors, it 
apparently was telling in affecting their formulation of 
Green's sentence to five years confinement for the murder of 
fifteen women and children.
The trial of Herrod remains the most intriguing of the 
four. The prosecution team in the first three courts-martial 
was disbanded shortly before Herrod's trial, the lead 
prosecutor no longer involved. The Marine Corps judge was 
unexpectedly replaced by a Navy judge whose ruling on a key 
issue — photo admissibility — may have reflected a different 
evidentiary orientation. A five-lawyer civilian team, led by 
experienced trial lawyers, defended the accused. Herrod 
aided his cause by maintaining his innocence from 
apprehension to trial, consistently adhering to a plausible 
account, unshaken by admissions and accusations of his co- 
accused. An articulate high school graduate, Herrod was a 
good witness in his own defense, as well.
3Pretrial investigation exhibit 38.
4Trockman, to author, 17 April 1991.
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Until recent years, the practice of law in military 
courtrooms has, for the most part, been free of motions, 
other than to exclude evidence. The few other motions were 
invariably presented orally. That was the case in 1970, in 
Vietnam, where no Marine judge advocate had secretary, clerk, 
or copy machine. The sixteen written pretrial motions 
entered by Herrod's civilian defense team, its three motions 
during trial, and five motions for mistrial, would have 
distracted a prosecution unused to such a paper flurry.
In the final analysis, the more experienced Herrod 
defense lawyers simply presented the more persuasive case to 
the finders of fact.
6.1.c. Law of War and the Son Thang Trials The chief of 
the U.S. Army's International Law Branch points out that "the 
average judge advocate, regardless of service, has a very 
inadequate knowledge of the law of war, particularly for 
trial purposes....[T]he average civilian attorney has even 
less..."5
What defenses may be raised in a U.S. court-martial 
trying offenses that sound in international law and the 
customary law of war? Because grave breaches are charged as 
ordinary UCMJ offenses are defense counsel limited to those 
special defenses usual to U.S. military law,6 or may law of 
war defenses be employed, as well?
In discussing the Nuremberg Tribunals, the U.S. manual 
on international law recites the general affirmative defenses 
to war crime charges: insanity, self-defense, mistake of
fact, self-defense, mistake of fact, ignorance of the law,
5W. Hays Parks, interview by author, 12 Dec. 1990, the Pentagon, tape recording, 
author's collection.
6"Special defenses, sometimes called affirmative defenses, are those which, although not 
denying that the objective acts charged were committed by the accused, do deny, either 
wholly or partially, criminal responsibility for those acts." Manual for Courts- 
Martial. 1969. par. 214. Unlike general defenses applicable to common-law or 
statutory crimes, special defenses apply to individual offenses, are usually statutory in 
origin, and usually place a burden of proof on the defendant to show that he acted 
reasonably.
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duress, "and the like."7 The manual then cites as war crime 
special defenses: military necessity, obsoleteness of the 
law, acts done in accordance with municipal law, acts done in 
an official capacity, reprisal, and superior orders.8 
Although several of the special defenses may be considered no 
longer viable — military necessity, act of state, acts in 
accordance with municipal law — or inapplicable to 
battlefield war crimes — obsoleteness of the law and, 
probably, reprisal — the manual makes no statement as to the 
applicability of the listed special defenses in court-martial 
war crimes adjudication. What, then, is the U.S. position as 
to available defenses at court-martial?
As is often the case in American military jurisprudence, 
English military law suggests guidance: "One consequence of 
formulating English law in terms of international law is that 
the latter may itself provide a defence..."9 U.S. military 
law, incorporating customary law of war in formulating its 
prohibitions, similarly allows for law of war's concomitant 
international law defenses.
Indicative of that position, U.S. military courts apply 
defenses provided for in treaties that are not found in 
military law.10 Courts-martial both explicitly and implicitly 
give application to defenses not ackiiowledged in the Manual 
for Courts -Martial.11 In the Vietnam-era case of Levy v 
Resor,12 for example, the military judge sua sponte solicited 
evidence on what was there referred to as the "Nuremberg 
defense" — the charge that U.S. Green Berets were committing 
war crimes in Vietnam and the government could not place a 
soldier (the accused, Levy) against his will in substantial
7Dept. of the Army, International Law, vol. II, 245.
8Ibid., 246-51.
9Rowe, "Murder and the Law of War," 223.
10(/.Sr. v Carter, 36 CMR 433 (USCMA, 1966) (Quinn, J. concurring.)
^Eugene R. Milhizer, "Necessity and the Military Justice System: A Proposed Special 
Defense," 121 Military L. Rev. 95, 97, 103, (1988).
1237 CMR 399. The appellate opinion solely considers the issue of bail in military law, 
foregoing discussion of the dismissed "Nuremberg defense."
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jeopardy of being implicated in such crimes. That defense 
was rejected but "the case does stand for the important 
precedent that a war-crimes defense is available, in relevant 
circumstances ..."13
In a recent opinion, the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Military Appeals applied an until-then novel defense, noting 
support for the defense by commentators, and its employment 
in other court systems. "With all this in mind," he wrote, 
that defense "must be recognized in military justice."14 No 
less may be said of law of war defenses.
Even without that appellate holding, and without Levy v 
Resor, the Nuremberg Charter, the Far East IMT, and the Royal 
Warrant of 14 June 1945 under which British military courts 
tried lesser Nuremberg cases, are precedent for the judicial 
relaxation of technical rules in war crimes cases.
If international law defenses were to be explicitly 
recognized in military law it would merely require a new 
Manual subparagraph setting forth those defenses or, more 
likely, adoption of them by judicial decision.15 To provide 
for members' consideration of special defenses on findings, 
model instructions would be added to the Military Judges' 
Benchbook,16 as well.
In addition to law of war defenses, explicitly 
recognized or not, any affirmative general defense provided 
in military law would continue to apply. "In broad terms, an 
accused may be said to have a defense when it appears that he 
should not be held legally responsible for the crime 
charged,"17 and he cannot be denied every opportunity to
13Anthony A. D'Amato, Harvey L. Gould, and Larry D. Woods, "War Crimes and Vietnam: 
The 'Nuremberg Defense1 and the Military Service Resister," 57 California L. Rev. 
1055, 1056 (1969).
1417.S’, v Byrd, 24 MJ 286, 292-93 (USCMA, 1987).
15Milhizer, "Necessity and the Military Justice System," 118.
16Dept. of the Army, Pam. 27-9 (Wash.: GPO, 1982), Chapter 5, Special and Other 
Defenses.
17Edward M. Byrne, Military Law. 3d ed. (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 
1 2 1 .
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present evidence to negate the existence of every element of 
the offense.18
Finally, the employment of international law defenses 
does not raise an issue of potentially inconsistent or 
antithetical defenses. Customary international law applies 
except where there are conflicting treaties, statutes, or 
constitutional provisions.19 The UCMJ is federal statutory law 
against which, therefore, conflicting international law 
defenses would fail. Similarly, the Manual for Courts - 
Martial, wherein military defenses are listed, has the force 
of law.20 The Manual's listing is neither exclusive nor 
exhaustive, and admits other defenses, including 
international law defenses not conflicting with treaties, 
statutes, or constitutional provisions. As long as defenses 
are consistent at trial no problem is presented.
Professor Wigmore points out that "courts-martial...have 
always been allowed to pursue a more liberal course...than 
do, habitually, the civil tribunals."21 That liberality is 
reflected in the long-standing employment of international 
law defenses in U.S. courts-martial, despite their lack of 
explicit mention in the Manual for Courts-Martial.
Had the lawyers trying the Son Thang cases, civilian and 
military, been more familiar with the law of war there were 
related issues they might have raised. The defense of 
duress, particularly, could have been asserted by Schwarz, 
Boyd, and Green. Faced by their leader, Herrod, brandishing 
a loaded grenade launcher and pistol while forcefully and 
repeatedly commanding obedience to his orders, subordinates
18 U.S. v Huff, 22 CMR 37 (USCMA, 1956).
19Farmer v Roundtree, 149 F.Supp. 327 (D.C. Tenn., 1953), cert. den. 357 U.S. 906.
20Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vol. I, 27. This force of law is raised 
by Art. 36 of the Code, wherein Congress grants the President, by whose order the 
Manual is published, authority to prescribe court-martial procedure and modes of 
proof.
21Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence. 3d ed., vol. I, 100.
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might reasonably have argued that they feared for their lives 
had they not obeyed.
The defense of reprisal might have been raised, as well 
— although that defense requires the proponent to admit 
having intentionally fired on the victims. While the 
patrol's actions did not comport with the law of war's 
strictures regarding reprisals, "the killing of reprisal 
victims or hostages in order to guarantee the peaceful 
conduct in the future of the populations of occupied 
territories was legal [according to some Nuremberg 
decisions] .1,22 Might not the entire patrol have asserted their 
actions to have been taken with such considerations in mind? 
Shortly before the patrol, a member of their company was 
killed by an explosive device set by guerrillas local to Son 
Thang. The efficacy of a reprisal defense is questionable in 
this instance, but it was a colorable issue that might 
reasonably have been presented for the fact finders' 
consideration.
Related to, but distinct from, the defense of superior 
orders is the argument that combat soldiers, having been 
trained and accustomed to follow orders without question lack 
the mens rea necessary for conviction of a battlefield 
criminal act. Linked to the absence of mens rea is the 
defense peculiar to 197 0 U.S. military law, partial mental 
responsibility. (See section 4.2.c.) But like duress and 
reprisal, mens rea and mental responsibility issues were 
unexplored.
6.1.d. The Military Jury in A Combat Zone An American law 
review article critical of Green's conviction* asserts that 
combat-related charges should be decided only by combat- 
experienced jurors:
Combat is a unique experience....To understand the
reactions of a person in Green's situation, a trier of
22U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV, 178.
* The only discussion of the Son Thang case in a law-oriented journal.
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fact should have some understanding of the immense 
difficulties and frustrations inherent in small-unit 
infantry operations. ...The composition of the court at
Green’s trial was clearly prejudicial to his case.23 
Oliver North, self-styled seeker of justice, writes that he 
warned Herrod's civilian lawyers: "I urged them to object to 
anyone assigned to the court...who wasn't a combat officer or 
NCO, because only men who had served in combat could 
appreciate the pressures that Herrod must have been under."24
General P.X. Kelley, an infantryman, Vietnam combat 
veteran, and former Commandant of the Marine Corps (1983-87), 
agrees: "Combat is a very different, very stressful, very
trying, very emotional period, and you have to have people 
[on juries] who can weigh all of that..."25 Professor L.C. 
Green adds:
It may even be questioned whether a military code, manual 
or directions to courts-martial drafted by lawyers...who 
carry military ranks merely because they serve in the 
Judge Advocate’s.. .Departments, but who have no idea of 
the realities of service life particularly in action, are 
the proper persons to be responsible for preparing these
regulations..,25
Such a criterion for war crimes fact-finders, however, would 
have excluded most of the Nuremberg and Far East tribunal 
judges, several Calley jurors, and most of the Vietnam War's 
military judges. Combat is a unique and emotional 
experience, but such a viewpoint suggests that its effects 
cannot be appreciated by any except those who experience it 
firsthand as infantrymen.
More than 448,000 Marines served in Vietnam. Far fewer, 
although in the combat zone, actually saw combat — one study 
asserts that no more than seventy-one percent of all Vietnam 
veterans saw any combat at all.27 Combat itself may be defined
23Webb, "The Sad Conviction of Sam Green," 18. Webb is a Marine infantry veteran of 
Vietnam.
24North, Under Fire. 123.
25Kelley interview, 12 Dec. 1990.
26Green, "Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man," 101.
27Randy Martin, "Who Went to War," in Ghislaine Boulanger and Charles Kadushin, eds., 
The Vietnam Veteran Redefined (London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986), 18.
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on a sliding scale. At what point on such a scale would one 
merit "war crime juror" status?
In fact, the officers and enlisted men who decided the 
Son Thang cases were as random, as much the peers of the 
accused, as any civilian jury is of a civilian accused. One 
need not be a business executive to be a fair juror in a 
white collar crime case, nor a police constable to decide a 
charge of excessive force in an arrest. To require only 
combat-experienced fact finders in war crimes cases injects 
elements not meant for inclusion in the weighing of guilt and 
innocence. A civilian judge on the U.S. Court of Military 
Appeals makes the point that "there are certain biases and 
prejudices in favor of letting the war criminal go, if you 
try him in the battle zone...."28 Better to let the member 
selection system, evolved over many years, function in war 
crimes cases as in any other. Complaints will persist, but 
"the traditional jury has never given complete satisfaction 
anywhere."29 Combat zone juries are no exception, but neither 
do they require special qualifications not imposed by the 
UCMJ.
6.2 International Legal Obligations
Municipal law provides for the enforcement and punishment of 
law of war violations. Customary international law allows 
nations to try their own soldiers before its military courts. 
If, under that scheme, the Son Thang trial results leave one 
dissatisfied, where else might those accused have been tried? 
An international criminal court does not exist, though not 
for lack of international interest and effort.
6.2.a. International Criminal Law and its Forum is there 
an international criminal law? Most authorities aver that
28Cox interview, 7 Dec. 1990.
29Morris Ploscowe, "The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe 
and America," 48 Harvard L. Rev. 433, 472 (1935).
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there is, "recognized by many different countries and self- 
contained legal systems..."30 Others hold that "despite all 
the talk...the prospects of anything real or similar to a 
criminal code of the kind that exists within a nation are 
minimal."31 Clearly there does exist an international law of 
war. But international criminal law might be described as 
being in a transitional stage, "a twilight zone,"32 still 
evolving from a phase of law between nations to a phase 
involving new forms of cooperation and organization.33
There is a long record of effort to create an 
international criminal law and, concomitantly, a court within 
which it may be applied.34 "The problem of an International 
Criminal Court, in particular with reference to the 
punishment of war crimes, has been an almost continuous 
subject of discussion since the first World War."35
[T]he United States has played an ambivalent role, now 
that of just another national-interest-pursuing state... 
and at other times that of an idealistically inclined 
nation, determined to bring about the legal and 
political ordering of freedom, justice, equality, and 
human dignity."3^
Following World War I, the League of Nations called for 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) to become 
the locus for trials of international crimes and war crimes 
in particular. In 1920 the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 
under the auspices of the League, also proposed that an 
international criminal court be established.37 From 1922 to
30Friedlander, "Problems of Enforcing International Criminal Law," in Bassiouni, 
International Criminal Law, vol. Ill, 13.
31 Green, "Is There An International Criminal Law?", 261.
32Gerhard O.W. Mueller, "International Criminal Law: Civitas Maxima," 15 Case 
Western J. of International L.. 1, 2 (1983).
33Leonard J. Hippchen and Yong S. Yim, Terrorism. International Crime, and Arms 
Control (Illinois: Charles Thomas, 1982), 144.
34For a detailed account of that history see, Ferencz, An International Criminal Court. 
vol. I, 36-46.
35Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," 80.
36Sweeney, The International Legal System: Cases and Materials. 1292.
37Bridge, "The Case For an International Court of Criminal Justice," 1267.
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192 6 the International Law Association prepared a draft 
statute for a criminal chamber of the PCIJ; a draft 
international criminal code was prepared by the Inter­
parliamentary Union, as well.38 In 1928 the International 
Association for Penal Law accepted a similar code, while a 
1937 international conference produced a convention for 
creation of an international criminal court.39 Following the 
Second World War, the U.N. War Crimes Commission called for 
establishment of a continuing international war crimes 
tribunal, separate from the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals.40 
Those efforts yielded no concrete results.
In 1949, the U.N. General Assembly approved, in 
principle, establishment of an international criminal court 
and appointed successive committees in 1951 and 1953 to 
produce a draft statute. But the international Law 
Commission, which oversaw those efforts, admitted to "a 
certain lack of enthusiasm"41 for portions of the task. The 
major states have not actively supported formative efforts 
and, in the words of one delegate, "the hesitancy it [the 
U.N. ] displayed was a confession of impotence.1,42
Despite this "wearisome history,1,43 and the intermittent 
suspension of U.N. efforts,44 promising work continues toward 
establishing both a code of crimes against peace and an 
international criminal court within the United Nations 
system.45
38U.N. International Law Commission, Historical Survey of the Question of International 
Criminal Jurisdiction. 2-4.
39Bridge, "The Case For an International Court of Criminal Justice," 1268.
40U.N., Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction. 4.
41Sir Ian Sinclair, The International Law Commission (Cambridge: Grotius 
Publications, 1987), 56.
42U.N., Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1950. vol. II (NY: U.N., 1957), 
247.
43Best, Nuremberg and After. 13.
44 e.g., G.A. Res. 1187, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, 52, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
45Stephen C. McCaffey, "Current Developments - The Forty-second Session of the 
International Law Commission," 84 AJIL 930 (1990). Also see: M. Cherif Bassiouni, A 
Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International Criminal
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The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals remain the only 
international trials sounding in international criminal law. 
For the foreseeable future, "the likelihood of setting up an 
international criminal court is very remote."46
6.2.b. The Impediment to an International Criminal Law
The comparative success of the International Court of 
Justice, although a civil forum, demonstrates that it is 
possible to devise an international court and an effective 
procedure. Lord Shawcross, chief Nuremberg prosecutor, warns 
that "international law will be a dead letter unless we give 
criminal jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice 
and set up a mechanism for enforcing its judgements."47 Why, 
then, the chronic lack of progress in codifying international 
criminal law and providing for its forum?
Most observers agree that extradition is the key to the 
control of international criminality, but extradition 
often is tied to a political axis. Absent treaty or 
convention, extradition practice depends upon comity and 
reciprocity. This has not proved to be an effective
counter to criminal activity.. . ,48 
Nations are unwilling to surrender jurisdiction over their 
nationals and fear the possible extradition and punishment of 
their own heads of state.49
Most countries deny extradition for military offenses 
such as desertion and draft dodging, though not necessarily 
*for those accused of war crimes.50 That exception is not 
always clear, however.
Tribunal (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) for a recent and excellent international 
criminal law bibliography, and listing of instruments on creation of an international 
criminal court.
46Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. 564.
47Strobe Talbott, "When Monsters Stay Home," Time. 15 April 1991, 24.
48Friedlander, "Problems of Enforcing International Criminal Law," in Bassiouni, 
International Criminal Law, vol. HI, 17. To the same effect: Howard, Restraints on War. 
156; and Ferencz, An International Criminal Court. 44-46, 85-86.
49Green, "Is There an International Criminal Law?", 252. To the same effect: 
Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Tribunal. 5.
50Ibid., 257.
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Even though war criminals are proceeded against under the 
ordinary criminal law of the state the offense may still 
be regarded as political by a state...and such states may 
refuse extradition because of the usual exception of
"political offense" in extradition treaties.5*
With states thus unwilling to give up a portion of their 
sovereign power to a central authority, enforcement of 
international norms has, by default and necessity, reverted 
to municipal legal systems.52
6.2.C. Court-Martial: An Appropriate Forum? The legal 
system employed by the U.S. to enforce law of war norms 
remains, most often, court-martial. Professor Telford 
Taylor, a retired U.S. Army Reserve brigadier general and 
former Nuremberg chief counsel urges, however, that it is a:
...doubtful question...whether an Army general court- 
martial is an appropriate judicial forum...for the trial 
of [battlefield war crime] cases. On the face of things 
the charges are simple enough... but, as has been seen, 
the simplicity is deceptive...5-*
Taylor, who did not practice general military law, and whose
uniformed tenure predates the UCMJ, suggests that trial be by
military commission, instead. He justifies his lack of
confidence in courts-martial by citing potential command
influence in members selection,* the legal complexity of the
ubiquitous superior orders defense, and the political
implications of war crimes prosecutions. It may be argued
that the My Lai prosecution demonstrated that Taylor's first
two concerns are unwarranted. At the trial level, at least,
his final concern also appears questionable. The Son Thang
prosecutions only reinforce that view.
5b r ig h t, "War Criminals," 273.
52Gary Komarow, "Individual Responsibility under International Law: the Nuremburg 
(sic) Principles in Domestic Legal Systems," 29 International and Comparative L. 
Quarterly 20, 22 (1980).
53Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 158. Columbia University Professor Leonard B. 
Boudin agrees with Taylor, in: "War Crimes and Vietnam: The Mote in Whose Eye?", 84 
Harvard L. Rev. 1940, 1944 fn.19 (1971).
* Had he known of the precipitous transfer of Lt.Col St.Amour shortly before he was to 
judge the Herrod trial Taylor probably would have cited command influence in judge 
selection, as well.
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Those more closely and more recently involved in the 
court-martial process reject suggestions that battlefield war 
crimes are beyond the ability of courts-martial to 
effectively litigate and punish. Waldemar Solf, then-Chief 
of the Judge Advocate General's International Affairs 
Division, in comparing courts-martial with the commissions 
urged by Telford Taylor, wrote:
After all, an ordinary court-martial... is hedged in with 
procedural limitations, exclusionary rules of evidence, 
and due process standards. These procedural safeguards 
were deliberately curtailed in the regulations 
established for war crimes military commissions during
and after world war II.54 
Solf's successor, W. Hays Parks, asks, "If you can walk in 
and prove a violation of [UCMJ] Article 118, [murder], with 
its rather simple elements...why complicate things by going 
to a military tribunal or military commission...?"55 The 
Director of the Marine Corps' Judge Advocate Division, 
Brigadier General Michael E. Rich, notes:
We've got to distinguish between law of war on the 
higher level, on the political level, and law of war on 
the battlefield level....Yes, if we'd tried Ho Chi Minh 
or Giap for their law of war violations.. .we wouldn't 
court-martial them. We'd have a Nuremberg-type 
tribunal. But if we want to talk about prosecuting 
[combat personnel] for murder, rape, robbery, assault, 
whatever, you don't need Nuremberg for that. It's just
a regular criminal proceeding..,55 
A military court's suitability to try war crimes may be 
debated, but there is much to recommend its employment and no 
compelling evidence to demonstrate its inferiority.
6.2.d. Law. War Crimes, and Punishment At a high level of 
generality, the criminal law may be viewed as a system of 
norms supported by potential sanctions, concerned with the 
prevention of harms and, ultimately, the security and 
existence of the community. Punishment — sentencing after
54Solf, "A Response to Telford Taylor's 'Nuremberg and Vietnam'," 61.
55Parks interview, 12 Dec. 1990.
56Rich interview, 26 Aug. 1990.
243
conviction — is the threat enforcing the criminal law. On a 
utilitarian level, sanctions provide a motive for obeying the 
law. In a philosophical sense, "the general justifying aim 
of sentencing...of those who break the criminal law is...to 
restore the balance which the offense disturbed.1,57 The 
sentencing process may be viewed as a symbolic expression of 
society's denunciation of the offense and a reaffirmation of 
the law and its values.58
What we have ended up with, then, is a conception of 
punishment as a social practice within a community, 
geared towards the pursuit of (which entails respect for) 
a plurality of the community's central goals and values
...with an importantly symbolic aspect.59 
This applies, of course, to military society no less than to 
civilian.
Justification for the institutions of criminal law and 
sentencing, Professor Andrew Ashworth contends, resides in 
general deterrence and public protection.60 Apropos of that 
view, Lord Lane writes:
[T]he Court has to ask itself.. .what is the minimum 
sentence possible, first of all to punish the defendant 
for his crime, secondly to mark the disapproval of the 
community...and thirdly, sufficient to act as a deterrent
in future to this man and to anyone else...?6*
Battlefield war crimes, however, are not usually 
premeditated, but are sudden, impulsive crimes of violence — 
the type of crime, most jurists would agree, not deterred by 
lengthy sentences.62
57Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1983), 16-17.
58Ibid., 300.
59Nicola Lacey, State Punishment (London: Routledge, 1988), 200.
60Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 11, 
13.
61/? v Hitchcock (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 160, 161.
62Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy. 341, 343; and, Christopher J. Emmins, A 
Practical Approach to Sentencing (London: Blackstone Press, 1985), 263.
244
If deterrent sentences are of questionable impact in 
such cases, then at least proportionality — a severity of 
sentence in proportion to the gravity of the offense63 and a 
key underlying structure of the criminal law64 — may be 
sought. But the notion of proportionality presumes a settled 
criteria of seriousness of cases, a ranking of severity of 
sentences, and an accepted relationship of cases and 
sentences.65 Those are not always present in battlefield war 
crime cases. Nevertheless, although proportionality begs the 
question of whose ideas of seriousness, severity, and 
relationship, it remains a legitimate sentencing goal.
Four Son Thang defendants had been tried, with starkly 
disparate trial and sentencing results and, as Professor 
H.L.A. Hart notes, "principles of justice and fairness 
between different offenders require...morally similar 
offences to be treated alike."66
To say that the law against murder is justly applied is 
to say that it is impartially applied to all those...who 
are alike in having done what the law forbids; no 
prejudice or interest has deflected the administrator 
from treating them 'equally'. 67
But despite impartial application of the military law, 
questionable outcomes had obtained. Was the system 
deficient, then? No. The criminal law of statutes and 
textbooks seldom reflects its actual enforcement in social 
situations. "[W]e must consider the interaction between the 
law itself and discretion in the criminal process...to 
understand the reality of the criminal law."68
Sentences imposed at trial often reflect the beliefs and 
experiences of the sentencers rather than rational
63Ibid., Emmins, 264.
64Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law. 16.
65Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy. 22.
66H.L.A. Hart, Law. Liberty, and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
37.
67H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 156.
68Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law. 4.
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differences in either offences or offenders69 and society's 
presumption of a value-neutral rationality in sentencing 
engenders unfulfilled expectations. "[T]his value attached... 
to rationality and consistency also generates severe 
embarrassment about...moral luck, an inevitability...with 
which every political theory must learn to live."70 The 
acquittal of patrol leader Herrod after conviction of two of 
his subordinates may be considered an example of embarrassing 
"moral luck,"* as may be Green's sentence to five years 
confinement for the same acts that brought Schwarz a life 
sentence.
Acquittals and unequal sentences are hardly unique, 
being documented in numerous studies.71 One author 
rationalizes such results by noting that "although the impact 
of the threat of punishment must be equal or not 
disproportionately different for different offenders, the 
impact of enforcement may be unequal."72 As to post-trial 
clemency action, there is little research in the area, but 
rather than evening out sentence differences, it apparently 
"makes disparity in time served as great as the discrepancies 
in time imposed."73
Besides trial, which represents the threat of 
punishment, an appropriate response to criminality must 
encompass enforcement — actual punishment — the "appropriate
69Barbara Hudson, Justice Through Punishment (London: Macmillan Education, 1987), 
47.
70Lacey, State Punishment. 167.
* An aspect of moral luck is "jury nullification”- a panel's recognition of guilt but 
refusal to return a guilty finding, notwithstanding. See, Gilligan and Lederer, Court- 
Martial Procedure, vol. 1, 611, 884. Moral luck is explored in: Bernard Williams, 
Moral Luck (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Thomas Nagel, Mortal 
Questions (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), ch. 3, Moral Luck.
71Roger Hood and Richard Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1970), 141-56, e.g., cite six such studies from the U.S. and England. Hudson, 
Justice Through Punishment. 43-48, notes another six.
72Lacey, State Punishment. 193. Italics in original.
73Hudson, Justice Through Punishment. 46.
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penal sanctions" spoken of by the 1949 Conventions.74 How 
"appropriate" were the punishments for U.S. war crimes in 
Vietnam? An answer may be determined by examining the few 
reported, identifiable war crime prosecutions — limited in 
the case of the Marine Corps almost exclusively to trials for 
the murder of Vietnamese noncombatants. No other law of war 
offense is traceable in sufficient degree to yield meaningful 
or quantifiable comparisons.
During the Vietnam War, twenty-seven Marines were 
convicted of murdering noncombatants .75 In several of those 
cases there were multiple victims or associated crimes, such 
as aggravated assault or rape. In 15 of the 27 convictions, 
among attendant punishments such as dishonorable discharge, 
reduction in grade, and loss of pay, the sentence imposed at 
trial included confinement for life; three other cases 
included confinement for 20, 30, and 50 years. Only in 7 of 
the 27 cases was the confinement imposed less than 10 years.76 
Those are substantial sentences.
Trial-level sentences do not tell the whole story, 
however. In military practice, unlike civilian forums, 
appeals are of right, and sentences are often mitigated at 
the appellate level. That was so in cases involving the 
murder of noncombatants. After appellate-level mitigation 
the 27 sentences were; confinement for life in only two 
cases; 30 years confinement in another; 20 to 30 years in 
five others; 10 to 20 years in three others; 5 to 10 in five 
others; less than 5 years confinement in ten cases; and two 
convictions set aside, one by reason of procedural error, the 
other for insanity.77 Although some sentences were
74Some authorities suggest that crime prevention does not, by itself, require formal 
punishment, e.g., R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986; reprint, 1991), 165.
75Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities,” pt. I, 14. Ninety-five Army personnel were 
similarly convicted of murder and manslaughter. Lewy, America in Vietnam. 325.
76BGen. John R. DeBarr, Wash., to Guenter Lewy, Massachusetts, 9 March 1976. 
Marines and Military Law collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington.
77Lewy, America in Vietnam, table 10-5, p. 458.
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significantly lessened, the range of penalties remained 
generally high.
Case comparisons are suspect, but that range of 
mitigated court-martial sentence is comparable to or higher 
than trial-level sentences in American civilian 
jurisdictions. In the first half of 197 0, the same period as 
the Son Thang trials, 132 homicide convictions in 
Pennsylvania state courts resulted in sentences ranging from 
probation (in 37 cases) , to confinement for life (in 3 
cases). Other Pennsylvania sentences for homicide were 
confinement for 1 year (in 45 cases), 2 years (in 18 cases), 
3 to 4 years (in 14 cases), 5 years (in 7 cases), 6 or more 
years (in 7 cases), and one sentence to death.78 The mitigated 
Marine Corps war crime sentences — imposed under active 
service conditions in a combat zone, one might note — cover a 
similar, or higher, span. There is no practical means of 
determining what, if any, sentence reductions resulted from 
appellate action in the Pennsylvania cases.
In U.S. Federal District Courts in 1973, the first year 
such statistics were compiled, sentences for the 25 convicted 
first and second degree murderers ranged from probation (in 2 
cases), to confinement for 3 to 5 years (in 3 cases), to 5 
years and over — the breakdown is no more specific — in 2 0 
cases.79 These sentences appear no more harsh than the 
mitigated sentences imposed upon Marines.
How do court-martial sentences for murdering Vietnamese 
noncombatants compare with sentences imposed in the same 
period upon U.S. personnel for murdering fellow-American 
soldiers? In five such convictions for premeditated murder, 
5 sentences to confinement for life resulted, reduced on
78Franklin E. Zimring, Joel Eigen, and Sheila O'Malley, "Punishing Homicide in 
Philadelphia," 43 Chicago L.Rev. 227, Table VI, 234 (1976). The table's percentages 
have been translated into discrete numbers, here.
79Michael J. Hindelang and others, eds., Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. 
1973 (Wash.: GPO/U.S. Dept, of Justice, 1973), Table 5.38. The rudimentary 
breakdown lists seven punishment categories: 1 year and under; 1-3 years; 3-5 years; 
5 years and over; probation; fine; and other.
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appeal to 30 years in one case, to 15 years in another; in 
two other cases the life sentences were set aside for new 
sentence or trial proceedings.80
But most court-martial convictions for killing 
Vietnamese were for unpremeditated murder. In eleven 
convictions of U.S. personnel for the unpremeditated murder 
of other U.S. personnel, four resulted in sentences to life, 
one of those reduced on appeal to 45 years, two reduced to 30 
years; the seven other sentences were: confinement for 18 
years (reduced to 2); two for 15 and one for 10 years (those 
three being set aside for new trials) ; two for 5 years; 
another for 15 months.81 Although there undeniably were 
occasional sentences reflecting a shameful xenophobia,82 there 
is no striking dissimilarity between the range of these 
sentences for unpremeditated murder and those imposed for the 
murder of Vietnamese noncombatants — the latter sentences may 
even tend to be more severe.
Acquittals can be as revealing as sentences imposed, 
since acquittals may indicate the reluctance of a court to 
convict, let alone sentence an accused. Sixteen Marines, or 
thirty-seven percent of those tried for murdering Vietnamese 
noncombatants, were acquitted or had their charges judicially 
dismissed.83 In U.S. District Courts in 1969, thirty-three 
percent of the homicide cases that went to trial resulted in
80Respectively, U.S. v Thomas, 41 CMR 828 (NCMR, 1970); U.S. v Brandy, 40 CMR 
674 (ACMR, 1969); U.S. v Walker, 41 CMR 632 (ACMR, 1969); U.S. v Newsome, 43 
CMR 695 (ACMR, 1970); U.S. v Jones, 44 CMR 818 (ACMR, 1969).
8Respectively, U.S. v Chappell; U.S. v Wimberly, 42 CMR 242 (ACMR, 1970); U.S. v 
White, 40 CMR 883 (ACMR, 1969); U.S. v Jackson, 40 CMR 355 (ACMR, 1969); U.S. 
v Richardson, 43 CMR 742 (ACMR, 1971); U.S. v Roman and Santiago-Ruiz, 40 CMR 
561 (ACMR, 1969); U.S. v Hurt, 41 CMR 206 (USCMA, 1970); U.S. v Butler, 40 CMR 
207 (USCMA, 1969); U.S. v Butler, 39 CMR 824 (NBR, 1968); U.S. v Thibeault, 43 
CMR 704 (ACMR, 1971).
82e.g., U.S. v Bumgarner, 43 CMR 559 (ACMR, 1970), in which conviction for the 
unpremeditated murder of three Vietnamese noncombatants resulted in a reduction in 
grade from sergeant to private, and forfeiture of $97 per month for six months. No 
discharge or confinement was imposed.
83DeBarr, to Lewy, 9 March, 1976, enclosure 8.
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acquittal or dismissal,84 a rate essentially the same as found 
in Marine Corps courts throughout the war for the same 
offense.
Whether the mitigated court-martial sentences constitute 
an "appropriate penal sanction" for grave breaches 
constituting the crime of murder may be arguable. One writer 
suggests, "it may be concluded, then, that the United States 
has provided effective penal sanctions for the grave breach 
involved in willfully killing civilians..."85 Another contends 
the final sentences merely demonstrate that:
the military system is not capable of handling 
objectively the investigation and punishment of alleged 
war crimes in Vietnam.... [A] n International Criminal 
Court would be the only acceptable alternative to what is
now at best a national embarrassment.8^
But sentence comparisons, state, federal, and military,* 
suggest not a national embarrassment as much as a sentencing 
incoherence. The sentences of American soldiers, whether for 
the murder of Vietnamese or for other Americans, range from 
severe to lenient; from the expected to the dismaying, 
without consistency or pattern. Sentencing results from the 
same period are similarly mixed when U.S. soldiers murdered 
other than Vietnamese or fellow-soldiers.87 The authors of a 
study of punishments imposed in civilian murder convictions 
point out, "the more culpable offense does not always receive 
the more severe punishment....[T] he huge differences in 
sanctions within the murder category would appear to offend
84U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1970 (Washington: 
GPO, 1970), table 236, p. 153.
85Rubin, "Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident," 269.
86Comment, "Punishment for War Crimes," 1346, fn. 203.
* General court-martial convictions are federal convictions.
87In the U.S., for murdering his wife and her lover, a soldier was sentenced to 
confinement for 5 years, reduced on appeal to 2 years, U.S. v Griggs, 41 CMR 541 
(ACMR, 1969); for murdering a Canadian soldier in Germany, a U.S. soldier was 
sentenced to 30 years confinement, U.S. v Stevenson, 41 CMR 69 (ACMR, 1969); for 
murdering an Okinawan prostitute, 18 years, U.S. v Nichols, 46 CMR 1316 (ACMR, 
1973); for murdering an American lover, 1 year, reduced to 7 months, U.S. v Small, 
45 CMR 700 (ACMR, 1972).
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any colorably coherent theory of punishment."88 Nor are 
sentencing practices any less disjointed in English 
practice.89
Sentences for U.S. war crimes in Vietnam, rather than 
being a factor of the victim's nationality, merely reflect 
the disarray in sentencing, generally. "Disparity in 
sentencing, with similar crimes receiving wildly dissimilar 
sentences, is an unavoidable feature of a judicial system 
charged with ascertaining the individual circumstances and 
needs of offenders."90
Colonel Robert Lucy, the 1st Marine Division's Staff 
Judge Advocate at the outset of the Son Thang trials, became 
counsel to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in late 197 0. 
He recalls:
It was always disappointing to me...how the sentences 
were just sliced to pieces....[T]hat was because of the 
political climate of the time....There was a feeling in 
Washington...congressional pressure to cut back on a lot
of the sentences...9*
Such an impression, however, reflects an unawareness of 
similarly "sliced to pieces" sentences imposed in venues 
other than those trying offenses committed in Vietnam. In 
courts-martial involving the murder of Vietnamese 
noncombatants — war crimes tried under U.S. military law — 
the sentences imposed at trial and subsequent to clemency 
action were in general conformity with sentences in similar 
prosecutions involving both American and other foreign 
victims. The concept of proportionality aside, the sentences 
reflected society's denunciation of the acts involved, and 
reaffirmed the criminal law.
88Zimring, Eigen, and O'Malley, "Punishing Homicide in Philadelphia," 242.
89Hood and Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology. 142, 147-51. Saying, "the evidence 
pointing to disparities in sentencing among the judiciary at all levels is overwhelming," 
the authors detail five British studies reflecting such disparities.
90Hudson, Justice Through Punishment. 27.
91Lucy interview, 22 June 1991.
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6.3. The Son Thang Appeals
Article 60, UCMJ, in effect in 197 0, reads: "After a trial by 
court-martial the record shall be forwarded to the convening 
authority, and action thereon may be taken..." Article 61: 
"The convening authority shall refer the record...to his 
staff judge advocate...who shall submit his written opinion 
thereon..."*
The Son Thang convening authority was the commander of 
the 1st Marine Division, Major General Charles F. widdecke, a 
taciturn, even dour, man.** Upon receiving his SJA's reviews 
and recommendations regarding the Schwarz and Green trials 
Widdecke would decide to reduce or let stand the findings and 
sentences in their cases, before forwarding the record to the 
Navy Court of Military Review, next step in the appellate 
process. According to his Assistant Division Commander, 
Brigadier General Simmons, Widdecke was troubled by the 
pending decisions, considering the Son Thang verdicts 
"inequitable" and "appalling.1,92 Widdecke1 s review of the 
cases would be the first of, potentially, three legal 
reviews.
6.3.a. The U.S. Military Appellate System. 1970 under 
then-applicable law, before being executed, court-martial 
sentences required review by the court's convening authority 
through a comprehensive summary and analysis of the case's 
legal issues.93 Any court-martial resulting in a sentence 
including a punitive discharge from the service — a bad 
conduct or dishonorable discharge — additionally required a 
second review and affirmation by a Court of Military Review
* Requirement for post-trial review by the convening authority was eliminated by the 
Military Justice Act of 1983.
** Widdecke died in 1973.
92Simmons interview, 10 May 1990.
93U.S. v Griffin, 24 CMR 16 (USCMA, 1957); U.S. v Vara, 25 CMR 155 (USCMA, 
1958).
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in Washington, D.C.94 Throughout the appellate process, the 
court-martial's sentence could not, and yet today may not, be 
increased, nor a not-guilty finding be disturbed.95
[T]he military review system is more protective of rights 
of convicted persons than state or federal review systems 
because several military reviews are automatic. 
Moreover, some military reviews correct factual errors 
and exercise clemency as well as reviewing questions of 
law and "clearly erroneous" factual findings.9^
Major General Widdecke, convening authority of the 
Schwarz and Green courts, was located at his division 
headquarters near DaNang, where the cases were tried. His 
post-trial reviews were prepared in the office of his Staff 
Judge Advocate (SJA) ,97 In such reviews the trial evidence was 
discussed, contested issues examined and their resolution 
considered for legal correctness. The sentence was reviewed 
to ensure it did not exceed the permitted maximum and that it 
was appropriate to the charges of which the accused stood 
convicted. No substantial error being found in the conduct 
of the trial, evidentiary rulings of the court, nor the 
sentence, the SJA would recommend that the convening 
authority approve the proceedings. A form was provided that 
merely required the convening authority's signature to carry 
out the recommendations.
Most convening authority reviews resulted in approval. 
If, however, substantial error was found, or proof of guilt 
fell below the required standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the SJA was obligated to recommend that the findings 
and sentence be disapproved and 'not guilty* findings be 
substituted. He could also recommend that a sentence 
considered excessive be reduced. Thus, the convening 
authority's review examined the law, the facts, and the
94Manual For Courts-Martial. 1969. Ch. XX, specifies appellate review procedures in 
effect during the Son Thang cases.
95Ibid., par. 88.a.; UCMJ, Arts. 62.(b), and 63.(b).
96Shanor and Terrell, Military Law in A Nutshell. 124-24.
97UCMJ, Articles 61, 65(b).
253
sentence. "The convening authority's primary concern is 
whether any error may have materially prejudiced the rights 
of the accused."98 Disapproval of guilty findings was unusual 
at the convening authority's level, but not unheard of. 
Sentence reductions were common.
Approved records of trial involving sentences of 
confinement of a year or more were required to be forwarded 
to the Court of Military Review (CMR), in Washington, for 
another review ab initio. CMR's jurisdiction was, and 
remains today, mandatory and automatic.99 CMR is actually an 
assembly of several appellate courts. Each armed service has 
its own CMR, each service's CMR having several panels of 
three appellate judges. During the Vietnam War, when case 
loads were at an all-time high, the Navy Court of Military 
Review (NCMR) — which also decides Marine Corps appeals — 
consisted of three panels. The panels usually sit separately 
but occasionally sit en banc. NCMR judges are senior 
military lawyers, Marine colonels and Navy captains.
General courts-martial in which punitive discharges are 
imposed, as in the two Son Thang convictions, require CMR's 
appellate review as a matter of law.100 Such reviews are 
carried out by judge advocates assigned to that armed 
service's appellate review activity, co-located with its CMR. 
Again, each service has its own appellate review activity, 
staffed by judge advocates of that service. Army appeals, in 
other words, are reviewed and briefed by Army appellate 
lawyers and decided by Army appellate judges. Appellate 
defense counsel, provided the accused without cost, review 
the record of trial for bases for legal attack. Under 
applicable Vietnam-era military law, issues could be raised 
at the appellate level even if not raised at trial. As in 
the convening authority's review, the facts, the law, and the
98Byrne, Military Law. 412.
"UCM J, Arts. 66(b), 67(a).
100UCMJ, Art. 65.(b), in the Vietnam era; now Art. 66.(b).
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sentence are examined for error.101 Most cases, lacking a 
basis for attack, are routinely form-briefed, the absence of 
grounds noted, appeal not pressed. Those cases that do go 
forward are fully briefed by opposing appellate counsel and 
submitted, in the case of Marine Corps appeals, to an NCMR 
panel for decision. Significant cases are orally argued 
before the panel. CMR appeals are carried out without the 
presence of the convicted servicemen and only rarely are 
civilian lawyers involved.
The quality of military appellate counsel, in the Naval 
Service at least, is uneven; too often Navy or Marine Corps 
judge advocates failing to gain promotion, are assigned to the 
appellate review activity to close out their careers, 
although that fact applies only in a minority of appellate 
assignments. Still, sometimes a less-than-expected quality 
of legal skill may be evidenced in briefs or oral argument. 
The appellate judges, however, are usually excellent jurists 
of demonstrated aptitude.
Neither appellate counsel nor judges hesitate to "bust," 
or overturn, a sentence or conviction, when warranted. 
Despite the appellate review activities being staffed by 
military lawyers, there is no pressure to preserve 
convictions. Similarly, CMR judges suffer no career harm 
because of their legal decisions, even if viewed as generally 
anti-prosecution. (i.e., anti-government.) Indeed, the 
careers of most CMR judges are assured before they are 
considered for such assignment and several have gone on to 
their serviced senior legal position.
While this somewhat idealized description of appellate 
practice does not consider "the force of personality, impact 
of reputation of colleagues, and debits and credits
10le.g., U.S. v Landry, 14 USCMA 553 (1964).
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accumulated from past compromises...,"102 it reasonably 
describes the second level of court-martial review.
In 1970, the Court of Military Appeals, or "COMA," was 
the third and final appellate level for military cases.* 
Situated in its own Washington, D.C., courthouse, COMA 
consisted of three civilian judges, appointed for staggered 
fifteen year terms by the President, subject to confirmation 
by the Senate.103 COMA judges usually come from the ranks of 
prominent practicing lawyers or judges. Cases reach COMA 
either by direction of an armed service judge advocate 
general, or by decision of COMA for "good cause shown."104
Neither the Schwarz nor Green appeals reached COMA, 
however; CMR did render opinions in both cases — but both men 
had already been freed from confinement and discharged from 
the Marine Corps before CMR's judgements were issued. Nor 
was there an appeal in the case of the officer who set in 
motion the Son Thang killer team, for he was never tried.
6.3.b. 1st Lt. Lewis R. Ambort Ambort, the company 
commander, told the departing patrol: "Don't let them get us 
any more. I want you to pay these little bastards back." 
Major Theer, who first investigated the allegations of 
murder, testified, "If the commanding officer said something, 
I'm sure that the men would.. .take it as authoritative. Like 
your father speaking to you."
Many years earlier, in approving the court-martial 
conviction of a U.S. officer during the Philippine 
insurrection of 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt wrote: 
"Loose and violent talk by an officer...is always likely to
102Alley, "Determinants of Military Judicial Decisions," contains detailed discussion of 
the appellate process at the CMR level.
* Current military law provides for final appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in certain 
restricted circumstances. (UCMJ, Art. 67a.) Through 1991, however, the Court had 
decided only one military case under its certiorari authority. In most instances COMA, 
now comprised of five judges, one of them a woman, remains the final appellate forum.
103Quinn, "The United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual Rights in the 
Military Service," 494.
104UCMJ, Art. 67(a).
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excite to wrongdoing those among his subordinates whose wills 
are weak or whose passions are strong."105 The U.S. law of war 
field manual reads, "direct incitement... as well as 
complicity in the commission of...war crimes are 
punishable."106 British military law is similar.107 The 1949 
Geneva Conventions call for "penal sanctions for persons 
committing, or ordering to be committed" grave breaches.108
Failure of the U.S. to prosecute Paul Meadlo, a 
confessed principal in the My Lai murders who was given 
immunity in exchange for testimony, has been raised as a 
possible violation of Geneva treaty obligations to prosecute 
those commiting grave breaches.109 A similar question applies 
to the failure to prosecute Krichten, granted immunity for 
testimony regarding events in Son Thang. Where immunity is 
conferred in war crime trials as a necessary aspect of 
prosecutorial discretion, however, close examination of the 
legal issues involved makes clear that:
the decision to forego prosecution...does not... 
contravene any minimum standard of international 
justice....[T]he federal grant of immunity is consistent 
with national norms regulating the practice. These 
determinations are important because the Geneva 
Conventions themselves provide minimal guidance in
defining the contours of the prosecutorial obligation.110 
But Lieutenant Ambort was not offered immunity; he simply was 
not prosecuted for his actions related to the Son Thang 
killings.
[Commanders are] bound to act so as to prevent such 
killings....This is a crucial aspect of what is called 
"command responsibility"....It is a large responsibility; 
for the general policy of the army, expressed through its 
officers, the climate they create by their day-to-day 
actions, has far more to do with the incidence of "extra"
105U.S. v BGen. Jacob H. Smith, 17.
106Dept. of the Army, Law of Land Warfare, par. 500.
107HMSO, Manual of Military Law, pt. Ill, par. 631.
108Arts. 49, 50, 129, and 146, respectively.
109Comment, "Punishment for War Crimes: Duty or Discretion?", 1312.
110Ibid., 1339.
257
killing than does the intensity of the actual 
f ighting.111
Was that failure to prosecute Ambort a breach of U.S. treaty 
obligations? If his conduct is assessed as having been . 
criminal, the answer is yes.
In describing a principal, the Manual for Courts- 
Martial, 1969, points out:
There must be an intent to aid or encourage the persons 
who commit the crime. The aider and abettor must share
the criminal intent....but... to make one liable as a
principal... the offense committed must be one...likely
to result as a natural or probable consequence...112 
Based upon his aggressive, goading patrol briefing should 
Ambort have been tried along with his men? "Certainly it 
would depend," one authority notes,
on the circumstances of the remark, [and] the
recipient....[I]f that... company commander were briefing 
his troop for a combat assault — troops eighteen years 
old who have been trained to respect and obey every word 
uttered by their company commander [he may be criminally
liable for their subsequent acts].113 
To what extent did Ambort1s guiding and conspiratorial role 
in the attempt to cover-up the incident call for prosecution? 
There appears to have been sufficient evidence to charge 
Ambort as a principal to unpremeditated murder (a violation 
of Article 77, UCMJ) and, by his initially assisting the 
offenders in order to hinder or prevent their apprehension, 
as an accessory after the fact (Article 7 8).
In fact, he was only charged with failure to report a 
possible war crime, as required by written, standing orders, 
and dereliction of duty in "negligently failing to take 
effective measures to minimize noncombatant casualties...and 
making no effort to insure that all personnel in [his] 
company were aware of rules of engagement."114 He was also
^W alzer, Just and Unjust Wars. 308.
112Par. 156, describing the offense encompassed by Art. 77, UCMJ. The maximum 
punishment for conviction as a principal is that authorized for the completed offense.
113Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes," 78.
114Son Thang daily report #13.
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charged with making a false statement with intent to deceive: 
that the killer team captured an enemy rifle during their Son 
Thang f oray.115
Since Ambort's charges, although less serious than they 
might have been, still potentially merited a general court- 
martial, they were referred to an Article 32 investigation, 
the pretrial hearing to determine probable cause. The 
investigation was conducted by the division's assistant SJA, 
Lieutenant Colonel James P. King. Two months before the 
first patrol member's trial, King recommended that Ambort 
merely receive nonjudicial punishment for having made a false 
official statement.116
An honorable, ethical, and conscientious officer, King 
later became commander of all Marine Corps lawyers, 
eventually retiring as a brigadier general. Today he harbors 
second thoughts about his decision to recommend that Ambort 
not be tried:
I agonized over the recommendation as I believed it to 
be close — very close!! But given the testimony that I 
heard from Ambort himself and the analysis of criminal 
intent...Ambort1s conduct amounted...to a high (very 
high) degree of negligence but did not amount to an 
order to kill women with children in their arms. His 
words came perilously close....[T]his was a close call, 
one I'm not sure was the correct one....I believed then 
and believe now that no. . .court-martial then in RVN 
would have convicted him. In retrospect, maybe he 
should have been tried....I could have been wrong, but I
called it as I saw it.117 
The commanding general accepted King's recommendation and 
personally conducted Ambort's nonjudicial punishment on 15 
May 197 0. The punishment imposed was a letter of reprimand 
and forfeiture of five-hundred dollars pay118 — the maximum 
sentence permitted at such a proceeding for one of Ambort's 
grade. A letter of reprimand effectively ends a military
115Ibid.
116Son Thang daily report #15.
117BGen. James P. King, NY, to author, London, 20 Jan. 1991.
118Son Thang daily report #18.
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career but was insignificant to one who, like Ambort, had no 
such aspirations.
Thirteen months later, Ambort was honorably discharged 
from the Marine Corps, eventually becoming an electrical 
contractor in southern California.119
6.3.C. Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz a civilian law firm from 
Schwarz1 home state submitted a brief for the convening 
authority's consideration in his review of the case. To 
expedite review, the brief's two authors wrote, they would 
avoid "technical discussion of abstruse legal concepts" and 
limit their analysis to "simple logic and plain common 
sense."120 Indeed they did. Citing no case, evidentiary 
rule, or legal authority, they merely argued that in light of 
Herrod's acquittal, fair play required that Schwarz' 
conviction be set aside. Treading a fine line just short of 
alleging incompetence on the part of Schwarz' trial defense 
counsel, they related the evidence not adduced by Schwarz' 
counsel that was adduced by Herrod's, and urged that the 
Herrod evidence now be applied to the Schwarz case, pari 
passu.
The SJA's review of Schwarz' case responded to the 
civilian firm's brief in detail, as well as to the trial 
testimony, the contested issues, and judicial rulings. The 
review concluded that there had been no prejudicial error. 
However, the review noted, the evidence revealed that 
Schwarz:
was carrying out the orders of his patrol leader. While 
the orders...were patently illegal, there is no evidence 
the accused entered into a pre-planned conspiracy to 
commit murder. Another consideration is the accused's
low level of basic intelligence...121
119Lewis R. Ambort, California, to author, London, 15 May 1992.
120Brief for appellant at 1, U.S. v Schwarz.
121Staff Judge Advocate’s review, U.S. v Schwarz, 27.
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Taking these factors into consideration, the SJA recommended 
that as a matter of clemency Schwarz' sentence to confinement 
at hard labor for life be reduced to twenty years.
Brigadier General Simmons, assistant division commander 
to Major General Widdecke, the convening authority, relates 
that Widdecke found his SJA's review and recommendation 
disquieting. "Why is it that the person who seems that he 
should be most guilty is acquitted...? How do you restore 
some kind of equity? And," said General Simmons, "I think 
that's what he eventually tried to do...."122 In a message to 
his superiors in the U.S., Widdecke wrote: "A careful study 
of the record of trial...has revealed certain mitigating 
factors..."123 He went on to detail the lack of a proper 
patrol briefing, Schwarz' short time with the unit, the 
combat environment, and the sentence and verdicts in the 
companion cases. Even considering Schwarz' egregious prior 
disciplinary record, wrote Widdecke, "the sentence awarded by 
the court appeared disproportionate..."124
With that warning to brace themselves, Widdecke approved 
the findings of guilt and the sentence, except that portion 
relating to confinement, which he reduced to one year. On 2 
April 1971, Schwarz was released from confinement and 
dishonorably discharged from the Marine Corps.125 As Professor 
Ashworth says, "the idea of moral accountancy may...be said 
to underlie some of the practices of mitigation of 
sentence. . . "126
122Simmons interview, 10 May 1990.
123USMC, CG 1st MarDiv "Secret-Marine Corps Eyes Only" message 151000Z Dec 70, 
Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash., and author's collection.
124Ibid.
125"In the Uproar Over Calley's Conviction," U.S. News & World Report. 19 April 
1971, 20. Schwarz also served 3 months, 20 days pretrial confinement, for which he 
received sentence credit.
126Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy. 306. Similarly, H.L.A. Hart suggests: 
"...good reason for administering a less severe penalty is made out if the situation or 
mental state of the convicted criminal is such that...his ability to control his actions is 
thought to have been impaired or weakened otherwise than by his own action, so that
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Having been convicted of war crimes involving the murder 
of twelve Vietnamese noncombatants, Schwarz served nine 
months and eleven days post-trial confinement. While that is 
dismaying, it may be what H.L.A. Hart refers to in suggesting 
that an intelligible standard of behavior may remain, despite 
absence of a sanction to maintain that standard:127 the 
American prohibition against the killing of noncombatants 
remains effective, the brevity of Schwarz' punishment 
notwithstanding.
Despite Schwarz' release and discharge, the military 
appellate process continued. At NCMR, four errors in his 
court-martial were briefed and argued, two of which were 
significant: "The military judge failed to properly define 
the defense issues," and "The convening authority erred in 
failing to consider the subsequent acquittal of Private 
Herrod as res judicata in this case."128
The first assignment of error referred to a defense- 
alleged failure of the trial judge to submit the issue of 
obedience to orders to the members. But the appellate court 
quoted the instruction given the members:*
...if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
under the circumstances of his age, understanding and 
military experience could not have honestly believed the 
orders issued by his team leader to be legal...then the 
killing alleged was without justification. A Marine is a 
reasoning agent who is under a duty to exercise judgement 
in obeying orders to the extent that where such orders 
are.. .palpably illegal on their face then the act of 
obedience to such orders will not justify acts pursuant
to such illegal orders.12^
conformity to the law...was a matter of special difficulty for him..." Punishment and 
Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 15.
127Hart, The Concept of Law. 34.
128l/.& v Schwarz, 45 CMR 852 (NCMR, 1971), 2. The other two assigned errors: 
Denial of due process in the judge's failure to fiilly advise Schwarz of his rights to 
counsel and to properly excuse absent defense counsel; and abuse of judicial discretion in 
admitting color photos of the victims.
* Appendix C recites the Vietnam-era standard instruction.
129t/.S. v Schwarz, 9.
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The appellate court found the instruction legally correct and 
sufficient to have put the issue before the fact finders, and 
noted that "by their conviction of the accused, the [trial] 
court... found as a matter of fact that the accused could not 
have honestly and reasonably believed that Herrod's order to 
kill...was legal,"130
Although not addressed by the appellate court, the 
outcome would have been no different had Schwarz' offenses 
been considered in relation to mistake of law/mistake of fact 
doctrine: a defense "when it [the mistake] negatives the 
existence of a mental state essential to the crime 
charged.1,131 The killing of unarmed noncombatants would not 
have been legal even under the facts purportedly believed by 
Schwarz — that Herrod had valid authority to order the 
killings, a mistake of law, for "his mistake should avail him 
only if it is objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances."132
The appellate court further found that the evidence did 
not establish that the patrol had been instructed to "shoot 
anything that moved" in the villes, nor to remove unarmed 
Vietnamese from their huts and shoot them. Nor did the 
evidence establish, held the court, that the patrol was under 
enemy fire, nor that Schwarz believed he was under a duty to 
obey Herrod's orders to kill the victims. "[W]e are persuaded 
that the evidence of record clearly supported the court- 
martial's rejection of the defense claim that the accused's 
conduct was justified by Private Herrod's order."133
Finally, the court addressed the issue of res judicata:
The doctrine of res judicata as it pertains in military 
trials provides that a matter put in issue and finally 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be
130Ibid.
131LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law. 2d ed., 406. To the same effect, U.S. v McDowell, 
41 CMR 487 (ACMR, 1969).
132C/.S. v Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947-48 (1976), italics in original. To the same 
effect, Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 154(a)(4).
133f/.iS. v Schwarz, 10.
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disputed between the same parties in a subsequent 
trial....In cases involving a crime impossible of sole 
commission but requiring concurrence of intent or action 
between two or more parties, adjudication of issues in a 
trial of one of those essential parties may be pleaded in 
defense by another who was not joined in the first
proceeding...134
But, continued the court, Schwarz was tried on the alternate 
theories that he was either the actual perpetrator of all or 
some of the killings, or a principal to them by having aided 
and abetted the actual killers. The UCMJ makes aiding and 
abetting an offense separately punishable, without regard to 
the conviction or acquittal of the actual perpetrator of the 
offense.135 Quoting a federal opinion, the military court 
continued:
And the acquittal of the principal presents no impediment 
to the trial and conviction of a person charged with 
aiding and abetting... .This is because one who aids or 
abets the commission of a crime is guilty as a principal
of a substantive, independent offense.13^
"It follows," CMR concluded, "that the...assignment of error 
is found to be without merit and is denied. The findings of 
guilty and the sentence approved on review below are 
affirmed. "137
Nowhere in the convening authority*s review or appellate 
opinion were war crimes directly referred to.
6.3.d. Pvt. Samuel G. Green. Jr. Like Schwarz, Green's 
confinement was reduced by the convening authority to one 
year, he was released, and dishonorably discharged.138 As in
134Ibid., 13.
135Art 77. Case law is to the same effect: U.S. v Marsh, 32 CMR 252 (USCMA, 1962). 
A case involving issues quite similar to Schwarz', decided similarly, is U.S. v Keenan. 
British criminal law is also in accord. Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law 
(Blackstone Press: London, 1991), 165; also as to separately-tried conspirators:
D.D.P. v Shannon [1975] A.C. 717, [1974] 2 All E.R. 1009, HL.
136t/.5. v Schwarz, 14, citing von Patzoll v U.S., 163 F.2d 216, 218-19 (CA 10 
1949), cert, den., 68 S. Ct 110.
137Ibid., 15.
138USMC, CG 1st MarDiv "Secret-Marine Corps Eyes Only" message 151001Z Dec 70, 
Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash., and author's collection.
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Schwarz' case, his military appellate lawyers continued to 
attack his conviction. The assignments of error were 
essentially the same as those raised by Schwarz, with two 
relatively unimportant additions.139 Obedience to orders and 
res judicata, again the major issues, were disposed of as in 
the Schwarz case, the two opinions sometimes employing the 
same language. (Different panels considered the two cases.)
One judge dissented, noting that Green's conviction was 
as an aider and abettor, not a principal; the prosecution 
admittedly proffered no evidence directly linking Green to 
any specific victim's death. Urging that Green, on his first 
combat patrol, "was a pure novice,"140 the dissenting judge 
contended:
[I]f at the time of the action herein the accused did aid 
and abet the killers but was laboring under the 
apprehension that he was acting within the scope of, and 
fulfilling his mission, he could be guilty of no offense 
under the aider-abettor-principal theory for he would be 
wanting in the requisite criminal intent.141
The issue, in the dissent, then became the reasonableness of
Green's asserted belief that Herrod's orders to fire were
legal. That belief, contended the dissenting judge, should
not have been measured by the instruction's "man of ordinary
sense and understanding," but on Green's actual belief. "The
issue to be decided. . .was whether the accused - not a
fictional person - did in fact believe the orders given the
team were legal..."142 Or, as another writer phrases it, it is
"a general principle of morality and the criminal law that
people ought to be judged on the facts as they believed them
to be. "143
139t/.S. v Green, 4. Earlier, in Green v Convening Authority, 42 CMR 178 (USCMA, 
1970), Green unsuccessfully sought to terminate proceedings against him through a 
writ of prohibition filed by civilian lawyers on his behalf.
140Ibid., U.S. v Green, (Jones, J., dissenting).
141Ibid.
142Ibid. Underlining in original.
143Rupert Cross, "Centenary Reflections on Prince's Case," 91 Law Quarterly Rev. 540 
(1975).
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Neither the UCMJ, the Manual for Courts-Martial, the Law 
of Land Warfare field manual, the British Manual of Military 
Law, nor the Charter of the IMT specifically address the 
point raised by the dissent: is the reasonableness of obeying 
an illegal order to be measured by the belief of the 
fictional reasonable man/reasonable woman of ordinary sense 
and understanding? Or by the actual, subjective belief of 
the particular accused who obeyed the order?
But the point of the dissent is merely the hoary tort- 
law question of reasonableness, cloaked in law of war terms. 
As in numerous behavioral assessments necessary in criminal 
law, the reasonable man standard is the only practical means 
of judging the conduct of an accused, for conditional 
subjectivism cannot disregard volitional criminal acts.144 "We 
would punish him all the same," writes an American jurist. 
"The social concern is with the deed...rather than with the 
mental state that accompanies it."145 He continues:
...there is no anomaly in sometimes imposing criminal 
liability on the pure of heart or the empty of mind. The 
criminal law is an instrument of social control....To 
decide [mental states] would require a type of 
investigation that is not conducted in criminal
trials. . .146
Harshly put, but correct. Oliver Wendell Holmes agrees that 
"Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general 
good."147 Along the same line, Professor Ashworth writes:
The belief principle has not, generally speaking, been 
applied where the mistake is as to what is permissible 
under the criminal law....English law has generally 
allowed the maxim [ignorance of the law affords no
144Glanville Williams, "Finis For Novus Actus?”, The Cambridge L.J. (1989), 391, 
392.
145Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence. 168-69.
146Ibid., 176-77.
14701iver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881), 48.
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excuse] to prevail in order to...reinforce the law’s 
function of declaring minimum standards of behavior. *48
It is apparent, then, that the majority in the Green case
applied the proper legal standard. "A guilty condition of
mind is not excluded by ignorance that the act in question
constitutes a crime."149
Following his discharge, Green pursued a collateral 
attack on his military conviction in the civilian courts of 
his home state. That attack was driven by James H. Webb, a 
highly-decorated Marine veteran of Vietnam who, after 
retiring for physical disability, became an attorney. Webb 
believed Green's conviction unjust and adopted his cause. 
The collateral attack was unsuccessful and, in July 197 5, 
Green shot and killed himself.
Webb rose to become the United States' Secretary of the 
Navy in 1987. While in that politically powerful office he 
oversaw the posthumous upgrading of Green's discharge from 
dishonorable to general.150 The record does not reveal the 
basis for such clemency.
Coda with the dismissal of Green's collateral attack 
the Son Thang incident was over. Son Thang was the worst 
known war crime committed by Marines in Vietnam. The courts- 
martial of the killer team demonstrated that, whether 
denominated UCMJ violations or war crimes, discovered 
battlefield excesses are vigorously prosecuted by the United 
States. Acquittals — negligible sentences, too — are part 
and parcel of the common law's adversarial system that should 
not detract from the integrity of the process itself.
In some cases mere formal conviction may be sufficient to 
preserve the reality and efficacy of the standards of the
148Andrew Ashworth, "Belief, Intent, and Criminal Liability," in John Eekelaar and 
John Bell, eds., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Third Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1987), 10-11.
149Greenspan, Modem Law of Land Warfare. 486.
150James H. Webb, Jr, Virginia, to author, London, 22 May 1991; and Timberg, "The 
Private War of Ollie and Jim," 152.
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criminal law....This is not a question of righting the 
wrong done in the compensatory sense of making good the 
loss to the particular victim....Nor is it exclusively a 
matter of deterrence, individual or general. It has 
principally to do with a collective need to underpin, 
recognize and maintain the...standards of the criminal 
law. . . *51
Finally, it bears reminding that "war is not a series of 
case studies that can be scrutinized with objectivity....War 
is the suffering and death of people you know, set against a 
background of suffering and death of people you do not."152
151Lacey, State Punishment. 182-83.
152james R. McDonough, Platoon Leader (NY: Bantam Books, 1985), 139.
CHAPTER 7. LITERATURE SURVEY AND SOURCES
"As for official historians, they concentrate on the writing of history and reflect only 
sporadically on its application..."
Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes
The law of war remains relevant on today's battlefield 
and will be equally so on tomorrow's battlefield. Advances 
in weapons, more effective tactics, and increased 
international concern for the welfare of war's participants 
and victims is unlikely to reduce the individual soldier's 
combat role. As long as one nation's infantry meets an enemy 
infantry, as long as armed combatants interact with civilian 
populations, war crimes and grave breaches may be 
anticipated.
Accordingly, the study and refinement of means to limit 
and control warfare's violence remains relevant. Whether war 
be global or limited, internal or international, declared or 
not, the law will continue to play a part in armed conflict.
Throughout recent history the study and discussion of 
law of war has been constant. Particularly in the twentieth 
century there has been a plethora of conventions, treaties, 
protocols, cases, studies, reports, books, and articles on 
the subject. In this chapter, some of the recently published 
law of war literature consulted in writing this dissertation 
is noted. Included are books, textbooks, and articles. Also 
mentioned is the wide variety of material, collectively 
referred to as "archival" material, that has been consulted. 
Finally, the sources unique to the writing of this 
dissertation are briefly discussed.
7.1. Law of War Literature
The literature takes the usual distinctive forms: texts, 
articles, and documents, each form surprisingly extensive, 
much of it very recent. The sampling consulted in this
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writing overlooks many excellent works; no single effort can 
encompass them all. Mention is made of a few considered to 
be of significant worth.
Scholarly writing on the law of war, an academic staple 
long before the turn of this century, enjoyed a quantitative 
and qualitative renaissance following the Great War. The 
terms of the Treaty of Versailles, mandating individual 
punishment for war crimes, and the formation of the League of 
Nations were, by themselves, the basis for many writings.
World War II again increased interest and output in the 
subject. The post-war trials of Axis personnel of both high- 
station and rear rank raised that output exponentially. 
While the United Nations has remained more aloof from the law 
of war than its precursor, the League of Nations, the U.N. 
has generated considerable interest in peripheral issues such 
as international criminal law and its forums.
The Vietnam War, besides providing scholars a critical 
target, re-visited numerous law of war issues, revived 
academic interest in the topic, and produced innumerable 
writings. One suspects that the Gulf War will eventually add 
to the law of war literature, as well.
7.1.a. Law of War Books Many English-language books 
discuss the law of war but few are dedicated specifically to 
the subject. Among those that are, the more informative and 
contemporary include Humanity in Warfare and The Law of War.1 
The latter, perhaps intended as a textbook, lacks the 
authority of the former but presents the fundamental law of 
war for the lawyer or law student in readable, authoritative 
fashion. The former is a less academic but an equally 
readable, highly instructive general history addressed to the 
layman. Professor Peter Rowe's Defence, the Legal 
Implications, is an excellent contemporary work, particularly 
valuable for its portrait of the British military legal
Geoffrey Best and Ingrid D. DeLupis, respectively.
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system. Another excellent, though less current study, is 
Greenspan's The Modern Law of Land Warfare. Like Professor 
Georg Schwarzenberger's outstanding treatise, The Law of 
Armed Conflict,2 the Greenspan book is out of print and not 
easily located. Nuremberg and Vietnam: an American Tragedy, 
by Nuremberg prosecutor and Columbia University professor 
Telford Taylor, discusses many pertinent law of war issues. 
The book's title, however, reflects the author's unconcealed 
ideological slant — a bias not uncommon in American-published 
legal works concerning the Vietnam War.3
All of the foregoing books, and others,4 discuss law of 
war issues in a depth and completeness that only book-length 
texts can offer.
Official military publications present authoritative, if 
largely uncritical, documentation of the law of war.5 The 
British Law of War on Land, the third volume of the Manual of 
Military Law, is particularly useful in offering detailed 
interpretations and case citations in unusually readable 
official prose. Although especially valuable, it remains out 
of print and difficult to locate. Despite being decidedly 
dated, Britain's 1912 law of war manual remains helpful.6 
Prugh's Law at War: Vietnam, 1964-1973 is a brief but
valuable official source, written by a soldier-scholar who
2Schwarzenberger, International Law: As Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
vol. II, The Law of Armed Conflict. Yet another excellent out-of-print treatise is: 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol I, Peace: and vol. II, Disputes. War and 
Neutrality. 8th ed.
3 e.g., Standard, Aggression: Our Asian Disaster. Donald A. Wells, War Crimes and Laws 
of War (NY: University Press of America, 1984); and any post-1965 book or article 
written or edited by the prolific Professor R.A. Falk.
4e.g„ Bishop, Justice Under Fire.
5Dept. of the Army, Pamphlet 27-161-1, Law of Peace, vol. I (Wash.: GPO, 1979); 
Pamphlet 27-161-2, International Law, vol. II; and Field Manual 27-10, The Law of 
Land Warfare. Previous editions of the latter manual were issued in 1940 and 1914. 
Although denominated as pamphlets, they are securely bound and hundreds of pages in 
length.
6Edmonds and Oppenheim, Land Warfare: An Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on 
Land for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty’s Army.
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was the U.S. Army's senior lawyer in Vietnam and, later, 
Judge Advocate General of the Army. Major General Prugh is 
recognized as a law of war expert.
Several volumes published by the United Nations are 
invaluable in presenting authoritative law of war-related 
histories and, particularly, accounts of the post-world War 
II Nuremberg and Control Council 10 trials.7 The U.N. 
histories are well-documented and annotated. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross, among its many 
publications on the subject, has published a useful, if 
somewhat shallow, guide to the law of war.8
The official record of the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal, that initial trial of twenty-four major 
German war criminals, was published by the IMT in four 
languages.9 The "subsequent proceedings," held under 
authority of Control Council Law No. 10 and involving 
thirteen trials of 181 major German war criminals, have been 
exhaustively documented, as well.10 These official volumes are 
valuable for their full discussion of law of war trial issues 
and their documentation of precedent. Many other books have 
considered the legal aspects of the Nuremberg trials, some of 
them particularly helpful in interpreting and understanding 
the trials' outcomes.11 Nuremberg also resulted in some
7Historv of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws 
of War: The Charter and Judgement of the Niimberg Tribunal: and Law Reports of Trial 
of War Criminals, vols. I-XV, a particularly instructive series.
8Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War.
9Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vols. I- 
33.
10The U.S., GPO version: Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurenberg Military 
Tribunals, vols. I-XV. The British version: The Trial of Major German War Criminals 
(London, H.M.S.O., 1946), 23 vols.
11 e.g., Ginsburgs and Kudriavtsev, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law: Robert
E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983); and Appleman, 
Military Tribunals and International Crimes.
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substandard or superficial (or both) books of little value to 
either scholar or general reader.12
The Tokyo trials — the IMT for the Far East, that tried 
twenty-eight accused Japanese war criminals13 — and the 
subsequent Far East trials, are not as well-documented as the 
Nuremberg trials but, because of their more controversial 
trial procedure, are of lesser legal academic interest.14
Among the many other books covering diverse law of war 
issues are several of particular interest. Addressing 
specific subject areas such as the issue of obedience of 
superior orders,15 or suggesting the documentary bases for 
the law of war,16 these works add significantly to the 
understanding of that law.
The Vietnam War resulted in several useful books in 
which a variety of voices are presented in a single volume,17 
providing one with a broad choice of viewpoints. Those 
fortunate enough to read French and German will discover a 
large number of equally valuable works.
12To name but two: Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg (NY: William Morrow, 
1987); and, Smith, Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg.
13R. John Pritchard and Sonia M. Zaide, eds., The Tokvo War Crimes Trial (London: 
Garland Publishing, 1981), 22 vols.
14An excellent treatment of the initial trials is: Roling and Riiter, The Tokyo Judgement, 
vols. I-II. The subsequent trials receive creditable layman's treatment in: Piccigallo, 
The Japanese on Trial. Descriptive of the Yamashita trial, which preceded the Far East 
IMT, an excellent legal analysis of the commander's responsibility for his troops' actions 
is found in: Lael, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility.
15Keijzer, Military Obedience, is especially helpful in addressing the practical, 
military aspects this multifaceted issue. Green, Superior Orders in National and 
International Law approaches the issue from a purely legal standpoint.
16Roberts and Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War makes pertinent conventions, 
protocols, and declarations available in one volume. Friedman, ed., The Law of War: A 
Documentary History, vols. I-II, offers a variety of useful reference documents.
17Falk, ed., The Vietnam War and International Law, vols. 1-4, published under the 
auspices of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, and edited by 
prolific anti-war academic Falk, these volumes are especially wide-ranging in then- 
balanced presentation of well-reasoned legal viewpoints. Also useful: Dinstein, ed., 
International Law At A Time of Perplexity. A less ambitious but still valuable work is, 
Trooboff, ed., Law and Responsibility in Warfare.
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7.1 .b. Law of War Textbooks Textbooks — books intended 
exclusively for instructional use — are often incisive guides 
to the law of war. The works of Professor Ian Brownlie, 
although not law of war texts per se, are excellent in 
explaining many concepts of contemporary international law 
that bear on the subject.18 While some public international 
law textbooks in general use tend to be rather basic,19 or 
evidence a bias against the efficacy of the law of war,20 
others nicely cover some law of war issues.21
The instructional departments of U.S. military academies 
and schools have produced textbooks that, while not always 
directed toward legal issues, address law of war concepts.22 
Often, they also provide a participant's view, helpful in 
illuminating aspects of the law that academics might 
overlook. These books are not generally available in the 
U.K., however.
Nor should law of war students limit themselves solely 
to international law textbooks. Those relating to
1 international Law and the Use of Force by States, the standard, is exceptionally well- 
written, comprehensive, and penetrating. Also valuable is his basic text, Principles of 
Public International Law. 4th ed. Of lesser application is Brownlie's System of the Law 
of Nations: State Responsibility. pt.I.
19David H. Ott, Public International Law in the Modern World (London: Pitman 
Publishing, 1987).
20Cassese, International Law in A Divided World.
21Sweeney, Oliver, and Leech, Cases and Materials on the International Legal System. 3d 
ed., a textbook employed at the U.S. Naval Academy, is notable. Equally so is Schachter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice: and, Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal 
Law, vol. I, Crimes, and vol. Ill, Enforcement. Five other examples are: Harris, Cases 
and Materials on International Law. 3d ed.; Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to 
International Law: Ingrid D. DeLupis, International Law and the Independent State. 2d ed. 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1987); James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations. 6th ed., ed. Humphrey 
Waldock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and Wallace, International Law, the latter 
being a concise but lucid treatment.
22Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making, by a West Point philosophy 
professor; Malham M. Wakin, ed., War. Morality, and the Military Profession. 2d ed. 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), a U.S. Air Force Academy text; Matthews and Brown, 
eds. The Parameters of Military Ethics, a U.S. Army War College textbook; and Axinn, A 
Moral Military, the latter not as incisive as the others but in use in various U.S. war 
studies courses.
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disciplines associated only with certain aspects of the law 
of war offer insights and perceptions not noted elsewhere.23
7.1.C. Law of War-Related Books in addition to the works 
already mentioned, many volumes, the subjects of which, 
again, are not the law of war, are helpful in understanding 
the application of that law in the Vietnam War. The best 
scholarly general account of U.S. involvement in the war is 
Professor Guenter Lewy's America in Vietnam. Superbly 
researched, it is comprehensive, reliable, and perceptive.
The My Lai incident, so similar to the Son Thang 
incident, resulted in numerous books, a few of which have 
much to say about the American soldiers * understanding and 
exercise of the law of war.24 Crimes of Obedience, by two 
sociologists,25 concentrates on My Lai and is excellent in 
presenting extra*legal aspects of the obedience to superior 
orders issue. Four Hours in My Lai26 is a particularly clear 
and comprehensive layman's account of the event and its 
subsequent cover-up.
The memoirs of U.S. Army generals who served in Vietnam 
provide firsthand accounts of law of war issues, though 
seldom denominated as such by the authors. A few memoirs are 
refreshingly, even surprisingly, frank and candid.27 That 
cannot be said of General Westmoreland's autobiography, which 
evidences a selective recollection and debatable
23Clark, Waging War: and Bull, Kingsbury, and Roberts, Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations are examples. Glad, ed., Psychological Dimensions of War, is another. 
International humanitarian law is well-covered in such books as: McCoubrey, 
International Humanitarian Law: Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 
though dated; and Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights.
24Peers, The My Lai Inquiry: Goldstein, Marshall, and Schwartz, The My Lai Massacre 
and its Cover-up: and Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Callev. which offers an 
excellent layman's account of the trial and the trial tactics involved.
25Kelman and Hamilton.
26Bilton and Sim.
27Particularly Palmer, The Twenty-Five Year War: and, Davidson, Vietnam at War. 
Kinnard, The War Managers, is somewhat less revealing.
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interpretations of portions of the record.28 Other than 
General Lewis Walt,29 no senior Marine Corps officer has 
published memoirs. Walt's account sheds no light on legal 
issues.
Blue's Bastards, by Son Thang patrol leader Randell 
Herrod, written nearly twenty years after the event, is 
entirely unreliable, more fiction than fact. It does offer 
an interesting view of Herrod's self-serving recollection of 
events and the other court-martial actors.
For those wishing to become familiar with contemporary 
U.S. military justice there are only a few guides, although 
those few are authoritative and quite good,30 Gilligan and 
Lederer's recent two-volume Court-Martial Procedure, in 
particular. The current Manual for Courts-Martial, United 
States, remains the most authoritative guide.
These few titles are, of course, far from exhaustive. 
The reader will be aware of several, if not many, others that 
might have been included. Those noted are among the titles 
consulted and considered particularly worthy of attention, 
however.
No single volume has been encountered that discusses 
contemporary law of war, applies it to a case, and examines 
law of war through that application. It is submitted that 
this dissertation fills that gap. Through the Son Thang 
incident and resulting courts-martial one may review and 
determine the efficacy of U.S. military law in executing the 
law of war. Through the four courts-martial one may also 
examine the path of the law of war from convention to 
courtroom. Many works examine one end of that continuum or 
the other. None have been found that illustrate the
28A Soldier Reports.
29Gen. Lewis W. Walt, Strange War. Strange Strategy (NY: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970).
30Byrne, Military Law. 3d ed., now dated by publication of the Manual for Courts- 
Martial. 1984: and Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vols. 1-2.
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transformation of the law of war from treaty to application 
and through appeal.
7.1.d. Law of War Journal Articles For every book on the 
law of war there are several journal articles. Like books, 
the publication of articles peaks during and immediately 
after wars, but the flow never entirely stops. The British 
Year Book of International Law, the American Journal of 
International Law, and the International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly frequently carry authoritative law of war articles. 
So does the less rigorously academic journal of the 
International Society of Military Law and the Law of War, 
Revue de Droit PSnal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre. The 
Revue publishes articles in several languages in the same 
volume. The U.S. armed forces publish law-oriented journals 
which occasionally carry law of war articles.31 The quality of 
article is uneven, but often is quite high.32
A number of excellent articles set out the relationship 
of international law/law of war to municipal law systems and 
the individual — a basis for understanding war zone 
prosecutions.33 These treatises, despite the age of some, 
remain valuable guides.
A propos of the Son Thang incident, several articles 
examine the issue of superior orders in post-World War II 
law, illustrating the continuing vitality of that defense.34
3Military Law Review (Army); Naval Law Review (formerly, Journal of the Judge 
Advocate Generali and Air Force Law Review.
32e.g.. Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes," and "Air War and the Law of 
War"; Alley, "Determinants of Military Judicial Decisions"; Smith, "New Protections 
for Victims of International Armed Conflicts."
33Baxter, "The Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War 
Crimes"; Gamer, "Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War"; 
Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular 
Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals"; Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the 
Punishment of War Crimes"; Comment, "Punishment for War Crimes: Duty —  or 
Discretion?"; and Hooker and Savasten, "The Geneva Convention of 1949: Application in 
the Vietnamese Conflict"
34Green, "Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man"; Wilner, "Superior Orders as a 
Defense to Violations of International Criminal Law"; Beaumont, "Duress as a Defense to
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The My Lai incident, in which obedience to superior orders 
was a central issue, has been extensively examined in several 
excellent pieces.35 The legal status of the My Lai civilians 
and, by extension, the Son Thang civilians, is made clearer 
in several articles, as well.36
An overlooked article by the prosecutor of Calley's 
immediate commanding officer, Captain Medina, is instructive: 
in Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable 
Standard,37 one suspects the author of attempting to distance 
himself from Medina's questionable prosecution tactics by 
pleading a lack of applicable norms regarding a commander's 
personal criminal responsibility.38 In fact, such norms are 
reasonably clear. (See sections 2.1.b. and 4.3.C.) The 
article is nevertheless useful for its inside view of the 
failed Medina prosecution and some of its legal hurdles.
Those interested in the epistemology of the military 
legal system,39 or its comparative ontology,40 have several
Murder”; and particularly instructive, Daniel, "The Defense of Superior Orders,” by 
the tenacious prosecutor of Lt. Calley.
35Among them, Rubin, "Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident"; Norman G. Cooper, "My 
Lai and Military Justice-To What Effect?", 59 Military L. Rev. 93 (1973); Boudin, 
"War Crimes and Vietnam: The Mote in Whose Eye?"; and Paust, "My Lai and Vietnam: 
Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility."
36Nurick, "The Distinction Between Combatant and Noncombatant in the Law of War"; 
Paulson and Banta, "The Killings at My Lai"; Gehring, "Loss of Civilian Protections 
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I"; and Carnahan, "The Law of War in 
the United States Court of Military Appeals."
37Col. William G. Eckhardt, 97 Military L. Rev. 1 (1982). Eckhardt unsuccessfully 
prosecuted two other My Lai cases, Hutto and Kotouc, as well.
38Three excellent articles addressing much the same subject are, Parks, "Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes", comprehensive in its coverage; Franklin A. Hart, 
"Yamashita, Nuremberg and Vietnam: Command Responsibility Reappraised," 25 Naval 
War College Review 19 (1972); and, O'Brien, "The Law of War, Command 
Responsibility and Vietnam."
39Henderson, "Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding"; and 
the more perceptive, Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original 
Practice," pts. I and II. Early writings on military law are reviewed in: William C. 
Mott, John E. Hartnett, and Kenneth B. Morton, "A Survey of the Literature of Military 
Law-A Selective Bibliography," 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 333 (1953); and: John E. 
Hartnett, "Survey Extended-The Literature of Military Law Since 1952," 12 Vanderbilt 
L. Rev. 369 (1959).
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scholarly sources from which to choose. The dynamics of the
military system are explored in military journal articles,41
but not in academically rigorous fashion.
In several significant areas the law of war has evolved 
so as to overtake journal articles published during or prior 
to World War II. In this dissertation an attempt is made to 
locate authority primarily in recent pieces. But a few
contemporary articles reveal a lack of understanding of the
military legal system,42 are overly facile,43 or exhibit poor 
legal reasoning.44
Any article by W. Hays Parks, Chief of the International 
Law Branch, International Affairs Division, Department of the 
Army, merits attention.45 Probably America's leading law of 
war expert, he writes knowledgeable, incisive, comprehensive 
articles on the law of war.
7.2. Law of War Archival Material
in a case study, sources other than the strictly legal are 
crucial to forming a contextual framework. Where "closed" 
communities are concerned — police, intelligence, political, 
or military societies, for example — discovery and 
acquisition of information can be problematic. Merely 
knowing what documentation is available is a significant
40Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: 
A Comparative Study"; and: Ploscowe, "The Development of Present-Day Criminal 
Procedures in Europe and America."
41Quinn, both "Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice," and, 
"The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process"; Brookshire, 
"Juror Selection Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice: Fact and Fiction"; Alley, 
"Determinants of Military Judicial Decisions."
42Sutherland, "The Constitution: The Civilian, and Military Justice."
43Cox, "The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice."
44Paust, "After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal 
District Courts"; Richard C. Johnson, "Unlawful Command Influence: A Question of 
Balance," JAG Journal March-April 1965, 87; Philip E. Lower, "Operational Law: A 
Commander's Responsibility," Military Review Sept. 1987, 28 - all three written by 
judge advocates and published in military journals.
45"Command Responsibility for War Crimes"; "Crimes in Hostilities," pts. I and II; and 
"Air War and the Law of War."
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matter; knowing how to locate and secure that closed 
community's documentation, even more significant.
7.2.a. Military and Civilian Appellate Opinions Many
appellate opinions have been referred to and quoted here, the 
bulk of them military opinions. General courts-martial are 
federal trials,46 open to the public,47 their appellate 
opinions available in published compilations. Beginning in 
1951, when the UCMJ was first implemented, and continuing 
until 197 5, appellate opinions appear in a series of fifty 
Court-Martial Reporter volumes, referred to as "C.M.R.s." 
CMRs contain appellate opinions of the armed service courts 
of military review and the military high court, the Court of 
Military Appeals (COMA). For several years COMA also 
published its own reports in separate COMA reporters, but 
that series, now discontinued, is not in general 
distribution.
In 197 5 a new series of reporters, the Military Justice 
Reporter, or "M.J.s," succeeded the CMRs when a new 
government publishing contract was entered into. The MJs 
continue to publish most military appellate opinions. Some 
opinions, considered not of significant interest to the legal 
community, go unpublished. Copies of unpublished opinions 
usually may be obtained from the office of the judge advocate 
general of the armed service involved or, more easily, from 
the COMA library in Washington, D.C. Some military opinions 
are important in understanding the law of war as it is 
enforced in the U.S. armed services.48
British and American civilian appellate opinions 
relating to the law of war require only the usual citations 
for their location. So, too, opinions of the International
46Middendorf v Henry.
47Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. par. 53.e.
48t/.& v Calley (all three appellate opinions, civilian and military); U.S. v Griffen\ U.S. 
v Keenan; U.S. v Schultz.
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Court of Justice and opinions contained in the International 
Law Reporter.
7.2.b. Marine Corps Court-Martial Records verbatim records 
of trial are crucial in relating the Son Thang incident. 
Records of trial are stored in repositories near Washington, 
D.C. Access to Marine Corps court-martial transcripts is 
through the Promulgation Section, Office of the Judge 
Advocate General of the Navy, in Washington. Presuming the 
researcher's access to the records system, location of 
Vietnam-era records still is not assured, however.
To obtain a record the court-martial number, by which 
records are stored, is required. Court-martial numbers are 
shown in reported opinions. If the case is unreported, an 
incomplete, hand-written, Promulgation Office card file must 
be searched to determine the case number. Even with a case 
number, many records are unavailable because lost, stolen, or 
mis-filed. Thus the third, final volume of the Schwarz 
record is lost, with its instructions and exhibits. The 
Green, and Boyd records are lost in toto.
Having obtained a case number, a request is submitted 
and forwarded to the repository. Several days later the 
record may be located and made available.
7.2.C. The Marine Corps Historical Center The mchc, in 
Washington, D.C., is a rich archival source, particularly in 
relation to the Vietnam War. In addition to a large and 
specialized military library, MCHC holds many Vietnam-era 
documentary and tactical records. Its Oral History Section 
maintains hundreds of tape-recorded interviews, many recorded 
in Vietnam. The interviews of senior officers have been 
transcribed and bound. The Vietnam War's combat 
chronologies, and message files of major Marine units, held 
in the Archives Section, are contemporary records that 
establish a reliable picture of combat actions more 
dependable than a participant's recollection. Casualty
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records and selected personnel files are available in the 
Research Section.
Unlike access to court-martial records, which is 
severely limited even to judge advocates, any researcher may 
examine and usually photocopy MCHC holdings.
7.2.d. Library Sources Major law libraries hold most of the 
non-military cases, books, and articles already mentioned. 
In the U.S. the Library of Congress, in Washington, D.C., is 
a source of otherwise unavailable books and records. in 
London, the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies holds many 
difficult-to-find works.
Specialized libraries in the U.S. also provide important 
archival material. The libraries of the Court of Military 
Appeals, the Navy Historical Center, and the Department of 
Defense (the Pentagon), all in Washington, D.C., and the 
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, in Quantico, 
Virginia, were profitably consulted, as was the small library 
of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of 
War, in Brussels. The libraries of the U.S. Military 
Academy, at West Point, New York, and the U.S. Naval Academy, 
at Annapolis, Maryland, were of lesser help because they 
contain little unique material. Several of the libraries 
mentioned require special permission for entry.*
The library of the Army's School of the Judge Advocate 
General, in Charlottesville, Virginia, is the most complete 
military law library in the U.S. In addition to its many 
books, it holds several thousand theses completed by judge 
advocate graduates of the School's year-long career course in 
military law. They, too, are excellent sources.49
* Those of West Point, Annapolis, the Pentagon, the Army's JAG School, and the Marine 
Command and Staff College.
49e.g., Williams, "The Army Lawyer as an International Law Instructor: Dissemination 
of die Conventions"; and Norene, "Obedience to Orders as a Defense to a Criminal Act"
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7.3. Unique Law of War Sources
Writer/researchers often bring unique personal experience to 
their projects, crucial in assembling needed data and gaining 
access to otherwise closed sources. Such was the instant 
case.
7.3.a. Military Background The author was a Marine with 
twenty-three years active service, five as a line officer, 
eighteen as a judge advocate. One-and-a-half tours of duty 
were served in Vietnam as a line officer. Marines under his 
command were charged with offenses in the nature of war 
crimes — not grave breaches — involving Vietnamese 
noncombatants. As a judge advocate the author participated 
in 800 courts-martial and held most of the legal billets 
described herein.
7.3.b. Previous Writings Besides essays and reviews in the 
professional journal, Marine Corps Gazette, the author 
researched and wrote the Marine Corps' official history of 
military law in Vietnam,50 completed in 1989 while assigned to 
the Marine Corps Historical Center. That assignment provides 
an enduring access to MCHC archival material, and opens doors 
to related sources.
7.3.C. Official Sources The combination of prior writings 
and a military legal career make official research sources 
available that might open to others only with difficulty. 
Preparing an official history, for instance, required 
contacting all surviving Marine Corps lawyers who served in 
Vietnam. Many of them were also willing to assist in the 
present writing. Navy and Court of Military Appeals sources 
were also opened, as were Pentagon offices, Military Academy 
and Naval Academy sources.
50Solis, Marines and Military Law.
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7.3.d. Unofficial Sources Many participants in the Son 
Thang courts-martial are friends or former co-workers of the 
author. Some have gone on to other positions related to 
military or international law, providing a further-expanded 
network of sources. Former Marines or judge advocates 
include the current Chief, International Law Branch, of the 
Department of the Army; a past Secretary of the Navy; a 
current board member of the international Society for 
Military Law and the Law of War; and the current Clerk of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. All provided material for this 
dissertation.
Most of the judge advocates and civilian lawyers who 
participated in the Son Thang courts-martial assisted, as 
well. Through them previously undiscovered sources emerged, 
such as the 900-page, verbatim Son Thang Article 32 pretrial 
investigation, stored in a garage for eighteen years. 
Article 32 investigations are not retained in official record 
systems. Photographs, letters, and other documents lost to 
official archives were similarly located. Unofficial 
contacts facilitated the loan of records of trial, message 
and correspondence files, and military records, and 
individuals were willing to be interviewed regarding usually 
undiscussed subjects.
In conducting research involving material and records of 
a specialized nature, such as courts-martial, it has proved a 
significant advantage to be of the society that produces and 
employs that material and those records.
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CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
"We should perhaps not so  much complain that the law of war does not work well, as  
marvel that It works at all."
Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare
Were a judge advocate-participant in the Son Thang 
trials asked how he came to be in that rough combat zone 
courtroom, trying Marines for multiple murder, he would have 
thought it an odd question. When members of a U.S. armed 
force kill noncombatants — or anyone else — Article 118 of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is violated and 
prosecution by general court-martial must follow, the 
military lawyer might have responded. The law of war? Yes, 
that too is involved, but not, he might say, in an overt way.
It is an indication of the evolutionary process of the 
law of nations, in a sense demonstrating the inevitability of 
its maturation and incorporation into the municipal law of 
modern states, that officers of the court could be the 
contemporary enforcing agents of the law of war without 
explicitly invoking it. So fully are aspects of the law of 
war incorporated into American military law, and the military 
justice codes of other nations, that its presence may go 
unnoticed.
In this chapter the events discussed in preceding 
sections are summarized. From that review, general 
conclusions are offered. Drawing from the summary and 
conclusions, recommendations are made to improve future 
prosecutions of battlefield war crimes committed by both 
friendly and the enemy forces.
8.1 Summary
Like most law, public international law arose from custom. 
Custom, along with general principles of law, conventions, 
judicial decisions, and the writings of scholars, form a body
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of jurisprudence around which case law and treaty-made law 
have developed, forming contemporary international law.
international law has no central law-making authority or 
inherent enforcement mechanism, those functions necessarily 
being left to the states embracing the system. Enforcement 
of international law, if imperfect, is nevertheless tangible, 
carried out by the political systems that employ that law, it 
being in the best interests of nations to honor their 
international obligations. World public opinion, as well as 
inter-state commercial, economic, and political endeavors, 
often turn on the observance of international norms.
An aspect of customary international law is its 
application to individuals in criminal forums. Piracy, slave 
trade, breach of blockade, carriage of contraband — through 
custom and state practice, crimes for which an accused is 
held personally liable under international law, that law 
enforced by the municipal courts of any nation capturing 
violators. Such prosecutions are an exception to usual rules 
of criminal jurisdiction, but the duty of a state to punish 
such violations of international law is itself a matter of 
international law. Whether punishment is carried out by 
application of a state's own municipal law, or directly, 
without domestic legislation, is left to each state. By 
either means, it is international law which is enforced.
The criminal prosecution of individuals charged with 
committing war crimes is an instance of the enforcement of 
international norms through a state's municipal courts.
8.1.a. War: Its Law. Its Crimes Commencing in the mid­
seventeenth century, the rise of modern states brought 
state-executed war. Today, wars are usually fought for 
political ends, raising a need for rules pointing to a 
furtherance, rather than a hindrance of those ends. 
Unchecked indiscriminate violence would inevitably prevent 
the political rapprochement and realignment that follows war.
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Usually, the definition of war crimes is vague, given 
the wide variety of possible offenses. "Criminal acts 
against soldiers or civilians of another country," is one 
definition.1 "Acts that remain criminal even though committed 
in the course of war, lying outside the immunity prescribed 
by the laws of war," is another.2 The more specific the 
definition the more clearly like common criminal offenses war 
crimes sound.
in applying the law of war to individuals, the 
competence of states to try accused war criminals, including 
their own nationals, has become accepted customary law. The 
forum for such trials might be international tribunal, 
civilian municipal court, or military court — most frequently 
the latter.
The most notable application of the law of war in recent 
times, the Nuremberg Trials, were international tribunals. 
Those Trials were followed by numerous related national 
tribunals and commissions. Through the less-heralded trials 
under Allied Control Council Law No. 10, many lower-ranking 
accuseds were tried for malum in se, battlefield war crimes. 
Other post-World War II war crimes trials included the 
military commission that tried General Yamashita, found 
guilty of failure to control his troops and permitting their 
atrocities.
Although legal opinion remains divided as to the justice 
of the Yamashita trial and the IMTs , they represent the high- 
water mark of the law of war. They reaffirmed the validity 
of international law of war norms and demonstrated that there 
remains the risk, however remote, of prosecution for war 
crimes.
In 1949, 58 nations signed four Geneva Conventions
pertaining to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, to POWs,
1Handel v Artukovic.
2Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam. 21.
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and to civilians.3 One hundred and sixty-five nations have 
ratified those Conventions, making them "adhered to by more 
states than any other agreements on the laws of war."4 The 
1949 Conventions remain the clearest statement of today's law 
of war. The "common articles" of the 1949 Conventions charge 
signatory states to search for, arrest, and bring to trial 
those committing the grave breaches defined in the 1949 
Conventions — in effect postulating universal criminal 
jurisdiction of a mandatory character. Most often that 
entails states employing existing municipal criminal law and 
institutional machinery in prosecuting grave breaches — 
military law in the case of the United States, contained in 
its UCMJ.
In some nations where trial is by court-martial, the 
charges are brought as violations of the military code 
involved, without requiring war crime charges per se. Such 
was the case in the trial of four U.S. Marines tried for the 
murder of sixteen Vietnamese noncombatants in the hamlet of 
Son Thang, in 1970.
8.1.b. U.S. Forces and the Son Thang Patrol criminal 
jurisdiction is usually territorial. Yet throughout the 
Vietnam War, by U.S.-South Vietnamese agreement, U.S. 
servicemen charged with murdering South Vietnamese civilians 
in South Vietnam were tried by U.S. military courts.
The My Lai incident had not yet gone to trial, but came 
to light three months before the Son Thang incident occurred. 
It has been argued that the killing of the My Lai victims, 
citizens of a U.S. co-belligerent, was not a war crime 
because 1949 Geneva Convention IV, relating to civilians, 
specifically excludes co-belligerents from its inventory of 
protected persons. That argument might apply equally to the 
Son Thang victims. But in both instances the law of war was
3Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Law of War. 326-31.
4Ibid., 169.
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violated and grave breaches committed. Were the My Lai and 
Son Thang captives the enemy, protected by the POW 
convention? "Should any doubt arise as to whether 
persons.. .belong to any of the categories [of POW] 
enumerated," the Convention reads, "...such persons shall 
enjoy the protection of the present Convention..."5 The 
argument that U.S. forces at My Lai ought reasonably to have 
considered the Vietnamese villagers to be suspected VC, and 
protected persons, is compelling in the case of both My Lai 
Son Thang.
In early 1970, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7), 
part of the 1st Marine Division, was led by a promising but 
untested commander. The battalion's junior officers were 
energetic but inexperienced. First Lieutenant Lewis R. 
Ambort commanded Company B. Ambort was aggressive, cocky, 
and given to inflating his company's combat reports. On 19 
February 1970, a nighttime patrol was formed from Marines of 
the second platoon of Company B, 1/7. Referred to within the 
company as a "killer team," the patrol's mission was only 
vaguely understood, even by those who directed its formation. 
Essentially, the killer team was to move through the 
surrounding area, which included the village of Son Thang, 
hoping to encounter the VC and engage them in combat. The 
patrol's guiding standard was simply, and erroneously, 
"anything that moves at night is fair game."6
The five-man killer team was led by Lance Corporal 
Randell Herrod, a combat veteran recommended for award of the 
prestigious Silver Star medal for previous combat valor. 
Herrod was also awaiting confirmation of a prior court- 
martial for unauthorized absence, for which he would shortly 
be reduced to the grade of private. Patrol leaders were 
usually noncommissioned officers and Herrod's casual
5Art. 5.
T^estimony of battalion commander, Lt.Col. Charles G. Cooper in record of trial, U.S. v 
Schwarz, 290.
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selection as leader reflects an odd departure from the 
standard practice. Apparently he was designated leader 
because of his experience and because no one more senior had 
volunteered-. Had there been no volunteers a patrol leader 
would have been appointed — almost certainly a corporal or 
sergeant.
The other team members included Private Michael Schwarz, 
a markedly unintelligent individual. Trailing an egregious 
disciplinary record, Schwarz had joined Company B only five 
days previously.
Private First Class Samuel Green had served two years 
civilian confinement before enlisting in the Marines less 
than six months previously. He had joined Company B only a 
week before and it was his first combat patrol.
Private First Class Thomas Boyd and Lance Corporal 
Michael Krichten had unremarkable records. They had been 
together in the same squad for seven months, the only two 
patrol members who knew each other before the day of the 
patrol.
Prior to the killer team's Son Thang patrol Company B, 
itself on an extended patrol, had been in virtually constant 
enemy contact. Nine of its number had been killed within the 
week preceding the Son Thang patrol, another only hours 
before the killer team was formed. That may account for 
Lieutenant Ambort' s inflammatory guidance to the Son Thang 
killer team, to "shoot first and ask questions later....Don't 
let them get us any more," he told them. "I want you to pay 
these little bastards back."7
As darkness fell the patrol approached Son Thang, a 
hamlet of five or six thatched- roof, bamboo-framed huts. At 
the first hut they encountered the four occupants were 
ordered outside. As the Vietnamese, two children and two 
women, one of them blind, stood before the killer team, one 
of the women suddenly ran. Herrod shot and wounded her, then
7Testimony of Lt. Ambort, ibid., 348.
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ordered Schwarz to "finish her off."8 At point blank range, 
Schwarz shot her with his pistol. Herrod then ordered the 
patrol to kill the remaining three. With only slight 
hesitation, the patrol opened fire at a range of ten to 
fifteen feet.
Leaving the four dead Vietnamese where they had fallen, 
the team moved to a second hut where much the same sequence 
of events occurred: on Herrod's order, a woman and five
children were shot dead by the patrol.
At a third hut six more Vietnamese, two women and four 
children, were killed, including a child of five or six 
years, again shot at point blank range by Schwarz at Herrod's 
order.
There is no evidence of motive or purpose for the 
killings being voiced by any member of the patrol, either at 
the time, or later. Court records do not indicate what 
conversation, if any, transpired during the incident.
Called back to Company B's position, Herrod reported 
that the killer team had encountered a VC patrol and killed 
six of the enemy. Lieutenant Ambort, suspecting, if not 
knowing, the truth, relayed the false report to battalion 
headquarters, embellishing it by forwarding an enemy weapon 
captured days before, reporting it captured by Herrod.
The next morning, another patrol discovered the victims' 
bodies and relayed to battalion headquarters the Vietnamese 
allegations that Marines had murdered the villagers the night 
before. As the only unit in that area, Company B was 
recalled to battalion headquarters and, after written 
warnings against self-incrimination, the patrol members were 
questioned, in sworn statements all five reported that they 
had heard male voices coming from the huts but upon 
investigation discovered only women and children. While they 
detained the Vietnamese, the patrol members unanimously said,
8Testimony of LCpl. Krichten, ibid., 286.
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they were taken under fire by VC. In returning fire the 
Vietnamese victims were caught in the crossfire and killed.
Immediately suspicious, the battalion operations officer 
mounted his own patrol to Son Thang and quickly realized from 
the location of the bodies and the absence of possible enemy 
ambush sites that the patrol’s account was false. Returning 
to battalion headquarters, he again advised the patrol 
members of their rights and asked if they desired to revise 
their initial statements. Herrod and Green stood by their 
first statements. Schwarz, however, yielded to questioning 
and tearfully wrote a lengthy second statement, admitting the 
criminal actions of the patrol and confirming an absence of 
enemy fire. He wrote that he had obeyed Herrod's order to 
fire on the victims. Boyd and Krichten followed with their 
own similar written admissions. All five were placed in 
pretrial confinement.
8.1.C. Law of War and Son Thang Trial Issues The acts 
committed at Son Thang were common war crimes. For hundreds 
of years wars have been governed, with greater or lesser 
effectiveness, by rules and laws forbidding such acts. In 
this century the Treaty of Versailles ending the first world 
war was the first international effort to try individual war 
criminals. The resulting Leipzig trials, in which Germany 
was allowed to try her own citizens for war crimes alleged by 
the Allies, proved "a farce."9 But they highlighted issues 
that were to recur at Nuremberg, and in Vietnam.
As warfare has "matured," ushering in area bombing and 
mobilization of entire populations, the distinction between 
civilians and combatants has grown ever more difficult to 
draw. Today, the civilian-combatant distinction is largely 
illusory on a strategic level, but remains clear-cut in 
battlefield situations involving moral choice and criminal 
intent. The Son Thang civilians, even if considered co­
9Wilner, "Superior Orders As A Defense to Violations of International Criminal Ljaw," 
13 4 .
292
belligerent nationals and unprotected persons in terms of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, were not "fair game." If by nothing 
else they were protected by the criminal law applicable to 
all U.S. armed service personnel, wherever located. The 
murder of unresisting, captive women and children, including 
a blind female and six Vietnamese children under nine years 
of age, was not without legal remedy.
The Son Thang killings were grave breaches akin to 
others committed by both sides in the Vietnam War. Assessing 
the extent of U.S. war crimes in Vietnam is impossible, for 
many such crimes went unreported and undiscovered. The most 
reliable indicator,,- unofficial and perhaps incomplete, 
reflects seventy-one war-time U.S. court-martial convictions 
for the murder of Vietnamese noncombatants.10 Illustrating 
only one problem of "reliable" statistics, at least one of 
those convictions, for the murder of a Vietnamese drug 
dealer, was not a war crime. Statistics relating to lesser 
law of war offenses are even less authoritative. 
Ultimately, the number of Vietnam war crimes cannot even be 
accurately estimated.
A war crimes issue central to two of the Son Thang 
courts-martial was that of superior orders. Today's U.S. 
military standard was first enunciated in an 1813 civil case: 
obedience to superior orders is not a defense if the 
subordinate knows, or ought to know, that the order is 
illegal. But under U.S. and British military law, until 
midway through World War II, the standard was quite 
different: obedience to orders was an absolute defense,
although commanders issuing illegal orders could be punished 
for their execution.11 (Ironically, German military law 
consistently applied the harsher U.S. civil standard.) As 
the end of the second World War approached and the trial of
10Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," pt. 1, 18.
J1War Dept., Rules of Land Warfare. 1914. par. 366; Edmonds and Oppenheim, Land 
Warfare, par. 443.
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German war criminals was considered, the U.S. and Britain 
revised their law of war manuals to effectively exclude 
superior orders as a defense to knowingly-committed war 
crimes.
That rule, contained in the Nuremberg IMT's Charter, was 
a rule of absolute liability for the commission of war crimes 
pursuant to orders. In practice, however, the rule was 
softened by application of a "moral choice," or duress test. 
In 1956, in its revised Law of Land Warfare manual, the stern 
U.S. position on obedience to orders was eased by injection 
of a mens rea test: the defense of obedience to orders is 
unavailable unless the accused "did not know and could not 
reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered 
was unlawful."12 That an individual acted pursuant to orders 
may be considered in mitigation of punishment, as well.
The subjective element of the defense of superior orders 
— "did not know" the order’s unlawfulness — was central to 
most U.S. courts-martial involving superior orders in 
Vietnam. Although much is made of the soldier's difficult 
position in having to discern the illegal orders from the 
legal, in fact the problem seldom arises. Most battlefield 
war crimes are simple malum in se offenses displaying 
illegality as a matter of law — situations recognizable to 
the dullest layman.
The commander's personal responsibility for ordering war 
crimes has remained essentially unchanged throughout this 
century. Commanders who order, or knowingly condone, war 
crimes may be held criminally liable; not an instance of 
absolute liability, but an application of a reasonableness 
test. Applying this standard to the Son Thang case it is 
apparent that commanders above the company level did not 
warrant prosecution. It was the five killer team members 
alone who would face trial for the events at Son Thang, 
applying the law of war, as well as municipal criminal law.
12Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, par. 509.a.
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The general court-martial's (GCM's) jurisdictional basis 
over war crimes is contained in the U.S. Constitution, which 
gives Congress the right to both punish "offenses against the 
law of nations,"13 and to make rules for the government of the 
armed forces.14 The UCMJ, which specifically provides for the 
punishment of war crimes,15 is federal law16 enacted by 
Congress. In application, war crimes by U.S. forces which 
are also offenses under the UCMJ are charged as those 
criminal law offenses, rather than as war crimes.
Military justice, once denigrated with some cause, had 
come far since the initial implementation of the UCMJ in 
1951. With its significant 1969 reforms, military justice 
was further improved and made as fair and just as any common 
law judicial system. It was that military system that 
decided the Son Thang cases.
8.1.d. Son Thang Trials and Appeals Eighteen days after 
being confined, the five Son Thang accused appeared before a 
joint preliminary inquiry. Over the course of twelve days 
each accused, represented by appointed military defense 
counsel, heard the prosecution's probable cause case. Not 
required to raise a defense or present evidence at that 
stage, no accused did so. At the investigation's conclusion 
the hearing officer recommended that the five be tried by 
GCM, each charged with sixteen counts of premeditated murder.
The first to go to trial was Private Schwarz. Another 
member of the patrol, Krichten, had been granted immunity in 
exchange for his testimony. Schwarz, faced with his own 
handwritten, sworn statement that the patrol had encountered 
no enemy in Son Thang, and detailing his and his co-actor's 
conduct there, knew that his best defense was to keep that 
statement from being entered into evidence. His military
13Art. 1, § 8, clause 10.
14Ibid., clause 14.
15 Art. 18.
16Title 10, U.S. Code, ch. 47.
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defense counsel argued that because of the strain Schwarz had 
been under, and the overly-compelling conduct of the 
battalion's initial investigation, the self-incriminating 
statement had been improperly coerced. That tack failed and 
the statement came before the members. Also admitted into 
evidence over strenuous defense objections were nine color 
photographs of the dead victims. Krichten's testimony was 
further damning. Schwarz, taking the stand in his own 
defense, asserted that the patrol had actually been ambushed 
and the civilian victims killed in the resulting crossfire 
directed by Herrod. Unpersuasive in attempting to reconcile 
that testimony with his contrary written statement, Schwarz 
was found guilty of twelve counts of unpremeditated murder. 
Then, after his abysmal disciplinary record was put into 
evidence, he was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and 
confinement at hard labor for life.
The next day, Private First Class Boyd went on trial. 
Unlike Schwarz, Boyd was represented by a civilian lawyer, 
appearing without fee. Boyd chose to be tried "judge alone" 
— without members. Believing the defense of superior orders 
to be futile, Boyd argued that he had indeed fired, but over 
the victims' heads. Krichten, the immunized government 
witness who had been Boyd's squadmate for seven months, 
surprised the prosecution by corroborating that defense. The 
military judge acquitted Boyd.
Seven weeks later, Private First Class Green, 
represented by his military lawyer, was less fortunate. 
Essentially putting the government to its proof, Green 
stressed his youth, combat inexperience, and obedience to 
Herrod's orders to fire. Krichten, again helpful to the 
defense, testified that Green had fired, but recalled no 
specific victim being hit by his fire. Despite the erroneous 
defense testimony of Green's battalion commander that Marines 
are taught to always obey all orders, Green was convicted by 
the members of fifteen counts of unpremeditated murder and
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sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and confinement at hard 
labor for a surprisingly mild five years.
The court-martial of patrol leader Herrod was last to be 
tried. Represented by two experienced civilian criminal 
defense lawyers, also acting without fee, the case was heard 
by a members panel of six officers. Aggressive from the 
outset, the defense made numerous pretrial motions and 
vigorously cross-examined the government witnesses. In their 
case-in-chief the defense postulated that the patrol had been 
ambushed, and presented evidence of a machine gun captured, 
they contended, near Son Thang soon after the patrol. 
Numerous defense witnesses confirmed hearing automatic 
weapons fire come from Son Thang on the night of the 
killings. Herrod repeated the story he had consistently held 
to: the patrol was fired upon by the enemy and the Vietnamese 
victims were killed in the ensuing crossfire. From pretrial 
motions to final arguments the prosecuting judge advocates 
were outclassed by the civilian defense team. Although 
subsequent juror interviews reveal a deep split in the 
members' recollections of the evidence, Herrod was found not 
guilty of all charges.
Following his acquittal he was given his previously- 
earned Silver Star medal, award of which had been delayed 
pending the outcome of his trial. He was then returned to 
the U.S. and honorably discharged to enroll in college.
Six-and-a-half months after the killings, the Son Thang 
trials were completed, the law of war not having been 
explicitly raised by either side. But each case had been 
vigorously prosecuted, with the genuine potential for 
findings of guilt and imposition of serious penalties — 
penalties in Schwarz' and Green's cases which were no more or 
less harsh than those in cases involving the murder of U.S. 
soldiers by other U.S. soldiers. The victim's nationality 
was not a factor in the quantum of punishment.
The UCMJ effectively fulfilled its function in. 
identifying and prosecuting those charged with grave breaches
297
of the law of war. Lacking an international criminal forum, 
the UCMJ demonstrated its ability to act in the capacity of 
arbiter and enforcement arm of the law of war.
Upon initial review of the cases, the convening 
authority mitigated the confinement portions of both Schwarz* 
and Green's sentences to one year, effectively reducing their 
imprisonment to time served. The assistant to the convening 
authority suggests that the reductions were an effort, in 
light of the two acquittals, particularly Herrod's, to 
achieve balanced justice. Instead, the reductions raise the 
question of the overall adequacy of punishment meted out to 
those convicted of Vietnam war crimes.
Although Schwarz and Green were released from 
confinement and discharged from the Marine Corps, their cases 
were forwarded to Washington, D.C. for completion of the 
military appellate process. The two cases presented similar'' 
issues and were similarly decided.
The military appellate court found that the issue of 
superior orders, contrary to the contention of appellate 
defense lawyers, had been submitted to the members with 
sufficient clarity and that, by their verdicts, the members 
had rejected that defense. Further, the acquittal of Herrod 
did not raise the doctrine of res judicata as to Schwarz and 
Green; absolving Herrod did not require that they also be 
acquitted.
A civilian court's 197 5 dismissal of Green's collateral 
attack on his military conviction ended the Son Thang 
litigation. Soon thereafter, Green shot and killed himself. 
Schwarz, able to find employment only as a laborer, was last 
seen in 1987. Herrod dropped out of college, held a variety 
of jobs and, in 1989, published a fanciful book about his 
Vietnam experiences.
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8.2 Conclusions
The conclusions to be drawn from the Son Thang incident and 
its subsequent courts-martial are related and are simply 
stated.
8.2.a. The Law of War is Enforced by Domestic Military Law
As postulated by international legal authorities, 
particularly since the turn of this century, domestic 
criminal law can effectively enforce international norms. So 
also can domestic military law enforce the law of war, 
including instances where one's own nationals are concerned. 
Particularly when, as in Son Thang, the offenses involved are 
battlefield malum in se crimes for which international 
tribunals are unlikely. The laws of war are customary 
international law, requiring no transfiguration, so rights 
and duties created by international law and the law of war 
are directly applicable to individual soldiers through the 
instrumentality of domestic military law. War crimes are 
crimes; it is irrelevant whether the charge sounds in law of 
war or in terms of the military code involved; to execute one 
is to enforce the other.
8.2.b. The UCMJ is Effective Domestic Military Law No
individual involved in the Son Thang prosecutions indicated a 
special awareness that he was executing international law of 
war obligations. When domestic military law and the law of 
war are coextensive, such an awareness is irrelevant. The 
UCMJ' s incorporation by reference of the law of war is all 
the jurisdictional grant necessary to transform U.S. military 
law into law of war, whether or not explicitly acknowledged 
by those invoking and applying it. The Son Thang courts- 
martial demonstrate the utility, validity, and practicality 
of courts-martial in meeting America's obligations under 
international law and the law of war.
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8.2.C. The UCMJ Enforces the Law of War The Leipzig 
trials illustrate that trying one's own nationals through 
application of domestic law is not always undertaken in good 
faith. The Son Thang trials demonstrate that no such 
assertion can be supported concerning battlefield war crimes 
committed by U.S. personnel during the Vietnam War. From the 
initial landing of U.S. troops through their final 
withdrawal, discovered battlefield war crimes were 
investigated and vigorously prosecuted.
The Son Thang trials involved virtually every judge 
advocate assigned to the 1st Marine Division. "Six and-a- 
half day workweeks, and working at night were routine..."17 
Long hours do not ensure good faith effort, but do suggest a 
genuine commitment to bring such cases to trial. The 
manpower expenditure, administrative effort, financial 
expense, and emotional toll involved in the Son Thang cases 
reflect the effort to achieve justice. Whether or not one 
views the results as just, the prosecutions were vigorous and 
sincere.
8.2.d . Am erican M ilitary Justice: Im perfectly Effective
Vigor and sincerity notwithstanding, there are weaknesses in 
the military justice system where law of war prosecutions are 
concerned. The Son Thang trials illustrate several of them.
Currently, the personnel implementing the system are 
those least experienced in its application. Newly 
commissioned judge advocates, only recently graduated from 
law school, are those assigned courtroom responsibilities. 
With seniority and experience they are made administrative or 
supervisory officers. This makes room for new tyro judge 
advocates but also perpetuates trial inexperience. In U.S. 
military courtrooms it is unusual to see a major trying 
cases; rare to see a lieutenant colonel doing so; a colonel, 
unheard of. Many junior Marine captains are superior trial
17King interview, 5 Nov. 1986.
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lawyers, having honed their skills in numerous courtroom 
contests. But they are not in the majority. It is 
disquieting to note that the Son Thang accuseds defended by 
military lawyers were convicted; those defended by civilian 
lawyers acquitted. In each trial, without exception, every 
judge advocate representing either the government or an 
accused was on his first tour of duty and had not tried a 
case before arriving in Vietnam. A Court of Military Appeals 
judge urges: "If we get into this situation again, we won't 
allow inexperienced people to carry the ball. This is an 
important case — send me your best."18 There is no provision 
to do so, however.
Three of the Son Thang accused were discharged either 
immediately upon acquittal, or after initial review of their 
trials. Their enlistments had expired while their cases were 
in progress. Military administrative regulations and 
judicial opinion19 provide that one may not be discharged 
while undergoing disciplinary proceedings. But if war crimes 
— or any crimes — are discovered after discharge of the 
suspect, the military loses court-martial jurisdiction and 
lacks authority to recall suspects to active duty for trial. 
Lieutenant Calley was only days from discharge when charges 
against him were signed by a junior Army judge advocate, 
concerned that Calley might escape military jurisdiction.20 
That potential loss of jurisdiction requires correction.
Since Vietnam, the law of war instruction received by 
judge advocates has been significantly increased but remains 
insufficient to create the proficiency necessary to 
effectively prosecute war crimes, or to recognize their 
unique issues and defenses. The few hours devoted to the law 
of war at judge advocate training schools are soon forgotten 
in the press of more ordinary courtroom encounters. The
18Cox interview, 7 Dec. 1990.
l9U.S. v Brown, 31 CMR 279 (USCMA, 1962); U.S. v Howard, 20 MJ 353 (USCMA, 
1985).
20Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley. 31.
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several annual refresher courses are available only to a 
small percentage of judge advocates, with no assurance they 
will ever have an opportunity to implement the skills gained. 
Law of war cases, few as they are, call for specialized 
knowledge applied by a specially trained few.
When battlefield war crimes are again tried, and they 
assuredly will be, these weaknesses will probably continue, 
the deficiencies considered too remote and conjectural to 
require action today. Inexperienced judge advocates, having 
received scant law of war training in the distant past, will 
again conduct the courts-martial with, one hopes, positive 
results.
8.3 Recommendations
Several modifications to the U.S. military justice system and 
military practice would materially enhance the enforcement of 
law of war and the prosecution of battlefield war crimes. 
These suggested modifications require a minimum of federal 
legislation, or change in existing federal law.
One recommendation that might have made a difference if 
applied in the Son Thang trials involves no more than 
employment of a tactic already provided for in military law, 
used in the past but,21 because of difficulties in its 
application,22 is now in disuse: common trials.23 The Son
Thang case was an ideal incident for consideration of such an 
approach, involving a single act or offense committed by two 
or more individuals, in concert and in pursuance of a common 
intent. Though admittedly difficult to control, a common
21 e.g., U.S. v Aikens, 5 B.R. 331 (1950).
22e.g., U.S. v Petro and Ferrell, 44 CMR 511 (ACMR, 1971). Common trials are 
difficult for military judges in terms of control, and difficult for prosecutors in terms 
of redaction of conflicting written statements, inconsistent pleas, and confrontation 
issues. See: Manual for Courts-Martial. 1984. Military Rule of Evidence 306; Gilligan 
and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vol. 1, 248; and Bruton v 17.5., 391 U.S. 123 
(1969) .
23Manual for Courts-Martial. 1969. pars. 26.d, and 33.1.
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trial is possible in such cases. Other, more substantial 
changes could make a meaningful difference.
8.3.a. Revise FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare The basic 
U.S. law of war manual referred to by units in the field — 
the guide relied upon by the infantry commander — is Field 
Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare. An Army publication, 
it is consulted by the Marine Corps, as well.* There are 
various departmental and service orders on the same subject, 
but FM 27-10 is held in each battalion Operations Officer's 
field library and every SJA's office.
FM 27-10 played no direct part in the Son Thang trials. 
And had its contents been current and more relevant it 
remains possible that its cautionary guidance regarding 
noncombatants would have still gone unheeded. But as the 
sole law of war/international law manual available at the 
infantry battalion level, it should be as current, 
comprehensive, and understandable as possible.
The latest in a line of manuals on the subject dating 
back to 1914, FM 27-10 was issued in July 1956. Since its 
initial implementation it has seen but one change, in 197 6, 
five pages in length, relating solely to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol prohibiting use of poisonous gases and 
bacteriological weapons. U.S. ratification of that Protocol 
in 1975 initiated that change.
Since FM 27-10 was issued the 1948 U.N. Convention on 
genocide, and the 1954 Hague Convention, and Protocol, for 
the protection of cultural property, all three signed but 
unratified by the U.S., may well have become customary 
international law, enforceable against U.S. personnel even 
without U.S. ratification. The 1977 Protocols I and II, 
though not ratified, include numerous provisions accepted by 
the U.S. which are not contained or explained in FM 27-10. 
The 1977 U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of Military Use
* The Navy and Air Force utilize their own manuals, oriented toward their non-land- 
bound missions.
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of Environmental Modification Techniques, ratified by the 
U.S. in 1980, goes unmentioned, as does the unratified 1981 
U.N. Convention prohibiting or restricting use of certain 
conventional weapons — some incendiary armaments and booby 
traps, fl^chettes, et cetera — considered excessively 
injurious or indiscriminate.
The post-World War II High Command and Yamashita cases, 
the My Lai Medina decision, and the 1977 Protocols, with 
their differing standards on the subject, have muddied the 
concept of command responsibility. This topic, too, calls 
for modification of FM 27-10. Any revision should make clear 
that in today's law of armed conflict there are two aspects 
to a commander's potential criminal responsibility: that 
involving individual criminal activity, for instance, through 
issuance of manifestly illegal orders, as in the Calley case; 
and that involving a commander's imputed knowledge and 
nonfeasance: responsibility for a subordinate's criminal
misconduct of which the commander knew or should have known, 
and about which he takes no action, as in the Medina case. 
It should be made plain that, in the latter type case, the 
standard employed in Captain Medina's court-martial, 
requiring that a commander have actual knowledge of a 
subordinate's misconduct, was in error. The correct standard 
is one of reasonableness: personal criminal liability follows 
if the commander knew, or was in possession of facts from 
which he should have known of a subordinate's misconduct. 
Actual knowledge, of course, will also result in liability. 
(That clarification should be reflected in an amendment to 
the Manual for Courts-Martial, as well.)
Weapons employment is in need of explanation. How valid 
is the U.S. presumption of legality of any weapon currently 
in its supply system? Napalm and depleted uranium munitions 
come to mind.
New means and methods of warfare should be discussed. 
Is electronic jamming prior to initiating hostilities itself 
a hostile act? If an enemy radar installation can be
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effectively jammed by electronic means when, if ever, is it a 
law of war issue to instead destroy the installation, killing 
its occupants? U.S. medical evacuation helicopters currently 
mount anti-anti-jamming systems. Is that a prohibited 
offensive use of medically-marked aircraft, or merely a means 
of enhancing survivability, permitting the aircraft to 
execute its mission? Are antipersonnel lasers lawful 
weapons?
Other aspects of the law of war call for inclusion or 
clarification. Reprisals, for example, remain lawful but the 
right to order them, as interpreted by the U.S., is retained 
in the National Command Authority — the Secretary of Defense 
and the the President. That fact is not reflected in FM 27- 
10. Targeting, a concept of increased importance, as 
evidenced in the Gulf War, is unmentioned, as are 
psychological operations.
Revision of the 1956 field manual was first initiated by 
the Judge Advocate General of the Army (JAG) in 1974.24 
Sixteen years later, the immediate-past JAG of the Army 
ruefully admitted, "That was one of my projects five years 
ago [as Assistant JAG in 1985] : to get that done or to die at 
my desk. I died at my desk."25 The Department of the Army's 
International Law Branch Chief, responsible for the revision, 
says, "It hasn't been forgotten. For these past five, six 
years we've been coordinating very closely with our 
counterparts in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, to come up with a fairly consistent text..."26 
Indeed, the U.K.'s Manual of Military Law, part III, The Law 
of War on Land, also published in 1956, remains unrevised and 
that fact is directly related to FM 27-10's lack of revision. 
Yet, as involved and as political as the process may be, 
revision should already have been completed.
24MGen George S. Prugh, California, to author, London, 8 Jan. 1992.
25Suter interview, 11 Dec. 1990.
26Parks interview, 12 Dec. 1990.
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8.3.b. Plan Multi-Service War Crimes Teams Had u.s. war
crimes teams been operating in Vietnam, staffed with 
experienced judge advocates specially trained in the 
disposition of such cases, the outcome of the Son Thang 
trials might have been different.
In February, 1945, a U.S. Army War Crimes Group (WCG) 
was established in the European Theater of Operations.27 It 
grew to a strength of 2,000 personnel, divided into 19 War 
Crimes Investigating Teams, each team assigned to conduct the 
investigation and trial of accused enemy war criminals in its 
assigned geographical area. A senior member recalls that the 
WCG was hampered by lack of central control of investigative 
efforts, and a lack of stenographers, investigators, and 
transportation.28 Still, by January 1948, the WCG had tried 
489 Germans for battlefield war crimes.
A similar War Crimes Division was formed during the 
Korean War and encountered problems similar to the WCG. 
Prisoner exchanges and terms of the truce agreement dictated 
that no trials be conducted.
"The Army spent little time during Vietnam dealing with 
enemy war crimes. There was no War Crimes Division 
or...Group, and no war crimes trials."29 MACV Directive 20-4, 
Investigations and War Crimes, was directed toward war crimes 
by either side but, because no enemy accused was in U.S. 
custody, it was only utilized in prosecutions of U.S. 
personnel.
Today, the Army has primary responsibility for the trial 
of enemy war crimes.30 Army regulations task the JAG with 
fulfilling that duty.31 The JAG, in turn, has designated
27Col. Steven F. Lancaster, "Enemy War Crimes: How to Investigate and Prosecute." 
(Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 1988). Except where otherwise noted, 
information regarding the War Crimes Group and Division are from this source.
28Col. Burton F. Ellis, California, to author, London, 18 July 1991.
29Lancaster, "Enemy War Crimes," 26.
30Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, 1() July 1979, 
par. E.2.f.
31Army Chief of Staff Regulation No. 11-2, 7 May 1975.
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twenty-two nine-person war crimes teams, to be manned by 
Reservists in time of war.32 There are questions, however, as 
to the practicality of this plan, the training mission of 
which is worded to reflect direction toward U.S. war crimes 
rather than those of the enemy, and whose wartime manning 
level, 198 personnel, is clearly inadequate to the task 
assigned.
There were more than 200 judge advocates deployed in the 
Gulf War.33 Among that number were several teams of Army 
Reservist judge advocates, assigned to gather evidence of 
Iraqi battlefield war crimes.34 The report of their activities 
remains classified, though an excised, unclassified version 
is eventually to be released. The preliminary impression is 
that, pre-existing Army regulations notwithstanding, the 
teams were sui generis and task-organized.
Realistic plans for the prosecution of war crimes must 
be formalized in advance of hostilities and once formalized, 
executed as written. Although the Army is responsible for 
trials, complementary war crime teams should be planned by 
the Marine Corps, the other armed service for which 
significant contact with enemy ground forces may be 
anticipated. Cross-service attachment of Marines to Army 
teams is also a possibility. Methods of inter-service 
coordination of teams should be considered, as well.
In the military milieu, planning for contingencies not 
immediately foreseeable seldom receives the most serious 
consideration. In the case of war crime trial plans, such an 
approach will only make prosecutions more difficult. At the
32Dept of the Army Regulation 27-1, Legal Services: Judge Advocate Legal Services, 1 
Aug. 1984; Regulation 27-1, Legal Services: JAG Service Organizations, 1 Jan. 1981; 
and FORSCOM Circular 27-87-1, Legal Services: Reserve Component Legal Training 
Program, 1 April 1987.
33Steven Keeva, "Lawyers in the War Room," A.B.A. Journal 52, 54 (Dec. 1991).
34Address by W. Hays Parks, Chief, International Law Branch, Dept, of the Army, 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 15 April 1991, tape 
recording, author's collection.
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division or brigade level, constant command support for war 
crime prosecutions is essential.
8.3.C. Provide for Wartime Modification of the UCMJ Today 
the UCMJ reflects most of the evidentiary and procedural 
benefits of the U.S. civilian jurisprudential system. But 
the Vietnam War demonstrated that application of the UCMJ in 
a combat zone can be accomplished only unevenly and with 
difficulty.
Many of those most experienced in its expeditionary 
employment decry the combat zone results:
[A] consistent source of concern in recent years has been 
whether the complex procedure-rich system created by the 
Code can survive in a major combat environment in which 
transportation of lawyers and judges is difficult or
impossible.
"[T]he Uniform Code of Military Justice is not capable of 
performing its intended role in times of military stress..."36 
"The system does not work, from a military viewpoint.... Under 
no circumstances will it work in an all-out war, as it is now 
organized."37 "It's totally unworkable in a combat 
environment."38 "We should get some realists to revise the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice....In wartime you've got to 
operate on a different basis..."39 "[T]he law should provide 
in advance for an automatic change on the outbreak of war 
from the peacetime procedure to that of wartime."40
The UCMJ should incorporate provisions similar the those 
in British military law allowing for field general courts-
35Gilligan and Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, vol. 1, 24.
36Westmoreland and Prugh, "Judges in Command," 4.
37Col. Donald E. Holben, interview by author, 13 Oct. 1986, California, tape 6472, Oral 
History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
38BGen. William H.J. Tiernan, interview by author, 14 Oct. 1986, California, tape
6484, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
39Col. Joseph R. Motelewski, interview by author, 24 Feb. 1987, North Carolina, tape
6489, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Wash.
40Archibald King, "Changes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice Necessary to Make it 
Workable in Time of War," 22 Federal Bar J. 49 (Winter 1962).
308
martial and, under specified, limited circumstances, allow 
latitude in the application of some evidentiary and 
procedural rules.41 British experience demonstrates the 
practicality of such provisions and, like much of U.S. 
military law based upon the British example, provides a 
proven model. The Son Thang results might have been the no 
different had such modifications been in place in 197 0, but 
those results would have been achieved with substantially 
equal justice and, one suspects, considerably less difficulty 
for both the government and the accused.
8.3.d. Establish Jurisdiction Over Ex-service Personnel a
commentator notes that,
A significant number of servicemen involved [in My Lai] 
were released from active duty between the time the 
offenses were allegedly committed and the time they were 
disclosed. Despite there being no statute of limitations 
for the prosecution of war crimes, these men will not be
brought to trial in any court."42 
Such dispositions are not in accord with the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, ratified by the U.S. and having the force of 
law.
Court-martial jurisdiction does not survive discharge43 
and it is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has held, to 
subject civilians — ex-service personnel, for example — to 
peacetime trial by military courts.44 At the same time, U.S. 
civilian courts lack jurisdiction over offenses committed 
outside the territorial and maritime limits of the United 
States. The result is a jurisdictional gap through which
41In British military law: Manual of Military Law, pt. I, ch. Ill, par. 5; Rules of 
Procedure (Army), 1972, rule 103.(1); and Army Act of 1955, sec. 224.(1)
42Kenneth A. Hook, "Jurisdiction Over Ex-servicemen for Crimes Committed Abroad: 
The Gap in the Law," 22 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 279 (1971), 301.
43Toth v Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). A line of subsequent 1960 cases also excludes 
civilians accompanying U.S. forces overseas from military jurisdiction: Kinsella v U.S.
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234; Grisham v Hagan, 361 U.S. 278; McElroy v U.S. ex rel. 
GuagliardOy 360 U.S. 281.
44Reid v Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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former service personnel, their crimes in uniform discovered 
only after their discharge, may escape.45
Schwarz1 enlistment would have been completed three-and- 
a-half months after his court-martial convened; Herrod^ 
enlistment twenty-eight days after his trial began — not 
lengthy periods, where the trial of serious crimes are 
involved. The potential escape without trial of servicemen 
charged with grave breaches because of administrative lapses 
in jurisdictional authority is unsatisfactory.
It has been suggested, unconvincingly, that federal 
district courts already have concurrent jurisdiction with 
military courts over foreign-committed war crimes;46 that the 
President, under authority of the UCMJ, could provide for 
grand jury indictment and trial of ex-service personnel 
before a military commission;47 and that military commissions 
may try former servicemen for war crimes.48 Each of these 
suggestions are materially flawed.
U.S. citizens are not immune from foreign trial for 
crimes committed in a foreign country, and it is 
constitutionally permissible to extradite U.S. citizens to 
the situs of such crimes for trial.49 But the U.S. recognizes 
no right of extradition absent a treaty.50 In the case of 
South Vietnam, there was no such treaty.51
Concerning foreign-based U.S. troops, where a crime is 
cognizable under host country law but military jurisdiction 
is unavailable, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
45In re Lo dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y., 1952), a case in which an ex-
serviceman escaped trial for murder.
46Paust, "After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal 
District Court."
47Paulson and Banta, "The Killings at My Lai: 'Grave Breaches' Under the Geneva 
Conventions and the Question of Military Jurisdiction."
48Comment, "Punishment for War Crimes," 1321.
49Neely v Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); Schooner Exchange v McFaddon.
5018 U.S.C. § 3184 (Supp. V, 1970).
51Ibid. There are 135 treaties controlling extradition with 81 countries.
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automatically vests jurisdiction in the host state.52 But, 
though some U.S. civilians were delivered to South Vietnamese 
authorities for trial, there was no U.S.-South Vietnam SOFA. 
The Pentalateral Agreement did function as a SOFA in several 
significant respects, but it lacked the criminal 
jurisdictional provisions usually contained in that 
specialized form of agreement.53
Great Britain has remedied this legal lacuna, vesting 
war crimes jurisdiction in her civilian courts.54 So could the 
U.S. "There is no reason why jurisdiction to try persons 
alleged to be guilty of war crimes should be conferred only 
on military courts or commissions."55 During Senate 
consideration of the 1949 Geneva Conventions this gap in U.S. 
law was noted by the Army JAG and passage of the minimal 
remedial legislation needed was urged,56 but the gap 
continues.
Congress should enact legislation conferring jurisdiction 
on the federal courts to try Americans charged with 
committing serious crimes abroad, particularly ex- 
servicemen charged with violations of the UCMJ that are
not discovered prior to their discharge.52 
Obtaining foreign witnesses, serving subpoenas, and taking 
depositions would remain problems but such legislation would 
at least make it them problems subject to resolution.
A legislative approach is to amend the UCMJ*s 
jurisdictional Article 3 to establish jurisdiction over ex- 
service personnel in U.S. district courts.58 If such a
52Hook, "Jurisdiction Over Ex-servicemen," 292-93.
53See Lazareff, Status of Military Forces Under Current International Law. First Part,
ch. 2, and Second Part, generally.
54Geneva Conventions Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52 (1957). Par 1.(2): "...a person may be 
proceeded against...in any place in the United Kingdom as if the offense had been 
committed in that place." Under the Act, conviction of killing a protected person 
requires mandatory life imprisonment. (Par. l.(l)(i)).
55Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth.
56Comment, "Punishment for War Crimes," 1320.
57Hook, "Jurisdiction Over Ex-servicemen," 296-97.
58S. 761, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., similar to a defeated 1956 bill, cited ibid., 299; and
Paulson and Banta, "The Killings at My Lai," 354.
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revision and resultant statute were mandated by the Congress 
the modification would take the form of an Presidential Order 
amending the Manual for Courts - Martial, a usual means of 
revising the Code and the Manual, requiring no further action 
for implementation. Concomitant legislation amending federal 
court jurisdiction would also be necessary. This approach 
reportedly has failed in the past due to Department of 
Justice objections based upon unspecified administrative 
problems, and Department of Defense concerns regarding 
extraterritorial service of process. Without having reviewed 
the hearings at which these objections were raised, they 
appear surmountable.
To prevent repetition of escapes from trial for grave 
breaches, legislation is required. The necessary corrective 
action is not complicated, and is called for by international 
treaty, and international law.
Coda
"The record is thus very far from perfect. All that can be 
said is that it is a better record than that of any other 
nation...and that it lends a degree of credibility 
to...orders and regulations that aim to prevent and punish 
war crimes.1,59
59Bishop, Justice Under Fire. 290.
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Appendix A 
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
ABR — Army Board of Review, precursor of ACMR — the Army Court of 
Military Review. Until supplanted by ACMR, considered appeals of all 
Army cases. In August 1969, when the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969 
became effective, ABR became ACMR. Similarly, NBR (Navy Board of 
Review) became NCMR and afbr (Air Force Board of Review) became AFCMR.
ACMR — U.S. Army Court of Military Review. See: CMR.
AFCMR — U.S. Air Force Court of Military Review. See: CMR.
Article 32 — In military practice, a pretrial proceeding closely akin 
to a civilian pretrial hearing; military analogue to the grand jury 
proceeding. Named for its position in the 140 articles of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, an Article 32 investigation is an open 
proceeding, foregoing the grand jury's secrecy. An Article 32 
investigation precedes general courts-martial. At the Article 32 the 
government must present sufficient evidence to convince an investigating 
(presiding) officer that an offense has been committed and that the 
accused committed it. It is an excellent discovery vehicle for the 
accused and his counsel, who need present no evidence. Following the 
Article 32 investigation the investigating officer submits a written 
report to the convening authority, recommending the further disposition 
of the case, if any. The recommendation does not bind the convening 
authority..
BGen. — Brigadier general; a one-star general.
CMA - see: COMA; USCMA.
CMR — Court of Military Review; military appellate court. Each armed 
service has its own CMR, served by appellate judge advocates and staffed 
by military judges from its own service. Each CMR has several panels of 
military appellate judges. The Marine Corps and Navy combine in the 
Navy Court of Military Review.
Also: the Court-Martial Reporter, the series of bound volumes, 
numbered 1 through 50, previously printed under government contract, in 
which most military appellate opinions from 1951 to 1977, from all 
service courts of military review and the U.S. Court of Military 
Appeals, are published. The MJ series of reporters follows the CMR 
series, which ceased publication in 1975 when the civilian publisher's 
contract expired. See: MJ.
COMA — The spoken term denoting the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. 
See: USCMA.
Control Council Law No. 10 — One of the series of laws enacted by 
the military powers in occupation of Germany, following world War II. 
It provided for trial within the respective German Zones of Occupation 
of persons charged with crimes recognized in Article II of the Nuremberg 
Charter.
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Convening authority — In military practice, the officer possessing 
legal authority, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to convene 
a specified type of court-martial. in the case of special courts- 
martial and general courts-martial, the convening authority also has the 
power to appoint qualified court personnel and members. Under procedure 
in effect until 1984, the convening authority took the initial action 
(review) on the court-martial record of trial before it was forwarded to 
the court of military review.
FSB — Fire support base; usually given a name which follows the term, 
e.g., FSB Dotty, in a combat zone, the base serving as the headquarters 
area of a battalion- or larger-sized infantry or artillery unit, from 
which elements of that unit are dispatched on combat missions. Usually 
containing a helicopter landing zone (LZ), FSBs are interchangeably 
referred to as LZs, using the same name; e.g., LZ Dotty.
FSB Ross — The FSB at which the headquarters element of the 1st 
Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7), the Son Thang patrol's parent unit, was 
located. About thirty kilometers south and sixteen kilometers west of 
DaNang, near Que Son District Headquarters, it commanded much of the Que 
Son Valley, the scene of heavy fighting.
GCM — General Court-Martial, one of the three levels of court-martial, 
the other two being the special court-martial and the summary court- 
martial. The most serious offenses, including war crimes, are tried by 
general court-martial.
Gen. — General; a four-star general.
GPO — Government Printing Office, the U.S. government organization that 
prints and binds most official U.S. manuals and books.
IMT — International Military Tribunal.
JA — Judge Advocate. In military practice, an officer who has 
graduated from an accredited civilian law school, is a member of some 
state's bar, completed a military legal training course, and been 
certified by his/her service's judge advocate general as being competent 
to act as a military lawyer.
JAD — Judge Advocate Division. That section of U.S. Marine Corps 
Headquarters having oversight of all Marine Corps legal activities, and 
which has personnel assignment authority (along with the Headquarters 
personnel section) over legal personnel. Commanded by a Marine Corps 
brigadier general who has powers and authority akin to the other armed 
service's judge advocates general (JAGs) . The Marine Corps, by federal 
law a part of the Naval Service, has no JAG, instead looking to the 
Navy's JAG in those matters that specifically require the action of a 
JAG, such as the certification of counsel.
Lt.Col. — Lieutenant colonel.
Lt.Gen. — Lieutenant general; a three-star general.
MACV — Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; the U.S. Army headquarters 
in Saigon that exercised overall administrative command and, to a 
degree, tactical command of all military units of all armed services in 
South Vietnam.
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Ma j . — Major.
MCM — Manual for Courts-Martial, United States. The manual containing 
rules for courts-martial, military rules of evidence and procedure, and 
reprinting the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Promulgated by the 
President as an executive order, it has the force of law pursuant to 
UCMJ Article 36. Versions have been published and made effective in 
1951, 1969, and 1984.
Member — In military practice, an individual ordered to hear a 
particular court-martial case; essentially the same as a civilian juror. 
At trial, members decide all issues of fact; issues of law are decided 
by the military judge. Though not required to be, members are usually 
commissioned officers, unless the accused requests that enlisted members 
be included on his/her panel, in which case at least one-third of the 
members must be enlisted personnel. Members are initially selected by 
an administrative officer on the staff of the convening authority, the 
selection being ratified by the convening authority by his signature on 
the completed roster. A minimum of five members hear general courts- 
martial. There is no statutory maximum number, but usually no more than 
six or seven constitute a panel.
MOen. — Major general; a two-star general.
Military judge — In military practice, the court-martial trial judge, 
with powers similar to those of a federal trial-level judge. At trial, 
the military judge decides all issues of law, rules on motions, and has 
overall responsibility for conduct of the proceedings.
MJ — either military judge (see above) , or the Military Justice 
Reporter, the regularly appearing series of bound volumes printed under 
government contract, in which most military appellate opinions, those 
from all service courts of military review and the U.S. Court of 
Military Appeals, are published. The MJ series of reporters follow the 
CMR series, which ceased publication in 1975. See: CMR.
M79 — A 40mm, smooth-bore, single-shot, shoulder weapon resembling a 
shotgun, designed to fill the gap between a rifle and a mortar. It 
fires a variety of anti-personnel rounds; i.e., high explosive, tear 
gas, and buckshot.
NCM — Navy Court-Martial; the term, followed by a number, identifies a 
particular court-martial in the Navy appellate system. Every Navy and 
Marine court-martial has an NCM number, e.g., NCM 70-382 indicates the 
three hundredth and eighty-second case received for action by the Navy 
Court of Military Review in the year 1970.
NCMR — Navy Court of Military Review, which considers the appeals of 
both Marine Corps and Navy cases. See: CMR.
NVA — North Vietnamese Army, connoting organized, uniformed, regular 
enemy troops, as opposed to VC irregulars.
ROEs — Rules of engagement.
SJA - Staff Judge Advocate. The senior military lawyer on the special 
staff of a division-, or larger-sized, Marine Corps unit. (wing, or 
larger, in the case of aviation units.)
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SOFA — Status of Forces Agreement.
Trial counsel — In military practice, the term denoting the military 
judge advocate assigned as court-martial prosecutor in a particular 
case; the officer of the court who represents the United States. See: 
JA.
UCMJ — Uniform Code of Military Justice. The basic statute governing 
military criminal law in the armed forces. Formulated by the U.S. 
Congress, enacted by the President, and codified in Chapter 47, Title 
10, U.S. Code, it is federal law. It includes the military legal 
system's jurisdictional basis, substantive offenses, and basic 
procedural structure. First effective in May 1951, it is periodically 
amended by Congressional action through Presidential Executive Orders. 
Major modifications have been made effective in August, 1969 and 
September, 1984.
USCMA — The United States Court of Military Appeals, the highest 
military appellate court. It considers appeals from all the military 
services. Established under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Court was created in May 1950. It is composed of five civilian judges 
(three, during the Vietnam War era) appointed by the President of the 
United States with the advise and consent of the Senate, and sits in 
Washington, D.C. See: COMA.
VC — Viet Cong; a contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning 
"Vietnamese Communists." The enemy's irregular, often loosely organized 
guerrilla force, without uniform or distinctive identifying insignia, 
that operated throughout South Vietnam, including in U.S. bases and 
cantonments.
1/7 — Common designation for the first battalion of the seventh 
Marines; pronounced, "one-seven." A regimental-size infantry unit.
316
Appendix B 
The Nuremberg Principles*
1. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime 
under international law is responsible therefor and liable to 
punishment.
2. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for 
an act which constitutes a crime under international law does 
not relieve the person who committed the act from 
responsibility under international law.
3. The fact that a person who committed an act which 
constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of 
State or responsible government official does not relieve him 
from responsibility under international law.
4. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from 
responsibility under international law, provided a moral 
choice was in fact possible to him.1
5. Any person charged with a crime under international law 
has a right to a fair trial on the facts and law.2
6. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes 
under international law.
a. Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances;
* U.N., Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1950. vol. II, 374.
JIn 1954, a revised draft of the Principles was submitted to the General Assembly and 
Article 4 was substantially changed: "The fact that a person charged with an offense
defined in this Code acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does 
not relieve him of responsibility in international law if, in the circumstances at the 
time, it was possible for him not to comply with that order." U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 9th 
Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 10 (A/2693) (1954).
2Art. 16 of the Charter sets out such procedure.
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(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for 
the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i) .
b. War crimes:
Violations of the laws or customs of war which 
include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave-labor or for any other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or 
ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity.
c. Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and 
other inhumane acts done against any civilian population, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when 
such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in 
execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or 
any war crime.
7. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a 
war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in 
Principle 6 is a crime under international law.
318
Appendix C
Military Judge's Instructions to Members on the Issue of 
Superior Orders
V ietnam -era  in s tru c tio n :*
"...[W]e've had evidence in the case regarding orders by 
a superior and the legality thereof. The general rule is 
that the acts of a subordinate done in good faith and in 
compliance with a supposed duty or order are justifiable. 
This justification does not exist however, when these acts 
are manifestly beyond the scope of his authority, or the 
order was of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and 
understanding would know it to be illegal.
"Thus, the acts of a Marine done in good faith and 
without malice, in the compliance with the orders of a 
superior...[are] justifiable, unless such acts are manifestly 
beyond the scope of his authority, and such that a man of 
ordinary sense and understanding would know them to be 
illegal. Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the accused, under the circumstances of his age and 
military experience could not have honestly believed the 
order issued by his squad leader to be legal under the laws 
and usages of war, then the killing of the alleged victim was 
without justification.
"A Marine is a reasoning agent, who is under a duty to 
exercise judgement in obeying orders to the extent that, 
where such orders are manifestly beyond the scope of the 
authority of the one issuing the order, and are palpably 
illegal upon their face, then the act of obedience to such 
orders will not justify acts pursuant to such illegal 
orders."
Instruction in Effect Since 1984:**
"Note 2. If there is a factual dispute as to whether or not_the order was lawful, 
that dispute must be resolved by the members.... The following instruction should be 
given in cases where the military judge concludes that the lawfulness of the order 
presents an issue of fact for determination by the members.
*From U.S. v Keenan, 39 CMR 108, 117, fn. 3 (USCMA, 1969), a case in which the 
accused was convicted of the premeditated murder of an elderly male Vietnamese 
noncombatant.
**Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-9, Military Judge’s Benchbook. (Wash.: GPO, 
1986), 3-59.
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"An order, to be lawful, must relate to specific 
military duty and be one which the member of the 
armed forces is authorized to give. An order is 
lawful if it is reasonably necessary to safeguard 
and protect the morale, discipline, and 
usefulness of the members of a command and is 
directly connected with the maintenance of good 
order in the services. (It is illegal if 
(unrelated to military duty) (its sole purpose is 
to accomplish some private end) (arbitrary and 
unreasonable)(given for the sole purpose of 
increasing the penalty for an offense which it is 
expected the accused may commit) (___________ ) .)
"You may find the accused guilty of failing to 
obey a lawful order only if you are satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that the order was 
lawful.
"Note 3. If the military judge determines, as a matter of law, that the order 
was not lawful, he should dismiss the affected specification, and the members should 
be so advised.
"Note 4. Paragraph 7-3, Circumstantial Evidence (Knowledge), is ordinarily 
applicable."
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